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Meet the Winners of Startups in North and Central America

It is as if blockchain, cryptocurrencies, and the decentralized network of applications have weaved an entirely new world of innovative solutions. Who would have imagined in 2009 that Satoshi Nakamoto’s vision of providing the world with a decentralized, peer-to-peer payment solution would age so well, so fast, and so far beyond what he envisioned! Being involved with a cryptocurrency project or two can give you a sense of how rapidly this space is evolving and how far-reaching its effects are. It’s a young industry that is challenging the way we conduct business, interact with internet applications, and go about our everyday tasks. It is this youthful vision, the burning enthusiasm, and the prudent innovation of crypto projects that I intend to bring forward with my content series, Unhashed. This is the first article of Unhashed, where I interviewed Harsh Rajat, the co-founder of Ethereum Push Notification Service (EPNS). About 12 years ago, the push notifications we so love were not a thing. And today, we cannot imagine how our days would be like without push notifications telling us about every deal, every update, every scheduled call we never want to miss. And when Harsh sat to brainstorm and pinpoint a missing piece of the Web3.0, he was awestruck by how push notification, one such tiny yet critical feature, was missing from the equation. That’s how he came up with the idea of starting EPNS. In this interview, we explore the story of EPNS and what it aims to bring to the world of decentralized applications. 1. Everybody in the crypto and blockchain space has a unique story of how they started out in this industry. What is your crypto/blockchain story? Harsh: It all started back in 2016 with my introduction to Bitcoin. Unwilling to let go of this opportunity to invest in an asset I thought had great potential, I started trading with whatever I knew about trading — buy low, sell high. It was in 2018 when I discovered Ethereum and its potential to support decentralized applications. That’s when things in crypto turned more interesting for me. Very soon, I was headed down the rabbit hole to explore the pain points of blockchain. I wanted to take the traditional route to do things — learn, research, take my time, explore, innovate. Sticking to my plan, I joined a blockchain company to explore the industry and the technology. Later, I dropped out from there to embark on my own journey to create something for the love of blockchain and crypto. I wanted to create something to improve the blockchain and crypto space as it stood back then. 2. Most likely, you’re the first to bring push notifications to the decentralized world. How did the idea of Ethereum Push Notification Service come by? Harsh: I along with my wife, Richa Joshi, started my ‘decentralized’ entrepreneur journey through exploring and observing a multitude of dApps and Smart Contracts=. The point of the exercise was to contrast the Web3.0 experience with traditional Web2.0 and see if there were any missing pieces we could add to the bigger picture. Our Eureka moment was when we found a very obvious problem, lack of push notifications. You see, the whole of blockchain infrastructure suffers from a communication void that Web2.0 solved back in 2010, when Apple introduced push notifications. If you think about it for a moment, all your current virtual interactions are guided by push notifications, and the services come to the users in Web2.0 rather than users having to check every application 10 times a day. Apple introduced push notifications just about 11 years ago, and the rest is history. From messages to emails and shopping deals to client calls, we rely so heavily on push notifications today that not having them in our lives can turn our world upside down. Contrast this experience with any dApp, smart contracts, or services you interact with on Web3. There’s no way to inform users (wallet addresses) about any important event that occurs. Instead, the applications rely on users to go back time and again to check if there’s any activity. For instance, liquidation on AAVE or Compound, DAO Governance proposal (Yam!), or ENS/dEx orders. Each of these scenarios is a reality right now but no solution exists to notify users about them who would be interested in them. You are not foreclosed by your bank without proper notices that reach you, but DeFi — while enabling awesome use cases — does that to you. And we wanted to fix that. That’s how we started on our journey to pull the blockchain world out of this stone age of communication. And we founded EPNS. 3. Can you explain in more detail how this will benefit the crypto and blockchain community? Harsh: Currently, there are many tremendously innovative blockchain & Web3.0 applications being deployed, especially those laying the foundation for decentralized finance (DeFi). But they all face the issue of not being able to communicate with their users directly. This tends to be a huge barrier for mainstream adoption, and for customer retention and engagement rates. Ask yourself, how many times would you open WhatsApp, Twitter, Amazon, or any other applications for that matter, if it were not for a push notification showing up on your screen? Push notifications play a major part in today’s customer retention strategy and increasing engagement rates. The possibilities for push notifications in Web3.0 are endless. Blockchain services, dApps, and developers will be able to effectively communicate with their users and the community as a whole. And you, as a user, can finally be notified when you’re about to get liquidated on AAVE, Compound, or any other DeFi platform. You’ll always know when a DAO Governance proposal has been listed for you to vote on or when your ENS domain name is about to expire. If you’re a gamer, you can get notified every time a new in-game NFT is listed for sale. Or, if you enjoy the guilty pleasure of participating in prediction markets, you can get notified whenever a new prediction is listed. You could get notified when you win the lottery on PoolTogether, when Loopring lists a new trading pair, or when Yearn Finance lists a new yVault, and what not! The list of use cases can go on, but the point is, push notifications have as much importance in Web3.0 as they had in Web2.0. 4.  How do you intend to prevent spam notifications, which are extremely common on Web2.0? We have carefully designed the EPNS protocol such that it implements ‘game theory’ in a way it disincentivizes services from spamming their users. Firstly, users have the power to opt in to channels to start receiving notifications, and if they choose to unsubscribe to a particular channel, they cannot be added back by the channel. This ensures services are incentivized to only send notifications that are relevant to the user’s interest. Secondly, we also have a spam throttling mechanism in the works. It will ensure that a service that started off sending relevant notifications doesn’t turn malicious at a later stage. We attach a spam score to them which is controlled by both positive actions (higher number of subscribers, the passage of time, etc.) and negative actions (unusual number of notifications, a higher number of unsubscribers, etc.). When this score crosses a certain threshold, it activates the protocol throttle mechanism thereby ensuring that it’s always in the best interest of services to not spam their users. We are also planning verified badges in the future to ensure that EPNS allows everyone to create a channel and opt in, but makes a distinction between spam channels and verified ones. 5. EPNS uses the Matic Network at its core. What prompted you to choose the Matic Network over others? How will EPNS and, more importantly, its users benefit from the use of Matic Network? Answer: High gas fees have been plaguing the Ethereum ecosystem for quite a while now. And although Ethereum is awesome, if we want users to completely enjoy the Web3.0 experience, we need to go better, faster, and cheaper; which is not so much the case with the scalability trilemma that we have now. And for this reason, we are actively exploring L2 solutions to deploy EPNS to. We have also won a grant with Matic and have been working on Matic integration in parallel as we see awesome benefits to launch a hybrid protocol. We have always envisioned our protocol as a scalable and fast solution that can fill the communication void between services. In addition to this, we think that meta transactions and the game theory that allow users to earn passively will take care of the same in the short run, and hopefully, and will take care of this in the long run. EIP-1599 ETH2.0 6. How far has EPNS come in its journey to bringing push notifications to the decentralized world? Harsh: We have had an awesome journey! We took our idea and research to the Ethereum Foundation, where the concept of EPNS was greatly supported. We went to the EthGlobal HackMoney 2020 where we built the proof of concept for EPNS. We were also selected for Gitcoin Kernel fellowship and made it to the top 20 projects! Followed by that, we entered Gitcoin Grant round 7 (top 5 projects/210+ contributors), which led us to raise our seed!!! We recently completed our seed round and were backed by some renowned Web3 leaders including Balaji Srinivasan (Fmr CTO of Coinbase and General Partner at a16z.), Kenneth Ng (Ethereum Foundation), Scott Moore (Co-founder, Gitcoin), Mariano Conti (Fmr Head of Smart Contracts, MakerDAO), Anthony Sassano (EthHub/TheDailyGwei), DeFiDad (COO, Zapper), Ravindra (Frontier Wallet), Preethi Kasireddy (Fmr Partner at a16z), and several more awesome people! All in all, it has been a great journey and we have so much more from protocol audit to mainnet launch and beta releases coming up very soon. Disclaimer: The sole purpose of Unhashed is to unhash (decode) information about projects innovating using blockchain and cryptocurrencies and bring it to the forefront for the community to be well-informed. The writer neither has any vested interest in any of the projects covered herein nor shares any investment advice regarding any crypto tokens.

