This paper is under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv Authors: (1) H. Wen, Department of Economics, University of Bath; (2) T. Huang, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Roehampton; (3) D. Xiao, School of Mathematical Sciences. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Relevant Blockchain Technologies Basic Model Advanced Models for Real-World Scenarios Monte Carlo Simulations Conclusions Future Investigations, and References 7. Future Investigations As our research journey navigates the intricate tapestry of the reputation system and its myriad facets, there remain certain areas poised for deeper exploration in subsequent phases of our investigation. Our anticipation is to cast our intellectual net even wider, to capture the more nuanced dynamics and emergent properties that our initial inquiry might have only touched upon. Firstly, we delve into the realm of Additional and Multiple Ratings, seeking to comprehend how multiple layers of feedback can enrich the analytical depth of our system. Proceeding from there, the lens of our inquiry shifts to an anticipatory stance, focusing on the Early Detection of Potential Problems — a proactive measure to ensure the seamless functioning of the reputation mechanism. As we transition into the practicalities of system deployment, the Adaptive Incentive Mechanisms for Post-Launch Stage promises a set of guiding principles and methodologies tailored for the evolving needs of a live system. Lastly, but by no means least, our exploration culminates in the conceptualization of a Perpetually Self-Adaptively-Evolving Universal Oracle, envisaging a system that not only evolves but also continually refines itself, embodying the principles of perpetual learning and adaptation. 7.1. Additional and Multiple Ratings In our subsequent studies, we aim to delve deeper into the intricacies of a singular agent assigning multiple ratings to a counterpart. We are conceptualizing an innovative weighting formula that, rather than merely focusing on staking quantity, places added emphasis on recent ratings. Such a revision is aimed at capturing the fluidity of actions and potential shifts in an agent’s viewpoint over time. To operationalize this, we propose the incorporation of indices representing an agent’s historical actions, coupled with a decay function to account for intervals between successive ratings. Our objective with this methodology is to temper the impact of aged ratings, acknowledging that the context of the scrutinized action may transform. To ensure its feasibility, we plan to employ MCSs within an expansive parameter spectrum. This will entail examining an array of decay functions related to diverse time spans. 7.2. Early Detection of Potential Problems 7.2.1. Manual Intervention During Testnets Despite the inherent design of the reputation system, which instinctively promotes agent integrity, and its satisfactory performance in simulations, it might be prudent to retain the option for manual interventions, particularly during the testnet phase. Potential indicators, like abrupt transaction surges or atypical staking by an agent, could be warning signs of looming issues or exploitation. Given the feedback dynamics of reputation systems, user reviews and ratings might act as preliminary alert signals. For example, a sharp decline in an agent’s reputation could necessitate in-depth scrutiny. This can be optimally executed if the manual intervention guidelines are unambiguous, thereby ensuring seamless coexistence with the autonomous functioning of the reputation system. 7.2.2. Machine Learning Integration Employing advanced analytics and machine learning algorithms can facilitate real-time transaction pattern monitoring. By amalgamating continuous oversight with adaptive algorithms proficient in learning from past data, the system can proactively pinpoint and address concerns, fortifying the trustworthiness of the blockchain and all its stakeholders. This anticipatory stance not only reduces potential threats but also nurtures user trust, bolstering durability and adaptability in a swiftly changing digital landscape. 7.3. Adaptive Incentive Mechanisms for Post-Launch Stage 7.3.1. Incentive Mechanisms for Early Problem Finders To counteract the ”Keynesian beauty contest” effect, as delineated by Keynes in 1936 [87], we contemplate the application of skewed functions to endorse rating diversity. If the collective outcomes of this ”contest” exceed a predetermined threshold, the system might autonomously incentivize divergent actions, aiming for recalibration. Designing such mechanisms necessitates meticulous scheming, exhaustive simulation-based validation, and thorough field testing to ensure interventions remain well-measured and intentional. 7.3.2. Strengthening Community Participation Besides prioritizing early problem identification, it’s essential to reward the astute minority who identify these issues promptly. Echoing sentiments from earlier chapters, a renewed focus will be directed towards championing community engagement. Establishing an organic incentive framework can ensure sustained competitiveness of the reputation system. This strategy not only lauds individuals for their proactive contributions but also consolidates the efficacy and integrity of the overarching system. 