HackPedia: 16 Solidity Hacks/Vulnerabilities, their Fixes and Real World Examples

A Complete List of all Solidity Hacks/Vulnerabilities, their Fixes and Real World Hack Examples This blog was written by in this . Dr. Adrian Manning SigmaPrime Blog Although in its infancy, Solidity has had widespread adoption and is used to compile the byte-code in many Ethereum smart contracts we see today. There have been a number of harsh lessons learned by developers and users alike in discovering the nuances of the language and the EVM. This post aims to be a relatively in-depth and up-to-date introductory post detailing the past mistakes that have been made by Solidity developers in an effort to prevent future devs from repeating history. Here are 16 interesting hacks: 1. Re-Entrancy One of the features of Ethereum smart contracts is the ability to call and utilise code of other external contracts. Contracts also typically handle ether, and as such often send ether to various external user addresses. The operation of calling external contracts, or sending ether to an address, requires the contract to submit an external call. These external calls can be hijacked by attackers whereby they force the contract to execute further code (i.e. through a fallback function) , including calls back into itself. Thus the code execution “ ” the contract. Attacks of this kind were used in the infamous DAO hack. re-enters For further reading on re-entrancy attacks, see and . Reentrancy Attack On Smart Contracts Consensus — Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices The Vulnerability This attack can occur when a contract sends ether to an unknown address. An attacker can carefully construct a contract at an external address which contains malicious code in the . Thus, when a contract sends ether to this address, it will invoke the malicious code. Typically the malicious code executes a function on the vulnerable contract, performing operations not expected by the developer. The name “re-entrancy” comes from the fact that the external malicious contract calls back a function on the vulnerable contract and “ ” code execution at an arbitrary location on the vulnerable contract. fallback function re-enters To clarify this, consider the simple vulnerable contract, which acts as an Ethereum vault that allows depositors to only withdraw 1 ether per week. EtherStore.sol This contract has two public functions. and . The function simply increments the senders balances. The function allows the sender to specify the amount of wei to withdraw. It will only succeed if the requested amount to withdraw is less than 1 ether and a withdrawal hasn't occurred in the last week. Or does it?... depositFunds() withdrawFunds() depositFunds() withdrawFunds() The vulnerability comes on line [17] where we send the user their requested amount of ether. Consider a malicious attacker creating the following contract, Attack.sol Let us see how this malicious contract can exploit our contract. The attacker would create the above contract (let's say at the address ) with the 's contract address as the constructor parameter. This will initialize and point the public variable to the contract we wish to attack. EtherStore 0x0...123 EtherStore etherStore The attacker would then call the function, with some amount of ether (greater than or equal to 1), lets say for this example. In this example we assume a number of other users have deposited ether into this contract, such that it's current balance is . The following would then occur: pwnEtherStore() 1 ether 10 ether Attack.sol — Line [15] — The function of the EtherStore contract will be called with a of (and a lot of gas). The sender ( ) will be our malicious contract ( ). Thus, . depositFunds() msg.value 1 ether msg.sender 0x0...123 balances[0x0..123] = 1 ether Attack.sol — Line [17] — The malicious contract will then call the function of the contract with a parameter of . This will pass all the requirements (Lines [12]-[16] of the contract) as we have made no previous withdrawals. withdrawFunds() EtherStore 1 ether EtherStore EtherStore.sol — Line [17] — The contract will then send back to the malicious contract. 1 ether Attack.sol — Line [25] — The ether sent to the malicious contract will then execute the fallback function. Attack.sol — Line [26] — The total balance of the EtherStore contract was and is now so this if statement passes. 10 ether 9 ether Attack.sol — Line [27] — The fallback function then calls the function again and " " the contract. EtherStore withdrawFunds() re-enters EtherStore EtherStore.sol — Line [11] — In this second call to , our balance is still as line [18] has not yet been executed. Thus, we still have . This is also the case for the variable. Again, we pass all the requirements. withdrawFunds() 1 ether balances[0x0..123] = 1 ether lastWithdrawTime EtherStore.sol — Line [17] — We withdraw another . 1 ether Steps 4–8 will repeat — until as dictated by line [26] in . EtherStore.balance >= 1 Attack.sol Attack.sol — Line [26] — Once there less 1 (or less) ether left in the contract, this if statement will fail. This will then allow lines [18] and [19] of the contract to be executed (for each call to the function). EtherStore EtherStore withdrawFunds() EtherStore.sol — Lines [18] and [19] — The and mappings will be set and the execution will end. balances lastWithdrawTime The final result, is that the attacker has withdrawn all (bar 1) ether from the contract, instantaneously with a single transaction. EtherStore Preventative Techniques There are a number of common techniques which help avoid potential re-entrancy vulnerabilities in smart contracts. The first is to ( whenever possible) use the built-in function when sending ether to external contracts. The transfer function only sends which isn't enough for the destination address/contract to call another contract (i.e. re-enter the sending contract). transfer() 2300 gas The second technique is to ensure that all logic that changes state variables happen before ether is sent out of the contract (or any external call). In the example, lines [18] and [19] of should be put before line [17]. It is good practice to place any code that performs external calls to unknown addresses as the last operation in a localised function or piece of code execution. This is known as the pattern. EtherStore EtherStore.sol checks-effects-interactions A third technique is to introduce a mutex. That is, to add a state variable which locks the contract during code execution, preventing reentrancy calls. Applying all of these techniques (all three are unnecessary, but is done for demonstrative purposes) to , gives the re-entrancy-free contract: EtherStore.sol Real-World Example: The DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) was one of the major hacks that occurred in the early development of Ethereum. At the time, the contract held over $150 million USD. Re-entrancy played a major role in the attack which ultimately lead to the hard-fork that created Ethereum Classic (ETC). For a good analysis of the DAO exploit, see . The DAO Phil Daian’s post 2. Arithmetic Over/Under Flows The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) specifies fixed-size data types for integers. This means that an integer variable, only has a certain range of numbers it can represent. A for example, can only store numbers in the range [0,255]. Trying to store into a will result in . If care is not taken, variables in Solidity can be exploited if user input is unchecked and calculations are performed which result in numbers that lie outside the range of the data type that stores them. uint8 256 uint8 0 For further reading on arithmetic over/under flows, see , and How to Secure Your Smart Contracts Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices Ethereum, Solidity and integer overflows: programming blockchains like 1970 The Vulnerability An over/under flow occurs when an operation is performed that requires a fixed size variable to store a number (or piece of data) that is outside the range of the variable’s data type. For example, subtracting from a (unsigned integer of 8 bits, i.e. only positive) variable that stores as it's value, will result in the number . This is an underflow. We have assigned a number below the range of the , the result and gives the largest number a can store. Similarly, adding to a will leave the variable unchanged as we have wrapped around the entire length of the (for the mathematicians, this is similar to adding $2\pi$ to the angle of a trigonometric function, $\sin(x) = \sin(x+2\pi)$). Adding numbers larger than the data type's range is called an overflow. For clarity, adding to a that currently has a zero value will result in the number . It's sometimes instructive to think of fixed type variables being cyclic, where we start again from zero if we add numbers above the largest possible stored number, and vice-versa for zero (where we start counting down from the largest number the more we subtract from 0). 1 uint8 0 255 uint8 wraps around uint8 2^8=256 uint8 uint 257 uint8 1 These kinds of vulnerabilities allow attackers to misuse code and create unexpected logic flows. For example, consider the time locking contract below. TimeLock.sol This contract is designed to act like a time vault, where users can deposit ether into the contract and it will be locked there for at least a week. The user may extend the time longer than 1 week if they choose, but once deposited, the user can be sure their ether is locked in safely for at least a week. Or can they?… In the event a user is forced to hand over their private key (think hostage situation) a contract such as this may be handy to ensure ether is unobtainable in short periods of time. If a user had locked in in this contract and handed their keys over to an attacker, an attacker could use an overflow to receive the ether, regardless of the . 