USA v. Google LLC Court Filing, retrieved on January 24, 2023 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 11 of 44. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here IV. GOOGLE’S SCHEME TO DOMINATE THE AD TECH STACK B. Google Uses Its Acquisitions and Position Across the Ad Tech Stack to Lock Out Rivals and Control Each Key Ad Tech Tool 89. After amassing a position as the dominant intermediary for display advertising, Google used its monopoly power over each level of the ad tech stack to reinforce its dominant positions and limit where and how other ad tech providers could compete. Most notably, Google made its Google Ads’ demand available only through its AdX ad exchange. In turn, Google effectively made its ad exchange available only to publishers using its publisher ad server (DFP). This benefited Google’s long-run aspirations of dominating the publisher ad server market, at the expense of Google Ads’ advertisers seeking access to the widest variety of publisher inventory at the lowest price. By allowing only its own publisher ad server effective access to important, unique Google Ads’ demand, Google could force publishers to adopt and remain on its publisher ad server; other ad servers could not compete to offer a similar product. But this restriction meant Google Ads’ advertisers could not buy inventory available only on other ad exchanges or via non-Google publisher ad servers, and they could not take advantage of fee competition that might make that advertising inventory less expensive. The restriction also was contrary to Google’s short-term financial interests, which turned on buying more and more-valuable advertisements from as many publishers as possible. 90. Google introduced several policies and auction changes to force more transactions to flow through its platforms and make it more difficult for publishers to switch ad servers. These restrictions collectively stifled competition by artificially preventing rivals from competing on the same terms as Google’s products, thereby impeding publishers’ and advertisers’ ability to work effectively with rivals and allowing those rivals to obtain scale. Google implemented these restrictions even though it knew that it would have been better for Google Ads’ advertisers (and far more profitable for Google Ads in the short run) to multi-home across ad exchanges. And, likewise, publishers would have benefited from being able to effectively access advertiser demand through multiple ad exchange intermediaries. These restrictions had the effect of taking Google’s publisher ad server from a market leader to a monopoly—currently with no credible competition—and catapulting its nascent ad exchange into a monopoly position that dwarfs all other ad exchanges. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case 1:23-cv-00108 retrieved on September 8, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

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