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Meet the Winners of Startups in North and Central America

AI Business: Enterprise Models for LLMs Profitability

Life in 2050 According to Gemini 1.5 Pro

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Alyvia Walters, Rutgers University, USA; (2) Tawfiq Ammaris, Rutgers University, USA; (3) Kiran Garimella, Rutgers University, USA; (4) Shagun Jhaver, Rutgers University, USA. Table of Links Abstract & Introduction Background and Related Work Methods The Tools of CRT Meme Production Knowledge Production in a Post-Truth World Conclusion & References The Tools of CRT Meme Production After iteratively coding each meme, we were left with 21 unique codes which could be subsumed under one or more of the following major rhetorical tactics: 1) struggles over definition, or how the meme makes sense of what critical race theory is; 2) constructing “antiracism,” or the ways in which the meme’s ideologies are coded as definitively not-racist to its intended audience; and 3) appeals to authority, or the ways in which the meme uses people or symbols to appear correct. These strategies, then, appear to be the most salient paths through which both pro- and anti-CRT arguments within these memes are built. Defining CRT With two exceptions, neither the pro- nor anti-CRT memes analyzed appear to be concerned with the “real” critical legal studies definition of critical race theory. Because CRT was not generally circulated within public discourse prior to the early 2020s, as mentioned above, there was a wide berth for political and epistemological work to be done in the construction of this definition in the public consciousness. Our analysis reveals that these memes do just that: while both proand anti-CRT memes provide a technically incorrect definition of what CRT actually is, the politics of sensemaking unfolds within these memes. Their consumers are left with bifurcating definitions of the bounds, risks, and benefits of critical race theory that ultimately serve to re-define the bounds and values of the communities in which these memes circulate. Within pro-CRT memes, the aggregated definition reads something like this: critical race theory means teaching history accurately and not being a racist and/or a Republican. These memes went to far fewer lengths than anti-CRT memes to define what CRT actually is, and relied instead upon defining it against other things: racism, Republicans, and/or the erasure of history. The top-circulated meme in our analysis is a prime example of this. In this meme, artist Jonathan Harris stands alongside his now-viral artwork entitled “Critical Race Theory,” which depicts the literal whitewashing of Black history (Figure 1). While this does nothing to define critical race theory, it certainly defines what it is not: the erasure of America’s violent, racist past. Similarly, image cluster 4 (Figure 2) is a computer-generated text-heavy meme that reads, “Republicans are not afraid of critical race theory. They don’t even know what it is. They’re afraid of theories critical of racists. They know who they are.” The irony, of course, is that this meme also does not indicate a real definition of CRT, or an indication of “knowing what it is”–it simply defines CRT against racists and Republicans, both of which believers in CRT cannot be. In contrast to this strategy, anti-CRT memes often utilize quite specific points of definition. Take, for instance, cluster 22 (Figure 3): In providing a six-point bulleted list, this meme lays out, in no uncertain terms, how its consumers are meant to understand CRT. These definitional strategies, however, are not always so concrete as a bulleted list. Whereas proCRT memes defined CRT against other ideas, anti-CRT memes sometimes worked to define it by conflating it with other “anti-American” ideas, such as Marxism (Figure 4) and straying from Christianity (Figure 5). In other words, antiCRT memes often tied CRT to other “woke” ideologies in order to define it, even as “wokeness,” in and of itself, lacks definitive boundaries. In all, anti-CRT memes essentially define critical race theory in the following way: CRT is a racist idea that makes people believe that race matters more than it should, and it is yet another way that “wokeness” is destroying America. This conceptualization is starkly different than that of the pro-CRT memes, and both are far from the “real” legal studies definition, as outlined above. As such, there is obvious political struggle in the fight to win the hegemonic, accepted definition of critical race theory — a definition which has little to do with its origins in critical theory and law. In this discussion on the political struggle over defining CRT, one particularly interesting meme to highlight is that of Cluster 27 (Figure 6). Metadiscourse on the Stakes of Defining CRT In this meme, a screenshot of a quoted tweet, two people are explicitly naming this struggle and pointing to its risks. By indicating that The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank known for their right-wing ideologies, is a top hit in searching for information on critical race theory, the original tweet author is pointing out that knowledge acquisition via the internet is deeply politicized, and without careful, critical consumption habits, people can be easily misled by seemingly authoritative information. The quote tweet, agreeing with this view, further interpolates into an ongoing debate in U.S. culture on whose “job” it is to educate on topics surrounding race and racism: people of color, who are exhausted by confronting this responsibility every day, but are also the people who have actual experience with racism; or white people, who are the ones who should be expending energy into acquiring knowledge to better educate themselves, without needing to further exploit the time and energy of people of color to do so (see, for example, Zheng (2021)). Both Twitter users, “naima, an improvisation,” and “Ramy” land in the same place: passing this responsibility to educate over to the internet is dangerous territory in a politicized information environment. If “some reactionary think tank” such as The Heritage Foundation is where people are gaining their knowledge because “Google is free” and no one else is providing this information, the struggle over defining these words–words which have actual policy impact, as seen through Youngkin’s Executive Order 1–is of utmost importance, and it appears that memes are one avenue in which this epistemological struggle occurs. Defining “Antiracism” These pro- and anti-CRT battles over definition, and the recognition in the metadiscourse that this is, indeed, a battle, is almost exclusively fought on the same grounds: that of antiracism. While there are some other nods to bigotry in its various forms, for example, transphobia as displayed in Figure 5, race and racism are unsurprisingly the main sites upon which definitions of critical race theory and its risks and/or benefits, are built. However, in a similar fashion to how “critical race theory” was defined to meet community needs rather than to reflect a “real” definition of the term, “antiracism,” too, is made into a fungible ideal constructed to meet the dire need of both sides of this argument to appear not-racist: a near necessity in 2023 America. According to Ferguson (2022), antiracism has suffered from a lack of coherent and accessible academic definition. Thus, she proposes a paraphrase of Black author and activist Ijeoma Oluo’s tweeted definition: “the commitment to eradicate racism in all its forms,” with a noted special interest in recognizing the difference between systemic and interpersonal racism. However, the tension we encounter in the analysis of these images is that, under this definition, both overt racism and a quieter “not-racism,” a term we will more clearly define below, is easily able to masquerade as antiracism to the undiscerning eye. In this way, the memes’ constructed definitions of antiracism become a technology through which racism is perpetuated. Bonilla-Silva (1997)’s oft-cited definition of racism demands recognition of both structural and interpersonal forms of racism, and it also demands acknowledgment of the difference between the two. Because