United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part of this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. Case Number: 1:20-cv-03010-APM Plaintiffs: United States of America Defendant: Google LLC. Filing Date: April 30, 2024 Location: United States District Court for the District of Columbia Table of Content Abbreviations Citations to Witness Testimony I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTIES A. The Plaintiffs
B. The Defendant II. Introduction To Third Parties III. Industry Background A. General Search Engines
B. General Search Competition
C. Advertising, Including Search And Text Ads
D. Search Access Points
E. Scale Is Vital For General Search Engines
F. Google’s Distribution Agreements IV. MARKET DEFINITIONS A. General Search Services In The United States Is A Relevant Market
B. Search Ads In The United States Compose A Relevant Market
D. Google Makes No Attempt To Identify An Alternate Advertising Market And Fails To Undermine The Search Ad And Text Ad Markets V. Google’s Monopoly Power In Each Market A. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market
B. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Search Ads Market
C. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Text Ads Market
VI. Google’s Contracts Lock Up Important Access Points
A. Google’s Apple Contract Is Exclusive
B. Google’s Android Contracts Are Exclusive
C. Google’s Browser Contracts Are Exclusive
D. Defaults Have A Powerful Effect On Users’ Search Behavior, Particularly On Mobile Devices VII. Google’s Rivals Are Foreclosed From Distribution A. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of General Search Queries Performed In The United States
B. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of Text Ads And Search Ads In The United States
C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser VIII. Anticompetitive Effects Arising From Google’s Conduct A. Google’s Contracts Prevent General Search Services From Accessing Scale And Reduced Scale Directly Reduces The Quality Of Rivals To The Detriment Of Consumers And Advertisers
B. Google’s Contracts Reduce Investment And Innovation Among Market Participants Including Google
C. Reduced Competition Reduces Search Quality And The Options Available To Consumers In General Search Services
D. Google Reduced The Quality And Increased The Prices Of Its Search Ads Products 401 IX. GOOGLE ADOPTED POLICIES FOR DESTROYING OR HIDING DOCUMENTS TO AVOID PRODUCING THEM TO REGULATORS AND LITIGANTS A. Google Adopted And Implemented An “Off The Record” Chats Default To Destroy Substantive And Relevant Written Communications
B. Google Trains Its Employees To Shield Emails And Other Documents From Review And Production In Investigations And Litigation X. GOOGLE’S PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS LACK FACTUAL SUPPORT AND DO NOT OUTWEIGH HARMS IN RELEVANT MARKETS A. Google Failed To Show Effective “Competition For The Contract”
B. Purported Pass-Through Benefits Are Unsubstantiated And Do Not Justify Competitive Harms To Consumers In Relevant Markets
C. Google’s MADAs And RSAs Are Not Necessary For Android’s Success And Do Not Benefit Search Consumers By Improving Device Quality XI. Google’s Embedded Hearsay Objections Are Meritless Appendix: Cited Exhibits Used With A Witness About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings.
This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part of this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series . You can jump to any part of this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series Case Number: 1:20-cv-03010-APM Case Number: Plaintiffs: United States of America Plaintiffs: Defendant: Google LLC. Defendant: Filing Date: April 30, 2024 Filing Date: Location: United States District Court for the District of Columbia Location: Table of Content Abbreviations Abbreviations Citations to Witness Testimony Citations to Witness Testimony I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTIES I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTIES A. The Plaintiffs B. The Defendant A. The Plaintiffs A. The Plaintiffs B. The Defendant B. The Defendant II. Introduction To Third Parties II. Introduction To Third Parties II. Introduction To Third Parties III. Industry Background III. Industry Background A. General Search Engines B. General Search Competition C. Advertising, Including Search And Text Ads D. Search Access Points E. Scale Is Vital For General Search Engines F. Google’s Distribution Agreements A. General Search Engines A. General Search Engines B. General Search Competition B. General Search Competition C. Advertising, Including Search And Text Ads C. Advertising, Including Search And Text Ads D. Search Access Points D. Search Access Points E. Scale Is Vital For General Search Engines E. Scale Is Vital For General Search Engines F. Google’s Distribution Agreements F. Google’s Distribution Agreements IV. MARKET DEFINITIONS IV. MARKET DEFINITIONS A. General Search Services In The United States Is A Relevant Market B. Search Ads In The United States Compose A Relevant Market D. Google Makes No Attempt To Identify An Alternate Advertising Market And Fails To Undermine The Search Ad And Text Ad Markets A. General Search Services In The United States Is A Relevant Market A. General Search Services In The United States Is A Relevant Market B. Search Ads In The United States Compose A Relevant Market B. Search Ads In The United States Compose A Relevant Market D. Google Makes No Attempt To Identify An Alternate Advertising Market And Fails To Undermine The Search Ad And Text Ad Markets D. Google Makes No Attempt To Identify An Alternate Advertising Market And Fails To Undermine The Search Ad And Text Ad Markets V. Google’s Monopoly Power In Each Market V. Google’s Monopoly Power In Each Market A. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market B. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Search Ads Market C. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Text Ads Market VI. Google’s Contracts Lock Up Important Access Points A. Google’s Apple Contract Is Exclusive B. Google’s Android Contracts Are Exclusive C. Google’s Browser Contracts Are Exclusive D. Defaults Have A Powerful Effect On Users’ Search Behavior, Particularly On Mobile Devices A. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market A. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market B. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Search Ads Market B. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Search Ads Market C. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Text Ads Market C. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Text Ads Market VI. Google’s Contracts Lock Up Important Access Points VI. Google’s Contracts Lock Up Important Access Points A. Google’s Apple Contract Is Exclusive A. Google’s Apple Contract Is Exclusive B. Google’s Android Contracts Are Exclusive B. Google’s Android Contracts Are Exclusive C. Google’s Browser Contracts Are Exclusive C. Google’s Browser Contracts Are Exclusive D. Defaults Have A Powerful Effect On Users’ Search Behavior, Particularly On Mobile Devices D. Defaults Have A Powerful Effect On Users’ Search Behavior, Particularly On Mobile Devices VII. Google’s Rivals Are Foreclosed From Distribution VII. Google’s Rivals Are Foreclosed From Distribution A. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of General Search Queries Performed In The United States B. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of Text Ads And Search Ads In The United States C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser A. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of General Search Queries Performed In The United States A. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of General Search Queries Performed In The United States B. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of Text Ads And Search Ads In The United States B. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of Text Ads And Search Ads In The United States C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser VIII. Anticompetitive Effects Arising From Google’s Conduct VIII. Anticompetitive Effects Arising From Google’s Conduct VIII. Anticompetitive Effects Arising From Google’s Conduct A. Google’s Contracts Prevent General Search Services From Accessing Scale And Reduced Scale Directly Reduces The Quality Of Rivals To The Detriment Of Consumers And Advertisers B. Google’s Contracts Reduce Investment And Innovation Among Market Participants Including Google C. Reduced Competition Reduces Search Quality And The Options Available To Consumers In General Search Services D. Google Reduced The Quality And Increased The Prices Of Its Search Ads Products 401 A. Google’s Contracts Prevent General Search Services From Accessing Scale And Reduced Scale Directly Reduces The Quality Of Rivals To The Detriment Of Consumers And Advertisers A. Google’s Contracts Prevent General Search Services From Accessing Scale And Reduced Scale Directly Reduces The Quality Of Rivals To The Detriment Of Consumers And Advertisers B. Google’s Contracts Reduce Investment And Innovation Among Market Participants Including Google B. Google’s Contracts Reduce Investment And Innovation Among Market Participants Including Google C. Reduced Competition Reduces Search Quality And The Options Available To Consumers In General Search Services C. Reduced Competition Reduces Search Quality And The Options Available To Consumers In General Search Services D. Google Reduced The Quality And Increased The Prices Of Its Search Ads Products 401 D. Google Reduced The Quality And Increased The Prices Of Its Search Ads Products 401 IX. GOOGLE ADOPTED POLICIES FOR DESTROYING OR HIDING DOCUMENTS TO AVOID PRODUCING THEM TO REGULATORS AND LITIGANTS IX. GOOGLE ADOPTED POLICIES FOR DESTROYING OR HIDING DOCUMENTS TO AVOID PRODUCING THEM TO REGULATORS AND LITIGANTS A. Google Adopted And Implemented An “Off The Record” Chats Default To Destroy Substantive And Relevant Written Communications B. Google Trains Its Employees To Shield Emails And Other Documents From Review And Production In Investigations And Litigation A. Google Adopted And Implemented An “Off The Record” Chats Default To Destroy Substantive And Relevant Written Communications A. Google Adopted And Implemented An “Off The Record” Chats Default To Destroy Substantive And Relevant Written Communications B. Google Trains Its Employees To Shield Emails And Other Documents From Review And Production In Investigations And Litigation B. Google Trains Its Employees To Shield Emails And Other Documents From Review And Production In Investigations And Litigation X. GOOGLE’S PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS LACK FACTUAL SUPPORT AND DO NOT OUTWEIGH HARMS IN RELEVANT MARKETS X. GOOGLE’S PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS LACK FACTUAL SUPPORT AND DO NOT OUTWEIGH HARMS IN RELEVANT MARKETS A. Google Failed To Show Effective “Competition For The Contract” B. Purported Pass-Through Benefits Are Unsubstantiated And Do Not Justify Competitive Harms To Consumers In Relevant Markets C. Google’s MADAs And RSAs Are Not Necessary For Android’s Success And Do Not Benefit Search Consumers By Improving Device Quality A. Google Failed To Show Effective “Competition For The Contract” A. Google Failed To Show Effective “Competition For The Contract” B. Purported Pass-Through Benefits Are Unsubstantiated And Do Not Justify Competitive Harms To Consumers In Relevant Markets B. Purported Pass-Through Benefits Are Unsubstantiated And Do Not Justify Competitive Harms To Consumers In Relevant Markets C. Google’s MADAs And RSAs Are Not Necessary For Android’s Success And Do Not Benefit Search Consumers By Improving Device Quality C. Google’s MADAs And RSAs Are Not Necessary For Android’s Success And Do Not Benefit Search Consumers By Improving Device Quality XI. Google’s Embedded Hearsay Objections Are Meritless XI. Google’s Embedded Hearsay Objections Are Meritless XI. Google’s Embedded Hearsay Objections Are Meritless Appendix: Cited Exhibits Used With A Witness Appendix: Cited Exhibits Used With A Witness Appendix: Cited Exhibits Used With A Witness About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. storage.courtlistener

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