How the US Government Plans to Ensure the Safety and Security of AI Technology

Section 4 - Ensuring the Safety and Security of AI Technology.

4.1.  Developing Guidelines, Standards, and Best Practices for AI Safety and Security.  (a)  Within 270 days of the date of this order, to help ensure the development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in coordination with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce may deem appropriate, shall:

          (i)   Establish guidelines and best practices, with the aim of promoting consensus industry standards, for developing and deploying safe, secure, and trustworthy AI systems, including:

               (A)  developing a companion resource to the AI Risk Management Framework, NIST AI 100-1, for generative AI;

               (B)  developing a companion resource to the Secure Software Development Framework to incorporate secure development practices for generative AI and for dual-use foundation models; and

               (C)  launching an initiative to create guidance and benchmarks for evaluating and auditing AI capabilities, with a focus on capabilities through which AI could cause harm, such as in the areas of cybersecurity and biosecurity.

          (ii)  Establish appropriate guidelines (except for AI used as a component of a national security system), including appropriate procedures and processes, to enable developers of AI, especially of dual-use foundation models, to conduct AI red-teaming tests to enable deployment of safe, secure, and trustworthy systems.  These efforts shall include:

               (A)  coordinating or developing guidelines related to assessing and managing the safety, security, and trustworthiness of dual-use foundation models; and

               (B)  in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF), developing and helping to ensure the availability of testing environments, such as testbeds, to support the development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI technologies, as well as to support the design, development, and deployment of associated PETs, consistent with section 9(b) of this order.

     (b)  Within 270 days of the date of this order, to understand and mitigate AI security risks, the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the heads of other Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) as the Secretary of Energy may deem appropriate, shall develop and, to the extent permitted by law and available appropriations, implement a plan for developing the Department of Energy’s AI model evaluation tools and AI testbeds.  The Secretary shall undertake this work using existing solutions where possible, and shall develop these tools and AI testbeds to be capable of assessing near-term extrapolations of AI systems’ capabilities.  At a minimum, the Secretary shall develop tools to evaluate AI capabilities to generate outputs that may represent nuclear, nonproliferation, biological, chemical, critical infrastructure, and energy-security threats or hazards.  The Secretary shall do this work solely for the purposes of guarding against these threats, and shall also develop model guardrails that reduce such risks.  The Secretary shall, as appropriate, consult with private AI laboratories, academia, civil society, and third-party evaluators, and shall use existing solutions.

     4.2.  Ensuring Safe and Reliable AI.  (a)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, to ensure and verify the continuous availability of safe, reliable, and effective AI in accordance with the Defense Production Act, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq., including for the national defense and the protection of critical infrastructure, the Secretary of Commerce shall require:

          (i)   Companies developing or demonstrating an intent to develop potential dual-use foundation models to provide the Federal Government, on an ongoing basis, with information, reports, or records regarding the following:

               (A)  any ongoing or planned activities related to training, developing, or producing dual-use foundation models, including the physical and cybersecurity protections taken to assure the integrity of that training process against sophisticated threats;

               (B)  the ownership and possession of the model weights of any dual-use foundation models, and the physical and cybersecurity measures taken to protect those model weights; and

               (C)  the results of any developed dual-use foundation model’s performance in relevant AI red-team testing based on guidance developed by NIST pursuant to subsection 4.1(a)(ii) of this section, and a description of any associated measures the company has taken to meet safety objectives, such as mitigations to improve performance on these red-team tests and strengthen overall model security.  Prior to the development of guidance on red-team testing standards by NIST pursuant to subsection 4.1(a)(ii) of this section, this description shall include the results of any red-team testing that the company has conducted relating to lowering the barrier to entry for the development, acquisition, and use of biological weapons by non-state actors; the discovery of software vulnerabilities and development of associated exploits; the use of software or tools to influence real or virtual events; the possibility for self-replication or propagation; and associated measures to meet safety objectives; and

          (ii)  Companies, individuals, or other organizations or entities that acquire, develop, or possess a potential large-scale computing cluster to report any such acquisition, development, or possession, including the existence and location of these clusters and the amount of total computing power available in each cluster.