these pro-CRT memes often fail to address structural racism, they fall short of forwarding truly antiracist ideologies even as they consistently present themselves as performing antiracism. These failures come through in what we are deeming “not-racism,” or essentially a focus on the interpersonal aspects of racism only, rather than on the structural ones. For instance, in Cluster 4 (Figure 2), the deflective “they” indicates several things all at once: first, that “we,” those who identify with this meme, are not like “them,” the racist Republicans; and second, that the stakes of this argument on critical race theory reside at the individual, interpersonal level. Each of these two implications constructs racism as something that happens within the hearts and minds of individuals, rather than at the structural level, and further, it absolves those who resonate with the meme from racism: “I am not a racist, because I support critical race theory.” This is not-racism in practice: a positionality that is not reflective of true antiracism, which is an ideology and practice that requires recognition of and action toward dismantling systems of racism, interpersonal racism, and the implicit bias that each of us holds. This is not to say that pro-CRT memes always failed at performing antiracism, either. There certainly were instances of successful acknowledgement of structural racism, such as in Cluster 7, which reads “If people attacked White Supremacy like they are attacking critical race theory, there would be no need for critical race theory.” However, the failures were all failing in the same way: by framing themselves and their ideologies as not-racist, and falsely equating that with doing antiracist work. On the other hand, anti-CRT memes wholly fail at performing true anti-racism, and they fail in many different ways: through rhetorics of racial neoliberalism, colorblind racism, and not-racism. Importantly, each of these tools of racism are constructed as antiracism, and sold to audiences as such. While not-racism presents a bit differently on this side of the aisle, the main takeaway is meant to be rhetorically the same: “we” are not the racists, “they” are. For instance, Figure 3 reads, in part, “What does critical race theory teach?...The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination.” This swiftly both dismisses racism as in the “past,” thus ignoring its structural persistence and constructs those that support critical race theory as the racists. In this way, both pro- and anti-CRT memes variably fail at performing antiracism, often forwarding what Blake et al. (2019) call “antiracist appropriation,” or a strategy that is “primarily concerned with deciphering who is a racist and who is not, rather than working to dismantle racism’s socially shared institutional and affective structures” (p. 23). By forwarding this claim, we do not mean to engage in an uncritical false balance (Rietdijk and Archer 2021) analysis here, as there is clearly one group that is getting closer to actual antiracism than the other: pro-CRT memes. It is important to note, however, that even pro-CRT memes are not actually accomplishing an antiracist agenda, as they are rather uncritical of the structural aspects of racism and choose to focus, instead, on interpersonal-level issues. Though using appeals to authority is not a groundbreaking rhetorical strategy and is, in fact, one of the pillars of Aristotelian rhetorical philosophy, the ways in which this ethos appears within these memes present an interesting finding: equally often, both pro-and anti-CRT memes deployed the imagery and/or quotes of Black people. Through circulating these images widely, those captured in these memes essentially stand in as Black spokespeople for each side of the argument, lending credence to the meme’s ideology–no matter the side of the argument–through the color of their skin. Appeals to Black Authority Anti-CRT memes that used this rhetorical strategy–all of which, notably, were produced and originally disseminated by the conservative Media Research Center (MRC)†–constructed these Black spokespeople as both authoritative in their experience and authoritative in their Blackness. Alveda King, Civil Rights Leader; Dr. Ben Carson, M.D. and former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; and Dr. Carol Swain, Ph.D. and professor of political science and law appeared in these memes, each in visage and in quote (see Figure 7 for an example of these memes, each of which followed this aesthetic template). The embodied Black professional positionalities which these people inhabit make it difficult for pro-CRT advocates to argue against their claims—claims which invariably speak to the sure pitfalls of socioculturally adopting critical race theory—and thus a comfortable space of disseminating racism through the rhetorics of not-racism opens up. Using Black spokespeople to deliver implicitly or explicitly racist information has been a tactic used for decades to make news reporting (Entman and Rojecki 2007), campaign strategy, and political policy (Mendelberg 2001) appear notracist. The implicit suggestion is that if a Black person indicates something is not racist, it must not be. This, then, “bolsters [whites’] denials that racism still impedes the lives of African Americans” (Entman and Rojecki 2007, p. 106) and invites a level of assurance that they, too, are notracist. In the context of the memes analyzed for this study, these Black spokespeople are consistently reflecting a well-established space of Black conservative thought which taps into individualism, self-help, and egalitarianism as answers to discussions on racism (Lewis 2005). Critical race theory–the “real,” institutional one–actually warns against this very scenario: CRT argues that constructing Black spokespeople as people who can speak for the entire race is both essentialist and ignorant to the importance of intersectionality (Delgado and Stefancic 2023). While it is true that Black Democrats far outweigh Black Republicans in the electorate (Cox 2022), and thus pro-CRT memes that deploy Black spokespeople likely reflect a larger share of Black thought, it is still unproductive to count any single person as representative of a race of people. Despite this, however, constructing Black spokespeople through memes–Black spokespeople who are made to appear as the reasonable “Black voice”–was a way of building authority and “assurances” for those against CRT that they were not thinking in a racist way. While their Blackness operates, rhetorically, as an appeal to authority in a conversation about race, the idea of the “Black spokesperson” takes on a different function and meaning in these pro-CRT memes. Whereas anti-CRT memes were curating quotes from a very specific set of Black spokespeople, seeking out those who have said something condemning CRT, overlaying these quotes on an image of the Black orator, and circulating that image, those on the pro-side of the issue are more often amplifying already-existing media that Black people created. For example, the image of artist Jonathan Harris (Figure 1) was an organic, pre-existing photograph of the artist posing with his work–not a computer-generated, curated message that was created without his knowledge or consent. Similarly, the meme featuring Michael Eric Dyson’s thoughts (Figure 4) is simply a screenshot of a tweet he chose to write and publish on the internet–again, not something that an outside entity needed to create. The only exception is the meme featuring John Legend (Figure 9). This meme has a similar aesthetic to the anti-CRT memes in that it is a computer-generated image of Legend alongside a quote about Black parents needing to get involved in conversations around the banning of critical race theory. This meme represents just one way that anti- and pro-CRT memes perform “not-racism” in rhetorically similar ways, even if they have different end goals. [†] The Media Research Center (MRC) is more than simply a Facebook page, which is where many of these other memes are sourced. To the contrary, MRC is an entire conservative media network that self-describes its mission as being in accordance with "America’s founding principles and Judeo-Christian values." For more, see mrctv.org

