20% of All General Searches in the U.S. Go Through the Default on User-Downloaded Version of Chrome

C. The Foreclosure Created By Google’s Agreements Is Enhanced By Google’s Ownership Of The Chrome Browser

968. About 20% of all general search queries in the United States go through the default on user-downloaded versions of Chrome (e.g., Chrome on Windows and Apple devices). Tr. 5763:9–13, 5765:6–15 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (user-downloaded Chrome includes Chrome on Windows and Apple devices; explaining that the yellow part of the bar (20%) on UPXD104 at 37 is user-downloaded Chrome); id. 10639:10–17 (20% of U.S. search queries come through user-downloaded Chrome). These are defaults not challenged by Plaintiffs’ complaint but still affect the portion of the relevant markets available to rivals and thus magnify the significance of the foreclosure created by the challenged agreements.

969. Because Google always sets itself as the Chrome search default, rivals cannot achieve distribution by being set as that default. In other words, queries going through the default on user-downloaded Chrome are not “fully available” to Google’s rivals. Tr. 922:19–23 (Kolotouros (Google)) (“Chrome, as an application, has Google as the default search engine, that is correct.”); Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (User-downloaded “Chrome queries are not fully available . . . to rivals, because Chrome is coming with a default in it to Google.”); id. 10639:10–19 (Google sets itself as the default on Chrome, which means rivals cannot access default distribution through Chrome.).

970. Even if Google is not engaging in exclusionary conduct by setting itself as the default on Chrome, the presence of Chrome makes the foreclosure caused by Google’s exclusionary contracts more significant. Tr. 5768:2–18 (Whinston (Pls. Expert)) (explaining that the presence of Chrome “color[s]” what the foreclosure range means—“when you think about these numbers [the 33% and the 50%,] . . . you shouldn’t think of it . . . relative to a hundred percent. You really should think of it in some sense relative to some smaller possible available market because of the presence of Chrome.”); id. 5752:18–5753:9 (discussing UPXD104 at 33, which states that foreclosure analysis needs to “consider[] how much of the market is available to rival sellers.”).