     (b)  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall define, and thereafter update as needed on a regular basis, the set of technical conditions for models and computing clusters that would be subject to the reporting requirements of subsection 4.2(a) of this section.  Until such technical conditions are defined, the Secretary shall require compliance with these reporting requirements for:

          (i)   any model that was trained using a quantity of computing power greater than 1026 integer or floating-point operations, or using primarily biological sequence data and using a quantity of computing power greater than 1023 integer or floating-point operations; and

          (ii)  any computing cluster that has a set of machines physically co-located in a single datacenter, transitively connected by data center networking of over 100 Gbit/s, and having a theoretical maximum computing capacity of 1020 integer or floating-point operations per second for training AI.

     (c)  Because I find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency related to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities declared in Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015 (Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), as amended by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), and further amended by Executive Order 13984, to address the use of United States Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Products by foreign malicious cyber actors, including to impose additional record-keeping obligations with respect to foreign transactions and to assist in the investigation of transactions involving foreign malicious cyber actors, I hereby direct the Secretary of Commerce, within 90 days of the date of this order, to:

          (i)    Propose regulations that require United States IaaS Providers to submit a report to the Secretary of Commerce when a foreign person transacts with that United States IaaS Provider to train a large AI model with potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity (a “training run”).  Such reports shall include, at a minimum, the identity of the foreign person and the existence of any training run of an AI model meeting the criteria set forth in this section, or other criteria defined by the Secretary in regulations, as well as any additional information identified by the Secretary.

          (ii)   Include a requirement in the regulations proposed pursuant to subsection 4.2(c)(i) of this section that United States IaaS Providers prohibit any foreign reseller of their United States IaaS Product from providing those products unless such foreign reseller submits to the United States IaaS Provider a report, which the United States IaaS Provider must provide to the Secretary of Commerce, detailing each instance in which a foreign person transacts with the foreign reseller to use the United States IaaS Product to conduct a training run described in subsection 4.2(c)(i) of this section.  Such reports shall include, at a minimum, the information specified in subsection 4.2(c)(i) of this section as well as any additional information identified by the Secretary.

          (iii)  Determine the set of technical conditions for a large AI model to have potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity, and revise that determination as necessary and appropriate.  Until the Secretary makes such a determination, a model shall be considered to have potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity if it requires a quantity of computing power greater than 1026 integer or floating-point operations and is trained on a computing cluster that has a set of machines physically co-located in a single datacenter, transitively connected by data center networking of over 100 Gbit/s, and having a theoretical maximum compute capacity of 1020 integer or floating-point operations per second for training AI.

     (d)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, pursuant to the finding set forth in subsection 4.2(c) of this section, the Secretary of Commerce shall propose regulations that require United States IaaS Providers to ensure that foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products verify the identity of any foreign person that obtains an IaaS account (account) from the foreign reseller.  These regulations shall, at a minimum:

          (i)    Set forth the minimum standards that a United States IaaS Provider must require of foreign resellers of its United States IaaS Products to verify the identity of a foreign person who opens an account or maintains an existing account with a foreign reseller, including:

               (A)  the types of documentation and procedures that foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products must require to verify the identity of any foreign person acting as a lessee or sub-lessee of these products or services;

               (B)  records that foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products must securely maintain regarding a foreign person that obtains an account, including information establishing:

                    (1)  the identity of such foreign person, including name and address;

                    (2)  the means and source of payment (including any associated financial institution and other identifiers such as credit card number, account number, customer identifier, transaction identifiers, or virtual currency wallet or wallet address identifier);

                    (3)  the electronic mail address and telephonic contact information used to verify a foreign person’s identity; and

                    (4)  the Internet Protocol addresses used for access or administration and the date and time of each such access or administrative action related to ongoing verification of such foreign person’s ownership of such an account; and

               (C)  methods that foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products must implement to limit all third-party access to the information described in this subsection, except insofar as such access is otherwise consistent with this order and allowed under applicable law;

          (ii)   Take into consideration the types of accounts maintained by foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products, methods of opening an account, and types of identifying information available to accomplish the objectives of identifying foreign malicious cyber actors using any such products and avoiding the imposition of an undue burden on such resellers; and

          (iii)  Provide that the Secretary of Commerce, in accordance with such standards and procedures as the Secretary may delineate and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, may exempt a United States IaaS Provider with respect to any specific foreign reseller of their United States IaaS Products, or with respect to any specific type of account or lessee, from the requirements of any regulation issued pursuant to this subsection.  Such standards and procedures may include a finding by the Secretary that such foreign reseller, account, or lessee complies with security best practices to otherwise deter abuse of United States IaaS Products.