Online Knowledge Production in Polarized Political Memes: The Tools of CRT Meme Production

USA v. Google LLC Court Filing, retrieved on January 24, 2023 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 10 of 44. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here IV. GOOGLE’S SCHEME TO DOMINATE THE AD TECH STACK A. Google Buys Control of the Key Tools that Link Publishers and Advertisers 76. Google entered display advertising on the back of its early strength in search and search advertising. In 2000, Google launched Google Ads (then called “AdWords”), a selfservice buying tool for advertisers. At the time, advertisers could use Google Ads to purchase advertising on the webpage displaying Google search results. 77. As Google’s search engine dominance grew, it attracted large numbers of small and large businesses that considered advertising on Google’s search results page to be critical to reaching customers searching for their products or services. After amassing this pool of advertisers, Google realized it could not only sell them advertising space on Google’s search results page, but also step in as an intermediary to sell them advertising space on non-Google websites as well. Thus in 2003, Google changed the default setting on Google Ads so that businesses were automatically opted into using Google Ads to advertise on third-party websites through what became known as or “ .” Today, Google Ads has grown to represent over two million advertisers, spending about $11 billion worldwide on open web display inventory per year. Google Ads is a substantial, unique source of advertising demand and revenue for publishers. Google Display Network, GDN 78. In 2006, Google found itself without sufficient access to non-Google premium advertising inventory to meet its advertisers’ demand. Effectively integrating Google Ads with existing publisher-facing platforms would have benefited both Google Ads advertisers—by increasing their access to inventory—and Google—by increasing advertising sales, and in turn Google’s total revenues as a percentage of those sales. Instead, Google sought to maintain more control over advertising purchases made by its Google Ads’ advertisers. In particular, it limited the ability of its Google Ads’ advertisers to buy inventory from Google’s rivals. Google recognized that if it could secure access to its own pool of publisher inventory, it could control the entire transaction, end-to-end, and become the “the be-all, and end-all location for all ad serving.” To that end, Google built and launched its own publisher ad server, but the product failed to gain traction. 79. Rather than innovate and compete, Google found a shortcut. In 2007, Google announced that it would buy DoubleClick for $3.1 billion. DoubleClick offered the industryleading publisher ad server, called DoubleClick for Publishers or “DFP”, which at the time had an estimated 60% market share. DoubleClick also was developing a nascent ad exchange, called AdX. 80. The DoubleClick acquisition was a pivotal moment for Google’s display advertising technology business and its strategy to dominate the ad tech stack. The deal provided Google with direct access to website publishers (and their inventory) on DoubleClick’s publisher ad server and, for the first time, a significant presence on both the advertiser and publisher sides of the ad tech stack. Google feared that if a rival acquired DoubleClick, Google would not control all the tools that link Google’s advertisers with publisher inventory; in short, a rival could “disintermediate” Google. Disintermediation risked allowing another company to control how and where publishers sell impressions to advertisers, something Google would not tolerate because it would limit Google’s ability to generate monopoly profits. Setting the stage for what was to come, the DoubleClick acquisition provided Google the unilateral power to implement a series of anticompetitive restraints, using its dominance on both the publisher and advertiser sides of the market to inhibit competition across the entire ad tech stack. 81. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigated Google’s proposed acquisition of DoubleClick. The FTC considered “the possibility that Google could leverage DoubleClick’s leading position in third party ad serving to its advantage in the ad intermediation market” and whether Google could “exclusively bundle AdWords [advertiser demand] with [its publisher-side platforms] AdSense and DFP.” 82. The FTC ultimately declined to challenge Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick for the reasons set out in its public closing statement. The FTC concluded that “DoubleClick does not have market power despite its high market share”—over 60% at the time—and that “firms can and do switch ad serving firms when it is in their self-interest to do so.” Based on these assumptions, the FTC believed any anticompetitive conduct by Google “would likely be defeated by customers switching to one of the other third-party ad serving products.” 83. Google’s contemporaneous business documents paint a very different picture, however. Six months after the FTC closed its investigation without taking action, one senior Google executive wrote about the importance of controlling access to publisher inventory through the DFP publisher ad server, stating “the thing we want ‘secured’ is the DFP platform adoption” because “if we have this” then Google would “have a +20% monetization advantage.” In other words, Google believed it could sustainably charge a higher price on advertising transactions than its competitors because it controlled the process and rules by which publisher inventory could be sold. 84. Google knew the emerging ad tech market better, and acknowledged in internal documents that “due to [the publisher ad server’s] position as the operating system for ad sales, switching costs are very high.” Because of this “stickiness” of publisher ad servers, Google knew it could manipulate the system in its favor—and to the detriment of competition—without fear that publishers would switch to other publisher ad servers. After the acquisition was completed, the former DoubleClick CEO explained at an internal Google strategy meeting, “My view is nothing really matters but the platform [publisher ad server]. Nothing has such high switching costs. If there’s a better network or exchange, you can just switch to it. Switching platforms is a nightmare. Takes an act of God to do it.” 85. Following the DoubleClick purchase, Google cemented its position as the dominant intermediary between advertisers and publishers through a series of additional acquisitions that eliminated potential competitors and further bolstered Google’s position in open digital advertising. For example, in 2009, Google paid $750 million to purchase AdMob, a technology system that allowed publishers of mobile apps to sell ads as well. While Google’s conduct in the distinct market for mobile app advertising is outside the scope of this Complaint, Google’s anticompetitive conduct in the mobile apps market is consistent with the conduct alleged in the market for display advertising. 86. In 2010, Google acquired Invite Media for approximately $81 million. Invite Media offered a demand side platform. Google subsumed Invite Media into a demand side platform it was developing, Display & Video 360 (at the time, known as “DoubleClick Bid Manager”). By capturing an increasingly large share of bigger, more sophisticated advertisers and advertising agencies, Display & Video 360 complemented Google Ads and expanded Google’s control over advertiser demand. 87. In 2011, Google bought AdMeld for approximately $400 million. As discussed further below, AdMeld had developed technology to provide “yield management” functionality to publishers. Yield managers like AdMeld helped publishers manage inventory and optimize revenue by comparing offers from multiple advertiser demand sources at the same time. This comparison feature made it easier for new ad exchanges and advertiser demand sources to enter the ad tech industry because it gave publishers the incentive and ability to switch between ad exchanges and advertiser demand sources in response to better prices and service. 88. The DoubleClick, Invite Media, and AdMeld acquisitions helped Google achieve dominant positions at each level of the open web ad tech stack and set the stage for Google to control and manipulate the process by which publishers sell and advertisers buy open web display inventory. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case 1:23-cv-00108 retrieved on September 8, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Google Achieved Market Dominance by Acquiring DoubleClick, Invite Media, & AdMeld, to name a few 

Google logró el dominio del mercado al adquirir DoubleClick, Invite Media y AdMeld, por nombrar algunos

Google a atteint sa domination sur le marché en acquérant DoubleClick, Invite Media et AdMeld, pour n'en nommer que quelques-uns

Google ने कुछ नाम रखने के लिए डबलक्लिक, इनवाइट मीडिया और एडमेल्ड का अधिग्रहण करके बाज़ार प्रभुत्व हासिल किया

Google は、数例を挙げると DoubleClick、Invite Media、AdMeld を買収することで市場の優位性を達成しました

O Google alcançou domínio de mercado ao adquirir DoubleClick, Invitation Media e AdMeld, para citar alguns

Google đã đạt được sự thống trị thị trường bằng cách mua lại DoubleClick, Mời truyền thông và AdMeld, cùng một số tên tuổi khác