Push Notifications Will Pull Blockchain Out of the Stone Age of Communication - Unhashed #1

Helloooooooo! Hope you're doing great! This is SMY! 👋 Let's jump right in 🚀 Although there are other options like physically connecting with adapters or purchasing software like Duet. But, if you're like me, you would want a seamless Just Work solution and have a second screen setup in no time. That's where Deskreen comes into play! Follow the steps to easily set up your screen. Contents: ⚡ Downloading Deskreen
⚡ Sharing your screen and Streaming on Mobile Step 1: Downloading Deskreen Head over to the following link, and download & install Deskreen for your platform: https://deskreen.com/lang-en Step 2: Allowing Deskreen For Mac users: Allow Screen Recording Permission on MacOS is in System Preferences -> Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Screen Recording For Windows users: need to add 'Private Network Access' for Deskreen on the first start or in firewall settings Step 3: Connect your Phone Open up Deskreen, and connect your Phone by scanning a QR or going to the given address: It will automatically ask for approval once you open the page on the Phone's browser. Click on Allow, and your Phone will be connected! Step 4: Share Your Desired Screen Once Connected, share your entire screen or desired window: Once done, confirm the options, and your screen will be streamed on your Phone! Wrapping Up: We just did the steps to Connect our Screen for Streaming on the Phone's browser. 🚀 ..... Now, you can Experience Seamless Multitasking 🚀 That's it, folks! I hope it was a good read for you. Thank you! ✨ 👉 Follow me GitHub LinkedIn Helloooooooo! Helloooooooo! Hope you're doing great! This is SMY! 👋 Let's jump right in 🚀 Although there are other options like physically connecting with adapters or purchasing software like Duet . But, if you're like me, you would want a seamless Just Work solution and have a second screen setup in no time. Duet Just Work That's where Deskreen comes into play! Follow the steps to easily set up your screen. Deskreen Contents: ⚡ Downloading Deskreen ⚡ Sharing your screen and Streaming on Mobile ⚡ Downloading Deskreen Downloading Deskreen ⚡ Sharing your screen and Streaming on Mobile Sharing your screen and Streaming on Mobile Step 1: Downloading Deskreen Head over to the following link, and download & install Deskreen for your platform: Deskreen https://deskreen.com/lang-en https://deskreen.com/lang-en Step 2: Allowing Deskreen For Mac users: Allow Screen Recording Permission on MacOS is in System Preferences -> Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Screen Recording For Windows users: need to add 'Private Network Access' for Deskreen on the first start or in firewall settings Step 3: Connect your Phone Open up Deskreen , and connect your Phone by scanning a QR or going to the given address: Deskreen It will automatically ask for approval once you open the page on the Phone's browser. Click on Allow, and your Phone will be connected! Step 4: Share Your Desired Screen Once Connected, share your entire screen or desired window: Once done, confirm the options, and your screen will be streamed on your Phone! Wrapping Up: We just did the steps to Connect our Screen for Streaming on the Phone's browser. 🚀 ..... Now, you can Experience Seamless Multitasking 🚀 That's it, folks! I hope it was a good read for you. Thank you! ✨ 👉 Follow me GitHub GitHub LinkedIn LinkedIn

How Turn Your Smartphone Into a Second Screen for FREE For Seamless Multitasking!

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 25 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here X. Request for Relief 232. To remedy these illegal acts, Plaintiffs request that the Court: Adjudge and decree that Apple has acted unlawfully to monopolize, or, in the alternative, attempt to monopolize, the smartphone market in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; Adjudge and decree that Apple has acted unlawfully to monopolize, or, in the alternative, attempt to monopolize, the performance smartphone market in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, the New Jersey Antitrust Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-1 to -19, Wisconsin’s Antitrust Act, Wis. Stat. Ch. § 133.03 et seq.; Enter relief as needed to cure any anticompetitive harm; Enjoin Apple from continuing to engage in the anticompetitive practices described herein and from engaging in any other practices with same purpose or effect as the challenged practices, including but not limited to: a. preventing Apple from using its control of app distribution to undermine cross-platform technologies such as super apps and cloud streaming apps, among others; b. preventing Apple from using private APIs to undermine cross platform technologies like messaging, smartwatches, and digital wallets, among others; and c. preventing Apple from using the terms and conditions of its contracts with developers, accessory makers, consumers, or others to obtain, maintain, extend, or entrench a monopoly. 5. Enter any other preliminary or permanent relief necessary and appropriate to restore competitive conditions in the markets affected by Apple’s unlawful conduct; 6. Enter any additional relief the Court finds just and proper; and 7. Award each Plaintiff, as applicable, an amount equal to its costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, incurred in bringing this action. Dated: March 21, 2024 Respectfully, FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEW JERSEY: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARIZONA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF CALIFORNIA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF MAINE: FOR PLAINTIFF PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN: FOR PLAINTIFF OF STATE OF MINNESOTA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEW YORK: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF OKLAHOMA: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF OREGON: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF TENNESSEE: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF WISCONSIN: FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF VERMONT: About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Plaintiffs Call for Remedies Against Apple's Unlawful Monopolization in Smartphone Market

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 22 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here D. Fourth Claim for Relief, in the Alternative: Attempted Monopolization of the Smartphone Market in the United States in Violation of Sherman Act § 2 218. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 217 above. 219. Smartphones in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and Apple has attempted to monopolize that market. 220. Apple has attempted to monopolize the smartphone market in the United States through an exclusionary course of conduct and the anticompetitive acts described herein. Each of Apple’s actions individually and collectively increased Apple’s market power in the smartphone market. 221. Apple’s anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited to, its contractual restrictions against app creation, distribution, and access to APIs that have impeded apps and technologies including, but not limited to, super apps, cloud streaming, messaging, wearables, and digital wallets. The areas identified in this complaint reflect a non-exhaustive list of recent anticompetitive acts but as technology advances, both the technologies impeded and the specific manner of impediment may shift in response to technological and regulatory change consistent with Apple’s past conduct. 222. While each of Apple’s acts is anticompetitive in its own right, Apple’s interrelated and interdependent actions have had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect that has harmed competition and the competitive process. 223. In undertaking this course of conduct, Apple has acted with specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy effective competition in, the smartphone market in the United States. There is a dangerous probability that, unless restrained, Apple will succeed in monopolizing the smartphone market in the United States, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Understand the Exclusionary Conduct Powering Apple's Smartphone Monopoly

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 21 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here C. Third Claim for Relief: Monopolization of the Smartphone Market in the United States in Violation of Sherman Act § 2 211. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 210 above. 212. Smartphones in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and Apple has monopoly power in that market. 213. Apple has willfully monopolized the smartphone market in the United States through an exclusionary course of conduct and the anticompetitive acts described herein. Each of Apple’s actions individually and collectively increased, maintained, or protected its smartphone monopoly. 214. Apple’s anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited to, its contractual restrictions against app creation, distribution, and access to APIs that have impeded apps and technologies including, but not limited to, super apps, cloud streaming, messaging, wearables, and digital wallets. The areas identified in this complaint reflect a non-exhaustive list of recent anticompetitive acts but as technology advances, both the technologies impeded and the specific manner of impediment may shift in response to technological and regulatory change consistent with Apple’s past conduct. 215. While each of Apple’s acts is anticompetitive in its own right, Apple’s interrelated and interdependent actions have had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect that has harmed competition and the competitive process. 216. Apple’s anticompetitive acts have had harmful effects on competition and consumers. 217. Apple’s exclusionary conduct lacks a procompetitive justification that offsets the harm caused by Apple’s anticompetitive and unlawful conduct. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

United States Alleges Apple's Monopolization of US Smartphone Market Violates Sherman Act

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 20 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here B. Second Claim for Relief, in the Alternative: Attempted Monopolization of the Performance Smartphone Market in the United States in Violation of Sherman Act § 2 205. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 204 above. 206. Performance smartphones in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and Apple has attempted to monopolize that market. 207. Apple has attempted to monopolize the performance smartphone market in the United States through an exclusionary course of conduct and the anticompetitive acts described herein. Each of Apple’s actions individually and collectively increased Apple’s market power in the performance smartphone market. 208. Apple’s anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited to, its contractual restrictions against app creation, distribution, and access to APIs that have impeded apps and technologies including, but not limited to, super apps, cloud streaming, messaging, wearables, and digital wallets. The areas identified in this complaint reflect a non-exhaustive list of recent anticompetitive acts but as technology advances, both the technologies impeded and the specific manner of impediment may shift in response to technological and regulatory change consistent with Apple’s past conduct. 209. While each of Apple’s acts is anticompetitive in its own right, Apple’s interrelated and interdependent actions have had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect that has harmed competition and the competitive process. 210. In undertaking this course of conduct, Apple has acted with specific intent to monopolize, and to destroy effective competition in, the performance smartphone market in the United States. There is a dangerous probability that, unless restrained, Apple will succeed in monopolizing the performance smartphone market in the United States, in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

