Here are the Bedford Finance Committee's recommendations on articles in the Town Meeting Warrant. A Special Town Meeting is scheduled for Monday, Nov. 18.

Bedford Finance Committee Recommendations on the 2024 Special Town Meeting Articles - The Bedford Citizen

During the operation, TAG Investigators utilized numerous law enforcement strategies to proactively target known gang members.

44 warrants served during TAG operation targeting ‘known gang members’

According to OPD Brandon was shot on November 21, 2019. He had come home from picking his son up from baseball practice. When they got home his son went to the front of the house and Brandon went to the side entrance, where a man was waiting. Brandon was shot in front of his son, who was able ...

OPD: Warrant issued in four year old cold case murder of Brandon Swinney

The Israeli government warned the Biden administration that if the International Criminal Court issues arrest warrants against Israeli leaders, it will take retaliatory steps against the Palestinian Authority that could lead to its collapse, two Israeli and U.S. officials said.

Israel tells U.S. it will retaliate against Palestinian Authority if ICC issues arrest warrants

Multiple law enforcement agencies have descended on a Fairview home to carry out a search warrant, according to Anchorage Police Department dispatch.

Police, feds conduct search warrant on Fairview home

Editor’s note: This report has ... Israel’s supporters in Congress are lashing out at the International Criminal Court (ICC) over potential arrest warrants that could be issued for alleged crimes by Israeli…...

Global court in pressure cooker over threat of Israel arrest warrants | The Hill

There was a large police presence at a local establishment earlier today, May 1.

Law enforcement teams execute search warrant, multiple detained - WBBJ TV

The Detroit Lions announced Thursday that they have released cornerback Cameron Sutton after a domestic battery warrant was issued for his arrest.

Lions release CB Cameron Sutton following issuance of domestic violence arrest warrant

The affidavit detailing the ATF case against the Little Rock airport executive who was shot and killed by federal agents serving a search warrant at his home has been released.

Released search warrant affidavit shows details of ATF case against Little Rock airport executive Bryan Malinowski | KARK

The warrants highlight a grim discovery from the home of the accused shooter: 11 guns, about 170 boxes and bags of ammunition 45 of them empty, along with over 100 rounds of loose ammo.

Raleigh mass shooting: Fiancé devastated after learning search warrant details

Warrant

warrant

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 19 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here CONCLUSION We conclude that Congress did not intend the SCA’s warrant provisions to apply extraterritorially.  The focus of those provisions is protection of a user’s privacy interests.  Accordingly, the SCA does not authorize a U.S. court to issue and enforce an SCA warrant against a United States‐based service provider for the contents of a customer’s electronic communications stored on servers located outside the United States.  The SCA warrant in this case may not lawfully be used to compel Microsoft to produce to the government the contents of a customer’s e‐mail account stored exclusively in Ireland.  Because Microsoft has otherwise complied with the Warrant, it has no remaining lawful obligation to produce materials to the government. We therefore the District Court’s denial of Microsoft’s motion to quash; we its order holding Microsoft in civil contempt of court; and we this cause to the District Court with instructions to quash the warrant insofar as it demands user content stored outside of the United States. REVERSE VACATE REMAND GERARD E. LYNCH, , concurring in the judgment: Circuit Judge I am in general agreement with the Court’s conclusion that, in light of the presumption against extraterritorial application of congressional enactments, the Stored Communications Act (“SCA” or the “Act”) should not, on the record made by the government below, be construed to require Microsoft to turn over records of the content of emails stored on servers in Ireland. I write separately to clarify what, in my view, is at stake and not at stake in this case; to explain why I believe that the government’s arguments are stronger than the Court’s opinion acknowledges; and to emphasize the need for congressional action to revise a badly outdated statute. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