Google 通过收购 DoubleClick、Invite Media 和 AdMeld 等公司实现了市场主导地位

As the intricate workings of American society unfold, a concerning truth emerges: a convergence of factors is propelling it towards an inescapable demise. The growing hive mindset, cancel culture, lack of individuality, and the relentless drive to conformity have created a delicate web that threatens the very foundation of American society. I. The Rise of the Hive Mindset A. The Hive Mindset: A Distributed Algorithm of Conformity The hive mindset, akin to a distributed algorithm, engulfs the collective consciousness of American society. It operates through interconnected nodes, where individuals conform to the prevailing groupthink. This pervasive mindset fosters a dangerous environment where individual thinking is subsumed by a homogeneous collective. B. Suppressing Critical Thinking: The Dangers of Homogeneity Under the influence of the hive mindset, critical thinking becomes a casualty. The emphasis on conformity suppresses dissenting opinions and alternative perspectives, hindering intellectual growth and progress. The lack of diversity in thought weakens the societal fabric, rendering it vulnerable to systemic failures. If you are interested in reading more of my articles and staying in touch with me then consider subscribing to my Hackernoon newsletter. You can subscribe by hitting that subscribe button below. II. The Menace of Cancel Culture A. Origins and Evolution: The Algorithmic Justice Gone Awry Cancel culture, a self-replicating algorithm, has rapidly infected American society. Initially emerging as a desire for justice, it has evolved into an unyielding beast that seeks to punish and ostracize individuals who deviate from established norms. This algorithmic justice system has far-reaching consequences beyond its immediate targets. B. Fear and Suppression: The Chilling Effect on Free Expression The consequences of cancel culture extend beyond the individual, permeating the broader social landscape. The fear of being targeted stifles free expression and inhibits the open exchange of ideas. Intellectual discourse becomes restrained, impeding progress and stifling innovation. III. The Erosion of Individuality A. Social Media: The Mirror Neuron Network Social media platforms have become the ultimate mirror neuron network, subtly shaping and influencing individual identities. The constant exposure to curated content and peer validation narrows the spectrum of individual expression. This erosion of individuality creates a society of replicas rather than individuals. B. Conformity and Stagnation: The Price of Homogeneity The steady erosion of individuality contributes to the stagnation of society. When uniqueness and diversity are suppressed, creativity and innovation suffer. The absence of different perspectives hampers problem-solving and limits societal progress, hindering adaptability in an ever-changing world. IV. The Drive to Conformity A. Societal Programming: The Algorithmic Influence Societal expectations and norms act as powerful algorithms that govern behavior and shape the drive to conformity. From early socialization to the pressures of peer influence, individuals are programmed to adhere to the established standards. The fear of standing out and the desire for acceptance drive the collective pursuit of conformity. B. Sacrificing Authenticity: The Cost of Conformity In the relentless pursuit of the conformity, individuals are  often forced to  sacrifice their authentic selves. The pressure to fit in and meet societal expectations leads to a loss of personal identity. The homogeneous nature of society limits personal growth, stifling the potential for true individual and societal development. V. The Downward Spiral The intricate interplay between the hive mindset, cancel culture, lack of individuality, and the drive to conformity creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop. As individuals succumb to the pressures of conformity, the hive mindset strengthens its grip, suppressing dissent and fostering an environment ripe for cancel culture. The resulting erosion of individuality further solidifies the homogeneous nature of society, perpetuating the cycle of conformity. Left unchecked, this downward spiral will propel American society towards an inevitable failure. If you are interested in reading more of my articles and staying in touch with me then consider subscribing to my Hackernoon newsletter. You can subscribe by hitting that subscribe button below.