     (e)  The Secretary of Commerce is hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of subsections 4.2(c) and (d) of this section.  Such actions may include a requirement that United States IaaS Providers require foreign resellers of United States IaaS Products to provide United States IaaS Providers verifications relative to those subsections.

     4.3.  Managing AI in Critical Infrastructure and in Cybersecurity.  (a)  To ensure the protection of critical infrastructure, the following actions shall be taken:

          (i)    Within 90 days of the date of this order, and at least annually thereafter, the head of each agency with relevant regulatory authority over critical infrastructure and the heads of relevant SRMAs, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency within the Department of Homeland Security for consideration of cross-sector risks, shall evaluate and provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security an assessment of potential risks related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure sectors involved, including ways in which deploying AI may make critical infrastructure systems more vulnerable to critical failures, physical attacks, and cyber attacks, and shall consider ways to mitigate these vulnerabilities.  Independent regulatory agencies are encouraged, as they deem appropriate, to contribute to sector-specific risk assessments.

          (ii)   Within 150 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Treasury shall issue a public report on best practices for financial institutions to manage AI-specific cybersecurity risks.

          (iii)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and with SRMAs and other regulators as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall incorporate as appropriate the AI Risk Management Framework, NIST AI 100-1, as well as other appropriate security guidance, into relevant safety and security guidelines for use by critical infrastructure owners and operators.

          (iv)   Within 240 days of the completion of the guidelines described in subsection 4.3(a)(iii) of this section, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall coordinate work by the heads of agencies with authority over critical infrastructure to develop and take steps for the Federal Government to mandate such guidelines, or appropriate portions thereof, through regulatory or other appropriate action.  Independent regulatory agencies are encouraged, as they deem appropriate, to consider whether to mandate guidance through regulatory action in their areas of authority and responsibility.

          (v)    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security Board as an advisory committee pursuant to section 871 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296).  The Advisory Committee shall include AI experts from the private sector, academia, and government, as appropriate, and provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Federal Government’s critical infrastructure community advice, information, or recommendations for improving security, resilience, and incident response related to AI usage in critical infrastructure.

     (b)  To capitalize on AI’s potential to improve United States cyber defenses:

          (i)    The Secretary of Defense shall carry out the actions described in subsections 4.3(b)(ii) and (iii) of this section for national security systems, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall carry out these actions for non-national security systems.  Each shall do so in consultation with the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security may deem appropriate.

          (ii)   As set forth in subsection 4.3(b)(i) of this section, within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, consistent with applicable law, each develop plans for, conduct, and complete an operational pilot project to identify, develop, test, evaluate, and deploy AI capabilities, such as large-language models, to aid in the discovery and remediation of vulnerabilities in critical United States Government software, systems, and networks.

          (iii)  As set forth in subsection 4.3(b)(i) of this section, within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall each provide a report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the results of actions taken pursuant to the plans and operational pilot projects required by subsection 4.3(b)(ii) of this section, including a description of any vulnerabilities found and fixed through the development and deployment of AI capabilities and any lessons learned on how to identify, develop, test, evaluate, and deploy AI capabilities effectively for cyber defense.

     4.4.  Reducing Risks at the Intersection of AI and CBRN Threats.  (a)  To better understand and mitigate the risk of AI being misused to assist in the development or use of CBRN threats — with a particular focus on biological weapons — the following actions shall be taken:

          (i)   Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall evaluate the potential for AI to be misused to enable the development or production of CBRN threats, while also considering the benefits and application of AI to counter these threats, including, as appropriate, the results of work conducted under section 8(b) of this order.  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

               (A)  consult with experts in AI and CBRN issues from the Department of Energy, private AI laboratories, academia, and third-party model evaluators, as appropriate, to evaluate AI model capabilities to present CBRN threats — for the sole purpose of guarding against those threats — as well as options for minimizing the risks of AI model misuse to generate or exacerbate those threats; and

               (B)  submit a report to the President that describes the progress of these efforts, including an assessment of the types of AI models that may present CBRN risks to the United States, and that makes recommendations for regulating or overseeing the training, deployment, publication, or use of these models, including requirements for safety evaluations and guardrails for mitigating potential threats to national security.