Microsoft Wins Appeal to Quash Warrant Asking it to Share Customer's Data

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 11 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here 1. Plain Meaning of the SCA As observed above, the SCA permits the government to require service providers to produce the contents of certain priority stored communications “only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction.”  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)(1)(a).  The provisions in § 2703 that permit a service provider’s disclosure in response to a duly obtained warrant do not mention any extraterritorial application, and the government points to no provision that even implicitly alludes to any such application.  No relevant definition provided by either Title I or Title II of ECPA, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2711, suggests that Congress envisioned any extraterritorial use for the statute. When Congress intends a law to apply extraterritorially, it gives an “affirmative indication” of that intent.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265.  It did so, for example, in the statutes at issue in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 207 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2014) (concluding that definition of “international terrorism” within 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) covers extraterritorial conduct because Congress referred to acts that “occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”) and United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) applies to extraterritorial conduct because it criminalizes “travel in foreign commerce undertaken with the intent to commit sexual acts with minors” that would violate United States law had the acts occurred in the jurisdiction of the United States).  We see no such indication in the SCA. We emphasize further that under § 2703, any “court of competent jurisdiction”―defined in § 2711(3)(B) to include “a court of general criminal jurisdiction of a State authorized by the law of that State to issue search warrants”―may issue an SCA warrant.  Section 2703(a) refers directly to the use of State warrant procedures as an adequate basis for issuance of an SCA warrant.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  We think it particularly unlikely that, if Congress intended SCA warrants to apply extraterritorially, it would provide for such far‐reaching state court authority without at least “address[ing] the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.”  Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256; see also American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (describing as beyond dispute the notion that “state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy”). The government asserts that “[n]othing in the SCA’s text, structure, purpose, or legislative history indicates that compelled production of records is limited to those stored domestically.”  Gov’t Br. at 26 (formatting altered and emphasis added).  It emphasizes the requirement placed on a service provider to disclose customers’ data, and the absence of any territorial reference restricting that obligation.  We find this argument unpersuasive:  It stands the presumption against extraterritoriality on its head.  It further reads into the Act an extraterritorial awareness and intention that strike us as anachronistic, and for which we see, and the government points to, no textual or documentary support. [20] [20] Seeking additional grounds for its position that to apply Morrison in this case is to proceed on a false premise, the government argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies only to “substantive provisions” of United States law, and that the SCA’s warrant provisions are procedural.  Gov’t Br. at 31.  The proposition that the SCA’s protections are merely procedural might reasonably be questioned.  But even assuming that they are procedural, the government gains no traction with this argument, which we rejected in Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 272‐73 (2d Cir. 2014). Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

Who in the US Has the Authority to Issue Warrants for Data Stored Overseas?