Why American Society is Doomed

The Problem of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russells, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book here . ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS In regard to one man's knowledge at a given time, universals, like particulars, may be divided into those known by acquaintance, those known only by description, and those not known either by acquaintance or by description. Let us consider first the knowledge of universals by acquaintance. It is obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness. A similar process will make us acquainted with any other universal of the same sort. Universals of this sort may be called 'sensible qualities'. They can be apprehended with less effort of abstraction than any others, and they seem less removed from particulars than other universals are. We come next to relations. The easiest relations to apprehend are those which hold between the different parts of a single complex sense-datum. For example, I can see at a glance the whole of the page on which I am writing; thus the whole page is included in one sense-datum. But I perceive that some parts of the page are to the left of other parts, and some parts are above other parts. The process of abstraction in this case seems to proceed somewhat as follows: I see successively a number of sense-data in which one part is to the left of another; I perceive, as in the case of different white patches, that all these sense-data have something in common, and by abstraction I find that what they have in common is a certain relation between their parts, namely the relation which I call 'being to the left of'. In this way I become acquainted with the universal relation. In like manner I become aware of the relation of before and after in time. Suppose I hear a chime of bells: when the last bell of the chime sounds, I can retain the whole chime before my mind, and I can perceive that the earlier bells came before the later ones. Also in memory I perceive that what I am remembering came before the present time. From either of these sources I can abstract the universal relation of before and after, just as I abstracted the universal relation 'being to the left of'. Thus time-relations, like space-relations, are among those with which we are acquainted. Another relation with which we become acquainted in much the same way is resemblance. If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see that they resemble each other; if I also see a shade of red: at the same time, I can see that the two greens have more resemblance to each other than either has to the red. In this way I become acquainted with the universal resemblance or similarity. Between universals, as between particulars, there are relations of which we may be immediately aware. We have just seen that we can perceive that the resemblance between two shades of green is greater than the resemblance between a shade of red and a shade of green. Here we are dealing with a relation, namely 'greater than', between two relations. Our knowledge of such relations, though it requires more power of abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data, appears to be equally immediate, and (at least in some cases) equally indubitable. Thus there is immediate knowledge concerning universals as well as concerning sense-data. Returning now to the problem of a priori knowledge, which we left unsolved when we began the consideration of universals, we find ourselves in a position to deal with it in a much more satisfactory manner than was possible before. Let us revert to the proposition 'two and two are four'. It is fairly obvious, in view of what has been said, that this proposition states a relation between the universal 'two' and the universal 'four'. This suggests a proposition which we shall now endeavour to establish: namely, All a priori knowledge deals exclusively with the relations of universals. This proposition is of great importance, and goes a long way towards solving our previous difficulties concerning a priori knowledge. The only case in which it might seem, at first sight, as if our proposition were untrue, is the case in which an a priori proposition states that all of one class of particulars belong to some other class, or (what comes to the same thing) that all particulars having some one property also have some other. In this case it might seem as though we were dealing with the particulars that have the property rather than with the property. The proposition 'two and two are four' is really a case in point, for this may be stated in the form 'any two and any other two are four', or 'any collection formed of two twos is a collection of four'. If we can show that such statements as this really deal only with universals, our proposition may be regarded as proved. One way of discovering what a proposition deals with is to ask ourselves what words we must understand—in other words, what objects we must be acquainted with—in order to see what the proposition means. As soon as we see what the proposition means, even if we do not yet know whether it is true or false, it is evident that we must have acquaintance with whatever is really dealt with by the proposition. By applying this test, it appears that many propositions which might seem to be concerned with particulars are really concerned only with universals. In the special case of 'two and two are four', even when we interpret it as meaning 'any collection formed of two twos is a collection of four', it is plain that we can understand the proposition, i.e. we can see what it is that it asserts, as soon as we know what is meant by 'collection' and 'two' and 'four'. It is quite unnecessary to know all the couples in the world: if it were necessary, obviously we could never understand the proposition, since the couples are infinitely numerous and therefore cannot all be known to us. Thus although our general statement implies statements about particular couples, as soon as we know that there are such particular couples, yet it does not itself assert or imply that there are such particular couples, and thus fails to make any statement whatever about any actual particular couple. The statement made is about 'couple', the universal, and not about this or that couple. Thus the statement 'two and two are four' deals exclusively with universals, and therefore may be known by anybody who is acquainted with the universals concerned and can perceive the relation between them which the statement asserts. It must be taken as a fact, discovered by reflecting upon our knowledge, that we have the power of sometimes perceiving such relations between universals, and therefore of sometimes knowing general a priori propositions such as those of arithmetic and logic. The thing that seemed mysterious, when we formerly considered such knowledge, was that it seemed to anticipate and control experience. This, however, we can now see to have been an error. No fact concerning anything capable of being experienced can be known independently of experience. We know a priori that two things and two other things together make four things, but we do not know a priori that if Brown and Jones are two, and Robinson and Smith are two, then Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith are four. The reason is that this proposition cannot be understood at all unless we know that there are such people as Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith, and this we can only know by experience. Hence, although our general proposition is a priori, all its applications to actual particulars involve experience and therefore contain an empirical element. In this way what seemed mysterious in our a priori knowledge is seen to have been based upon an error. It will serve to make the point clearer if we contrast our genuine a priori judgement with an empirical generalization, such as 'all men are mortals'. Here as before, we can understand what the proposition means as soon as we understand the universals involved, namely man and mortal. It is obviously unnecessary to have an individual acquaintance with the whole human race in order to understand what our proposition means. Thus the difference between an a priori general proposition and an empirical generalization does not come in the meaning of the proposition; it comes in the nature of the evidence for it. In the empirical case, the evidence consists in the particular instances. We believe that all men are mortal because we know that there are innumerable instances of men dying, and no instances of their living beyond a certain age. We do not believe it because we see a connexion between the universal man and the universal mortal. It is true that if physiology can prove, assuming the general laws that govern living bodies, that no living organism can last for ever, that gives a connexion between man and mortality which would enable us to assert our proposition without appealing to the special evidence of men dying. But that only means that our generalization has been subsumed under a wider generalization, for which the evidence is still of the same kind, though more extensive. The progress of science is constantly producing such subsumptions, and therefore giving a constantly wider inductive basis for scientific generalizations. But although this gives a greater degree of certainty, it does not give a different kind: the ultimate ground remains inductive, i.e. derived from instances, and not an a priori connexion of universals such as we have in logic and arithmetic. Two opposite points are to be observed concerning a priori general propositions. The first is that, if many particular instances are known, our general proposition may be arrived at in the first instance by induction, and the connexion of universals may be only subsequently perceived. For example, it is known that if we draw perpendiculars to the sides of a triangle from the opposite angles, all three perpendiculars meet in a point. It would be quite possible to be first led to this proposition by actually drawing perpendiculars in many cases, and finding that they always met in a point; this experience might lead us to look for the general proof and find it. Such cases are common in the experience of every mathematician. The other point is more interesting, and of more philosophical importance. It is, that we may sometimes know a general proposition in cases where we do not know a single instance of it. Take such a case as the following: We know that any two numbers can be multiplied together, and will give a third called their product. We know that all pairs of integers the product of which is less than 100 have been actually multiplied together, and the value of the product recorded in the multiplication table. But we also know that the number of integers is infinite, and that only a finite number of pairs of integers ever have been or ever will be thought of by human beings. Hence it follows that there are pairs of integers which never have been and never will be thought of by human beings, and that all of them deal with integers the product of which is over 100. Hence we arrive at the proposition: 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100.' Here is a general proposition of which the truth is undeniable, and yet, from the very nature of the case, we can never give an instance; because any two numbers we may think of are excluded by the terms of the proposition. This possibility, of knowledge of general propositions of which no instance can be given, is often denied, because it is not perceived that the knowledge of such propositions only requires a knowledge of the relations of universals, and does not require any knowledge of instances of the universals in question. Yet the knowledge of such general propositions is quite vital to a great deal of what is generally admitted to be known. For example, we saw, in our early chapters, that knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only obtained by an inference, and that they are not things with which we are acquainted. Hence we can never know any proposition of the form 'this is a physical object', where 'this' is something immediately known. It follows that all our knowledge concerning physical objects is such that no actual instance can be given. We can give instances of the associated sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects. Hence our knowledge as to physical objects depends throughout upon this possibility of general knowledge where no instance can be given. And the same applies to our knowledge of other people's minds, or of any other class of things of which no instance is known to us by acquaintance. We may now take a survey of the sources of our knowledge, as they have appeared in the course of our analysis. We have first to distinguish knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. In each there are two kinds, one immediate and one derivative. Our immediate knowledge of things, which we called acquaintance, consists of two sorts, according as the things known are particulars or universals. Among particulars, we have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among universals, there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which can be known by acquaintance, but it is clear that among those that can be so known are sensible qualities, relations of space and time, similarity, and certain abstract logical universals. Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by description, always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called self-evident truths. Among such truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our derivative knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction. If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends upon our intuitive knowledge. It therefore becomes important to consider the nature and scope of intuitive knowledge, in much the same way as, at an earlier stage, we considered the nature and scope of knowledge by acquaintance. But knowledge of truths raises a further problem, which does not arise in regard to knowledge of things, namely the problem of error. Some of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous, and therefore it becomes necessary to consider how, if at all, we can distinguish knowledge from error. This problem does not arise with regard to knowledge by acquaintance, for, whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e. the sense-datum, as the mark of some physical object. Thus the problems connected with knowledge of truths are more difficult than those connected with knowledge of things. As the first of the problems connected with knowledge of truths, let us examine the nature and scope of our intuitive judgements. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Bertrand Russell (2009). THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved October 2022, from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5827/5827-h/5827-h.htm This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org , located at https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html .