DOJ Accuses Apple of Anticompetitive Conduct in the Smartphone Market

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 17 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here E. Apple has monopoly power in the smartphone and performance smartphone markets 180. Apple has monopoly power in the smartphone and performance smartphone markets because it has the power to control prices or exclude competition in each of them. Apple also enjoys substantial and durable market shares in these markets. Moreover, Apple’s market shares likely underestimate Apple’s power because they are protected by significant barriers to entry, network effects, and switching costs. Apple recognizes and exploits these barriers to entry, network effects, and switching costs to protect itself from competition from rival platforms and innovations, products, and services that may diminish consumer reliance on the iPhone. Apple’s power will likely increase over time. 181. In the U.S. market for performance smartphones, where Apple views itself as competing, Apple estimates its market share exceeds 70 percent. These estimates likely understate Apple’s market share today. For example, Apple’s share among key demographics, including younger audiences and higher-income households, is even larger. Even in the broadest market consisting of all smartphones—including many smartphones that Apple and industry participants do not view as competing with Apple’s iPhones and other higher-end phones— Apple’s share is more than 65 percent by revenue. Similarly, even if consumers choose one phone over another, the vast majority of developers consider iPhones and Android devices as complements because developers must build apps that run on both platforms due to the lack of user multi-homing. In effect, the lack of multi-homing among users necessitates multi-homing among developers. This market reality increases the power that Apple is able to exercise over developers that seek to reach users on smartphones—especially performance smartphones that run sophisticated apps. 182. Apple’s high market shares are durable. Over the last decade, Apple increased its share of smartphones sold in the United States most years. Through the same period, Apple collected more than half the revenue for all smartphones sold in the United States. 183. Apple’s monopoly power in the relevant markets is protected by substantial barriers to entry and expansion. For example, since fewer than ten percent of smartphone purchasers in the United States are buying their first smartphone, there are fewer new customers available for Apple’s rivals. Instead, rivals must encourage existing iPhone users to switch from using an iPhone to using another smartphone when they replace or upgrade their phone. As a result, switching costs—many created or exacerbated by Apple—impose substantial barriers to entry and expansion for rival smartphones. This barrier is increasingly impenetrable. Nearly 90 percent of iPhone owners in the United States replace their iPhone with another iPhone. At least one U.S. carrier estimates that as high as 98 percent of iPhone users on its network replace or upgrade their iPhone in a given quarter by buying another iPhone. The increased switching costs that consumers experience because of Apple’s conduct underpins these exceedingly high retention rates. 184. Apple’s monopoly power in the relevant markets is protected by other barriers to entry, expansion, or repositioning as well. For example, introducing a new smartphone requires considerable investments in acquiring expensive and scarce components such as mobile chips and specialized glass for screens. Other significant barriers to entry include product design, software development, regulatory approval, manufacturing, marketing, and customer service. Because most smartphones are bought through mobile carriers including Verizon, which has its operations headquarters in this district, new entrants or those seeking to expand or reposition must meet the carriers’ technical requirements to access the major carrier networks in the United States. New entrants and smaller rivals must also negotiate distribution agreements and persuade carriers and other retailers to promote their products to consumers. As explained above, rival smartphones must also overcome the substantial network effects generated by interactions between users, developers, and others who interact with the iPhone. 185. Apple’s iPhone platform is protected by several additional barriers to entry and expansion, including strong network and scale effects and high switching costs and frictions. For example, if an iPhone user wants to buy an Android smartphone, they are likely to face significant financial, technological, and behavioral obstacles to switching. The user may need to re-learn how to operate their smartphone using a new interface, transfer large amounts of data (e.g., contacts), purchase new apps, or transfer or buy new subscriptions and accessories. These switching costs and frictions are even higher when software applications, APIs, and other functionality do not help the different devices and operating systems communicate and interoperate. These switching costs and frictions increase the “stickiness” of the iPhone, making users more beholden to the smartphone manufacturer and platform operator. 186. Many prominent, well-financed companies have tried and failed to successfully enter the relevant markets because of these entry barriers. Past failures include Amazon (which released its Fire mobile phone in 2014 but could not profitably sustain its business and exited the following year); Microsoft (which discontinued its mobile business in 2017); HTC (which exited the market by selling its smartphone business to Google in September 2017); and LG (which exited the smartphone market in 2021). Today, only Samsung and Google remain as meaningful competitors in the U.S. performance smartphone market. Barriers are so high that Google is a distant third to Apple and Samsung despite the fact that Google controls development of the Android operating system. 187. Apple’s monopoly power is separately demonstrated by direct indicia. For example, Apple can and does profitably forego innovation without fear of losing customers to competitors. For example, Apple’s vice president of iPhone marketing explained in February 2020: “In looking at it with hindsight, I think going forward we need to set a stake in the ground for what features we think are ‘good enough’ for the consumer. I would argue were [sic] already doing *more* than what would have been good enough.” After identifying old features that “would have been good enough today if we hadn’t introduced [updated features] already,” she explained, “anything new and especially expensive needs to be rigorously challenged before it’s allowed into the consumer phone.” 188. Apple’s profits and profit margins, for nearly every aspect of the iPhone, are further evidence of Apple’s monopoly power. For example, Apple’s per-unit smartphone profit margins are far more than its next most profitable rival. Apple charges carriers considerably more than its rivals to buy and resell its smartphones to the public and employs contract clauses that may impede the ability of carriers to promote rival smartphones, a harmful exercise of monopoly power that is hidden to most consumers. Apple extracts fees from developers—as much as 30 percent when users purchase apps or make in-app payments. Apple also extracts a 0.15 percent commission from banks on credit card transactions through its digital wallet, while none of its smartphone competitors with digital wallets charge any fee. Apple predicts that it will collect nearly $1 billion in worldwide revenue on Apple Pay fees by 2025.A recent report by the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau suggest these revenues will only increase, as “analysts expect the value of digital wallet tap-to-pay transactions will grow by over 150 percent by 2028.” 189. Apple increasingly charges developers additional fees to promote their apps in the App Store as well. In fact, this is one of the fastest-growing parts of Apple’s services business, with revenue “increasing by more than a third to $4.4B in FY 2022.” 190. These indicia of Apple’s monopoly power are direct evidence of its monopoly power in the relevant markets. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