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 12 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here 2. The SCA’s Use of the Term of Art “Warrant” Congress’s use of the term of art “warrant” also emphasizes the domestic boundaries of the Act in these circumstances. In construing statutes, we interpret a legal term of art in accordance with the term’s traditional legal meaning, unless the statute contains a persuasive indication that Congress intended otherwise.  See F.A.A. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 (2012) (“[W]hen Congress employs a term of art, ‘it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.’”) (quoting Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 307 (1992)).  “Warrant” is such a term of art. The term is endowed with a legal lineage that is centuries old.  The importance of the warrant as an instrument by which the power of government is exercised and constrained is reflected by its prominent appearance in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV.  It is often observed that “[t]he chief evil that prompted the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment was the indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted by the British under the authority of general warrants.”  United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).   Warrants issued in accordance with the Fourth Amendment thus identify discrete objects and places, and restrict the government’s ability to act beyond the warrant’s purview ― of particular note here, outside of the place identified, which must be described in the document.  Id. at 445–46. As the term is used in the Constitution, a warrant is traditionally moored to privacy concepts applied within the territory of the United States:  “What we know of the history of the drafting of the Fourth Amendment . . . suggests that its purpose was to restrict searches and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic matters.” In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration omitted and ellipses in original) (quoting United States v. Verdugo‐Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990)).  Indeed, “if U.S. judicial officers were to issue search warrants intended to have extraterritorial effect, such warrants would have dubious legal significance, if any, in a foreign nation.”  Id. at 171. Accordingly, a warrant protects privacy in a distinctly territorial way.[21] The SCA’s legislative history related to its post enactment amendments supports our conclusion that Congress intended to invoke the term “warrant” with all of its traditional, domestic connotations.[22] Since the SCA’s initial passage in 1986, Congress has amended § 2703 to relax some of the Rule 41 requirements as they relate to SCA warrants.  Although some address the reach of SCA warrants, none of the amendments contradicts the term’s traditional domestic limits.  See USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107‐56, § 220; 115 Stat. 272, 291–92 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b)); 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 107‐273, § 11010, 116 Stat. 1758, 1822 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g)); Foreign Evidence Request Efficiency Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111‐79, § 2, 123 Stat. 2086, 2086 (2009) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)). These amendments to the SCA are fully consistent with the historical role of warrants as legal instruments that pertain to discrete objects located within the United States, and that are designed to protect U.S. citizens’ privacy interests. The magistrate judge took a different view of the legislative history of certain amendments to the SCA. He took special notice of certain legislative history related to the 2001 amendment to the warrant provisions enacted in the USA PATRIOT ACT. A House committee report explained that “[c]urrently, Federal Rules [sic] of Criminal Procedure 41 requires that the ‘warrant’ be obtained ‘within the district’ where the property is located.  An investigator, for example, located in Boston . . . might have to seek a suspect’s electronic e‐mail from an Internet service provider (ISP) account located in California.” In re Warrant, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (quoting H.R. Rep. 107‐236(I), at 57 (2001)).  The magistrate judge reasoned that this statement equated the location of property with the location of the service provider, and not with the location of any server. Id. at 474. But this excerpt says nothing about the need to cross international boundaries; rather, while noting the “cross‐jurisdictional nature of the Internet,” it discusses only amendments to Rule 41 that allow magistrate judges “within the district” to issue warrants to be executed in other “districts”—not overseas.  Id. at 473 (quoting H.R. Rep. 107‐236(I), at 58).  Furthermore, the Committee discussion reflects no expectation that the material to be searched and seized would be located any place other than where the service provider is located.  Thus, the Committee’s hypothetical focuses on a situation in which an investigator in Boston might seek e‐mail from “an Internet service provider (ISP) account located in California.”  To our reading, the Report presumes that the service provider is located where the account is—within the United States.[23] [21] The government argues that the SCA’s warrant provisions were “modeled after the Right to Financial Privacy Act,” 12 U.S.C. §§ 3402(3), 3406, and that the latter act also “envisions that warrants—along with subpoenas and summonses—will trigger a disclosure requirement.” Gov’t Br. at 19 (citing S. Rep. No. 99‐541, at 3).  It points to no authority definitively construing the latter act’s warrant provisions, however, nor any acknowledgment in the history of the SCA that enforcement of the warrant’s disclosure commands would cross international boundaries. For these reasons, we accord little weight to the observation. [22] We note that a 2009 amendment to Rule 41 expressly authorizes the use of such warrants to seize electronically‐stored data, without abandoning the requirement that the warrant specify the place from which the data is to be seized.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B) (allowing magistrate judge to “authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information” (emphasis added)). [23] Our brief discussion here of the law of warrants is offered in aid only of our interpretation of the statutory language.  Consequently, we do not consider whether the Fourth Amendment might be understood to impose disclosure‐related procedural requirements more stringent than those established by the SCA.  See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding Fourth Amendment protects certain electronic communications based on users’ reasonable expectations of privacy); see also Email Privacy Act, H. R. 699, 114th Cong. § 3 (passed by House Apr. 27, 2016) (requiring government to obtain warrant before obtaining documents stored online). Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

The Factors Prompting a Judge to Issue Warrants for Microsoft Data Stored in Ireland

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 10 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here C. Whether the SCA’s Warrant Provisions Contemplate Extraterritorial Application We dispose of the first question with relative ease.  The government conceded at oral argument that the warrant provisions of the SCA do not contemplate or permit extraterritorial application.[19] Our review of the statute confirms the soundness of this concession. [19] When asked, “What text in the Stored Communications Act do you point to, to support your assertion that . . . Congress intended extraterritorial application?”, the government responded, “There’s no extraterritorial application here at all.”  Recording of Oral Argument at 1:06:40– 1:07:00.  Later, when Judge Lynch observed, “I take it that suggests that the government actually agrees that there shall not be extraterritorial application of the Stored Communications Act . . . what this dispute is about is about the focus of the statute and what counts as an extraterritorial application of the statute,” the government answered, “That’s right, Judge.”  Id. at 1:25:38– 1:26:05. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

The US Conceded That The Warrant Presented to Microsoft Did Not Apply to Overseas Locations