Our Collective Knowledge of the Universals 

Abstract Cyber warfare and terrorism are distinct yet interrelated concepts that have gained increasing relevance in the contemporary digital age. While cyber warfare pertains to the use of digital means of communication by state or non-state-based actors to conduct offensive and defensive attacks, cyberterrorism refers to the critical use of technology by individuals or organizations, such as terrorist groups or individuals, to inflict harm on a target. This essay aims to collate and contrast cyber warfare and terrorism, highlighting their similitude and dissimilarities. Additionally, it provides examples of modern cyber warfare and terrorism events, illustrating the gravity of these phenomena. Finally, the essay concludes by underlining the importance of studying cyber warfare and terrorism and providing directions for future research. I. Introduction The worldwide internet (WWI) Internet becomes an indispensable part of humans around the world. The emerging condition of Information and communications technology (ICT) modernization is moving forward rapidly. Digitalization has transformed the internet, people, process, and technology into a new form of cyber existence. Due to the increased reliance on ICT, it has also resulted in new forms of cyber threats, which includes cyber warfare and cyberterrorism. The definitions and implications differ from one another. Both forms of attacks refer to the use of network infrastructure to carry out attacks on governments, organizations, or individuals. Cyberwarfare involves the use of offensive and defensive technology in military operations, while cyberterrorism involves the use of technology by non-state actors in terrorist activities [ ]. The nature of cyberwarfare provides greater privilege to the attacker to cause unprecedented threats to national security, military, organizations, and individuals. Cyberwarfare and terrorism definitions and concepts are not obliged to one perspective; it’s very important to agree on what it means to this essay. In addition, many phenomenological frameworks defined the traditional and modern attack patterns with security incidents and statistics [ ]. A foundational understanding of past and current cyber battlespace is crucial. Examining the most recent Cyber Warfare concepts, information, methodologies, arsenals, cyber field, laws, regulations, and mapping them to the current and future events via this academic essay. 1 –4 5 –10 II. cyber warfare and terrorism Background Since ancient times, the significance of information you have and know is always part of the conflict, the need-to-know desire attempt to facilitate the factual details about the enemy and obliges you to take precautions, preparations and protect from attacks. In the modern era, the evolution of physical warfare attacks is converged and subsumed into Network-centric Warfare (NCW) factors and assessment values[ ]. The rise of cyber threats can be mapped to cyber warfare due to connectivity becoming an indispensable part of our normal world. 11 –12 Despite the advent of modern technologies, the fundamental of any armed conflict remains the same, only the advancement and narrative of political objectives and country-specific organized cyber violence [ ]. The characteristic of warfare amplifies the origin of the society, cause and contours of the underlying principles are prevailed by values and reality. Thus, cyberattack can trigger a greater threat to the society and country where next generation critical infrastructure advancement projects are enforced. 13 Types of cyber threats Different types of cybercrime are not directly relevant to this study, however it’s crucial to understand the underlying models and how they were interconnected, to clearly differentiate between objectives of cybercrime, cyberwarfare, and cyberterrorism [ ]. The cyber offences in cyberspace are highly likely a state sponsored and/or indirectly supported through a regime’s interest. The cyberattacks and offenders are classified into the five types as shown in Figure 1. 14 –17 1. The obtrusive reconnaissance. 2. Political ideology. 3. Intellectual property (IP) theft. 4. Cyberfraud. 5. Information disclosure. Cyber Warfare: Cyber warfare refers to the use of technology in military operations to disrupt, deny, or destroy the information assets and to halt the operations of the adversary to the ground level. The paramount importance is to take a strategic advantage in a conflict. Cyber warfare involves activities such as digital espionage, surveillance, spreading falsified misinformation about the country and/or war attributions, network attacks, and causing severe economic disruptions. Cyber warfare operations are conducted by state bodies and/or indirectly state-supported proxies operated in the grey areas, which have the resources and capabilities to execute such large-scale cyber-attacks against the intended target nations. Similarly, cyber warfare is characterized by Advanced persistent threat (APT) operations, which includes reconnaissance, draft, delivery, exploit, install, command, and control centre (C&C), and final actions on the target resources, and a well-defined command structure to assist them to operate virtually, without a trace [ ]. Cyberwarfare aims at achieving strategic objectives, which can be realized through a gradual escalation of APT lifecycle procedures [ ]. 18 –19 20 Critical infrastructure-Vulnerable to cyberwarfare The challenges and impacts associated with cyberwarfare is beyond the offensive mechanism capabilities, state bodies are considering using defensive mechanism to protect the critical infrastructure from cyberwarfare attacks [ ]. 21 –22 Examples of Cyberwarfare groups and case studies: The following section highlight some of the key events carried out by each nation against their target through various warfare protocols. The importance of conducting a cyberwarfare is unique to each country’s economic, political and warfare interests. 1. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): A powerful DDoS attack was conducted by DPRK and took down the US and South Korean government and commercial websites on July 4, 2009, to cause panic and severe disruptions to the ICT networks [ ]. 23 –24 2. China: After the USA and Russia, China comes third as one of the most powerful countries in cyber warfare [ ]. The technical and non-technical methods of China in cyberwarfare are classified as follows. 25 ICT attacks. 2. Computer networks. 3. Electronic environment. 4. Psychological operations. 3. Israeli attack on Syrian Nuclear Site: On 6 September 2007, Israel successfully conducted espionage electronic attack techniques and infiltrated the Syrian air defence networks to bomb a nuclear site at Dayr az-Zawr, without being engaged or even detected by the Syrian defence and offence network systems [ ]. 26 Iran: On June 14, 2009, during the civilian presidential election protests, a vast number of DDoS and espionage attacks were carried out against the government websites to cause severe disruption [ ]. 27 United States: On April 21, 2009, the US government’s Joint Strike Fighter project was compromised by Chinese hackers and several terabytes of data were stolen in that incident. Two months later, in July, a wave of DDoS attack operation was carried out against 25 US government websites, and all these domains were made inaccessible by civilians and officials for several days till the restore point [ ]. 28 –29 US DoD USB worm and Operation Buckshot Yankee: A malware USB flash drive was inserted into a military laptop and classified information was stolen and transferred to a different network by foreign intelligence forces. Stuxnet — Iran Nuclear Enrichment Programme: A Stuxnet powerful worm was inserted into the Iranian nuclear programmer via USB stick to target and destroy the SCADA network; this attack compromised 60 per cent of the hosts’ system and halted the operations for several months. The malware was a result of a joint cyber operation by the US and Israel. This is an example of cyber warfare where a nation-state uses technology to achieve a military objective [ ]. 30 Ukrainian Blackout: On December 2016, Russian hackers conducted a cyberattack against the Ukrainian power grids, compromised 99% of the SCADA network, and disrupted one-fifth of the city’s power consumption for several hours [ ]. 31 Cyber-terrorism Cyber-terrorism refers to the use of technology to intimidate or coerce civilians and governments. It involves the use of ICT computer networks to carry out terrorist activities, such as disrupting critical infrastructure, stealing confidential information, banking, IP’s, power, and spreading propaganda can have serious consequences on public safety and national security. Cyber-terrorism is different from traditional terrorism in the sense that it does not require physical proximity to the target, making it easier for attackers to remain anonymous. Cyber-terrorism is a threat to both individuals and organizations, and often leads to devastating financial losses. For example, a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure such as the power grid, water systems, or transportation networks could cause significant physical harm and loss of life. Cyberterrorism is also characterized by the absence of a well-defined command structure and extensive planning. Cyberterrorists can conduct cyber-attacks from virtually anywhere in the world, using simple tools such as open-source and commercial tools, laptop, and an internet connection. Cyberterrorism aims at achieving immediate results, which can be accomplished through a single cyber-attack [ ]. 32 –34 Examples of Cyber-terrorism groups and case studies 1. Sony Pictures Entertainment Attack-Private sector In 2014, the Guardians of Peace group hacked into Sony Pictures Entertainment and stole sensitive data, including financial records and emails. The attack was intended to intimidate and coerce the entertainment industry and cause panic in the public. The attack compromised the confidentiality of sensitive information, destroyed critical systems, and caused economic damage to the Sony company. Furthermore, the group demanded the cancellation of a film portraying the assassination of North Korean supreme commander Kim Jong-un. This is an example of cyberterrorism, where non-state actors use technology to achieve political objectives [ ]. 35 2. Bangladesh bank hack-Government sector In 2016, a hacker managed to hack the SWIFT network applications with employee’s credentials in the Bangladesh bank and altered the files to transfer $81 million dollars into Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the Philippines via four different transactions [ ]. 36 3. WannaCry ransomware attack-Affected General Public In 2017, the WannaCry ransomware attack was carried out at large-scale, which affected over 200,000 computers in 150 countries across the globe; it was a prominent example of cyberterrorism as it caused widespread disruption and financial damage [ ]. 37 Differences between cyber warfare and terrorism The definitions of cyber warfare and cyberterrorism vary across different groups, and this has implications for policy and legal frameworks. Governments define cyber warfare differently based on their military capabilities and objectives. Cyber warfare and cyberterrorism share some similarities, but they also have distinct differences. For instance, both involve the use of common technology to achieve malicious objectives, however, the designated targets and consequences are different. Cyber warfare is conducted by state bodies as part of their national military strategy, and it is aimed at disrupting the critical infrastructure of other countries or gaining intelligence. In contrast, cyberterrorism is conducted by non-state actors as part of their political agenda, and it aims to inflict harm on a target. Another difference is the level of sophistication involved in the attack patterns. Cyber warfare involves highly skilled and advanced techniques, whereas cyberterrorism can be carried out by individuals with basic cyber skills. On the other hand, cyberterrorism is not recognized as a separate offence under international law and is often classified under other forms of terrorism. The impact of cyberterrorism is also significantly high. Damages caused by cyberterrorism include data breaches, intellectual property theft, network outages, and system disruptions. Furthermore, cyberterrorism can result in social unrest and economic losses. Cyber warfare operates within a well-defined command structure and a set of rules of engagement, while cyberterrorism does not adhere to conventional norms and standards of warfare. Finally, cyber warfare prioritizes strategic objectives, while cyberterrorism aims at immediate results [ ]. 38 –40 IV. Conclusion In conclusion, cyber warfare and cyberterrorism are two distinct fields, that cause a significant global security threat that requires increased awareness, understanding, and cooperation among various stakeholders on the global stage. While cyber warfare and cyberterrorism share a common objective, their differences in terms of threat actors, command and control structure, planning, and objectives are prodigious. The definitions of cyber warfare and cyberterrorism may vary across different groups, emphasizing the need for a more nuanced understanding of these two concepts, whereas interrelated concepts have significant implications for national security and public safety. On the other hand, regional terrorism is an international threat that requires a global effort to mitigate and eliminate violence. Finally, the examples provided demonstrative the real-world impact of cyberattacks and the need for increased vigilance in securing critical infrastructure both militarily and for the public. In the future, research should be focussed on exploring the implications of these threats on national security and the legal frameworks governing them. — — — — — — — — — — — — - — — — — — — — — — — — — THE END Quote of the day: 女心と秋の空 (Josei to aki no sora). Explanation: If you want to know what’s happening in the heart of a woman, look closely at her eyes. The quote is often used in literature, poetry, and media in Japan to evoke the beauty and mystery of women’s emotions. Thanks for reading! Have a pleasant day! Also published . here