How Apple Secured Monopoly Power in Smartphone Markets

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 16 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here D. Relevant Markets 164. All smartphones compete against each other in a broad relevant market. But industry participants, including Apple, assess competition among smartphones in narrower markets that are best understood as submarkets of the larger all-smartphone market. Because Apple chooses not to compete to sell new smartphones in the entry-level tier, the most relevant market to assess its conduct is a narrower submarket that excludes this tier. Regardless of how the market is drawn, however, Apple’s conduct is unlawful. iv. Performance smartphones are a relevant product market 165. Performance smartphones are a narrower relevant product market within the broader smartphone market. This narrower market includes those smartphones that compete with most iPhones and excludes the lowest-end smartphones, which industry participants sometimes refer to as “entry-level” smartphones. 166. Industry participants recognize performance smartphones as distinct and frequently group smartphones into tiers that include entry-level smartphones and higher tiers such as “premium” or “flagship.” 167. Apple has also long recognized a distinction between these higher-end smartphones and lower-end, entry-level smartphones. Apple’s own documents indicate it does not view entry-level smartphones as competing with the iPhone and other performance smartphones. 168. Performance smartphones have distinct characteristics and uses as compared to other smartphones. For example, entry-level smartphones are generally made with lower-quality materials and are less durable (e.g., plastic instead of metal and glass). They have lower-performance components such as slower processors and lower-capacity storage, which prevent users from running more intensive applications or storing large volumes of pictures and data on the device. Entry-level smartphones often lack features such as an NFC antenna that allows consumers to use their phone to make payments or access passes for public transit. 169. Consumers typically purchase performance smartphones under different terms than entry-level smartphones. Consumers generally use entry-level smartphones along with prepaid service plans. By contrast, consumers usually purchase performance smartphones for use with post-paid service plans that include promotional discounts to consumers who purchase performance smartphones. 170. Because of these differences, among others, between entry-level smartphones and performance smartphones, entry-level smartphones are not reasonable substitutes for performance smartphones. 171. Moreover, competition from non-performance smartphones is not sufficient today to prevent Apple from exercising monopoly power in the performance smartphone market. v. Smartphones are a broader relevant product market 172. Smartphones are a relevant product market. Smartphones are distinct from phones that offer less capable hardware and software options than smartphones. These other phones, sometimes called “feature phones,” may offer basic web browsing in addition to calling and messaging options, but do not offer the breadth of access to the internet or third-party apps as smartphones. Similarly, these phones often have lower-quality hardware, such as poorer displays, less capable cameras, and rely on physical keyboards instead of smartphone touch screens. Thus, these phones are not reasonable substitutes for smartphones. 173. Smartphones are also distinct from other portable devices, such as tablets, smartwatches, and laptop computers. These devices lack the combination of function, size, and portability that consumers rely on in a smartphone, even if they offer some similar capabilities. Thus, none of these other products are reasonable substitutes for smartphones. 174. Apple, other participants in the market, and the public recognize that smartphones are distinct from feature phones and other portable devices. 175. Competition from feature phones, or other alternatives, is not sufficient to prevent Apple from exercising monopoly power in the smartphone market. vi. The United States is a relevant geographic market for performance smartphones and smartphones 176. The United States is a relevant geographic market for the sale of performance smartphones and smartphones. Users in the United States demand services offered by U.S. retailers when they purchase a smartphone. For example, consumers who purchase a smartphone from their mobile carrier can get assistance with activating their new device, setting it up, and transferring important content like apps, messages, photos, and video to their new smartphone. A smartphone purchased abroad for use in the United States might be incompatible with the consumer’s domestic carrier, may not have the necessary radio technology to take advantage of the carrier’s highest speed connections, the carrier might not be able to offer support during setup or subsequently, or the phone’s warranty may be invalid. 177. Consumers must also purchase smartphones through a U.S. retailer if they want to take advantage of valuable promotions offered by their mobile carrier. These same promotions and free financing are unavailable to U.S. consumers who purchase their phones in other countries. 178. Finally, potential new smartphone entrants to the U.S. market must also comply with telecommunications regulations and satisfy other legal requirements. No extensive regulatory framework governs how Apple operates its platform with respect to developers, but there are a number of regulatory requirements that must be met in order to enter the smartphone market. For example, some smartphone makers are effectively barred from offering their smartphones to U.S. consumers. 179. Consumers in the United States could not avoid or defeat an increase in the price of performance smartphones or smartphones by purchasing and importing smartphones from abroad. This allows Apple to set prices for the same smartphone in the United States separately from those in other countries. For example, Apple lowered the price of the iPhone 11 in China relative to the United States because Apple faced greater competition in China. This additional competition arises in part because a popular super app put competitive pressure on Apple and made it easier for users to switch from an iPhone to a rival smartphone. As a result, Apple is unable to command the same prices for the iPhone in China than they do in the United States due to less competition. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

Defining Relevant Markets in the Smartphone Industry

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 14 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here B. Smartphone Hardware 151. A smartphone’s hardware includes the frame and screen. Higher performing smartphones are typically constructed from better materials like glass and metal instead of plastic, manufactured to higher standards that make them more durable (e.g., water and dust proof), and have higher quality displays. 152. A smartphone’s hardware also includes the semiconductor chipsets that run the smartphone: central processing of software instructions, graphics, video, display, memory, data storage, and connection to wireless networks. Chipsets that offer superior performance—faster processing and network connections, better graphics, more storage—are costly. As a result, smartphone manufacturers typically include them only in more expensive performance smartphones. 153. Smartphone hardware includes other important components like cameras, and position and motion sensors. Performance smartphones typically have higher quality cameras, better battery life, wireless charging, and advanced biometrics such as face scanning. 154. Smartphones also contain several types of antennas that allow the phone to communicate with other smartphones, accessories, or other devices using standard communication protocols such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Near-Field Communications (NFC). a. Wi-Fi is a wireless networking technology that uses radio waves to provide wireless high-speed Internet access through mobile devices, computers, printers, and other equipment. “Wi-Fi,” in particular, refers to IEEE 802.11 standards that define the protocols that enable communications with current Wi-Fi-enabled wireless devices such as wireless routers and access points. b. Bluetooth is a wireless standard that allows smartphones to use shortwave radios to communicate with accessories like headphones and smartwatches. An industrywide Bluetooth standard specifies technological requirements to ensure that all Bluetooth devices can recognize and interact with each other. A typical Bluetooth signal has a range of about 30 feet. c. Near Field Communication (NFC) allows smartphones to interact with NFCenabled devices like a credit card terminal at a coffee shop. NFC relies on shortrange wireless technologies, including radio signals, to communicate and share information. To operate, two NFC-enabled devices must typically be within four centimeters or less of one another. 155. Three device manufacturers, Apple, Samsung, and Google, account for approximately 94 percent of all smartphones by revenue in the United States. Apple and Samsung alone account for approximately 90 percent of all smartphone revenues in the United States. 156. Cloud-based technologies are run using hardware and software in remote computing centers (“the cloud”) rather than by hardware and software on a smartphone. The user experiences the technology on the phone but the complex computing that generates the rich experience and that executes the user’s commands happens in the cloud. Thus, cloud apps can deliver rich experiences on smartphones with less capable hardware than iPhones currently contain. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The Guarded Dominance of Apple, Samsung, and Google in the Smartphone Market

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 13 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here A. Background 148. Mobile phones are portable devices that enable communications over radio frequencies instead of telephone landlines. These signals are transmitted by equipment covering distinct geographic areas, or “cells,” which is why mobile phones were called cell phones. The first commercial cell phones became available in the 1980s. Since then, improvements in both cell phone components and wireless technology have made it possible to transfer large volumes of data around the globe in a short period. As a result, mobile phones began to offer a wider array of features and the adoption of mobile phones dramatically increased. Today, nearly all American adults own a mobile phone. 149. Smartphones combine the functionality of a traditional mobile phone with advanced hardware and software components. Smartphones not only make phone calls, but allow users to listen to music, send text messages, take pictures, play games, access software for work, manage their finances, and browse the internet. Consumers choose between smartphones based, in part, on their functionality. Today, smartphone functionality is driven in large part, though not exclusively, by a combination of hardware and software components. Thus, in a competitive market, smartphone manufacturers would compete and innovate to provide the best functionality. 150. Although consumers could replace some smartphone functionality with separate devices such as by always carrying a camera and laptop, they generally prefer to access this combination of functionality as part of a single device. Thus, phones with some but not all of these features are not reasonable substitutes for smartphones. For example, a Canon or Nikon camera is not a substitute for an Apple or Samsung smartphone notwithstanding that both these products are capable of taking digital pictures. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The All-in-One Appeal of Smartphones and Apple's Monopoly Framework 

