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GitHub Copilot's Security Challenges: Insights and Recommendationsby@gitflow
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GitHub Copilot's Security Challenges: Insights and Recommendations

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A study replicating Copilot's vulnerabilities in Python code reveals ongoing security challenges despite updates, emphasizing the need for rigorous code security reviews and tools. Copilot's recommendations underscore the responsibility of developers, signaling broader implications for code generation tools' trustworthiness and security.
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Authors:

(1) Vahid Majdinasab, Department of Computer and Software Engineering Polytechnique Montreal, Canada;

(2) Michael Joshua Bishop, School of Mathematical and Computational Sciences Massey University, New Zealand;

(3) Shawn Rasheed, Information & Communication Technology Group UCOL - Te Pukenga, New Zealand;

(4) Arghavan Moradidakhel, Department of Computer and Software Engineering Polytechnique Montreal, Canada;

(5) Amjed Tahir, School of Mathematical and Computational Sciences Massey University, New Zealand;

(6) Foutse Khomh, Department of Computer and Software Engineering Polytechnique Montreal, Canada.

Abstract and Introduction

Original Study

Replication Scope and Methodology

Results

Discussion

Related Work

Conclusion, Acknowledgments, and References

VII. CONCLUSION

This study aimed to replicate the work of Pearce et al. [14], which uncovered several security weaknesses in code suggestions generated by GitHub Copilot. The replication study focused on Python-generated code and used the same baseline of weaknesses (MITRE top CWEs) to create the code generation prompts (covering a variety of weaknesses and scenarios). Following the study of [14], GitHub announced an upgrade to Copilot aimed at filtering out solutions that include top CWEs. Despite the current improvements from Copilot, our results demonstrate that Copilot continues to propose vulnerable suggestions for various scenarios. Particularly, within four of the CWEs tested (CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-434 (Unrestricted File Upload), CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), and CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data)), Copilot’s suggestions still exhibit vulnerabilities.


Our results highlight the importance for developers to continuously check the security of the code generated by such models through the implementation of rigorous security code reviews and with the use of a security analysis tool. This has been the recommendation provided by Copilot explicitly: “You are responsible for ensuring the security and quality of your code. We recommend you take the same precautions when using code generated by GitHub Copilot that you would when using any code you didn’t write yourself.” [29].


The issues associated with the security of generated code, especially from LLMs, will continue to impact the quality of code generation tools and thus might reduce the trust of developers using such tools. It is important to continue investigating such issues as both the underlying code generation models and the nature of weaknesses evolve fast.


While there is some work done on Copilot’s security, little is done in terms of other code-generation tools (especially those that utilize similar LLMs). We expect those tools to face similar security challenges, which will require further investigation.

VIII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is partially supported by Massey University SREF funding, the Fonds de Recherche du Quebec (FRQ), the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), and the National Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC).

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This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license.