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 4 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here III. Statutory Background The Warrant was issued under the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, legislation enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.   Before we begin our analysis, some background will be useful. A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) became law in 1986.[10]  As it is summarized by the Department of Justice, ECPA “updated the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, which addressed interception of conversations using ‘hard’ telephone lines, but did not apply to interception of computer and other digital and electronic communications.”[11] ECPA’s Title II is also called the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).  The Act “protects the privacy of the contents of files stored by service providers and of records held about the subscriber by service providers,” according to the Justice Department.[12] We discuss its provisions further below. [10] Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 99‐508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848–73 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121 et seq.). 11 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Justice Information Sharing, (last visited May 12, 2016).  The Department advises that the acronym “ECPA” is commonly used to refer to the three titles of ECPA as a group (Titles I, II, and III of Pub. L. 99‐508).  Id.  Title I “prohibits the intentional actual or attempted interception, use, disclosure, or procurement of any other person” to intercept wire, oral, or electronic transmissions; Title II is the Stored Communications Act, discussed in the text; Title III “addresses pen register and trap and trace devices,” requiring government entities to obtain a court order authorizing their installation.  Id.  Title I and III are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510‐22; Title II is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701‐12, and constitutes chapter 121 of Title 18. https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285 [12] note 11. See supra Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

What Does the Law Say About the Warrant Issued to Microsoft?

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 3 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here II. Procedural History On December 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued the “Search and Seizure Warrant” that became the subject of Microsoft’s motion to quash. Although the Warrant was served on Microsoft, its printed boilerplate language advises that it is addressed to “[a]ny authorized law enforcement officer.” Id. at 44.  It commands the recipient to search “[t]he PREMISES known and described as the email account [redacted]@MSN.COM, which is controlled by Microsoft Corporation.”[6]  Id.  It requires the “officer executing [the] warrant, or an officer present during the execution of the warrant” to “prepare an inventory . . .  and promptly return [the] warrant and inventory to the Clerk of the Court.”  Id Its Attachment A, “Property To Be Searched,” provides, “This warrant applies to information associated with [redacted]@msn.com, which is stored at premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by Microsoft Corporation . . . .” Id. at 45. Attachment C, “Particular Things To Be Seized,”[7] directs Microsoft to disclose to the government, “for the period of inception of the account to the present,” and “[t]o the extent that the information . . . is within the possession, custody, or control of MSN [redacted],” id., the following information: (a) “The contents of all e‐mails stored in the account, including copies of e‐mails sent from the account”; (b) “All records or other information regarding the identification of the account,” including, among other things, the name, physical address, telephone numbers, session times and durations, log‐in IP addresses, and sources of payment associated with the account; (c) “All records or other information stored by an individual using the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, pictures, and files”; and (d) “All records pertaining to communications between MSN [redacted] and any person regarding the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken.” J.A. 46–47. [8] After being served with the Warrant, Microsoft determined that the e‐mail contents stored in the account were located in its Dublin datacenter. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information, which was kept within the United States, and moved the magistrate judge to quash the Warrant with respect to the user content stored in Dublin. As we have recounted, the magistrate judge denied Microsoft’s motion to quash. In a Memorandum and Order, he concluded that the SCA authorized the District Court to issue a warrant for “information that is stored on servers abroad.” In re Warrant to Search a Certain E‐Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In re Warrant”).  He observed that he had found probable cause for the requested search, and that the Warrant was properly served on Microsoft in the United States. He noted that, inasmuch as an SCA warrant is served on a service provider rather than on a law enforcement officer, it “is executed like a subpoena in that it . . . does not involve government agents entering the premises of the ISP [Internet service provider] to search its servers and seize the e‐mail account in question.”  Id. at 471. Accordingly, he determined that Congress intended in the Act’s warrant provisions to import obligations similar to those associated with a subpoena to “produce information in its possession, custody, or control regardless of the location of that information.”  Id. at 472 (citing Marc Rich, 707 F.2d at 667). While acknowledging that Microsoft’s analysis in favor of quashing the Warrant with respect to foreign‐stored customer content was “not inconsistent with the statutory language,” he saw Microsoft’s position as “undermined by the structure of the SCA, its legislative history,” and “by the practical consequences that would flow from adopting it.”  He therefore concluded that Microsoft was obligated to produce the customer’s content, wherever it might be stored.  He also treated the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place of storage (Ireland), as the relevant place of seizure. Microsoft appealed the magistrate judge’s decision to Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska, who, on de novo review and after a hearing, adopted the magistrate judge’s reasoning and affirmed his ruling from the bench.  In re Warrant to Search a Certain E‐Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation, 1:13‐mj‐02814 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 4, 2013), ECF No. 80 (order reflecting ruling made at oral argument). Microsoft timely noticed its appeal of the District Court’s decision denying the motion to quash.  Not long after, the District Court acted on a stipulation submitted jointly by the parties and held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the Warrant.[9] Id. at ECF No.92.  Microsoft timely amended its notice of appeal to reflect its additional challenge to the District Court’s contempt ruling. We now reverse the District Court’s denial of Microsoft’s motion to quash; vacate the finding of contempt; and remand the case to the District Court with instructions to quash the Warrant insofar as it calls for production of customer content stored outside the United States. [6] The name of the e‐mail address associated with the account is subject to a sealing order and does not bear on our analysis. [7] Although the Warrant includes an Attachment A and C, it appears to have no Attachment B. [8] The Warrant also describes in Attachment C techniques that would be used (presumably by the government, not Microsoft) “to search the seized e‐mails for evidence of the specified crime.” J.A. at 47. [9] As reflected in their stipulation, Microsoft and the government agreed to the contempt finding to ensure our Court’s appellate jurisdiction over their dispute. See United States v. Punn, 737 F.3d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting general rule that contempt finding needed before ruling denying motion to quash is sufficiently “final” to support appellate jurisdiction).  Because Microsoft timely appealed the contempt ruling, we need not decide whether we would have had jurisdiction over an appeal taken directly from the denial of the motion to quash.  See United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting exception to contempt requirement as basis for appellate jurisdiction in context of third party subpoena issued in administrative investigation). Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