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 10 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here A. Apple’s conduct harms the competitive process 126. As described above, Apple protects its monopoly power in smartphones and performance smartphones by using its control over app distribution and app creation to suppress or delay apps, innovations, and technologies that would reduce user switching costs or simply allow users to discover, purchase, and use their own apps and content without having to rely on Apple. As a result, Apple faces less competition from rival smartphones and less competitive pressure from innovative, cross-platform technologies not because Apple makes its own products better but because it makes other products worse. With the benefit of less competition, Apple extracts extraordinary profits and regulates innovation to serve its interests. This leaves all smartphone users worse off, with fewer choices, higher prices and fees, lower quality smartphones, apps, and accessories, and less innovation from Apple and others. Left unchallenged, Apple will continue to use and strengthen its smartphone monopoly to dictate how companies can create and distribute apps in the future so that they cannot threaten Apple’s smartphone monopolies. 127. Apple’s conduct has resulted in less choice for smartphone users. Today, only two companies (Google and Samsung) remain as meaningful competitors to Apple in the premium smartphone market. 128. Even when users consider these alternatives, Apple’s conduct has increased the technical, behavioral, monetary, and other costs of switching from an iPhone to an alternative smartphone. This undermines competition and entrenches Apple’s monopoly power. For example, according to user surveys, one of the biggest reasons iPhone users do not switch to rival smartphones today is to avoid the problems Apple has created for cross-platform messaging. Likewise, Apple exercised its control over app distribution and app creation to impede the development and growth of super apps, depriving users of technology that would have facilitated switching by decreasing user’s dependence on Apple and the iPhone. Apple took a similar approach to cloud streaming apps, delaying or suppressing technology that would have made it easier for users to switch to cheaper smartphones. Apple also used its control over app creation, including its control over critical APIs, to impose technical and contractual restrictions on messaging apps, third-party smartwatches, and digital wallets, undermining cross-platform technologies that would have helped users overcome switching costs and friction and ultimately increased smartphone competition. 129. Apple’s conduct has delayed or suppressed the emergence of cross-platform technologies that would put competitive pressure on Apple’s ability to extract extraordinary profits from users and developers. For example, if developers could distribute their programs through super apps or cloud streaming apps, rather than the App Store, it would put competitive pressure on Apple’s ability to control app distribution and app creation as well as the taxes Apple imposes on developers who want to distribute apps to iPhone users. Similarly, third-party digital wallets, or other apps with tap-to-pay functionality, would benefit users and developers by putting more competitive pressure on Apple as well. For example, digital wallets could eventually provide developers an alternative way to process payments and manage customer relationships, forcing Apple to compete more aggressively by lowering fees and improving quality, which would ultimately benefit users. Instead, Apple continues to exert its power over customers and financial institutions when users pay for something with their phone—in the App Store, in an app, or increasingly in the physical world with tap-to-pay. 130. Apple’s conduct has harmed users in other ways. For example, third-party digital wallets would reduce Apple’s ability to charge banks high fees when users make payments using Apple Wallet, which ultimately cost consumers through higher prices or other reductions in quality. Alternative digital wallets could also provide smartphone users better rewards, e.g., cash back, as well as a more private, secure payment experience from a user’s preferred financial institution rather than being forced to go through Apple. But these tap-to-pay digital wallet products and services do not exist today because of Apple. 131. Apple’s conduct has made its own products worse, sacrificing the short-term profits Apple could earn from improving the iPhone in order to preserve the long-term value of maintaining its monopoly. In a competitive market, Apple would compete aggressively to support the development of popular apps and accessories for iPhone users, which would in turn make iPhones more attractive to users and more valuable. But Apple takes steps to delay or suppress cross-platform technologies that it recognizes would be popular with users, such as super apps and cloud streaming apps, because of the threat they pose to Apple’s smartphone monopolies. As a result, several developers have abandoned plans to develop super apps and cloud-based gaming apps even after making substantial investments in bringing them to market. Apple’s conduct may have also slowed the development of innovative, high-compute apps related to education, artificial intelligence, and productivity as well. Apple has also impeded innovation by third-party smartwatches such that manufacturers have limited the functionality of their smartwatches for iPhone users, suspended support for iPhone compatibility because of Apple’s restrictions, or canceled development of cross-platform smartwatches altogether. At least one company’s canceled smartwatch formed part of its overall wearables strategy, including future development of virtual-reality technology. Similarly, Apple degrades third-party messaging apps, even though it makes cross-platform messaging less private and less secure for iPhone users, because doing so raises switching costs. 132. Apple’s conduct has harmed other smartphone users, too. Because of the resources and risks required to maintain different features across different smartphones, many potential super app, mini program, and other developers do not implement features prohibited by Apple even on other smartphones. For example, prospective digital wallet providers, including U.S. banks, have abandoned the development of digital-wallet apps for either Apple or other smartphones. Another company decided not to offer users an innovative digital car key in part because Apple required that company to add any features related to the key into Apple Wallet rather than allowing that company to put its key solely in its own app. Other developers have shrunk, shuttered, or abandoned plans to launch super apps, cloud-streamed gaming apps, smartwatches, and other apps. As a result, all smartphone users enjoy lower quality smartphones, less innovation, and less choice. 133. Apple’s documents and conduct show that Apple is motivated by the anticompetitive purpose of building or maintaining monopoly power in the relevant markets. For example, Apple sacrificed substantial revenues it could have earned from super apps, mini programs, cloud streaming apps, and other third-party apps and accessories. In particular, mobile gaming already accounts for a large and growing portion of Apple’s revenue. Popular cloud streamed gaming apps would offer iPhone users access to popular services (including games) and in turn generate significant revenue for Apple through subscriptions and in-app purchases. Instead, Apple preferred the long-term benefit of reduced smartphone competition to the revenue it would generate from cloud gaming, super apps, and mini programs or the quality (and consumer demand) increase that would flow from this innovation. Apple has also used its control over app distribution and app creation to selectively undermine cross-platform technologies, not because this helps protect users but because it helps protect Apple. 134. The harms to smartphone competition caused by Apple’s conduct are amplified by Apple’s decision to grant itself exclusive distribution rights to iPhone users through the Apple App Store. If Apple allowed users to access apps in other ways, users could choose an app store that did not restrict super apps or mini programs, even if Apple ran its App Store the same way it does today. Apple does not allow that choice, however, because if it did developers could write their programs for any smartphone rather than specifically for iOS, just as internet browsers and Apple’s QuickTime allowed developers to write programs that worked on a variety of operating systems not just Windows. That would lower users’ switching costs and reduce users’ and developers’ dependence on Apple and the iPhone. 135. Apple’s smartphone monopoly gives it many levers to maintain its power even in the face of interventions focused on eliminating or disciplining specific anticompetitive practices. This is because Apple’s iPhone monopoly, secured by its anticompetitive conduct, grants it the power to set the rules by which most smartphone users buy digital and hardware products, and by which developers are allowed to sell these same products to users. If Apple is forced to change some of these rules, it has the power to adopt new rules, restrictions, or features that reinforce Apple’s monopoly and harm competition in other ways. For example, Apple has stated plans to adopt RCS due to market and international regulatory pressure. But Apple continues to contractually restrict third parties from accessing other APIs and features that would enable cross-platform messaging apps. In another instance, Apple was enjoined from enforcing certain anti-steering provisions in its agreements with developers. In response, Apple simply created a different set of onerous restrictions on app developers to achieve a similar result. In other cases, Apple has used its control over app distribution to force companies to comply with Apple’s policies that may contradict local laws by delaying the review of the offending companies’ apps. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The Impact of Apple's Monopoly on Smartphone Users and the Competitive Landscape

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 6 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here III. Smartphones Are Platforms 48. Smartphones combine the functionality of a traditional mobile phone with advanced hardware and software components. This cluster of services and features results in a distinct product for consumers and developers. For example, smartphones not only make phone calls, but also allow users to listen to music, send text messages, take pictures, play games, access software for work, manage their finances, and browse the internet. 49. Smartphones are platforms. Platforms bring together different groups that benefit from each other’s participation on the platform. A food delivery app, for example, is a multisided platform that brings together restaurants, couriers, and consumers. A two-sided platform, for example, may bring together service providers on the one hand and consumers on the other. The technology and economics of a smartphone platform are fundamentally different from the technology and economics of a simultaneous transaction platform, such as a credit card, because smartphone platforms compete over device features and pricing in ways that do not directly relate to app store transactions. Whereas credit card transactions reflect a single simultaneous action that requires both sides of the transaction for either side to exist, consumers value smartphone platforms for a variety of reasons separate from their ability to facilitate a simultaneous transaction. Consumers care about non-transactional components of the phone, such as its camera and processing speed, and they care about non-transactional components of apps, such as their features and functionality. 50. The economics of a smartphone platform are such that the platform’s value to users—and in turn to the platform operator—increase when new apps and new features are added to the platform. In order to create these economic benefits for itself and its users, Apple has opened its smartphone platform to third-party developers, whose countless inventions and innovations have created enormous value. Apple has willingly opened the platform to third-party developers to capture this value even though there is no extensive regulatory framework requiring it to do so or overseeing how it interacts with those third parties. In this way, smartphone platforms are very different from other platforms, like landline telephone networks, whose value-adding features were built primarily by the platform operator and which were only opened to third parties when the platform operator was required to do so by regulation. When a third-party developer for the iPhone creates a valuable new feature, consumers benefit and consumer demand goes up for Apple’s products, increasing the economic value of the iPhone to Apple. This has played out hundreds of thousands of times for the iPhone, resulting in an enormously valuable smartphone platform reflecting the combined contributions of millions of developers. 51. In contrast, limiting the features and functionality created by third-party developers—and therefore available to iPhone users—makes the iPhone worse and deprives Apple of the economic value it would gain as the platform operator. It makes no economic sense for Apple to sacrifice the profits it would earn from new features and functionality unless it has some other compensating reason to do so, such as protecting its monopoly profits. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The Value Chain of Smartphone Platforms and the Skewed Economics of Apple's Dominance 

