Do ATMs running Windows XP pose a security risk? You can bank on it!

I originally wrote this article for CSO back in February 2014. Even though my piece is now three years old, unfortunately this issue is still timely and relevant! It’s 2017, and ATMs around the world are still running Windows XP embedded, long after Microsoft ceased support with security and stability patches. See these more recent articles that other people have written for more information:

• Windows XP and USB ports making cash machine vulnerable to attack
• Most ATMs in India Are Easy Targets for Hackers & Malware Attacks

I’m just an ordinary person like you. I have a chequing account with Royal Bank of Canada. After cancelling my credit card, it’s the only financial product that I have. I look at my balance from time to time and I have thoughts like, “Whew! After paying for my rent, I’ll have $100 per week to spend on groceries and still have enough left to preorder a copy of Persona 5! But I still have to wait for my next paycheque to buy those cute $80 shoes that I have my eyes on.” I’m working class, and if my money was stolen through a banking exploit, I’d be way more hurt than a rich person would be. And I know that many of my readers are in the same boat, except you may have children and family to support.

Last year, I broke up with Sean Rooney, my common-law husband of five years. I’m now happily in love and living with musician, artist, and indie record label owner Rob Michalchuk. Interestingly enough, unlike my former cybersecurity professional ex-fiance, Rob has given me many ideas for articles!

So, the part of this article about Sean Rooney being my fiance is now outdated. But the very real cybersecurity threat of ATMs still running Windows XP isn’t.

Please feel free to share this article on Twitter, and click on the green heart if you think my piece is a worthwhile read. You can find me on Twitter via @kim_crawley.

World-renowned IT security expert Bruce Schneier is a friend of mine. He’s worked extensively with my fiance, Sean Rooney, on a couple of projects. So, beyond my career-related need to keep up with the latest IT security news, I also read Schneier’s website periodically the way people look at their friends’ pages on Facebook. “What’s he up to lately? What’s on his mind?”

On January 27th, he posted something that intrigued me. Banks are pressuring Microsoft to continue Windows XP support, because they still use the OS with their ATMs.

That shocked me because I ignorantly assumed, considering how data-sensitive ATMs are, they’d exclusively use UNIX or Linux kernels.

I must note that all of the opinions I’m expressing in this article are entirely my own. The security or insecurity of Microsoft products is a hot-button issue in my field. Based on many years of direct experience, I hold Microsoft in very low esteem when it comes to vulnerabilities in code.

As of this writing, Windows XP was released twelve years ago, positively ancient by OS standards.

A document about XP vulnerabilities that still exist would require at least a thousand page book to cover properly, so I’ll just give you a “Coles Notes” version, focusing on a few that can pose a special threat to ATMs.

• Newer ATMs can be patch-managed remotely. But older ATMs, including a large percentage of the machines still in use in the US, can only be patched manually. That means a bank’s IT professionals have to visit the machines, branch-by-branch, one-by-one, to apply Microsoft’s Windows XP for Embedded Systems’ security patches. The IT professionals who have the specialized knowledge necessary to manually patch ATMs are expensive. Their time is expensive. Major banks with older ATMs probably employ many of them. But given what I’ve seen of the stingy attitude many major corporations, including those in finance, have toward labor expenses, this is what I expect. Their employers may be reluctant to deploy them to each of their manual-only ATMs within the days after an embedded Windows XP patch becomes available. Microsoft and vendor neutral security firms publicize vulnerability information as soon as they have it. That could leave a window of days, or even weeks, between a vulnerability being public knowledge and a manually managed ATM receiving a patch for it. If a blackhat can crack an ATM, even if it’s only one, it could be incredibly lucrative for them. So, the motive is there.
• Many ATMs running XPe (embedded Windows XP) may not be using Enhanced Write Filter. EWF is designed to protect malware from executing onto a drive, corrupting files. Running EWF is always optional in XPe. As we’ve seen in countless incidents like when Target and Neiman Marcus’ POS (point of sale) systems were infected last year, large corporations may hire the best IT staff. But they need approval from their employers for their security strategies to take effect. The ultimate decision makers tend to be executives with limited technical expertise. Often, those executives decide to not take the advice of the “computer geeks” they employ. The “suits” usually think they’re saving money by not allowing their IT and software development departments to have the budgets they ask for. But, I don’t think, by taking that attitude, that those corporate executives are saving their companies money in the long run. Depending on a bank’s corporate structure, a “suit” may also say no to running EWF, which has its own patches that need to be managed.
• The hardware configuration of one model of ATM to another is usually unique. Each and every hardware component needs a driver to run properly in XPe. With Microsoft OSes especially, drivers usually contain proprietary (closed-source) code. Schneier has noted that it’s easier for third-party developers, including those employed by hardware component vendors and banks, to develop custom software for open-source drivers. Those developers constantly learn about new vulnerabilities they must write patch code for. Other embedded OSes, such as those built with a Linux kernel, are a lot more likely to have open-source drivers. And the specialized hardware that ATMs use are a niche.
• Microsoft will cease supporting standard Windows XP on April 8th of this year. There’ll be no more anti-malware patches as of July 14th, 2015. XPe-specific support will cease sometime in the beginning of 2016. As such a large percentage of ATMs are still running an OS that was originally released twelve years ago, how likely is it that banks will migrate all of their ATMs to Windows 7 for Embedded Systems or Linux/UNIX kernel embedded OSes in two years? Many ATM models and their hardware components will need to be completely replaced in order to run a newer OS. For a bank with thousands of ATMs, that can be incredibly expensive.

“I have talked to some customers who, for one reason or another, will not have completely migrated from Windows XP before April 8. I have even talked to some customers that say they won’t migrate from Windows XP until the hardware is running on fails,” said Microsoft’s Tim Rains.

Banks and ATM manufacturers such as Diebold are usually secretive about the specifics of the hardware and software they use. That’s perfectly understandable.

Wells Fargo, Bank of America and Royal Bank of Canada are among many banks worldwide which are still operating huge numbers of XPe ATMs.

If we see major attacks on XPe-run ATMs in 2016 and beyond, it’ll make retail POS attacks look minor in comparison. Remember, ATMs must be connected to a bank’s centralized electronic banking systems in order to operate. Trillions may be at risk.

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