United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part of this filing here. This part is 25 of 37. C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser 968. About 20% of all general search queries in the United States go through the default on user-downloaded versions of Chrome (e.g., Chrome on Windows and Apple devices). Tr. 5763:9–13, 5765:6–15 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (user-downloaded Chrome includes Chrome on Windows and Apple devices; explaining that the yellow part of the bar (20%) on UPXD104 at 37 is user-downloaded Chrome); id. 10639:10–17 (20% of U.S. search queries come through user-downloaded Chrome). These are defaults not challenged by Plaintiffs’ complaint but still affect the portion of the relevant markets available to rivals and thus magnify the significance of the foreclosure created by the challenged agreements. 969. Because Google always sets itself as the Chrome search default, rivals cannot achieve distribution by being set as that default. In other words, queries going through the default on user-downloaded Chrome are not “fully available” to Google’s rivals. Tr. 922:19–23 (Kolotouros (Google)) (“Chrome, as an application, has Google as the default search engine, that is correct.”); Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (User-downloaded “Chrome queries are not fully available . . . to rivals, because Chrome is coming with a default in it to Google.”); id. 10639:10–19 (Google sets itself as the default on Chrome, which means rivals cannot access default distribution through Chrome.). 970. Even if Google is not engaging in exclusionary conduct by setting itself as the default on Chrome, the presence of Chrome makes the foreclosure caused by Google’s exclusionary contracts more significant. Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (explaining that the presence of Chrome “color[s]” what the foreclosure range means—“when you think about these numbers [the 33% and the 50%,] . . . you shouldn’t think of it . . . relative to a hundred percent. You really should think of it in some sense relative to some smaller possible available market because of the presence of Chrome.”); id. 5752:18–5753:9 (discussing UPXD104 at 33, which states that foreclosure analysis needs to “consider[] how much of the market is available to rival sellers.”). Continue Reading Here. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings.
This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part of this filing here. This part is 25 of 37. United States of America v. Google LLC., Court Filing, retrieved on April 30, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series . You can jump to any part of this filing here . This part is 25 of 37. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser 968. About 20% of all general search queries in the United States go through the default on user-downloaded versions of Chrome (e.g., Chrome on Windows and Apple devices). Tr. 5763:9–13, 5765:6–15 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (user-downloaded Chrome includes Chrome on Windows and Apple devices; explaining that the yellow part of the bar (20%) on UPXD104 at 37 is user-downloaded Chrome); id. 10639:10–17 (20% of U.S. search queries come through user-downloaded Chrome). These are defaults not challenged by Plaintiffs’ complaint but still affect the portion of the relevant markets available to rivals and thus magnify the significance of the foreclosure created by the challenged agreements. 969. Because Google always sets itself as the Chrome search default, rivals cannot achieve distribution by being set as that default. In other words, queries going through the default on user-downloaded Chrome are not “fully available” to Google’s rivals. Tr. 922:19–23 (Kolotouros (Google)) (“Chrome, as an application, has Google as the default search engine, that is correct.”); Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (User-downloaded “Chrome queries are not fully available . . . to rivals, because Chrome is coming with a default in it to Google.”); id. 10639:10–19 (Google sets itself as the default on Chrome, which means rivals cannot access default distribution through Chrome.). 970. Even if Google is not engaging in exclusionary conduct by setting itself as the default on Chrome, the presence of Chrome makes the foreclosure caused by Google’s exclusionary contracts more significant. Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (explaining that the presence of Chrome “color[s]” what the foreclosure range means—“when you think about these numbers [the 33% and the 50%,] . . . you shouldn’t think of it . . . relative to a hundred percent. You really should think of it in some sense relative to some smaller possible available market because of the presence of Chrome.”); id. 5752:18–5753:9 (discussing UPXD104 at 33, which states that foreclosure analysis needs to “consider[] how much of the market is available to rival sellers.”). Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on April 30, 2024, storage.courtlistener is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. storage.courtlistener

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20% of All General Searches in the U.S. Go Through the Default on User-Downloaded Version of Chrome

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