100 ether lockTime The attacker could determine the current for the address they now hold the key for (its a public variable). Let's call this . They could then call the function and pass as an argument the number . This number would be added to the current and cause an overflow, resetting to . The attacker could then simply call the function to obtain their reward. lockTime userLockTime increaseLockTime 2^256 - userLockTime userLockTime lockTime[msg.sender] 0 withdraw Let’s look at another example, this one from the . Ethernaut Challanges SPOILER ALERT: . If you’ve not yet done the Ethernaut challenges, this gives a solution to one of the levels This is a simple token contract which employs a function, allowing participants to move their tokens around. Can you see the error in this contract? transfer() The flaw comes in the function. The require statement on line [13] can be bypassed using an underflow. Consider a user that has no balance. They could call the function with any non-zero and pass the require statement on line [13]. This is because is zero (and a ) so subtracting any positive amount (excluding ) will result in a positive number due to the underflow we described above. This is also true for line [14], where our balance will be credited with a positive number. Thus, in this example, we have achieved free tokens due to an underflow vulnerability. transfer() transfer() _value balances[msg.sender] uint256 2^256 Preventative Techniques The (currently) conventional technique to guard against under/overflow vulnerabilities is to use or build mathematical libraries which replace the standard math operators; addition, subtraction and multiplication (division is excluded as it doesn’t cause over/under flows and the EVM throws on division by 0). have done a great job in building and auditing secure libraries which can be leveraged by the Ethereum community. In particular, their is a reference or library to use to avoid under/over flow vulnerabilities. OppenZepplin Safe Math Library To demonstrate how these libraries are used in Solidity, let us correct the contract, using Open Zepplin's library. The over flow-free contract would become: TimeLock SafeMath Notice that all standard math operations have been replaced by the those defined in the library. The contract no longer performs any operation which is capable of doing an under/over flow. SafeMath TimeLock Real-World Examples: PoWHC and Batch Transfer Overflow ( ) CVE-2018–10299 A 4chan group decided it was a great idea to build a ponzi scheme on Ethereum, written in Solidity. They called it the Proof of Weak Hands Coin (PoWHC). Unfortunately it seems that the author(s) of the contract hadn’t seen over/under flows before and consequently, 866 ether was liberated from its contract. A good overview of how the underflow occurs (which is not too dissimilar to the Ethernaut challenge above) is given in . Eric Banisadar’s post Some developers also implemented a function into some token contracts. The implementation contained an overflow. explains it, however I think the title is misleading, in that it has nothing to do with the ERC20 standard, rather some ERC20 token contracts have a vulnerable function implemented. batchTransfer() ERC20 This post batchTransfer() 3. Unexpected Ether Typically when ether is sent to a contract, it must execute either the fallback function, or another function described in the contract. There are two exceptions to this, where ether can exist in a contract without having executed any code. Contracts which rely on code execution for every ether sent to the contract can be vulnerable to attacks where ether is forcibly sent to a contract. For further reading on this, see and . How to Secure Your Smart Contracts: 6 Solidity security patterns — forcing ether to a contract The Vulnerability A common defensive programming technique that is useful in enforcing correct state transitions or validating operations is . This technique involves defining a set of invariants (metrics or parameters that should not change) and checking these invariants remain unchanged after a single (or many) operation(s). This is typically good design, provided the invariants being checked are in fact invariants. One example of an invariant is the of a fixed issuance token. As no functions should modify this invariant, one could add a check to the function that ensures the remains unmodified to ensure the function is working as expected. invariant-checking totalSupply ERC20 transfer() totalSupply There is one apparent , in particular, that may tempt developers to use, but can in fact be manipulated by external users, regardless of the rules put in place in the smart contract. This is the current ether stored in the contract. Often, when developers first learn Solidity, they have the misconception that a contract can only accept or obtain ether via payable functions. This misconception can lead to contracts that have false assumptions about the ether balance within them which can lead to a range of vulnerabilities. The smoking gun for this vulnerability is the (incorrect) use of . As we will see, incorrect uses of can lead to serious vulnerabilities of this type. “invariant” this.balance this.balance There are two ways in which ether can (forcibly) be sent to a contract without using a function or executing any code on the contract. These are listed below. payable Self Destruct / Suicide Any contract is able to implement the function, which removes all bytecode from the contract address and sends all ether stored there to the parameter-specified address. If this specified address is also a contract, no functions (including the fallback) get called. Therefore, the function can be used to forcibly send ether to any contract regardless of any code that may exist in the contract. This is inclusive of contracts without any payable functions. This means, any attacker can create a contract with a function, send ether to it, call and force ether to be sent to a contract. Martin Swende has an excellent describing some quirks of the self-destruct opcode (Quirk #2) along with a description of how client nodes were checking incorrect invariants which could have lead to a rather catastrophic nuking of clients. [selfdestruct(address)](http://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/latest/introduction-to-smart-contracts.html#self-destruct) selfdestruct() selfdestruct() selfdestruct(target) target blog post Pre-sent Ether The second way a contract can obtain ether without using a function or calling any payable functions is to pre-load the contract address with ether. Contract addresses are deterministic, in fact the address is calculated from the hash of the address creating the contract and the transaction nonce which creates the contract. i.e. of the form: (see for some fun use cases of this). This means, anyone can calculate what a contract address will be before it is created and thus send ether to that address. When the contract does get created it will have a non-zero ether balance. selfdestruct() address = sha3(rlp.encode([account_address,transaction_nonce])) Keyless Ether Let’s explore some pitfalls that can arise given the above knowledge. Consider the overly-simple contract, EtherGame.sol This contract represents a simple game (which would naturally invoke ) whereby players send quanta to the contract in hope to be the player that reaches one of three milestones first. Milestone's are denominated in ether. The first to reach the milestone may claim a portion of the ether when the game has ended. The game ends when the final milestone ( ) is reached and users can claim their rewards. race-conditions 0.5 ether 10 ether The issues with the contract come from the poor use of in both lines [14] (and by association [16]) and [32]. A mischievous attacker could forcibly send a small amount of ether, let's say via the function (discussed above) to prevent any future players from reaching a milestone. As all legitimate players can only send increments, would no longer be half integer numbers, as it would also have the contribution. This prevents all the if conditions on lines [18], [21] and [24] from being true. EtherGame this.balance 0.1 ether selfdestruct() 0.5 ether this.balance 0.1 ether Even worse, a vengeful attacker who missed a milestone, could forcibly send (or an equivalent amount of ether that pushes the contract's balance above the ) which would lock all rewards in the contract forever. This is because the function will always revert, due to the require on line [32] (i.e. is greater than ). 10 ether finalMileStone claimReward() this.balance finalMileStone Preventative Techniques This vulnerability typically arises from the misuse of . Contract logic, when possible, should avoid being dependent on exact values of the balance of the contract because it can be artificially manipulated. If applying logic based on , ensure to account for unexpected balances. this.balance this.balance If exact values of deposited ether are required, a self-defined variable should be used that gets incremented in payable functions, to safely track the deposited ether. This variable will not be influenced by the forced ether sent via a call. selfdestruct() With this in mind, a corrected version of the contract could look like: EtherGame Here, we have just created a new variable, which keeps track of the known ether deposited, and it is this variable to which we perform our requirements and tests. Notice, that we no longer have any reference to . depositedEther this.balance Real-World Example: Unknown I’m yet to find and example of this that has been exploited in the wild. However, a few examples of exploitable contracts were given in the . Underhanded Solidity Contest 4. Delegatecall The and opcodes are useful in allowing Ethereum developers to modularise their code. Standard external message calls to contracts are handled by the opcode whereby code is run in the context of the external contract/function. The opcode is identical to the standard message call, except that the code executed at the targeted address is run in the context of the calling contract along with the fact that and remain unchanged. This feature enables the implementation of whereby developers can create reusable code for future contracts. CALL DELEGATECALL CALL DELEGATECALL msg.sender msg.value libraries Although the differences between these two opcodes are simple and intuitive, the use of can lead to unexpected code execution. DELEGATECALL For further reading, see , and . Ethereum Stack Exchange Question Solidity Docs How to Secure Your Smart Contracts: 6 The Vulnerability The context preserving nature of has proved that building vulnerability-free custom libraries is not as easy as one might think. The code in libraries themselves can be secure and vulnerability-free however when run in the context of another application new vulnerabilities can arise. Let's see a fairly complex example of this, using Fibonacci numbers. DELEGATECALL Consider the following library which can generate the Fibonacci sequence and sequences of similar form. (This code was modified from ) FibonacciLib.sol web3j This library provides a function which can generate the -th Fibonacci number in the sequence. It allows users to change the 0-th number and calculate the -th Fibonacci-like numbers in this new sequence. n start n Let’s now consider a contract that utilises this library. FibonacciBalance.sol This contract allows a participant to withdraw ether from the contract, with the amount of ether being equal to the Fibonacci number corresponding to the participants withdrawal order; i.e., the first participant gets 1 