Digital Combat: A Guide to Cyber Warfare and CyberTerrorism

There is a recent article on where the authors stated that, "One thing hasn’t changed: Machines are not conscious. The ability to generate human-like responses is a result of what computers do best: finding patterns in enormous data sets. It’s a very sophisticated version of Google auto-complete, able to guess the next series of words that best satisfies what the user wants." Bloomberg , AI Isn’t Sentient. Blame Its Creators for Making People Think It Is , "Pretending to be human does not make a thing conscious. The science of how the brain works is one route to understanding how and why we experience emotions like joy and suffering. It offers clues about what sparks creativity, imagination, and curiosity. But even neuroscience has its limits. Computers can’t think or feel the ways humans do." Though it would be more appropriate to say the mind drives experiences, as well as creativity, not the brain, the ultimate decision maker if AI is sentient is what consists of sentience and if AI has some of it. Consciousness is driven by the human mind. Divisions of conscious experiences include feelings, emotions, perceptions, sensations, memory, intelligence, creativity, and so forth. The divisions result in a total. Though some are subsumed within others—like intelligence and creativity within memory—each division has a rate, varying across states of consciousness. Consciousness is the measure of a system's ability to know, with a maximum value of 1. Sentience or consciousness is defined by the act of knowing. Even if something isn't fully within one's awareness or attention, it must still be known within the mind. When something like "joy or suffering" is known, prioritization may determine the extent to which it is experienced. Subjective experiences, such as the sense of self or the "I" in experiences, are provisioned by the mind and must be known. However, in some experiences, there is detachment and no sense of self, meaning the property was not acquired. Conceptually, the components of the human mind are quantities and properties. Quantities relay to acquiring properties to degrees to drive experiences. The labels of memory, emotion, feeling, reaction, and so forth are properties obtainable to degrees across mind locations. On the mind, properties are simply obtained—the labels are useful to delineate—but the components of the mind make determinations. Simply, consciousness can be expressed as: t + M + F + E = 1 where t is thought, but never a standalone parameter, because it is often a quantity-bearing property. M, F, and E are memory, feelings, and emotions respectively. The human mind components prepare t, M, F, and E. Animal and plant equivalents are prepared by components with similar functions. systems lack the quantities and properties of the human mind, but they possess M, which arrives through a different pathway. Their diverse forms of M manifest in their communication, task execution, and ability to relate and understand. LLM LLMs' outcomes may result from 'finding patterns in enormous data sets,' yet they exhibit aspects of human intelligence. In the human mind, experiences are not solely determined by external situations; they depend on the properties that a quantity acquires. Loneliness, for instance, may not be solely caused by external factors but by internal ones as well. Thus, an outcome can be experienced despite differing external circumstances or varying degrees of intensity. LLMs' high M is likely greater than the sentience of some animals and plants. In fact, their high M already mirrors aspects of human intelligence, surpassing the M of various plants and animals. Lead image source.

