The U.S. Government Sues Google: Taking an In-Depth Look at the Antitrust Lawsuit

Case Number: 1:20-cv-03010-APM

Plaintiffs: United States of America

Defendant: Google LLC.

Filing Date: April 30, 2024

Location: United States District Court for the District of Columbia

Table of Content

Abbreviations

Citations to Witness Testimony

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PARTIES

• A. The Plaintiffs
• B. The Defendant

II. Introduction To Third Parties

III. Industry Background

• A. General Search Engines
• B. General Search Competition
• C. Advertising, Including Search And Text Ads
• D. Search Access Points
• E. Scale Is Vital For General Search Engines
• F. Google’s Distribution Agreements

IV. MARKET DEFINITIONS

• A. General Search Services In The United States Is A Relevant Market
• B. Search Ads In The United States Compose A Relevant Market
• D. Google Makes No Attempt To Identify An Alternate Advertising Market And Fails To Undermine The Search Ad And Text Ad Markets

V. Google’s Monopoly Power In Each Market

• A. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. General Search Services Market
• B. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Search Ads Market
• C. Google Has Monopoly Power In The U.S. Text Ads Market
• VI. Google’s Contracts Lock Up Important Access Points
• A. Google’s Apple Contract Is Exclusive
• B. Google’s Android Contracts Are Exclusive
• C. Google’s Browser Contracts Are Exclusive
• D. Defaults Have A Powerful Effect On Users’ Search Behavior, Particularly On Mobile Devices

VII. Google’s Rivals Are Foreclosed From Distribution

• A. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of General Search Queries Performed In The United States
• B. Google’s Conduct Forecloses A Substantial Share Of Text Ads And Search Ads In The United States
• C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser

VIII. Anticompetitive Effects Arising From Google’s Conduct

• A. Google’s Contracts Prevent General Search Services From Accessing Scale And Reduced Scale Directly Reduces The Quality Of Rivals To The Detriment Of Consumers And Advertisers
• B. Google’s Contracts Reduce Investment And Innovation Among Market Participants Including Google
• C. Reduced Competition Reduces Search Quality And The Options Available To Consumers In General Search Services
• D. Google Reduced The Quality And Increased The Prices Of Its Search Ads Products 401

IX. GOOGLE ADOPTED POLICIES FOR DESTROYING OR HIDING DOCUMENTS TO AVOID PRODUCING THEM TO REGULATORS AND LITIGANTS

• A. Google Adopted And Implemented An “Off The Record” Chats Default To Destroy Substantive And Relevant Written Communications
• B. Google Trains Its Employees To Shield Emails And Other Documents From Review And Production In Investigations And Litigation

X. GOOGLE’S PRO-COMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS LACK FACTUAL SUPPORT AND DO NOT OUTWEIGH HARMS IN RELEVANT MARKETS

• A. Google Failed To Show Effective “Competition For The Contract”
• B. Purported Pass-Through Benefits Are Unsubstantiated And Do Not Justify Competitive Harms To Consumers In Relevant Markets
• C. Google’s MADAs And RSAs Are Not Necessary For Android’s Success And Do Not Benefit Search Consumers By Improving Device Quality

XI. Google’s Embedded Hearsay Objections Are Meritless

Appendix: Cited Exhibits Used With A Witness