Microsoft Moves to Quash Warrant Asking It to Share Emails of Customer Suspected of Drug Trafficking

Apple vs. FBI (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on February 16, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 17 of 17. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here II. Search Procedure for digital Devices 4. In searching digital devices or forensic copies thereof, law enforcement personnel executing this search warrant will employ the following procedure: a. Law enforcement personnel or other individuals assisting law enforcement personnel (the "search team") will, in their discretion, either search the digital device (s) on-site or seize and transport the device (s) to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory or similar facility to be searched at that location. The search team shall complete the search as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 60 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If additional time is needed, the government may seek an extension of this time period from the Court on or before the date by which the search was to have been completed. b. The search team will conduct the search only by using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only the specific items to be seized under this warrant. i. The search team may subject all of the data contained in each digital device capable of containing any of the items to be seized to the search protocols to determine whether the device and any data thereon falls within the list of items to be seized. The search team may also search for and attempt to recover deleted, "hidden," or encrypted data to determine, pursuant to the search protocols, whether the data falls within the list of items to be seized. ii. The search team may use tools to exclude normal operating system files and standard third-party software that do not need to be searched. c. When searching a digital device pursuant to the specific search protocols selected, the search team shall make and retain notes regarding how the search was conducted pursuant to the selected protocols. d. If the search team, while searching a digital device, encounters immediately apparent contraband or other evidence of a crime outside the scope of the items to be seized, the team shall immediately discontinue its search of that device pending further order of the Court and shall make and retain notes detailing how the contraband or other evidence of a crime was encountered, including how it was immediately apparent contraband or evidence of a crime. e. If the search determines that a digital device does not contain any data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government will, as soon as is practicable, return the device and delete or destroy all forensic copies thereof. f. If the search determines that a digital device does contain data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government may make and retain copies of such data, and may access such data at any time. g. If the search determines that a digital device is (1) itself an item to be seized and/or (2) contains data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government may retain forensic copies of the digital device but may not access them (after the time for searching the device has expired) absent further court order. h. The government may retain a digital device itself until further order of the Court or one year after the conclusion of the criminal investigation or case (whichever is latest), only if the device is determined to be an instrumentality of an offense under investigation or the government, within 14 days following the time period authorized by the Court for completing the search, obtains an order from the Court authorizing retention of the device (or while an application for such an order is pending). Otherwise, the government must return the device. Notwithstanding the above, after the completion of the search of the digital devices, the government shall not access digital data falling outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order of the Court. i. Notwithstanding the above, after the completion of the search of the digital devices, the government shall not access digital data falling outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order of the Court. 5. In order to search for data capable of being read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel are authorized to seize the following items: a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further or store evidence of the offense (s) listed above; b. Any equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding, or storage of digital data; c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of storing digital data; d. Any documentation, operating logs, or reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device; e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, or other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device; f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, or similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device. 6. The special procedures relating to digital devices found in this warrant govern only the search of digital devices pursuant to the authority conferred by this warrant and do not apply to any search of digital devices pursuant to any other court order. 7. The government is allowed to share the information obtained from this search (to include copies of digital media) with any government agency investigating, or aiding in the investigation of, this case or related matters. Continue Reading Here. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15-0451M retrieved on September 25, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. archive.epic.org