ether, the second also gets 1, the third gets 2, the forth gets 3, the fifth 5 and so on (until the balance of the contract is less than the Fibonacci number being withdrawn). There are a number of elements in this contract that may require some explanation. Firstly, there is an interesting-looking variable, . This holds the first 4 bytes of the Keccak (SHA-3) hash of the string "fibonacci(uint256)". This is known as the and is put into to specify which function of a smart contract will be called. It is used in the function on line [21] to specify that we wish to run the function. The second argument in is the parameter we are passing to the function. Secondly, we assume that the address for the library is correctly referenced in the constructor (section discuss some potential vulnerabilities relating to this kind if contract reference initialisation). fibSig function selector calldata delegatecall fibonacci(uint256) delegatecall FibonacciLib Deployment Attack Vectors Can you spot any error(s) in this contract? If you put this into remix, fill it with ether and call , it will likely revert. withdraw() You may have noticed that the state variable is used in both the library and the main calling contract. In the library contract, is used to specify the beginning of the Fibonacci sequence and is set to , whereas it is set to in the contract. You may also have noticed that the fallback function in the contract allows all calls to be passed to the library contract, which allows for the function of the library contract to be called also. Recalling that we preserve the state of the contract, it may seem that this function would allow you to change the state of the variable in the local contract. If so, this would allow one to withdraw more ether, as the resulting is dependent on the variable (as seen in the library contract). In actual fact, the function does not (and cannot) modify the variable in the contract. The underlying vulnerability in this contract is significantly worse than just modifying the variable. start start 0 3 FibonacciBalance FibonacciBalance setStart() start FibonnacciBalance calculatedFibNumber start setStart() start FibonacciBalance start Before discussing the actual issue, we take a quick detour to understanding how state variables ( variables) actually get stored in contracts. State or variables (variables that persist over individual transactions) are placed into sequentially as they are introduced in the contract. (There are some complexities here, and I encourage the reader to read for a more thorough understanding). storage storage slots Layout of State Variables in Storage As an example, let’s look at the library contract. It has two state variables, and . The first variable is , as such it gets stored into the contract's storage at (i.e. the first slot). The second variable, , gets placed in the next available storage slot, . If we look at the function , it takes an input and sets to whatever the input was. This function is therefore setting to whatever input we provide in the function. Similarly, the function sets to the result of . Again, this is simply setting storage to the value of . start calculatedFibNumber start slot[0] calculatedFibNumber slot[1] setStart() start slot[0] setStart() setFibonacci() calculatedFibNumber fibonacci(n) slot[1] fibonacci(n) Now lets look at the contract. Storage now corresponds to address and corresponds to . It is here where the vulnerability appears. preserves contract context. This means that code that is executed via will act on the state (i.e. storage) of the calling contract. FibonacciBalance slot[0] fibonacciLibrary slot[1] calculatedFibNumber delegatecall delegatecall Now notice that in on line [21] we execute, . This calls the function, which as we discussed, modifies storage , which in our current context is . This is as expected (i.e. after execution, gets adjusted). However, recall that the variable in the contract is located in storage , which is the address in the current contract. This means that the function will give an unexpected result. This is because it references ( ) which in the current calling context is the address (which will often be quite large, when interpreted as a ). Thus it is likely that the function will revert as it will not contain amount of ether, which is what will return. withdraw() fibonacciLibrary.delegatecall(fibSig,withdrawalCounter) setFibonacci() slot[1] calculatedFibNumber calculatedFibNumber start FibonacciLib slot[0] fibonacciLibrary fibonacci() start slot[0] fibonacciLibrary uint withdraw() uint(fibonacciLibrary) calcultedFibNumber Even worse, the contract allows users to call all of the functions via the fallback function on line [26]. As we discussed earlier, this includes the function. We discussed that this function allows anyone to modify or set storage . In this case, storage is the address. Therefore, an attacker could create a malicious contract (an example of one is below), convert the address to a (this can be done in python easily using ) and then call . This will change to the address of the attack contract. Then, whenever a user calls or the fallback function, the malicious contract will run (which can steal the entire balance of the contract) because we've modified the actual address for . An example of such an attack contract would be, FibonacciBalance fibonacciLibrary setStart() slot[0] slot[0] fibonacciLibrary uint int(' ',16) setStart( ) fibonacciLibrary withdraw() fibonacciLibrary Notice that this attack contract modifies the by changing storage . In principle, an attacker could modify any other storage slots they choose to perform all kinds of attacks on this contract. I encourage all readers to put these contracts into and experiment with different attack contracts and state changes through these functions. calculatedFibNumber slot[1] Remix delegatecall It is also important to notice that when we say that is state-preserving, we are not talking about the variable names of the contract, rather the actual storage slots to which those names point. As you can see from this example, a simple mistake, can lead to an attacker hijacking the entire contract and its ether. delegatecall Preventative Techniques Solidity provides the keyword for implementing library contracts (see the for further details). This ensures the library contract is stateless and non-self-destructable. Forcing libraries to be stateless mitigates the complexities of storage context demonstrated in this section. Stateless libraries also prevent attacks whereby attackers modify the state of the library directly in order to effect the contracts that depend on the library's code. As a general rule of thumb, when using pay careful attention to the possible calling context of both the library contract and the calling contract, and whenever possible, build state-less libraries. library Solidity Docs DELEGATECALL Real-World Example: Parity Multisig Wallet (Second Hack) The Second Parity Multisig Wallet hack is an example of how the context of well-written library code can be exploited if run in its non-intended context. There are a number of good explanations of this hack, such as this overview: by Anthony Akentiev, this and . Parity MultiSig Hacked. Again stack exchange question An In-Depth Look at the Parity Multisig Bug To add to these references, let’s explore the contracts that were exploited. The library and wallet contract can be found on the parity github . here Let’s look at the relevant aspects of this contract. There are two contracts of interest contained here, the library contract and the wallet contract. The library contract, and the wallet contract, Notice that the contract essentially passes all calls to the contract via a delegate call. The constant address in this code snippet acts as a placeholder for the actually deployed contract (which was at ). Wallet WalletLibrary _walletLibrary WalletLibrary 0x863DF6BFa4469f3ead0bE8f9F2AAE51c91A907b4 The intended operation of these contracts was to have a simple low-cost deployable contract whose code base and main functionality was in the contract. Unfortunately, the contract is itself a contract and maintains it's own state. Can you see why this might be an issue? Wallet WalletLibrary WalletLibrary It is possible to send calls to the contract itself. Specifically, the contract could be initialised, and become owned. A user did this, by calling function on the contract, becoming an owner of the library contract. The same user, subsequently called the function. Because the user was an owner of the Library contract, the modifier passed and the library contract suicided. As all contracts in existence refer to this library contract and contain no method to change this reference, all of their functionality, including the ability to withdraw ether is lost along with the contract. More directly, all ether in all parity multi-sig wallets of this type instantly become lost or permanently unrecoverable. WalletLibrary WalletLibrary initWallet() WalletLibrary kill() Wallet WalletLibrary 5. Default Visibilities Functions in Solidity have visibility specifiers which dictate how functions are allowed to be called. The visibility determines whether a function can be called externally by users, by other derived contracts, only internally or only externally. There are four visibility specifiers, which are described in detail in the . Functions default to allowing users to call them externally. Incorrect use of visibility specifiers can lead to some devestating vulernabilities in smart contracts as will be discussed in this section. Solidity Docs public The Vulnerability The default visibility for functions is . Therefore functions that do not specify any visibility will be callable by external users. The issue comes when developers mistakenly ignore visibility specifiers on functions which should be private (or only callable within the contract itself). public Lets quickly explore a trivial example. This simple contract is designed to act as an address guessing bounty game. To win the balance of the contract, a user must generate an Ethereum address whose last 8 hex characters are 0. Once obtained, they can call the function to obtain their bounty. WithdrawWinnings() Unfortunately, the visibility of the functions have not been specified. In particular, the function is and thus any address can call this function to steal the bounty. _sendWinnings() public Preventative Techniques It is good practice to always specify the visibility of all functions in a contract, even if they are intentionally . Recent versions of Solidity will now show warnings during compilation for functions that have no explicit visibility set, to help encourage this practice. public Real-World Example: Parity MultiSig Wallet (First Hack) In