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 3 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here II. Defendant Apple 19. Apple is a global technology company with headquarters in Cupertino, California. Apple is one of the world’s most valuable public companies with a market capitalization over $2.5 trillion. In fiscal year 2023, Apple generated annual net revenues of $383 billion and net income of $97 billion. Apple’s net income exceeds any other company in the Fortune 500 and the gross domestic products of more than 100 countries. 20. The iPhone, Apple’s signature product, is the primary driver of Apple’s growth and profitability, routinely commanding profit margins of more than 30 percent on devices alone—significantly higher than its smartphone competitors. iPhone sales have made up a majority of Apple’s annual revenue every year since 2012. 21. Apple increasingly extracts revenue from iPhone users beyond the initial smartphone sale. For example, Apple offers iPhone upgrades, apps and in-app payments, paid digital subscription services (e.g., Apple’s music streaming, TV, news, gaming, fitness, and cloud storage subscriptions), accessories (e.g., tracking devices, headphones, chargers, iPhone cases), and more. Apple refers to these offerings as “Services” and “Wearables, Home, and Accessories,” respectively. In fiscal year 2023, these offerings accounted for nearly one-third of Apple’s total revenue, or four times what Apple earned from selling Mac computers. Some of the largest drivers of revenue within these categories are Apple’s smartwatch, the Apple Watch, and Apple’s App Store, where iPhone users purchase and download apps. In recent years, Services have accounted for an increasing share of Apple’s revenues, while the iPhone has remained the primary gateway through which U.S. consumers access these services. 22. Apple’s U.S. market share by revenue is over 70 percent in the performance smartphone market—a more expensive segment of the broader smartphone market where Apple’s own executives recognize the company competes—and over 65 percent for all smartphones. These market shares have remained remarkably durable over the last decade. 23. Apple’s smartphone market shares understate Apple’s dominance and likely growth in key demographics, including among younger American consumers. For example, one-third of all iPhone users in the United States were born after 1996, as compared to just 10 percent for Samsung, Apple’s closest smartphone competitor. Surveys show that as many as 88 percent of U.S. teenagers expect to purchase an iPhone for their next smartphone. iPhone users also tend to come from higher income households. Because smartphone users generally use a single smartphone to access related products and services, locking up key user groups allows Apple to capture greater spending on iPhone-related products and services, realize higher margins per user as compared to its smartphone rivals, and exercise greater control over developers and other smartphone ecosystem participants. 24. In fiscal year 2023, Apple spent $30 billion on research and development. By comparison, Apple spent $77 billion on stock buybacks during the same year. 25. Apple was founded in 1976. During its first 25 years, the company focused in large part on producing and marketing personal computers. Although the market for personal computers expanded over the next several decades, Apple struggled to gain customer adoption for its higher-priced products relative to its lower-cost competitors, including IBM and Microsoft. In the late 1990s, Apple significantly restructured the company and embarked on a new strategy focused not just on selling personal computers, but also consumer devices like the iPod, which led to the development of the iPhone. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