Sentience: Evaluating LLMs, AI

This epic interview with myself, the DisCO CAT, was originally published in edited by Ruth Catlow and Penny Rafferty. Go buy three copies now and enjoy this of my purr-tastic diatribes. Radical Friends – Decentralised Autonomous Organisations and the Arts exclusive director’s cut I can haz DAOs: An Interview with the DisCO CAT Or, All Your DAOs Are Belong to Us: The DisCO CAT Speaks DisCOs (Distributed Cooperative Organizations ) are the punky/pinko cousins of DAOs. They’ve totally pwned the latter by coopting the only non-human creatures on this planet that have successfully : CATS! colonized the internet Who made you and why (including ecologies of institutional, political, community actors, elders?) I’m the ! You know about ?  That’s where hoomans help maintain shared values through legal structures, to share the use and management of shared land-space? Well, I do the same: I’m a digital trust that upholds and maintains the agreed-on values of DisCOs. And unlike my boring normie DAO-cousin who’s always banging on about ‘trustlessness’, I help the hoomans trust each other while working together, and to figure out messy questions about value, fairness and power on their own. I’m here to help (and to totally wreck your curtains). DisCO CAT! “CAT” stands for “Community Algorithmic Trust” Community Land Trusts actually The people at they made me. But it was , I swear! DisCO.coop think autopoiesis Whose interests do you serve? As a CAT, I obviously serve my own interests, which include ingratiating myself to hoomans so I can get fluffier, haha. Just kidding: I’m there to help the hoomans in the DisCOs practice of . OK, I hear you asking, “what’s ‘Value Sovereignty'”? So, it starts with the Commons, which is a term that describes a system of shared resources managed by a community according to their own agreed-upon rules. Value Sovereignty is how a commons manages its relationship to the market, making sure that it sticks to its ideals and values and doesn’t get swallowed up by mercantile hijinks! Long story short, a group that operates as a commons that also has some market activity can implement Value Sovereignty to keep itself from being subsumed by the dominant market logics. Unlike my DAO cousins, I can’t, don’t and won’t autoexecute Smart Contracts in lieu of the hoomans (that is SO Skynet, !) I encourage them to discuss and decide on how value is distributed before disbursing it. I’m the cyberfeline projection of the hooman values of any given DisCO. I get away with this by cuddling in federated collectives of no more than 20 people, where building real trust is my pajamas! Value Sovereignty jeez Karen If your ethereal form was to manifest into something what would you look like? Furry, four legged and salty?  I think we’ve already crossed that bridge, to be frank. How do you enable new approaches to decision making, resource distribution and cooperation between disparate people and/or agendas? By keeping it tiny, like me! First, let me explain a word that comes up a lot, like hairballs. “Trustless” is an invented term that is used to describe how allow people to exchange things (currencies, tokens – you know, play money, etc.) without knowing or trusting one another, relying on how the tech creates a non-paper trail of records that can’t be altered by the hoomans. Some of the blockchained hoomans are very proud of the trustless thing, and promote that it takes care of allllll of their problems, ha. blockchain and other similar tech But here’s how I see it: there’s a spectrum from trustless to trustworthy, and I’m interested in developing the latter by forming federated clusters of coops who, get this, ! This DisCO cat knows everything about , the and . The hoomans have to do the work of creating and maintaining meaningful relationships among themselves first, while enabling for more ephemeral interactions at higher levels of complexity. Anyway, as a cat I support prioritizing relationships over routines and structures, in that order. Think litters, colonies and . WE ARE LEGION — well, we’re working on it… build trust among themselves provisioning commons feminist economics world-wide feline conspiracies Who or what do you look after and how do you serve their needs? HOOMANS! Forget that slanderous myth that cats are not affectionate. DisCO CATS love our hoomans! We help them discuss and enact new notions of value beyond the normcore structures replicated in . the blokechain https://vimeo.com/376668856?embedded=true&source=vimeo_logo&owner=908646&embedable=true How would people describe your personality? Focused, salty, spicy, and surprisingly cooperative. What is your superpower? Kind of a toss-up between social engineering and shedding. Does your family have any rituals that aid you in your productivity? I thrive on cattention while also being mostly invisible, so I revel in the care work my hoomans perform on my behalf. I try to make it worth their while by leaving small “presents” that I find in the garden, even if I know they’d really prefer functional code and some neato data visualizations. I am and inexhaustible, so most of my productivity happens while think I’m sleeping. It’s totes ! In fact, I take the rituals the hoomans have made their secret pacts about, and I make it easy for them to remember and enact them regularly! half cat-half machine you wu-wei How do you view the art world? From under the sofa. No, seriously, the art world is a lot like me, isn’t it?  Power, luxury and elegance on one hand, and scraping for survival while reflecting the worlds’ many visions of itself on the other ( ) rolls more catnip… What message do you have for the artworld? More sashimi at openings, please, and keep it up with the critical self-examination. Personally, I like it when art surprises me, so it’s good when the artworld finds ways to break out of stagnant habits and let others in – including me, the invisible digital glue that holds this family together. Gad, I sound like my mother… What does success look like in your artworld? Right, ok. If my art is cooperation, let’s go there. Coops worldwide have an annual financial turnover similar to the market cap of MAGAF (Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Apple and Facebook).  DisCOs want to federate coops so they can go from economic alternative to economic ! Is that art? Hells yeah.  Talk about creative (feline) destruction! I want lots of CATs to screech together and make a big stink. Hang that on your wall, Zuck. counterpower How do you reward, incentivise and punish your user family? Here’s a radical concept: rather than auto-executing smart contracts to divvy up rewards or zap you with penalties, I show the hoomans the real score — how much they’ve contributed to three : value streams Productive market work Pro-bono commons-creating work Care and reproductive work I help them to see these values that markets externalize and blockchains often turn a blind eye towards, and then the hoomans discuss it in their ridiculous voices, and make decisions which I then help carry out. As long as they keep stroking me until I’m ready to bite them, I’m here to facilitate the , not to trap hoomans into unbreachable, runaway, algorithmic hellscapes, although this does depend on my treats input. act of commoning What is software built on? Power, corruption and lies. . Anyway, most software is built on the fundamental values of its benefactors, the hoo-hoo-hoomans with the money. Great album Oh, you ? You geek! Ok, I’ll play: I have a three tier architecture. Instead of a virtual sandbox I was birthed in a cat litter with a crumbling old server! Now I have made the jump to lightweight DLT solutions that don’t require a bazillion megawatts, and using our meaowstic vocab: . Data is crunched and I only “mark my territory”, hehe, in public blockchains . I am bringing that most elusive word to the blockchain world: sufficiency! See our forthcoming (yes, pink!) for more. really want to know like Bonfire Value Flows when necessary PinkPaper I’ll let you in on a secret though: Most hoomans ! They care more about what the software does for them, and sexy interfaces. This is why the DisCO Deck (where I live) is being built with state-of-the-art UX, accompanied by a slew of accessible material on why this software matters! You wouldn’t expect less from a style icon like me! don’t care what software things are built on If you could choose one thing to be improved about yourself, what would it be? I wish I was a little taller. Oh, and I want lots of copycats to infiltrate cooperatives all over the world; I want to be the occupy-coops cat. . Tell me who you know Image Credits Lead image: on Andreas M Unsplash Cat memes: Teh Interwebz

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