How the U.S. Law Enforcement Executes Search Warrants for Digital Devices 

Apple vs. FBI (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on February 16, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 14 of 17. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here Search and Seizure Warrant Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15-0451M retrieved on September 25, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. archive.epic.org

Apple vs. FBI: Search and Seizure Warrant

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SAMUEL BANKMAN-FRIED Court Filing Lewis A. Kaplan, December 9, 2022 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 22 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here ARGUMENT III. The Bank Fraud, Unlicensed Money Transmitting, and FCPA Conspiracy Charges (Counts 9, 10, and 13) Violate the Rule of Specialty and Must Be Dismissed. A. Counts 9, 10 and 13 Are “Separate Offenses” From Those on Which Mr. Bankman-Fried’s Extradition Was Granted. The rule of specialty precludes the Government from prosecuting Mr. Bankman-Fried on the bank fraud, unlicensed money transmitting, and FCPA conspiracy charges (Counts 9, 10, and 13, respectively). To determine whether the rule of specialty has been violated, courts in the Second Circuit consider whether the challenged charges are “separate offenses” from those on which extradition was granted. United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486, 490–91 (2d Cir. 1962); Fiocconi v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 480-81 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the Paroutian test and noting that “[t]he ‘principle of specialty’ reflects a fundamental concern of governments that persons who are surrendered should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government, especially for political crimes.”). In determining whether charges added after extradition are “separate” for purposes of the rule of specialty, courts have considered whether the government seeks to add charges against a defendant that the requested state “was not aware [of] when it agreed to his extradition.” United States v. Nosov, 153 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the rule of specialty was not violated where the superseding indictment added new counts implicating extradited defendant’s codefendants, and not the defendant); see also United States v. Waknine, No. CR 04-373(A)-DT, 2005 WL 8156937, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2005) (holding that charges based on newly alleged 22 specified unlawful activity in superseding indictment were not “of the same character” as those identified in extradition order where they were not “included in the original indictment or overlap [with] allegations contained therein”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the criminal statutes and the factual allegations underlying Counts 9, 10 and 13 are not referenced at all in the Warrant of Surrender or the Diplomatic Note. See Ex. 2 at SDNY_03_01098056; Ex. 1 at Ex. SBF 1 at 1-6. Neither of these documents reference the additional offenses by name or by statutory provision, and there is no reference to any U.S. bank accounts, including any bank accounts affiliated with FTX or Alameda, any transfers of funds through the U.S., any U.S. regulatory licenses that any FTX entity was purportedly required to obtain, any freezing of Alameda’s accounts on Chinese cryptocurrency changes or any payments Alameda allegedly made to unfreeze those accounts. And there is no reason to believe the Bahamas would have understood that the Government intended to prosecute Mr. Bankman-Fried on these additional charges as they are substantively distinct from the charges laid out in the Diplomatic Note, and are premised on factual allegations that were not included in the Diplomatic Note. See Lewis Decl. ¶¶ 45, 47-52. This accords with the treatment of these offenses by U.S. courts, which generally view the mail, wire and bank fraud statutes as establishing separate offenses. See, e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 359, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2391 (2014) (“But the two statutes [the mail fraud and bank fraud statutes], as an initial matter, have notable textual differences.”); United States v. Henderson, 968 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]ire fraud, mail fraud and bank fraud are separate offenses requiring separate and distinct elements of proof.”). Thus, Counts 9, 10 and 13 are “separate offenses” for which Mr. Bankman-Fried may not be prosecuted absent the express consent of the Bahamas as discussed further below. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case S5 22 Cr. 673 (LAK) retrieved on September 1, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. Storage.Courtlistener