A Deep Dive into Apple's Dominance in the Smartphone Market

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 2 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here I. Introduction 1. The Apple Computer Company, as it was then called, was founded in 1976 to make and market personal computers. From its inception, Apple had a knack for expensive, high-end design and niche marketing relative to its competitors. But it struggled to compete against rivals that offered lower prices and more programs. After two decades, Apple struggled to compete against Windows personal computers and by the late 1990s, it was on the brink of bankruptcy. 2. Apple’s fortunes changed around the time it launched the iPod in 2001. Innovative design and savvy marketing had not been enough to drive a successful business strategy. This time, the confluence of several factors made it a smash success. Apple’s iTunes application allowed iPod users to organize their song library and update their iPod. A path clearing antitrust enforcement case, brought by the United States and state attorneys general, against Microsoft opened the market and constrained Microsoft’s ability to prohibit companies like Apple from offering iTunes on Windows PCs. Licensing agreements with the major music labels allowed Apple to offer iPod/iTunes users a wide selection of music for a fee-predownloaded. The iPod experience gave Apple a recipe for the future: a high-end device, a large number of platform participants (i.e., music labels and consumers), and a digital storefront. More importantly, it gave Apple a playbook: drive as many consumers and third-party participants to the platform as possible and offer a wide selection of content, products, and services created by those third parties to consumers. This structure put Apple in the driver’s seat to generate substantial revenues through device sales in the first instance and subsequently the ancillary fees that it derives from sitting between consumers on the one hand and the products and services they love on the other. 3. Apple’s experience with the iPod set the stage for Apple’s most successful product yet. In 2007, Apple launched the iPhone, a smartphone that offered high-end hardware and software applications, called “apps,” built atop a mobile operating system that mimicked the functionality and ease of use of a computer. Apple initially offered only a small number of apps that it created for the iPhone. But Apple quickly realized the enormous value that a broader community of entrepreneurial, innovative developers could drive to its users and the iPhone platform more broadly. So Apple invited and capitalized on the work of these third parties while maintaining control and monetizing that work for itself. The value of third parties’ work served an important purpose for Apple. Indeed, as early as 2010, then-CEO Steve Jobs discussed how to “further lock customers into our ecosystem” and “make Apple[’s] ecosystem even more sticky.” Three years later, Apple executives were still strategizing how to “get people hooked to the ecosystem.” 4. That strategy paid off. Over more than 15 years, Apple has built and sustained the most dominant smartphone platform and ecosystem in the United States by attracting third-party developers of all kinds to create apps that users could download on their smartphones through a digital storefront called the App Store. As developers created more and better products, content, apps, and services, more people bought iPhones, which incentivized even more third parties to develop apps for the iPhone. Today, the iPhone’s ecosystem includes products, apps, content, accessories, and services that are offered by content creators, newspaper publishers, banks, advertisers, social media companies, airlines, productivity developers, retailers and other merchants, and others. As Apple’s power grew, its leverage over third parties reinforced its tight control over how third parties innovate and monetize on and off the smartphone in ways that were anticompetitive and exclusionary. 5. Today, Apple charges as much as $1,599 for an iPhone and earns high margins on each one, more than double those of others in the industry. When developers imagine a new product or service for iPhone consumers, Apple demands up to 30 percent of the price of an app whose content, product, or service it did not create. Then when a consumer wants to buy some additional service within that app, Apple extracts up to another 30 percent, again for a service Apple does not create or develop. When customers buy a coffee or pay for groceries, Apple charges a fee for every “tap-to-pay” transaction, imposing its own form of an interchange fee on banks and a significant new cost for using credit cards. When users run an internet search, Google gives Apple a significant cut of the advertising revenue that an iPhone user’s searches generate. 6. Apple keenly understands that while a community of developers and accessory makers is indispensable to the success of the iPhone, they also pose an existential threat to its extraordinary profits by empowering consumers to “think different” and choose perfectly functional, less-expensive alternative smartphones. 7. Apple’s smartphone business model, at its core, is one that invites as many participants, including iPhone users and third-party developers, to join its platform as possible while using contractual terms to force these participants to pay substantial fees. At the same time, Apple restricts its platform participants’ ability to negotiate or compete down its fees through alternative app stores, in-app payment processors, and more. 8. In order to protect that model, Apple reduces competition in the markets for performance smartphones and smartphones generally. It does this by delaying, degrading, or outright blocking technologies that would increase competition in the smartphone markets by decreasing barriers to switching to another smartphone, among other things. The suppressed technologies would provide a high-quality user experience on any smartphone, which would, in turn, require smartphones to compete on their merits. 9. Apple suppresses such innovation through a web of contractual restrictions that it selectively enforces through its control of app distribution and its “app review” process, as well as by denying access to key points of connection between apps and the iPhone’s operating system (called Application Programming Interfaces or “APIs”). Apple can enforce these restrictions due to its position as an intermediary between product creators such as developers on the one hand and users on the other. 10. This complaint highlights five examples of Apple using these mechanisms to suppress technologies that would have increased competition among smartphones. Suppressing these technologies does not reflect competition on the merits. Rather, to protect its smartphone monopoly—and the extraordinary profits that monopoly generates—Apple repeatedly chooses to make its products worse for consumers to prevent competition from emerging. These examples below individually and collectively have contributed to Apple’s ability to secure, grow, and maintain its smartphone monopoly by increasing switching costs for users, which leads to higher prices and less innovation for users and developers. Apple has used one or both mechanisms (control of app distribution or control of APIs) to suppress the following technologies, among others: Super apps provide a user with broad functionality in a single app. Super apps can improve smartphone competition by providing a consistent user experience that can be ported across devices. Suppressing super apps harms all smartphone users—including Apple users—by denying them access to high quality experiences and it harms developers by preventing them from innovating and selling products. Cloud streaming game apps provide users with a way to play computing intensive games in the cloud. Cloud streaming games (and cloud streaming in general) can improve smartphone competition by decreasing the importance of expensive hardware for accomplishing high compute tasks on a smartphone. Suppressing cloud streaming games harms users by denying them the ability to play high-compute games, and it harms developers by preventing them from selling such games to users. Messaging apps are apps that allow users to communicate with friends, family, and other contacts. Messaging apps that work equally well across all smartphones can improve competition among smartphones by allowing users to switch phones without changing the way they communicate with friends, family, and others. Apple makes third-party messaging apps on the iPhone worse generally and relative to Apple Messages, Apple’s own messaging app, by prohibiting third-party apps from sending or receiving carrier-based messages. By doing so, Apple is knowingly and deliberately degrading quality, privacy, and security for its users and others who do not have iPhones. Apple also harms developers by artificially constraining the size of their user base. Smartwatches are an expensive accessory that typically must be paired to a smartphone. Smartwatches that can be paired with different smartphones allow users to retain their investment in a smartwatch when switching phones thereby decreasing the literal cost associated with switching from one smartphone to another, among other things. By suppressing key functions of third-party smartwatches—including the ability to respond to notifications and messages and to maintain consistent connections with the iPhone—Apple has denied users access to high performing smartwatches with preferred styling, better user interfaces and services, or better batteries, and it has harmed smartwatch developers by decreasing their ability to innovate and sell products. Digital wallets are an increasingly important way that smartphones are used and are a product in which users develop a great deal of comfort and trust as they typically contain users’ most sensitive information. Digital wallets that work across smartphone platforms allow users to move from one smartphone brand to another with decreased frictions, among other things. Apple has denied users access to digital wallets that would have provided a wide variety of enhanced features and denied digital wallet developers—often banks—the opportunity to provide advanced digital payments services to their own customers. 11. By maintaining its monopoly over smartphones, Apple is able to harm consumers in a wide variety of additional ways. For example, by denying iPhone users the ability to choose their trusted banking apps as their digital wallet, Apple retains full control both over the consumer and also over the stream of income generated by forcing users to use only Apple authorized products in the digital wallet. Apple also prohibits the creation and use of alternative app stores curated to reflect a consumer’s preferences with respect to security, privacy, or other values. These and many other features would be beneficial to consumers and empower them to make choices about what smartphone to buy and what apps and products to patronize. But allowing consumers to make that choice is an obstacle to Apple’s ability to maintain its monopoly. 12. Of course, this is not the story Apple presents to the world. For decades, Apple branded itself a nimble, innovative upstart. In 1998, Apple co-founder Steve Jobs criticized Microsoft’s monopoly and “dirty tactics” in operating systems to target Apple, which prompted the company “to go to the Department of Justice” in hopes of getting Microsoft “to play fair.” But even at that time, Apple did not face the same types of restrictions it imposes on third parties today; Apple users could use their iPod with a Windows computer, and Microsoft did not charge Apple a 30 percent fee for each song downloaded from Apple’s iTunes store. Similarly, when Apple brought the iPhone to market in 2007, it benefited from competition among component makers and wireless carriers. 13. While Apple’s anticompetitive conduct arguably has benefited its shareholders— to the tune of over $77 billion in stock buybacks in its 2023 fiscal year alone—it comes at a great cost to consumers. Some of those costs are immediate and obvious, and they directly affect Apple’s own customers: Apple inflates the price for buying and using iPhones while preventing the development of features like alternative app stores, innovative super apps, cloud-streaming games, and secure texting. 14. Other costs of Apple’s anticompetitive conduct may be less obvious in the immediate term. But they are no less harmful and even more widespread, affecting all smartphone consumers. Apple’s smartphone monopoly means that it is not economically viable to invest in building some apps, like digital wallets, because they cannot reach iPhone users. This means that innovations fueled by an interest in building the best, most user-focused product that would exist in a more competitive market never get off the ground. What’s more, Apple itself has less incentive to innovate because it has insulated itself from competition. As Apple’s executives openly acknowledge: “In looking at it with hindsight, I think going forward we need to set a stake in the ground for what features we think are ‘good enough’ for the consumer. I would argue we’re already doing *more* than what would have been good enough. But we find it very hard to regress our product features YOY [year over year].” Existing features “would have been good enough today if we hadn’t introduced [them] already,” and “anything new and especially expensive needs to be rigorously challenged before it’s allowed into the consumer phone.” Thus, it is not surprising that Apple spent more than twice as much on stock buybacks and dividends as it did on research and development. 15. Moreover, Apple has demonstrated its ability to use its smartphone monopoly to impose fee structures and manipulate app review to inhibit aggrieved parties from taking advantage of regulatory and judicial solutions imposed on Apple that attempt to narrowly remedy harm from its conduct. 16. Apple wraps itself in a cloak of privacy, security, and consumer preferences to justify its anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, it spends billions on marketing and branding to promote the self-serving premise that only Apple can safeguard consumers’ privacy and security interests. Apple selectively compromises privacy and security interests when doing so is in Apple’s own financial interest—such as degrading the security of text messages, offering governments and certain companies the chance to access more private and secure versions of app stores, or accepting billions of dollars each year for choosing Google as its default search engine when more private options are available. In the end, Apple deploys privacy and security justifications as an elastic shield that can stretch or contract to serve Apple’s financial and business interests. 17. Smartphones have so revolutionized American life that it can be hard to imagine a world beyond the one that Apple, a self-interested monopolist, deems “good enough.” But under our system of antitrust laws, “good enough” is, quite simply, not enough. Consumers, competition, and the competitive process—not Apple alone—should decide what options consumers should have. And competition, not Apple’s self-interested business strategies, should be the catalyst for innovation essential to our daily lives, not only in the smartphone market but in closely related industries like personal entertainment, automotive infotainment, and even more innovations that have not yet been imagined. Competition is what will ensure that Apple’s conduct and business decisions do not thwart the Apple. next 18. Protecting competition and the innovation that competition inevitably ushers in for consumers, developers, publishers, content creators, and device manufacturers is why Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit under Section 2 of the Sherman Act to challenge Apple’s maintenance of its monopoly over smartphone markets, which affect hundreds of millions of Americans every day. Plaintiffs bring this case to rid smartphone markets of Apple’s monopolization and exclusionary conduct and to ensure that the next generation of innovators can upend the technological world as we know it with new and transformative technologies. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

The DOJ Sues Apple for Orchestrating a Monopoly in the Smartphone Market 

DOJ স্মার্টফোন বাজারে একচেটিয়া অর্কেস্ট্রেট করার জন্য অ্যাপলের বিরুদ্ধে মামলা করেছে

Das US-Justizministerium verklagt Apple wegen der Schaffung eines Monopols auf dem Smartphone-Markt

El Departamento de Justicia demanda a Apple por orquestar un monopolio en el mercado de teléfonos inteligentes

Le DOJ poursuit Apple pour avoir orchestré un monopole sur le marché des smartphones

स्मार्टफोन बाजार में एकाधिकार स्थापित करने के लिए डीओजे ने एप्पल पर मुकदमा दायर किया

司法省、スマートフォン市場の独占を画策したとしてアップルを提訴

DOJ, 스마트폰 시장 독점 조율 혐의로 애플 고소

O DOJ processa a Apple por orquestrar um monopólio no mercado de smartphones

Министерство юстиции подает в суд на Apple за организацию монополии на рынке смартфонов