the first Parity multi-sig hack, about $31M worth of Ether was stolen from primarily three wallets. A good recap of exactly how this was done is given by Haseeb Qureshi in . this post Essentially, the multi-sig wallet (which can be found ) is constructed from a base contract which calls a library contract containing the core functionality (as was described in ). The library contract contains the code to initialise the wallet as can be seen from the following snippet here Wallet Real-World Example: Parity Multisig (Second Hack) Notice that neither of the functions have explicitly specified a visibility. Both functions default to . The function is called in the wallets constructor and sets the owners for the multi-sig wallet as can be seen in the function. Because these functions were accidentally left , an attacker was able to call these functions on deployed contracts, resetting the ownership to the attackers address. Being the owner, the attacker then drained the wallets of all their ether, to the tune of $31M. public initWallet() initMultiowned() public 6. Entropy Illusion All transactions on the Ethereum blockchain are deterministic state transition operations. Meaning that every transaction modifies the global state of the Ethereum ecosystem and it does so in a calculable way with no uncertainty. This ultimately means that inside the blockchain ecosystem there is no source of entropy or randomness. There is no function in Solidity. Achieving decentralised entropy (randomness) is a well established problem and many ideas have been proposed to address this (see for example, or using a chain of Hashes as described by Vitalik in this ). rand() RandDAO post The Vulnerability Some of the first contracts built on the Ethereum platform were based around gambling. Fundamentally, gambling requires uncertainty (something to bet on), which makes building a gambling system on the blockchain (a deterministic system) rather difficult. It is clear that the uncertainty must come from a source external to the blockchain. This is possible for bets amongst peers (see for example the ), however, it is significantly more difficult if you want to implement a contract to act as (like in blackjack our roulette). A common pitfall is to use future block variables, such as hashes, timestamps, blocknumber or gas limit. The issue with these are that they are controlled by the miner who mines the block and as such are not truly random. Consider, for example, a roulette smart contract with logic that returns a black number if the next block hash ends in an even number. A miner (or miner pool) could bet \$1M on black. If they solve the next block and find the hash ends in an odd number, they would happily not publish their block and mine another until they find a solution with the block hash being an even number (assuming the block reward and fees are less than $1M). Using past or present variables can be even more devastating as Martin Swende demonstrates in his excellent . Furthermore, using solely block variables mean that the pseudo-random number will be the same for all transactions in a block, so an attacker can multiply their wins by doing many transactions within a block (should there be a maximum bet). commit-reveal technique the house blog post Preventative Techniques The source of entropy (randomness) must be external to the blockchain. This can be done amongst peers with systems such as , or via changing the trust model to a group of participants (such as in ). This can also be done via a centralised entity, which acts as a randomness oracle. Block variables (in general, there are some exceptions) should not be used to source entropy as they can be manipulated by miners. commit-reveal RandDAO Real-World Example: PRNG Contracts Arseny Reutov wrote a after he analysed 3649 live smart contracts which were using some sort of pseudo random number generator (PRNG) and found 43 contracts which could be exploited. This post discusses the pitfalls of using block variables as entropy in further detail. blog post 7. External Contract Referencing One of the benefits of Ethereum is the ability to re-use code and interact with contracts already deployed on the network. As a result, a large number of contracts reference external contracts and in general operation use external message calls to interact with these contracts. These external message calls can mask malicious actors intentions in some non-obvious ways, which we will discuss. global computer The Vulnerability In Solidity, any address can be cast as a contract regardless of whether the code at the address represents the contract type being cast. This can be deceiving, especially when the author of the contract is trying to hide malicious code. Let us illustrate this with an example: Consider a piece of code which rudimentarily implements the cipher. Rot13 Rot13Encryption.sol This code simply takes a string (letters a-z, without validation) and encrypts it by shifting each character 13 places to the right (wrapping around ‘z’); i.e. ‘a’ shifts to ’n’ and ‘x’ shifts to ‘k’. The assembly in here is not important, so don’t worry if it doesn’t make any sense at this stage. Consider the following contract which uses this code for its encryption The issue with this contract is that the address is not public or constant. Thus the deployer of the contract could have given an address in the constructor which points to this contract: encryptionLibrary which implements the rot26 cipher (shifts each character by 26 places, get it? :p). Again, thre is no need to understand the assembly in this contract. The deployer could have also linked the following contract: If the address of either of these contracts were given in the constructor, the function would simply produce an event which prints the unencrypted private data. Although in this example a library-like contract was set in the constructor, it is often the case that a privileged user (such as an ) can change library contract addresses. If a linked contract doesn't contain the function being called, the fallback function will execute. For example, with the line , if the contract specified by was: encryptPrivateData() owner encryptionLibrary.rot13Encrypt() encryptionLibrary then an event with the text “Here” would be emitted. Thus if users can alter contract libraries, they can in principle get users to unknowingly run arbitrary code. Note: Don’t use encryption contracts such as these, as the input parameters to smart contracts are visible on the blockchain. Also the Rot cipher is not a recommended encryption technique :p Preventative Techniques As demonstrated above, vulnerability free contracts can (in some cases) be deployed in such a way that they behave maliciously. An auditor could publicly verify a contract and have it’s owner deploy it in a malicious way, resulting in a publicly audited contract which has vulnerabilities or malicious intent. There are a number of techniques which prevent these scenarios. One technique, is to use the keyword to create contracts. In the example above, the constructor could be written like: new constructor() {encryptionLibrary = new Rot13Encryption();} This way an instance of the referenced contract is created at deployment time and the deployer cannot replace the contract with anything else without modifying the smart contract. Rot13Encryption Another solution is to hard code any external contract addresses if they are known. In general, code that calls external contracts should always be looked at carefully. As a developer, when defining external contracts, it can be a good idea to make the contract addresses public (which is not the case in the honey-pot example) to allow users to easily examine which code is being referenced by the contract. Conversely, if a contract has a private variable contract address it can be a sign of someone behaving maliciously (as shown in the real-world example). If a privileged (or any) user is capable of changing a contract address which is used to call external functions, it can be important (in a decentralised system context) to implement a time-lock or voting mechanism to allow users to see which code is being changed or to give participants a chance to opt in/out with the new contract address. Real-World Example: Re-Entrancy Honey Pot A number of recent honey pots have been released on the main net. These contracts try to outsmart Ethereum hackers who try to exploit the contracts, but who in turn end up getting ether lost to the contract they expect to exploit. One example employs the above attack by replacing an expected contract with a malicious one in the constructor. The code can be found : here This by one reddit user explains how they lost 1 ether to this contract trying to exploit the re-entrancy bug they expected to be present in the contract. post 8. Short Address/Parameter Attack This attack is not specifically performed on Solidity contracts themselves but on third party applications that may interact them. I add this attack for completeness and to be aware of how parameters can be manipulated in contracts. For further reading, see , or this . The ERC20 Short Address Attack Explained ICO Smart contract Vulnerability: Short Address Attack reddit post The Vulnerability When passing parameters to a smart contract, the parameters are encoded according to the . It is possible to send encoded parameters that are shorter than the expected parameter length (for example, sending an address that is only 38 hex chars (19 bytes) instead of the standard 40 hex chars (20 bytes)). In such a scenario, the EVM will pad 0’s to the end of the encoded parameters to make up the expected length. ABI specification This becomes an issue when third party applications do not validate inputs. The clearest example is an exchange which doesn’t verify the address of an token when a user requests a withdrawal. This example is covered in more detail in Peter Venesses’ post, mentioned above. ERC20 The ERC20 Short Address Attack Explained Consider, the standard transfer function interface, noting the order of the parameters, ERC20 function transfer(address to, uint tokens) public returns (bool success); Now consider, an exchange, holding a large amount of a token (let’s say ) and a user wishes to withdraw their share of 100 tokens. The user would submit their address, and the number of tokens, . The exchange would encode these parameters in the order specified by the function, i.e. then . The encoded result would be . The first four bytes ( ) are the , the second 32 bytes are the address, followed by the final 32 bytes which represent the number of tokens. Notice that the hex at the end corresponds to 100 tokens (with 18 decimal places, as specified by the token contract). REP 0xdeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead 100 transfer() address tokens a9059cbb000000000000000000000000deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddead0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000056bc75e2d63100000 a9059cbb transfer() function signature/selector uint256 56bc75e2d63100000 REP Ok, so now lets look at what happens if we were to send an address that was missing 1 byte (2 hex digits). Specifically, let’s say an attacker sends as an address (missing the last two digits) and the same tokens to withdraw. If the exchange doesn't validate this input, it would get encoded as . The difference is subtle. Note that has been padded to the end of the encoding, to make up for the short address that was sent. When this gets sent to the smart contract, the parameters will read as and the value will be read as (notice the two extra 's). This value is now, tokens (the value has been multiplied by ). In this example, if the exchange held this many tokens, the user would withdraw tokens (whilst the exchange thinks the user is only withdrawing ) to the modified address. Obviously the attacker wont posses the modified address in this example, but if the attacker where to generate any address which ended in 's (which can be easily brute forced) and used this generated address, they could easily steal tokens from the unsuspecting exchange. 0xdeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeadde 100 a9059cbb000000000000000000000000deaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeadde0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000056bc75e2d6310000000 00 address 0xdeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeaddeadde00 56bc75e2d6310000000 0 25600 256 25600 100 0 Preventative Techniques I suppose it is obvious to say that validating all inputs before sending them to the blockchain will prevent these kinds of attacks. It should also be noted that parameter ordering plays an important role here. As padding only occurs at the end, careful ordering of parameters in the smart contract can potentially mitigate some forms of this attack. Real-World Example: Unknown I do not know of any publicised attack of this kind in the wild. 9. Unchecked CALL Return Values There a number of ways of performing external calls in solidity. Sending ether to external accounts is commonly done via the method. However, the function can also be used and, for more versatile external calls, the opcode can be directly employed in solidity. The and functions return a boolean indicating if the call succeeded or failed. Thus these functions have a simple caveat, in that the transaction that executes these functions will not revert if the external call (intialised by or ) fails, rather the or will simply return . A common pitfall arises when the return value is not checked, rather the developer expects a revert to occur. transfer() send() CALL call() send() call() send() call() send() false For further reading, see and . DASP Top 10 Scanning Live Ethereum Contracts for the “Unchecked-Send” Bug The Vulnerability Consider the following example: This contract represents a Lotto-like contract, where a receives of ether, which typically leaves a little left over for anyone to withdraw. winner winAmount The bug exists on line [11] where a is used without checking the response. In this trivial example, a whose transaction fails (either by running out of gas, being a contract that intentionally throws in the fallback function or via a ) allows to be set to (regardless of whether ether was sent or not). In this case, the public can withdraw the 's winnings via the function. send() winner call stack depth attack payedOut true winner withdrawLeftOver() Preventative Techniques Whenever possible, use the function rather than as will if the external transaction reverts. If is required, always ensure to check the return value. transfer() send() transfer() revert send() An even more robust is to adopt a . In this solution, each user is burdened with calling an isolated function (i.e. a function) which handles the sending of ether out of the contract and therefore independently deals with the consequences of failed send transactions. The idea is to logically isolate the external send functionality from the rest of the code base and place the burden of potentially failed transaction to the end-user who is calling the function. recommendation withdrawal pattern withdraw withdraw Real-World Example: Etherpot and King of the Ether was a smart contract lottery, not too dissimilar to the example contract mentioned above. The solidity code for etherpot, can be found here: . The primary downfall of this contract was due to an incorrect use of block hashes (only the last 256 block hashes are useable, see Aakil Fernandes’s about how Etherpot failed to implement this correctly). However this contract also suffered from an unchecked call value. Notice the function, on line [80] of lotto.sol: Etherpot lotto.sol post cash() Notice that on line [21] the send function’s return value is not checked, and the following line then sets a boolean indicating the winner has been sent their funds. This bug can allow a state where the winner does not receive their ether, but the state of the contract can indicate that the winner has already been paid. A more serious version of this bug occurred in the . An excellent of this contract has been written which details how an unchecked failed could be used to attack the contract. King of the Ether post-mortem send() 10. Race Conditions / Front Running The combination of external calls to other contracts and the multi-user nature of the underlying blockchain gives rise to a variety of potential Solidity pitfalls whereby users code execution to obtain unexpected states. is one example of such a race condition. In this section we will talk more generally about different kinds of race conditions that can occur on the Ethereum blockchain. There is a variety of good posts on this area, a few are: , and the . race Re-Entrancy Ethereum Wiki — Safety DASP — Front-Running Consensus — Smart Contract Best Practices The Vulnerability As with most blockchains, Ethereum nodes pool transactions and form them into blocks. The transactions are only considered valid once a miner has solved a consensus mechanism (currently PoW for Ethereum). The miner who solves the block also chooses which transactions from the pool will be included in the block, this is typically ordered by the of a transaction. In here lies a potential attack vector. An attacker can watch the transaction pool for transactions which may contain solutions to problems, modify or revoke the attacker's permissions or change a state in a contract which is undesirable for the attacker. The attacker can then get the data from this transaction and create a transaction of their own with a higher and get their transaction included in a block before the original. ETHASH gasPrice gasPrice Let’s see how this could work with a simple example. Consider the contract FindThisHash.sol Imagine this contract contains 1000 ether. The user who can find the pre-image of the sha3 hash can submit the solution and retrieve the 1000 ether. Lets say one user figures out the solution is . They call with as the parameter. Unfortunately an attacker has been clever enough to watch the transaction pool for anyone submitting a solution. They see this solution, check it's validity, and then submit an equivalent transaction with a much higher than the original transaction. The miner who solves the block will likely give the attacker preference due to the higher and accept their transaction before the original solver. The attacker will take the 1000 ether and the user who solved the problem will get nothing (there is no ether left in the contract). 0xb5b5b97fafd9855eec9b41f74dfb6c38f5951141f9a3ecd7f44d5479b630ee0a Ethereum! solve() Ethereum! gasPrice gasPrice A more realistic problem comes in the design of the future Casper implementation. The Casper proof of stake contracts invoke slashing conditions where users who notice validators double-voting or misbehaving are incentivised to submit proof that they have done so. The validator will be punished and the user rewarded. In such a scenario, it is expected that miners and users will front-run all such submissions of proof, and this issue must be addressed before the final release. Preventative Techniques There are two classes of users who can perform these kinds of front-running attacks. Users (who modify the of their transactions) and miners themselves (who can re-order the transactions in a block how they see fit). A contract that is vulnerable to the first class (users), is significantly worse-off than one vulnerable to the second (miners) as miner's can only perform the attack when they solve a block, which is unlikely for any individual miner targeting a specific block. Here I'll list a few mitigation measures with relation to which class of attackers they may prevent. gasPrice One method that can be employed is to create logic in the contract that places an upper bound on the . This prevents users from increasing the and getting preferential transaction ordering beyond the upper-bound. This preventative measure only mitigates the first class of attackers (arbitrary users). Miners in this scenario can still attack the contract as they can order the transactions in their block however they like, regardless of gas price. gasPrice gasPrice A more robust method is to use a scheme, whenever possible. Such a scheme dictates users send transactions with hidden information (typically a hash). After the transaction has been included in a block, the user sends a transaction revealing the data that was sent (the reveal phase). This method prevents both miners and users from frontrunning transactions as they cannot determine the contents of the transaction. This method however, cannot conceal the transaction value (which in some cases is the valuable information that needs to be hidden). The smart contract allowed users to send transactions, whose committed data included the amount of ether they were willing to spend. Users could then send transactions of arbitrary value. During the reveal phase, users were refunded the difference between the amount sent in the transaction and the amount they were willing to spend. commit-reveal ENS A further suggestion by Lorenz, Phil, Ari and Florian is to use . An efficient implementation of this idea requires the opcode, which currently hasn't been adopted, but seems likely in upcoming hard forks. Submarine Sends CREATE2 Real-World Examples: ERC20 and Bancor The standard is quite well-known for building tokens on Ethereum. This standard has a potential frontrunning vulnerability which comes about due to the function. A good explanation