Sam Bankman-Fried's Warrant of Surrender Did Not Include Charges Related to Fraud, Others

Zachary McCoy went for a bike ride on a Friday in March 2019. The avid biker would do loops around his Gainesville, Fla., neighborhood and track his rides with a fitness app on his Android phone. McCoy didn’t think anything unusual had happened that day. But months later, in January of this year, McCoy saying that his data was going to be released to local police. He’d become a potential suspect in a local burglary—and had no idea why. got an email from Google “There was absolutely nothing that tied Zack to this at all, other than Google saying he was there on the street,” McCoy’s lawyer, Caleb Kenyon, said. Police pegged McCoy as a potential suspect without security camera footage, eye-witness accounts, or any sort of forensic evidence because his device had shown up as near the burglary site. The Gainesville Police Department had gotten something called a geofence warrant granted by the . Alachua County court , or reverse-location warrants, are a fairly new concept. Geofence warrants With permission from a judge, they allow law enforcement to obtain anonymized data from Google from almost any device that was in a certain geographic area at a specific time. Police can then go back to Google for more specific user information on anyone they deem a suspect. There was absolutely nothing that tied Zack to this at all, other than Google saying he was there on the street. In McCoy’s case, he was tracking his bike ride using Runkeeper, which makes use of Google’s location services, just as many apps do. (Check your settings in your Google account—if “location history” is on, then Google has data on your movements.) He hired an attorney to fight the warrant before his personal information was released, and police ended up not pursuing the case. (The Gainesville Police Department declined to comment, except to say that there has not yet been an arrest in the burglary.) Google is the only tech company publicly known to release this kind of information to law enforcement specifically in response to geofence warrants. It is not clear how many other companies do the same. Microsoft assistant general counsel Hasan Ali, in an email response to The Markup’s request for comment, said “Microsoft does not and would not be in a position to comply with any warrants seeking such information.” Apple and Facebook declined to comment on the record regarding the warrants and whether they have any similar data and do or do not provide it to law enforcement. There’s no centralized database or oversight of geofence warrants, so it’s hard to measure exactly how often they’re used and for what sorts of crimes. Criminal cases springing from such warrants have largely involved robberies, burglaries, and murders—but there’s growing that police may use them to gather information on people who attend protests. speculation According to The New York Times, federal law enforcement first used the warrants . Since then, local police departments have adopted the tool—and its use is growing rapidly. in 2016 500% Increase in number of law enforcement requests Google received for geofenced location data between 2018 and 2019. In a court filing late last year, said law enforcement requests for geofenced location history data in its trove went up 1,500 percent between 2017 and 2018, and at least 500 percent between 2018 and 2019. Google has yet to release any exact figures, but reportedly they have received as many as . Google 180 requests in a single week In an email response to The Markup’s request for comment, Google’s Director of Law Enforcement and Information Security, Richard Salgado, said, “We vigorously protect the privacy of our users while supporting the important work of law enforcement.  We developed a process specifically for these requests that is designed to honor our legal obligations while narrowing the scope of data disclosed.” Civil liberties groups—and increasingly politicians and judges as well—are watching the rise in geofence warrants with concern. There are around the country the constitutionality of such warrants, to limit their use, and at least one member of Congress who believes the federal government should get involved. cases challenging proposed legislation in New York “I think they’re incredibly dangerous, particularly if there are not significant guardrails put in place,” Rep. Kelly Armstrong (R-ND) told The Markup. So What Exactly Do Police Get Through These Warrants? A traditional search warrant for a car or a house or a laptop typically targets a specific person police have probable cause to suspect of a crime. Geofence warrants allow law enforcement officers to search when they don’t have a potential suspect. Geofencing itself simply means drawing a virtual border around . Data can then be gathered on users who enter that area. a predefined geographical area Geofencing is often used by marketers trying to reach specific audiences. A conservative political organization called CatholicVote has used geofencing technology and send targeted political ads to their devices. Clothing retailer Gap used the technology to send virtual ads to users . An NBC News report from late last year found that the University of North Carolina was using geofencing to of protesters on campus. And the American Civil Liberties Union found in 2016 that law enforcement was using a social media monitoring service called Geofeedia to . to identify Catholic church-goers within a certain distance of their physical ads monitor the location and social media activity track Black Lives Matter protesters (In response to the ACLU’s report, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram announced they would no longer provide their users’ data to Geofeedia.) While