Table of Links Abstract and Introduction


Preliminaries


Overview


Protocol
4.1 Efficient Option Transfer Protocol
4.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options


Security Analysis
5.1 Option Transfer Properties
5.2 Option Properties


Implementation


Related Work


Conclusion and Discussion, and References A. Codes A.1 Robust and Efficient Transfer Protocol
A.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options B. Proofs B.1 Transfer Protocol Proofs
B.2 Option 2 PRELIMINARIES Blockchain, Smart Contract, and Asset. A blockchain is a tamperproof distributed ledger that records asset balances for each address. An asset can be a cryptocurrency, a token, or any item transactable on-chain. A party can be an individual, organization, or any entity capable of interacting with the blockchain. A smart contract (simply as "contract") is an agreement written in code. Parties can create contracts, call functions, and check contract code and state. Δ represents the time period sufficient for parties to release, broadcast, and confirm transactions on the blockchain. Cryptographic Primitives. A secret is known exclusively to its generator, and 𝐻(·) represents a collision-resistant hash function. In asymmetric encryption, the private key 𝑠𝑘 is used confidentially for signing, and the public key 𝑝𝑘 is shared openly. In this paper, Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures (DAPS) [35] is a key component in our protocol design. Initially, DAPS are designed to inhibit the reuse of a single private key for signing two different messages, where a message consists of a pair of message address and message payload in the form of (𝑎, 𝑝). DAPS ensures that a particular secret key 𝑠𝑘 cannot sign the same address 𝑎 with different payloads 𝑝. This property can be used for preventing double spending in blockchains. Two messages 𝑚1 = (𝑎1, 𝑝1) and 𝑚2 = (𝑎2, 𝑝2) are considered colliding if 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 and 𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝2. Any two signatures with the identical address but different contents will disclose the secret key. Given a security parameter 𝜆, DAPS can be delineated as follows. • Key Generation: KeyGen(1 𝜆 ) → (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) • Signature: Sign(𝑠𝑘,𝑚) → 𝜎𝑚, where 𝑚 = (𝑎, 𝑝) • Verification: Verify(𝑝𝑘,𝑚, 𝜎𝑚) → True/False • Extraction: Extract(𝑝𝑘,𝑚1, 𝜎𝑚1 ,𝑚2, 𝜎𝑚2 ) → 𝑠𝑘/⊥ Hashed TimeLock Contracts (HTLCs). The Hashed TimeLock Contract (HTLC) is a cryptographic contract utilized to facilitate secure and trustless transactions. In an vanilla HTLC, funds are locked in a contract and can only be accessed by the designated recipient upon fulfillment of predetermined conditions within a specified time frame 𝑇 . The condition is expressed as the presentation of a preimage of the hash. For example, the contract asks the designated recipient to present the preimage 𝐴 for the hash 𝐻(𝐴). If 𝐴 is not provided before 𝑇 , the funds are refunded after 𝑇. Authors:
(1) Zifan Peng, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (zpengao@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn);
(2) Yingjie Xue, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (yingjiexue@hkust-gz.edu.cn);
(3) Jingyu Liu, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (jliu514@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn). This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 license. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Preliminaries Overview Protocol
4.1 Efficient Option Transfer Protocol
4.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options Security Analysis
5.1 Option Transfer Properties
5.2 Option Properties Implementation Related Work Conclusion and Discussion, and References Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Preliminaries Preliminaries Preliminaries Overview Overview Overview Protocol 4.1 Efficient Option Transfer Protocol 4.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options Protocol 4.1 Efficient Option Transfer Protocol 4.1 Efficient Option Transfer Protocol 4.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options 4.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options Security Analysis 5.1 Option Transfer Properties 5.2 Option Properties Security Analysis 5.1 Option Transfer Properties 5.1 Option Transfer Properties 5.2 Option Properties 5.2 Option Properties Implementation Implementation Implementation Related Work Related Work Related Work Conclusion and Discussion, and References Conclusion and Discussion, and References Conclusion and Discussion, and References A. Codes A. Codes A.1 Robust and Efficient Transfer Protocol A.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options A.1 Robust and Efficient Transfer Protocol A.1 Robust and Efficient Transfer Protocol A.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options A.2 Holder Collateral-Free Cross-Chain Options B. Proofs B. Proofs B.1 Transfer Protocol Proofs B.2 Option B.1 Transfer Protocol Proofs B.1 Transfer Protocol Proofs B.2 Option B.2 Option 2 PRELIMINARIES Blockchain, Smart Contract, and Asset. A blockchain is a tamperproof distributed ledger that records asset balances for each address. An asset can be a cryptocurrency, a token, or any item transactable on-chain. A party can be an individual, organization, or any entity capable of interacting with the blockchain. A smart contract (simply as "contract") is an agreement written in code. Parties can create contracts, call functions, and check contract code and state. Δ represents the time period sufficient for parties to release, broadcast, and confirm transactions on the blockchain. Blockchain, Smart Contract, and Asset. Cryptographic Primitives . A secret is known exclusively to its generator, and 𝐻(·) represents a collision-resistant hash function. In asymmetric encryption, the private key 𝑠𝑘 is used confidentially for signing, and the public key 𝑝𝑘 is shared openly. Cryptographic Primitives Cryptographic Primitives In this paper, Double-Authentication-Preventing Signatures (DAPS) [35] is a key component in our protocol design. Initially, DAPS are designed to inhibit the reuse of a single private key for signing two different messages, where a message consists of a pair of message address and message payload in the form of (𝑎, 𝑝). DAPS ensures that a particular secret key 𝑠𝑘 cannot sign the same address 𝑎 with different payloads 𝑝. This property can be used for preventing double spending in blockchains. Two messages 𝑚1 = (𝑎1, 𝑝1) and 𝑚2 = (𝑎2, 𝑝2) are considered colliding if 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 and 𝑝1 ≠ 𝑝2. Any two signatures with the identical address but different contents will disclose the secret key. Given a security parameter 𝜆, DAPS can be delineated as follows. • Key Generation : KeyGen(1 𝜆 ) → (𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) Key Generation • Signature : Sign(𝑠𝑘,𝑚) → 𝜎𝑚, where 𝑚 = (𝑎, 𝑝) Signature • Verification : Verify(𝑝𝑘,𝑚, 𝜎𝑚) → True/False Verification • Extraction : Extract(𝑝𝑘,𝑚1, 𝜎𝑚1 ,𝑚2, 𝜎𝑚2 ) → 𝑠𝑘/⊥ Extraction Hashed TimeLock Contracts (HTLCs) . The Hashed TimeLock Contract (HTLC) is a cryptographic contract utilized to facilitate secure and trustless transactions. In an vanilla HTLC, funds are locked in a contract and can only be accessed by the designated recipient upon fulfillment of predetermined conditions within a specified time frame 𝑇 . The condition is expressed as the presentation of a preimage of the hash. For example, the contract asks the designated recipient to present the preimage 𝐴 for the hash 𝐻(𝐴). If 𝐴 is not provided before 𝑇 , the funds are refunded after 𝑇. Hashed TimeLock Contracts (HTLCs) Authors: (1) Zifan Peng, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (zpengao@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn); (2) Yingjie Xue, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (yingjiexue@hkust-gz.edu.cn); (3) Jingyu Liu, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (jliu514@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn). Authors: Authors: (1) Zifan Peng, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (zpengao@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn); (2) Yingjie Xue, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (yingjiexue@hkust-gz.edu.cn); (3) Jingyu Liu, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) Guangzhou, Guangdong, China (jliu514@connect.hkust-gz.edu.cn). This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 license. available on arxiv

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