of this vulnerability can be found . ERC20 approve() here The standard specifies the function as: approve() function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) returns (bool success) This function allows a user to permit other users to transfer tokens on their behalf. The frontrunning vulnerability comes in the scenario when a user, Alice, her friend, to spend . Alice later decides that she wants to revoke 's approval to spend , so she creates a transaction that sets 's allocation to . , who has been carefully watching the chain, sees this transaction and builds a transaction of his own spending the . He puts a higher on his transaction than 's and gets his transaction prioritised over hers. Some implementations of would allow to transfer his , then when 's transaction gets committed, resets 's approval to , in effect giving access to . The mitigation strategies of this attack are given in the document linked above. approves Bob 100 tokens Bob 100 tokens Bob 50 tokens Bob 100 tokens gasPrice Alice approve() Bob 100 tokens Alice Bob 50 tokens Bob 150 tokens here Another prominent, real-world example is . Ivan Bogatty and his team documented a profitable attack on the initial Bancor implementation. His and discuss in detail how this was done. Essentially, prices of tokens are determined based on transaction value, users can watch the transaction pool for Bancor transactions and front run them to profit from the price differences. This attack has been addressed by the Bancor team. Bancor blog post Devon 3 talk 11. Denial Of Service (DOS) This category is very broad, but fundamentally consists of attacks where users can leave the contract inoperable for a small period of time, or in some cases, permanently. This can trap ether in these contracts forever, as was the case with the Second Parity MultiSig hack The Vulnerability There are various ways a contract can become inoperable. Here I will only highlight some potentially less-obvious Blockchain nuanced Solidity coding patterns that can lead to attackers performing DOS attacks. Looping through externally manipulated mappings or arrays — In my adventures I’ve seen various forms of this kind of pattern. Typically it appears in scenarios where an wishes to distribute tokens amongst their investors, and do so with a -like function as can be seen in the example contract: owner distribute() Notice that the loop in this contract runs over an array which can be artificially inflated. An attacker can create many user accounts making the array large. In principle this can be done such that the gas required to execute the for loop exceeds the block gas limit, essentially making the function inoperable. investor distribute() 2. Owner operations — Another common pattern is where owner’s have specific privileges in contracts and must perform some task in order for the contract to proceed to the next state. One example would be an ICO contract that requires the owner to the contract which then allows tokens to be transferable, i.e. finalize() In such cases, if a privileged user loses their private keys, or becomes inactive, the entire token contract becomes inoperable. In this case, if the cannot call no tokens can be transferred; i.e. the entire operation of the token ecosystem hinges on a single address. owner finalize() 3. Progressing state based on external calls — Contracts are sometimes written such that in order to progress to a new state requires sending ether to an address, or waiting for some input from an external source. These patterns can lead to DOS attacks, when the external call fails, or is prevented for external reasons. In the example of sending ether, a user can create a contract which doesn’t accept ether. If a contract needs to send ether to this address in order to progress to a new state, the contract will never achieve the new state as ether can never be sent to the contract. Preventative Techniques In the first example, contracts should not loop through data structures that can be artificially manipulated by external users. A withdrawal pattern is recommended, whereby each of the investors call a withdraw function to claim tokens independently. In the second example a privileged user was required to change the state of the contract. In such examples (wherever possible) a fail-safe can be used in the event that the becomes incapacitated. One solution could be setting up the as a multisig contract. Another solution is to use a timelock, where the require on line [13] could include a time-based mechanism, such as which allows any user to finalise after a period of time, specified by . This kind of mitigation technique can be used in the third example also. If external calls are required to progress to a new state, account for their possible failure and potentially add a time-based state progression in the event that the desired call never comes. owner owner require(msg.sender == owner || now > unlockTime) unlockTime Note: Of course there are centralised alternatives to these suggestions where one can add a _maintenanceUser_ who can come along and fix problems with DOS-based attack vectors if need be. Typically these kinds of contracts contain trust issues over the power of such an entity, but that is not a conversation for this section. Real-World Examples: GovernMental was an old Ponzi scheme that accumulated quite a large amount of ether. In fact, at one point it had accumulated 1100 ether. Unfortunately, it was susceptible to the DOS vulnerabilities mentioned in this section. describes how the contract required the deletion of a large mapping in order to withdraw the ether. The deletion of this mapping had a gas cost that exceeded the block gas limit at the time, and thus was not possible to withdraw the 1100 ether. The contract address is and you can see from transaction that the 1100 ether was finally obtained with a transaction that used 2.5M gas. GovernMental This Reddit Post 0xF45717552f12Ef7cb65e95476F217Ea008167Ae3 0x0d80d67202bd9cb6773df8dd2020e7190a1b0793e8ec4fc105257e8128f0506b 12. Block Timestamp Manipulation Block timestamps have historically been used for a variety of applications, such as entropy for random numbers (see the section for further details), locking funds for periods of time and various state-changing conditional statements that are time-dependent. Miner’s have the ability to adjust timestamps slightly which can prove to be quite dangerous if block timestamps are used incorrectly in smart contracts. Entropy Illusion Some useful references for this are: , this , The Solidity Docs Stack Exchange Question The Vulnerability or its alias can be manipulated by miners if they have some incentive to do so. Lets construct a simple game, which would be vulnerable to miner exploitation, block.timestamp now Roulette.sol This contract behaves like a simple lottery. One transaction per block can bet for a chance to win the balance of the contract. The assumption here is that, is uniformly distributed about the last two digits. If that were the case, there would be a 1/15 chance of winning this lottery. 10 ether block.timestamp However, as we know, miners can adjust the timestamp, should they need to. In this particular case, if enough ether pooled in the contract, a miner who solves a block is incentivised to choose a timestamp such that or modulo 15 is . In doing so they may win the ether locked in this contract along with the block reward. As there is only one person allowed to bet per block, this is also vulnerable to attacks. block.timestamp now 0 front-running In practice, block timestamps are monotonically increasing and so miners cannot choose arbitrary block timestamps (they must be larger than their predecessors). They are also limited to setting blocktimes not too far in the future as these blocks will likely be rejected by the network (nodes will not validate blocks whose timestamps are in the future). Preventative Techniques Block timestamps should not be used for entropy or generating random numbers — i.e. they should not be the deciding factor (either directly or through some derivation) for winning a game or changing an important state (if assumed to be random). Time-sensitive logic is sometimes required; i.e. unlocking contracts (timelocking), completing an ICO after a few weeks or enforcing expiry dates. It is sometimes recommend to use (see the ) and an average block time to estimate times; .i.e. with a block time, equates to approximately, . Thus, specifying a block number at which to change a contract state can be more secure as miners are unable to manipulate the block number as easily. The contract employed this strategy. block.number Solidity docs 1 week 10 second 60480 blocks BAT ICO This can be unnecessary if contracts aren’t particularly concerned with miner manipulations of the block timestamp, but it is something to be aware of when developing contracts. Real-World Example: GovernMental was an old Ponzi scheme that accumulated quite a large amount of ether. It was also vulnerable to a timestamp-based attack. The contract payed out to the player who was the last player to join (for at least one minute) in a round. Thus, a miner who was a player, could adjust the timestamp (to a future time, to make it look like a minute had elapsed) to make it appear that the player was the last to join for over a minute (even though this is not true in reality). More detail on this can be found in the by Tanya Bahrynovska. GovernMental History of Ethereum Security Vulnerabilities Post 13. Constructors with Care Constructors are special functions which often perform critical, privileged tasks when initialising contracts. Before solidity constructors were defined as functions that had the same name as the contract that contained them. Thus, when a contract name gets changed in development, if the constructor name isn't changed, it becomes a normal, callable function. As you can imagine, this can (and has) lead to some interesting contract hacks. v0.4.22 For further reading, I suggest the reader attempt the (in particular the Fallout level). Ethernaught Challenges The Vulnerability If the contract name gets modified, or there is a typo in the constructors name such that it no longer matches the name of the contract, the constructor will behave like a normal function. This can lead to dire consequences, especially if the constructor is performing privileged operations. Consider the following contract This contract collects ether and only allows the owner to withdraw all the ether by calling the function. The issue arises due to the fact that the constructor is not exactly named after the contract. Specifically, is not the same as . Thus, any user can call the function, set themselves as the owner and then take all the ether in the contract by calling . withdraw() ownerWallet OwnerWallet ownerWallet() withdraw() Preventative Techniques This issue has been primarily addressed in the Solidity compiler in version . This version introduced a keyword which specifies the constructor, rather than requiring the name of the function to match the contract name. Using this keyword to specify constructors is recommended to prevent naming issues as highlighted above. 