This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: (1) Kiriaki Frangias; (2) Andrew Lin; (3) Ellen Vitercik; (4) Manolis Zampetakis. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Warm-up: Agents with known equal disutility Agents with unknown disutilites Experiments Conclusions and future directions, References A Summary of notation B Omitted proofs from Section 2 C Omitted proofs from Section 3 D Additional Information about Experiments C Omitted proofs from Section 3 We similarly handle the second case, in which the agent does not exert effort, this time noting that the agent does not experience disutility: For agent ai to be incentivized to exert effort, the payment needs to be such that: Using E[|Ci|] < d and simplifying we get the lower bound: To satisfy individual rationality, we require the following: which holds if and only if: which is always satisfied as long as constraint 12 is satisfied. where the first inequality follows from above. Therefore the optimization problem for a suitable g∗ is the following: such that: This paper is available on Arxiv under CC 4.0 license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: (1) Kiriaki Frangias; (2) Andrew Lin; (3) Ellen Vitercik; (4) Manolis Zampetakis. This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: Authors: (1) Kiriaki Frangias; (2) Andrew Lin; (3) Ellen Vitercik; (4) Manolis Zampetakis. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Warm-up: Agents with known equal disutility Warm-up: Agents with known equal disutility Agents with unknown disutilites Agents with unknown disutilites Experiments Experiments Conclusions and future directions, References Conclusions and future directions, References A Summary of notation A Summary of notation B Omitted proofs from Section 2 B Omitted proofs from Section 2 C Omitted proofs from Section 3 C Omitted proofs from Section 3 D Additional Information about Experiments D Additional Information about Experiments C Omitted proofs from Section 3 We similarly handle the second case, in which the agent does not exert effort, this time noting that the agent does not experience disutility: For agent a i to be incentivized to exert effort, the payment needs to be such that: i Using E[|C i |] < d and simplifying we get the lower bound: i To satisfy individual rationality, we require the following: which holds if and only if: which is always satisfied as long as constraint 12 is satisfied. where the first inequality follows from above. Therefore the optimization problem for a suitable g ∗ is the following: g such that: This paper is available on Arxiv under CC 4.0 license. This paper is available on Arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Arxiv