7.3.3. Exploring Decentralized Autonomy through DAO The exploration of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) presents an innovative blueprint for a self-regulating, independent system. By their design, DAOs, anchored in predefined rules, circumvent centralized control, potentially ensuring unbiased decision-making mechanisms. These organizations can be tailored to autonomously reward contributors, manage resources, and make judgements rooted in the community’s collective wisdom. Incorporating DAOs into our system’s architecture might further bolster incentivized participation, aligning individual rewards with collective benefits. 7.4. Perpetually Self-Adaptively-Evolving Universal Oracle An astutely crafted reputation system with intrinsic incentive mechanisms for integrity ratings, coupled with the principles of DAO, paves the way for a perpetually self-operating, self-correcting, and adaptively evolving Universal Oracle. This union merges the immutable trust mechanism of a DAO with the dynamic adaptability of our model, crafting a system poised for long-term resilience and relevance. Users, being both beneficiaries and decision-makers regarding the oracle’s direction, ensure each update carries the legacy of existing participants while extending to new ones. This reinforces the network effect and establishes barriers against imitators. Consequently, such a system, by continuously recalibrating its parameters and practices in response to evolving circumstances, can potentially maintain its integrity and relevance indefinitely, surpassing any other competitors. References [1] Carlo Morelli, Information Costs and Information Asymmetry in British Food Retailing, The Service Industries Journal, Volume 19, 1999 - Issue 3, Pages 175-186. [2] T¨ulin Erdem, Joffre Swait, Brand Credibility, Brand Consideration, and Choice, Journal of Consumer Research, Volume 31, Issue 1, June 2004, Pages 191–198. [3] Tae Hyun Baek, Jooyoung Kim, Jay Hyunjae Yu, The Differential Roles of Brand Credibility and Brand Prestige in Consumer Brand Choice, Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 27(7): 662–678, July 2010. [4] Gerald Bloom, Hilary Standing, Robert Lloyd, Markets, information asymmetry and health care: Towards new social contracts, Social Science & Medicine, Volume 66, Issue 10, May 2008, Pages 2076-2087. [5] Xueping Zhen, Shuangshuang Xu, Yongjian Li, Dan Shi, When and how should a retailer use third-party platform channels? The Impact of spillover effects, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 301, Issue 2, 1 September 2022, Pages 624-637. [6] Wu, Y., Ngai, E.W.T., Wu, P., & Wu, C. (2020). Fake online reviews: Literature review, synthesis, and directions for future research. Decision Support Systems, 132, [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.dss.2020.113280. [7] Sekar, S. (2023). Technical Perspective: A Rare Glimpse of Tracking Fake Reviews. Communications of the ACM, 66(10), 97. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3615429. [8] Harrison-Walker, L.J., & Jiang, Y. (2023). Suspicion of online product reviews as fake: Cues and consequences. Journal of Business Research, 160, [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres. 2023.113780. [9] Shukla, A.D., & Goh, J.M. (2023). Fighting fake reviews: Authenticated anonymous reviews using identity verification. Business Horizons, [In Press, Journal Pre-proof], [online] Available at: https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.bushor.2023.08.002. [10] JP Vergne, Decentralized vs. Distributed Organization: Blockchain, Machine Learning and the Future of the Digital Platform, Organization Theory, Volume 1, Issue 4, October-December 2020, https://doi. org/10.1177/2631787720977052. [11] Satoshi Nakamoto, 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://www.bitcoin.org. [12] Jiin-Chiou Cheng, Narn-Yih Lee, Chien Chi, Yi-Hua Chen, Blockchain and smart contract for digital certificate, 2018 IEEE International Conference. [13] Ethereum whitepaper, https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/. [14] Steve Ellis, Ari Juels, and Sergey Nazarov, ChainLink: A Decentralized Oracle Network, 4 September 2017. [15] Giulio Caldarelli and Joshua Ellul, The Blockchain Oracle Problem in Decentralized Finance—A Multivocal Approach, Applied Sciences, Volume 11, Issue 16, 2021, https://doi.org/10.3390/app11167572. [16] Kenneth Hsien Yung Chung, Dan Li, Peter Adriaens, Technology-enabled financing of sustainable infrastructure: A case for blockchains and decentralized oracle networks, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 187, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2022.122258. [17] Lorenz Breidenbach et al., Chainlink 2.0: Next Steps in the Evolution of Decentralized Oracle Networks, 15 April 2021. 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Future Investigations on an Intrinsic Integrity-Driven Model for Sustainable Reputation Systems

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