0.4.22 constructor Real-World Example: Rubixi Rubixi ( ) was another pyramid scheme that exhibited this kind of vulnerability. It was originally called but the contract name was changed before deployment to . The constructor's name wasn't changed, allowing any user to become the . Some interesting discussion related to this bug can be found on this . Ultimately, it allowed users to fight for status to claim the fees from the pyramid scheme. More detail on this particular bug can be found . contract code DynamicPyramid Rubixi creator Bitcoin Thread creator here 14. Unintialised Storage Pointers The EVM stores data either as or as . Understanding exactly how this is done and the default types for local variables of functions is highly recommended when developing contracts. This is because it is possible to produce vulnerable contracts by inappropriately intialising variables. storage memory To read more about and in the EVM, see the , , . storage memory Solidity Docs: Data Location Solidity Docs: Layout of State Variables in Storage Solidity Docs: Layout in Memory This section is based off the excellent post by Stefan Beyer . Further reading on this topic can be found from Sefan’s inspiration, which is this reddit thread . The Vulnerability Local variables within functions default to or depending on their type. Uninitialised local variables can point to other unexpected storage variables in the contract, leading to intentional (i.e. the developer intentionally puts them there to attack later) or unintentional vulnerabilities. storage memory storage Let’s consider the following, relatively simple name registrar contract: This simple name registrar has only one function. When the contract is , it allows anyone to register a name (as a hash) and map that name to an address. Unfortunately, this registrar is initially locked and the on line [23] prevents from adding name records. There is however a vulnerability in this contract, that allows name registration regardless of the variable. unlocked bytes32 require register() unlocked To discuss this vulnerability, first we need to understand how storage works in Solidity. As a high level overview (without any proper technical detail — I suggest reading the Solidity docs for a proper review), state variables are stored sequentially in _slots_as they appear in the contract (they can be grouped together, but not in this example, so we wont worry about that). Thus, exists in , exists in and in etc. Each of these slots are of byte size 32 (there are added complexities with mappings which we ignore for now). The boolean will look like (64 's, excluding the ) for or (63 's) for . As you can see, there is a significant waste of storage in this particular example. unlocked slot 0 registeredNameRecord slot 1 resolve slot 2 unlocked 0x000...0 0 0x false 0x000...1 0 true The next piece of information that we need, is that Solidity defaults complex data types, such as , to when initialising them as local variables. Therefore, on line [16] defaults to . The vulnerability is caused by the fact that is not initialised. Because it defaults to storage, it becomes a pointer to storage and because it is uninitialised, it points to slot (i.e. where is stored). Notice that on lines [17] and [18] we then set to and to , this in effect changes the storage location of slot 0 and slot 1 which modifies both and the storage slot associated with . structs storage newRecord storage newRecord 0 unlocked nameRecord.name _name nameRecord.mappedAddress _mappedAddress unlocked registeredNameRecord This means that can be directly modified, simply by the parameter of the function. Therefore, if the last byte of is non-zero, it will modify the last byte of storage and directly change to . Such values will pass the on line [23] as we are setting to . Try this in Remix. Notice the function will pass if you use a of the form: unlocked bytes32 _name register() _name slot 0 unlocked true _name require() unlocked true _name 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 Preventative Techniques The Solidity compiler raises unintialised storage variables as warnings, thus developers should pay careful attention to these warnings when building smart contracts. The current version of mist (0.10), doesn’t allow these contracts to be compiled. It is often good practice to explicitly use the or when dealing with complex types to ensure they behave as expected. memory storage Real-World Examples: Honey Pots: OpenAddressLottery and CryptoRoulette A honey pot named OpenAddressLottery ( ) was deployed that used this uninitialised storage variable querk to collect ether from some would-be hackers. The contract is rather in-depth, so I will leave the discussion to this where the attack is quite clearly explained. contract code reddit thread Another honey pot, CryptoRoulette ( ) also utilises this trick to try and collect some ether. If you can’t figure out how the attack works, see for an overview of this contract and others. contract code An analysis of a couple Ethereum honeypot contracts 15. Floating Points and Precision As of this writing (Solidity v0.4.24), fixed point or floating point numbers are not supported. This means that floating point representations must be made with the integer types in Solidity. This can lead to errors/vulnerabilities if not implemented correctly. For further reading, see , Ethereum Contract Security Techniques and Tips — Rounding with Integer Division The Vulnerability As there is no fixed point type in Solidity, developers are required to implement their own using the standard integer data types. There are a number of pitfalls developers can run into during this process. I will try to highlight some of these in this section. Lets begin with a code example (lets ignore any over/under flow issues for simplicity). This simple token buying/selling contract has some obvious problems in the buying and selling of tokens. Although the mathematical calculations for buying and selling tokens are correct, the lack of floating point numbers will give erroneous results. For example, when buying tokens on line [7], if the value is less than the initial division will result in , leaving the final multiplication (i.e. divided by equals ). Similarly, when selling tokens, any tokens less than will also result in . In fact, rounding here is always down, so selling , will result in . 1 ether 0 0 200 wei 1e18 weiPerEth 0 10 0 ether 29 tokens 2 ether The issue with this contract is that the precision is only to the nearest (i.e. ). This can sometimes get tricky when dealing with in tokens when you need higher precisions. ether 1e18 wei decimals ERC20 Preventative Techniques Keeping the right precision in your smart contracts is very important, especially when dealing ratios and rates which reflect economic decisions. You should ensure that any ratios or rates you are using allow for large numerators in fractions. For example, we used the rate in our example. It would have been better to use which would be a large number. To solve for the amount of tokens we could do . This would give a more precise result. tokensPerEth weiPerTokens msg.sender/weiPerTokens Another tactic to keep in mind, is to be mindful of order of operations. In the above example, the calculation to purchase tokens was . Notice that the division occurs before the multiplication. This example would have achieved a greater precision if the calculation performed the multiplication first and then the division, i.e. . msg.value/weiPerEth*tokenPerEth msg.value*tokenPerEth/weiPerEth Finally, when defining arbitrary precision for numbers it can be a good idea to convert variables into higher precision, perform all mathematical operations, then finally when needed, convert back down to the precision for output. Typically 's are used (as they are optimal for gas usage) which give approximately 60 orders of magnitude in their range, some which can be dedicated to the precision of mathematical operations. It may be the case that it is better to keep all variables in high precision in solidity and convert back to lower precisions in external apps (this is essentially how the variable works in contracts). To see examples of how this can be done and the libraries to do this, I recommend looking at the . They use some funky naming, 's and 's but the concept is useful. uint256 decimals ERC20 Token Maker DAO DSMath WAD RAY Real-World Example: Ethstick I couldn’t find a good example where rounding has caused a severe issue in a contract, but I’m sure there are plenty out there. Feel free to update this if you have a good one in mind. For lack of a good example, I want to draw your attention to mainly because I like the cool naming within the contract. This contract doesn’t use any extended precision, however, it deals with . So this contract will have issues of rounding, but only at the level of precision. It has some more serious flaws, but these are relating back to the difficulty in getting entropy on the blockchain (see ). For a further discussion on the Ethstick contract, I'll refer you to another post of Peter Venesses, . Ethstick wei wei Entropty Illusion Ethereum Contracts Are Going to be Candy For Hackers 16. Tx.Origin Authentication Solidity has a global variable, which traverses the entire call stack and returns the address of the account that originally sent the call (or transaction). Using this variable for authentication in smart contracts leaves the contract vulnerable to a phishing-like attack. tx.origin For further reading, see , and . Stack Exchange Question Peter Venesses’s Blog Solidity — Tx.Origin attacks The Vulnerability Contracts that authorise users using the variable are typically vulnerable to phishing attacks which can trick users into performing authenticated actions on the vulnerable contract. tx.origin Consider the simple contract, Notice that on line [11] this contract authorises the function using . This contract allows for an attacker to create an attacking contract of the form, withdrawAll() tx.origin To utilise this contract, an attacker would deploy it, and then convince the owner of the contract to send this contract some amount of ether. The attacker may disguise this contract as their own private address and social engineer the victim to send some form of transaction to the address. The victim, unless being careful, may not