          (ii)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of OSTP, shall enter into a contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct — and submit to the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, the Director of OSTP, and the Chair of the Chief Data Officer Council — a study that:

               (A)  assesses the ways in which AI can increase biosecurity risks, including risks from generative AI models trained on biological data, and makes recommendations on how to mitigate these risks;

               (B)  considers the national security implications of the use of data and datasets, especially those associated with pathogens and omics studies, that the United States Government hosts, generates, funds the creation of, or otherwise owns, for the training of generative AI models, and makes recommendations on how to mitigate the risks related to the use of these data and datasets;

               (C)  assesses the ways in which AI applied to biology can be used to reduce biosecurity risks, including recommendations on opportunities to coordinate data and high-performance computing resources; and

               (D)  considers additional concerns and opportunities at the intersection of AI and synthetic biology that the Secretary of Defense deems appropriate.

     (b)  To reduce the risk of misuse of synthetic nucleic acids, which could be substantially increased by AI’s capabilities in this area, and improve biosecurity measures for the nucleic acid synthesis industry, the following actions shall be taken:

          (i)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OSTP, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Director of OSTP may deem appropriate, shall establish a framework, incorporating, as appropriate, existing United States Government guidance, to encourage providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences to implement comprehensive, scalable, and verifiable synthetic nucleic acid procurement screening mechanisms, including standards and recommended incentives.  As part of this framework, the Director of OSTP shall:

               (A)  establish criteria and mechanisms for ongoing identification of biological sequences that could be used in a manner that would pose a risk to the national security of the United States; and

               (B)  determine standardized methodologies and tools for conducting and verifying the performance of sequence synthesis procurement screening, including customer screening approaches to support due diligence with respect to managing security risks posed by purchasers of biological sequences identified in subsection 4.4(b)(i)(A) of this section, and processes for the reporting of concerning activity to enforcement entities.

          (ii)   Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in coordination with the Director of OSTP, and in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of HHS, and the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce may deem appropriate, shall initiate an effort to engage with industry and relevant stakeholders, informed by the framework developed under subsection 4.4(b)(i) of this section, to develop and refine for possible use by synthetic nucleic acid sequence providers:

               (A)  specifications for effective nucleic acid synthesis procurement screening;

               (B)  best practices, including security and access controls, for managing sequence-of-concern databases to support such screening;

               (C)  technical implementation guides for effective screening; and

               (D)  conformity-assessment best practices and mechanisms.

          (iii)  Within 180 days of the establishment of the framework pursuant to subsection 4.4(b)(i) of this section, all agencies that fund life-sciences research shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, establish that, as a requirement of funding, synthetic nucleic acid procurement is conducted through providers or manufacturers that adhere to the framework, such as through an attestation from the provider or manufacturer.  The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of OSTP shall coordinate the process of reviewing such funding requirements to facilitate consistency in implementation of the framework across funding agencies.

          (iv)   In order to facilitate effective implementation of the measures described in subsections 4.4(b)(i)-(iii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Homeland Security may deem appropriate, shall:

               (A)  within 180 days of the establishment of the framework pursuant to subsection 4.4(b)(i) of this section, develop a framework to conduct structured evaluation and stress testing of nucleic acid synthesis procurement screening, including the systems developed in accordance with subsections 4.4(b)(i)-(ii) of this section and implemented by providers of synthetic nucleic acid sequences; and

               (B)  following development of the framework pursuant to subsection 4.4(b)(iv)(A) of this section, submit an annual report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, and the Director of OSTP on any results of the activities conducted pursuant to subsection 4.4(b)(iv)(A) of this section, including recommendations, if any, on how to strengthen nucleic acid synthesis procurement screening, including customer screening systems.

     4.5.  Reducing the Risks Posed by Synthetic Content.

 To foster capabilities for identifying and labeling synthetic content produced by AI systems, and to establish the authenticity and provenance of digital content, both synthetic and not synthetic, produced by the Federal Government or on its behalf:

(a)  Within 240 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce may deem appropriate, shall submit a report to the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs identifying the existing standards, tools, methods, and practices, as well as the potential development of further science-backed standards and techniques, for:

          (i)    authenticating content and tracking its provenance;

          (ii)   labeling synthetic content, such as using watermarking;

          (iii)  detecting synthetic content;

          (iv)   preventing generative AI from producing child sexual abuse material or producing non-consensual intimate imagery of real individuals (to include intimate digital depictions of the body or body parts of an identifiable individual);

          (v)    testing software used for the above purposes; and

(vi)   auditing and maintaining synthetic content.

