Did the Court Rely on a Mistaken Understanding of the Law in Microsoft's Refusal to Comply?

DISCUSSION - I. Standard of Review

We will vacate a finding of civil contempt that rests on a party’s refusal to comply with a court order if we determine that the district court relied on a mistaken understanding of the law in issuing its order.  United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 464–70 (1951).  Similarly, we will vacate a district court’s denial of a motion to quash if we conclude that the denial rested on a mistake of law.[18] See In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2003).

It is on the legal predicate for the District Court’s rulings―its analysis of the Stored Communications Act, in particular, and of the principles of construction set forth by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)―  that we focus our attention in this appeal.

[18] Our Court has not squarely held what standard governs our review of a district court’s denial of a motion to quash and its related contempt finding.  We need not dwell long on this threshold question, however, because even a deferential abuse‐of‐discretion review incorporates a de novo examination of the district court’s rulings of law, such as we conduct here.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued June 18, 2009, 593 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2010).