notice that there is code at the attacker's address, or the attacker may pass it off as being a multisignature wallet or some advanced storage wallet. Phishable In any case, if the victim sends a transaction (with enough gas) to the address, it will invoke the fallback function, which in turn calls the function of the contract, with the parameter . This will result in the withdrawal of all funds from the contract to the address. This is because the address that first initialised the call was the victim (i.e. the of the contract). Therefore, will be equal to and the on line [11] of the contract will pass. AttackContract withdrawAll() Phishable attacker Phishable attacker owner Phishable tx.origin owner require Phishable Preventative Techniques should not be used for authorisation in smart contracts. This isn't to say that the variable should never be used. It does have some legitimate use cases in smart contracts. For example, if one wanted to deny external contracts from calling the current contract, they could implement a of the from . This prevents intermediate contracts being used to call the current contract, limiting the contract to regular code-less addresses. tx.origin tx.origin require require(tx.origin == msg.sender) Real-World Example: Not Known I do not know of any publicised exploits of this form in the wild. Ethereum Quirks I intend to populate this section with various interesting quirks that get discovered by the community. These are kept in this blog as they may aid in smart contract development if one were to utilize these quirks in practice. Keyless Ether Contract addresses are deterministic, meaning that they can be calculated prior to actually creating the address. This is the case for addresses creating contracts and also for contracts spawning other contracts. In fact, a created contract’s address is determined by: keccak256(rlp.encode([ , ]) Essentially, a contract’s address is just the hash of the account that created it concatenated with the accounts transaction nonce(A transaction nonce is like a transaction counter. It increments ever time a transaction is sent from your account.). The same is true for contracts, except contracts nonce's start at whereas address's transaction nonce's start at . keccak256 1 0 This means that given an Ethereum address, we can calculate all the possible contract addresses that this address can spawn. For example, if the address were to create a contract on its 100th transaction, it would create the contract address , which would give the contract address, . 0x123000...000 keccak256(rlp.encode[0x123...000, 100]) 0xed4cafc88a13f5d58a163e61591b9385b6fe6d1a What does this all mean? This means that you can send ether to a pre-determined address (one which you don’t own the private key to, but know that one of your accounts can create a contract to). You can send ether to that address and then retrieve the ether by later creating a contract which gets spawned over the same address. The constructor could be used to return all your pre-sent ether. Thus if someone where to obtain all your Ethereum private keys, it would be difficult for the attacker to discover that your Ethereum addresses also have access to this ether. In fact, if the attacker spent too many transaction such that the nonce required to access your ether is used, it is impossible to recover your hidden ether. hidden Let me clarify this with a contract. contract KeylessHiddenEthCreator {uint public currentContractNonce = 1; // keep track of this contracts nonce publicly (it's also found in the contracts state) // determine future addresses which can hide ether. function futureAddresses(uint8 nonce) public view returns (address) { if(nonce == 0) { return address(keccak256(0xd6, 0x94, this, 0x80)); } return address(keccak256(0xd6, 0x94, this, nonce)); // need to implement rlp encoding properly for a full range of nonces } // increment the contract nonce or retrieve ether from a hidden/key-less account // provided the nonce is correct function retrieveHiddenEther(address beneficiary) public returns (address) { currentContractNonce +=1; return new RecoverContract(beneficiary); } function () payable {} // Allow ether transfers (helps for playing in remix) } contract RecoverContract {constructor(address beneficiary) {selfdestruct(beneficiary); // don't deploy code. Return the ether stored here to the beneficiary.}} This contract allows you to store keyless ether (relatively safely, in the sense you can’t accidentally miss the nonce)[³]. The function can be used to calculate the first 127 contract addresses that this contract can spawn, by specifying the . If you send ether to one of these addresses, it can be later recovered by calling the enough times. For example, if you choose (and send ether to the associated address), you will need to call four times and it will recover the ether to the address. futureAddresses() nonce retrieveHiddenEther() nonce=4 retrieveHiddenEther() beneficiary This can be done without a contract. You can send ether to addresses that can be created from one of your standard Ethereum accounts and recover it later, at the correct nonce. Be careful however, if you accidentally surpass the transaction nonce that is required to recover your ether, your funds will be lost forever. For more information on some more advanced tricks you can do with this quirk, I recommend reading . Martin Swende’s post One Time Addresses Ethereum transaction signing uses the Elliptic Curve Digital Signing Algorithm (ECDSA). Conventionally, in order to send a verified transaction on Ethereum, you sign a message with your Ethereum private key, which authorises spending from your account. In slightly more detail, the message that you sign is the components of the Ethereum transaction, specifically, the , , , , and fields. The result of an Ethereum signature is three numbers, , and . I won't go into detail about what each of these represent, instead I refer the interested readers to the (which describes and ) and the (Appendix F - which describes ) and finally for the current use of . to value gas gasPrice nonce data v r s ECDSA wiki page r s Ethereum Yellow Paper v EIP155 v So we know that an Ethereum transaction signature consists of a message and the numbers , and . We can check if a signature is valid, by using the message (i.e. transaction details), and to derive an Ethereum address. If the derived Ethereum address matches the field of the transaction, then we know that and were created by someone who owns (or has access to) the private key for the field and thus the signature is valid. v r s r s from r s from Consider now, that we don’t own a private key, but instead make up values for and for an arbitrary transaction. Consider we have a transaction, with the parameters: r s {to: "0xa9e", value: 10e18, nonce: 0} I’ve ignored the other parameters. This transaction will send 10 ether to the address. Now lets say we make up some numbers and (these have specific ranges) and a . If we derive the Ethereum address related to these made up numbers we will get a random Ethereum address, lets call it . Knowing this address, we could send 10 ether to the address (without owning the private key for the address). At any point in the future, we could send the transaction, 0xa9e r s v 0x54321 0x54321 {to: "0xa9e", value: 10e18, nonce: 0, from: "0x54321"} along with the signature, i.e. the , and we made up. This will be a valid transaction, because the derived address will match our field. This allows us to spend our money from this random address ( ) to the address we chose . Thus we have managed to store ether in an address that we do not have the private key and used a one-time transaction to recover the ether. v r s from 0x54321 0xa9e This quirk can also be used to send ether to a large number of people in a trustless manner, as Nick Johnson describes in . How to send Ether to 11,440 people Single Transaction Airdrops An Airdrop refers to the process of distributing tokens amongst a large group of people. Traditionally, airdrops have been processed via a large number of transactions where each transaction updates either a single or a batch of user’s balances. This can be costly and strenuous on the Ethereum blockchain. There is an alternative method, in which many users balances can be credited with tokens using a single transaction. This technique is explained in more detail by its proposer, RicMoo in his post: . Merkle Air-Drops: Make Love, Not War The idea is to create a which contains (as leaf nodes) all the addresses and balances of users to be credited tokens. This will be done off-chain. The merkle tree can be given out publicly (again off-chain). A smart contract can then be created containing the root hash of the merkle tree which allows users to submit to obtain their tokens. Thus a single transaction (the one used to create the contract, or to simply store the Merkle tree root hash), allows all credited users to redeem their airdropped tokens. Merkle Tree merkle-proofs RicMoo in his also provides an example of a function which can accept Merkle Proofs and credit a user’s balance: post function redeem(uint256 index, address recipient,uint256 amount, bytes32[] merkleProof) public { // Make sure this has not been redeemed uint256 redeemedBlock = \_redeemed\[index / 256\]; uint256 redeemedMask = (uint256(1) << uint256(index % 256)); require((redeemedBlock & redeemedMask) == 0); // Mark it as redeemed (if we fail, we revert) \_redeemed\[index / 256\] = redeemedBlock | redeemedMask; // Compute the merkle root from the merkle proof bytes32 node = keccak256(index, recipient, amount); uint256 path = index; for (uint16 i = 0; i < merkleProof.length; i++) { if ((path & 0x01) == 1) { node = keccak256(merkleProof\[i\], node); } else { node = keccak256(node, merkleProof\[i\]); } path /= 2; } // Check the resolved merkle proof matches our merkle root require(node == \_rootHash); // Redeem! \_balances\[recipient\] += amount; \_totalSupply += amount; Transfer(0, recipient, amount); } This function could be built into a token contract to allow future airdrops. The only transaction required to credit all user’s balances, would be the transaction that sets the Merkle tree root. Thanks for reading;) About the Author is a Co-Founder of Vaibhav Saini TowardsBlockchain , an MIT Cambridge Innovation Center incubated startup. He works as Senior blockchain developer and has worked on several blockchain platforms including Ethereum, Quorum, EOS, Nano, Hashgraph, IOTA. He is currently a sophomore at . IIT Delhi Learned something? Press and hold the 👏 to say “thanks!” and help others find this article. Hold down the clap button if you liked the content! It helps me gain exposure . Want to learn more? 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