(b)  Within 180 days of submitting the report required under subsection 4.5(a) of this section, and updated periodically thereafter, the Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Director of OMB, shall develop guidance regarding the existing tools and practices for digital content authentication and synthetic content detection measures.  The guidance shall include measures for the purposes listed in subsection 4.5(a) of this section.

(c)  Within 180 days of the development of the guidance required under subsection 4.5(b) of this section, and updated periodically thereafter, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director of National Intelligence; and the heads of other agencies that the Director of OMB deems appropriate, shall — for the purpose of strengthening public confidence in the integrity of official United States Government digital content — issue guidance to agencies for labeling and authenticating such content that they produce or publish.

(d)  The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, consider amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation to take into account the guidance established under subsection 4.5 of this section.

4.6.  Soliciting Input on Dual-Use Foundation Models with Widely Available Model Weights.  When the weights for a dual-use foundation model are widely available — such as when they are publicly posted on the Internet — there can be substantial benefits to innovation, but also substantial security risks, such as the removal of safeguards within the model.  To address the risks and potential benefits of dual-use foundation models with widely available weights, within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, and in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall:

(a)  solicit input from the private sector, academia, civil society, and other stakeholders through a public consultation process on potential risks, benefits, other implications, and appropriate policy and regulatory approaches related to dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available, including:

          (i)    risks associated with actors fine-tuning dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available or removing those models’ safeguards;

          (ii)   benefits to AI innovation and research, including research into AI safety and risk management, of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available; and

          (iii)  potential voluntary, regulatory, and international mechanisms to manage the risks and maximize the benefits of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available; and

(b)  based on input from the process described in subsection 4.6(a) of this section, and in consultation with the heads of other relevant agencies as the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, submit a report to the President on the potential benefits, risks, and implications of dual-use foundation models for which the model weights are widely available, as well as policy and regulatory recommendations pertaining to those models.

     4.7.  Promoting Safe Release and Preventing the Malicious Use of Federal Data for AI Training.To improve public data access and manage security risks, and consistent with the objectives of the Open, Public, Electronic, and Necessary Government Data Act (title II of Public Law 115-435) to expand public access to Federal data assets in a machine-readable format while also taking into account security considerations, including the risk that information in an individual data asset in isolation does not pose a security risk but, when combined with other available information, may pose such a risk:

(a)  within 270 days of the date of this order, the Chief Data Officer Council, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop initial guidelines for performing security reviews, including reviews to identify and manage the potential security risks of releasing Federal data that could aid in the development of CBRN weapons as well as the development of autonomous offensive cyber capabilities, while also providing public access to Federal Government data in line with the goals stated in the Open, Public, Electronic, and Necessary Government Data Act (title II of Public Law 115-435); and

     (b)  within 180 days of the development of the initial guidelines required by subsection 4.7(a) of this section, agencies shall conduct a security review of all data assets in the comprehensive data inventory required under 44 U.S.C. 3511(a)(1) and (2)(B) and shall take steps, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to address the highest-priority potential security risks that releasing that data could raise with respect to CBRN weapons, such as the ways in which that data could be used to train AI systems.

     4.8.  Directing the Development of a National Security Memorandum.  To develop a coordinated executive branch approach to managing AI’s security risks, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy shall oversee an interagency process with the purpose of, within 270 days of the date of this order, developing and submitting a proposed National Security Memorandum on AI to the President.  The memorandum shall address the governance of AI used as a component of a national security system or for military and intelligence purposes.  The memorandum shall take into account current efforts to govern the development and use of AI for national security systems.  The memorandum shall outline actions for the Department of Defense, the Department of State, other relevant agencies, and the Intelligence Community to address the national security risks and potential benefits posed by AI.  In particular, the memorandum shall:

     (a)  provide guidance to the Department of Defense, other relevant agencies, and the Intelligence Community on the continued adoption of AI capabilities to advance the United States national security mission, including through directing specific AI assurance and risk-management practices for national security uses of AI that may affect the rights or safety of United States persons and, in appropriate contexts, non-United States persons; and

     (b)  direct continued actions, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to address the potential use of AI systems by adversaries and other foreign actors in ways that threaten the capabilities or objectives of the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community, or that otherwise pose risks to the security of the United States or its allies and partners.