it’s unclear exactly how deep police can dive into user data they obtain from geofence warrants, current cases where the warrants are being challenged are revelatory. In an , police were able to use such a warrant to not only identify the accused but also access his location history from that day and personal information like his email address. That case is in federal court in the Eastern District of Virginia. In a , a man was identified through a geofence warrant through which police also acquired two email addresses of his, a complete list of Google-associated applications he’d used, and the IP address of at least one of his devices. armed robbery case in Richmond, Va. burglary case in state court in San Francisco (Defendants in both cases, which are wending their ways through court, argue that the warrants were unconstitutional.) In a in the Virginia case, Google said that in addition to location history, geofence warrants can include “account-identifying information” and “account subscriber information such as the Gmail address associated with the account and the first and last name entered by the user on the account.” court filing Are These Warrants Constitutional? Civil liberties groups say the issue with geofence warrants is just how much information from innocent individuals law enforcement can get their hands on. The claim is that they violate the Fourth Amendment, which protects Americans against “ ” and stipulates that warrants only be issued with probable cause “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The problem with geofence warrants is that the persons and place to be searched are rarely particular, and there’s no limit to how many innocent people are included if they happen to be in law enforcement’s search boundaries. unreasonable searches and seizures … no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Police, on the other hand, generally argue that such warrants aren’t so different from other types of surveillance—from using security camera footage to to see which devices passed through the area. sifting through data from cell towers Google has not taken a public position on whether it believes the warrants are constitutional but says it does provide data when presented with a warrant. The company has outlined its process in court filings and said that it considers executing geofence warrants “ ” that’s significantly different from cellphone tower dumps. a broad and intrusive search The constitutional question is largely unsettled—no case involving a geofence warrant has made its way to a high-level court. But on Aug. 24, Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued what is believed to be the on the Fourth Amendment’s relationship to geofence warrants. first federal court opinion Investigators in the state requested a in hopes of finding a suspect who allegedly stole prescription drugs. Despite repeatedly narrowing their request, Judge Fuentes declined to grant the warrant. geofence warrant three times While geofence warrants are not in themselves “categorically unconstitutional,” he wrote, investigators lacked probable cause to scoop up vast location data from cellphones of people who obviously had no connection to a crime but happened to be nearby when it was committed. “The potential to use Google’s capabilities to identify a wrongdoer by identifying everyone (or nearly everyone) at the time and place of a crime may be tempting,” Fuentes wrote. “But if the government can identify that wrongdoer only by sifting through the identities of unknown innocent persons without probable cause and in a manner that allows officials to ‘rummage where they please in order to see what turns up,’ ” then courts should not permit the practice. There Are Political Efforts to Rein Them In On April 8, state senator Zellnor Myrie introduced the in New York. Reverse Location Search Prohibition Act The bill would prohibit “the search, with or without a warrant, of geolocation data of a group of people who are under no individual suspicion of having committed a crime, but rather are defined by having been at a given location at a given time.” If the bill passes, New York would become the first state where geofence warrants are banned. We can either create boundaries on what kinds of data companies can collect—only to be outpaced by new advances in technology—or we can put limits on how law enforcement can obtain and use that data. “We can either create boundaries on what kinds of data companies can collect—only to be outpaced by new advances in technology—or we can put limits on how law enforcement can obtain and use that data,” Myrie said in an email. Armstrong, the North Dakota congressman, has also confronted Google about its compliance with geofence warrants. At a hearing featuring the , Armstrong pointedly asked Google CEO Sundar Pichai about such warrants. CEO’s of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google “People would be terrified to know that law enforcement could grab general warrants and get everyone’s information everywhere,” Armstrong . “It requires Congress to act, and it requires everybody that is a witness in this hearing to be willing to work too, because it is the single most important issue.” said in the hearing Pichai responded by saying Google thinks “it’s an important area for Congress to have oversight” and that the company recently began automatically deleting location activity after “a certain period of time.” “I don’t blame the tech companies solely for this,” Armstrong told The Markup. “Congress’s failure to act on this is going to become more and more of an issue.” . Originally published as " What Are Geofence Warrants" with the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license

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