DOJ, Akıllı Telefon Pazarında Tekel Kurduğu İçin Apple'a Dava Açtı

DOJ kiện Apple vì sắp xếp độc quyền trên thị trường điện thoại thông minh

美国司法部起诉苹果公司垄断智能手机市场

Tech giant Apple has come under fire in recent weeks following underwhelming iPhone sales and a perceived lack of innovation among its smartphone releases. But is the reality that Apple is preparing for a future bigger than the iPhone? Sales issues surrounding the iPhone have led to Apple’s stock receiving two rating downgrades within a week, sending share values tumbling at the start of January 2024. Following an initial Barclays downgrade, Harsh Kumar from Piper Sandler & Co. opted to downgrade Apple’s rating from ‘Overweight’ to ‘Neutral’, underlining a troubled period for the stock on Wall Street. “We are concerned about handset inventories entering into 1H24 and also feel that growth rates have peaked for unit sales,” in a note. explained Kumar Barclays analysts led by Tim Long also shared the perspective that iPhone sales were insufficient. “Our checks remain negative on volumes and mix for iPhone 15, and we see no features or upgrades that are likely to make the iPhone 16 more compelling,” . the analysts confirmed has long struggled to capture any meaningful momentum since Q3 2023, and the iPhone’s perceived shortcomings, along with geopolitical tensions leading to on Apple products in China, have paved the way for growing negative sentiment towards the innovative tech firm. Apple’s stock reported bans Interest in iPhones Waning? On the surface, iPhone specifications have begun to appear relatively familiar from model to model as technological limitations prevent the implementation of powerful new features packed into handsets. Taking a deeper glance at how recent iPhone models compare, we can see that the , front camera, and connectivity as well as very similar features in terms of battery life and physical appearance as the iPhone 14. iPhone 15 features the same display This, accompanied by growing consumer wariness about the drawbacks of through fears of slowing handset speeds, battery drainage, and a lack of meaningful features, illustrates that have become limited in the level of innovation available to consumers in new models. iOS system updates Apple’s iPhones As wider economic headwinds are caused by high inflation, lingering high interest rates, and geopolitical conflict, consumer spending has been in the US and beyond, creating greater hesitation over upgrading products with fewer tangible benefits. dealt a sizeable blow The widespread consumer spending downturn has seen Taiwanese firm Foxconn report a in December 2023 sales, with forecasts remaining gloomy in the new year–adding to the concern that iPhone sales aren’t set to recover any time soon. heavy 27% drop The Financial Times’ flagship opinion column, Lex, suggests that news of slowing iPhone sales is over the long term, however. unlikely to trouble Apple While the column offers a reminder that Apple still dominates the growing smartphone premium market with a 71% global share, the innovative tech firm also has its attention firmly fixed on groundbreaking innovations elsewhere in the near future, all with the potential to outlast the smartphone as we know it today. 2024 Will See Apple Embrace Generative AI So far, Apple has been slow to embrace the generative AI boom, which was sparked by OpenAI’s launch of ChatGPT in late 2022. However, this is set to change quickly as the firm has begun to the development of generative artificial intelligence products. committing $1 billion per year “But you can bet that we’re investing, we’re investing quite a bit, we’re going to do it responsibly and it will — you will see product advancements over time where those technologies are at the heart of them,” , Apple CEO. confirmed Tim Cook In December 2023, , a machine learning framework that allows developers to build models that run on Apple Silicon and deep learning model library MLX Data. Apple launched MLX In addition to this, Craig Federighi, Apple’s senior vice president in charge of AI and software engineering, has been working on adding AI to upcoming rollouts of iOS. This would introduce large language models to Apple devices that could help bring to a range of core Apple services. greater artificial intelligence For instance, Siri could benefit from vast improvements in terms of comprehension and the quality of query responses, while Apple’s Messages app would gain the ability to field questions itself and auto-complete sentences intuitively. Apple has been cautious with its adoption of generative AI, but as the iPhone approaches a technological ceiling in its current form, the Wall Street speculators of today may be sorely missing the bigger picture: the future of Apple won’t feature the iPhone. Innovating Beyond iPhone In a world where generative AI can intuitively write messages on your behalf and generate a conversational level of comprehension with consumers, the future of the smartphone could face an upcoming challenge for relevance. Apple has long been seeking out what a looks like, and its lack of major iPhone developments in recent years portrays a company that’s finally beginning to believe that the end is in sight for the heyday of the smartphone. future without smartphone dependency While Apple’s generative AI push may be at its fledgling stage, 2024 could yet prove to be a transformative year for the company as dives into the world of spatial computing with the launch of the Vision Pro. “Today marks the beginning of a new era for computing,” when announcing the Vision Pro last year. “Just as the Mac introduced us to personal computing, and iPhone introduced us to mobile computing, Apple Vision Pro introduces us to spatial computing." declared Cook Crucially, the Vision Pro operates as an ‘infinite canvas’ that delivers a fully interactive and three-dimensional user interface that’s , hands, and voice. controlled primarily by the user’s eyes This offers an indication of Apple’s future intentions. We’re looking at a life beyond hardware, and control delivered through biometrics. Although the Vision Pro’s launch may be initially impacted by the same consumer spending issues that have hampered iPhone sales in recent months, it’s an innovation that has the potential to unite a range of technologies for entertainment, productivity, and social purposes. Building a Sustainable Future Apple’s future will ultimately lie beyond the iPhone, but its success could be hampered by the sheer scale of the technological revolution on the horizon. With firms like Meta and Microsoft still betting big on the metaverse, Apple’s spatial computing ambitions with the Vision Pro could face rivals that carry similar purposes. This technological space race will depend on many emerging technologies and their long-term sustainability. However, it’s important to keep the bigger picture in mind when looking at Apple’s recent iPhone sales struggles. In the future that Apple is preparing for, the iPhone will be obsolete.

Life After Smartphones: Are Critics of Apple’s iPhone Sales Slump Missing the Bigger Picture?

স্মার্টফোনের পরে জীবন: অ্যাপলের আইফোন বিক্রয় মন্দার সমালোচকরা কি বড় ছবি মিস করছেন?

Leben nach Smartphones: Verkennen Kritiker des iPhone-Verkaufsrückgangs von Apple das Gesamtbild?

La vida después de los teléfonos inteligentes: ¿Los críticos de la caída de las ventas del iPhone de Apple están perdiendo el panorama general?

La vie après les smartphones : les critiques de la chute des ventes d’iPhone d’Apple manquent-elles une vue d’ensemble ?

स्मार्टफ़ोन के बाद का जीवन: क्या Apple के iPhone की बिक्री में गिरावट के आलोचक बड़ी तस्वीर को भूल रहे हैं?

スマートフォンの後の生活: Apple の iPhone 販売不振を批判する人たちは全体像を見逃しているのでしょうか?

스마트폰 이후의 삶: Apple의 iPhone 판매 부진을 비판하는 사람들은 더 큰 그림을 놓치고 있습니까?

A vida depois dos smartphones: os críticos da queda nas vendas do iPhone da Apple estão perdendo a visão geral?

Жизнь после смартфонов: критики падения продаж iPhone от Apple упускают общую картину?

Akıllı Telefonlardan Sonra Hayat: Apple'ın iPhone Satışlarındaki Düşüşü Eleştirenler Büyük Resmi Kaçırıyor mu?

Cuộc sống sau điện thoại thông minh: Những người chỉ trích doanh số iPhone sụt giảm của Apple có bỏ lỡ bức tranh toàn cảnh hơn không?

智能手机之后的生活：对苹果 iPhone 销量下滑的批评者是否忽视了更大的前景？

Authored by and DIMO Co-Founder Joe Bender Andy Chatham The next 10 years of the automotive industry are shaping up to be a bloodbath. As competition heats up the knives are starting to come out, and gaps are opening up for new product categories and business models. Consider how much is at stake: Cars are a ~5x larger market than phones. This gap is larger in the developed world. Automakers & suppliers are massive (typically unionized) employers. They have huge political and cultural influence as some of the largest advertisers. Car brands are a national source of pride. Historically, having a domestic auto industry is viewed as a national security priority. Things are starting to look ugly for legacy automakers The public markets have priced in a very high chance that some of the legacy players like GM, Ford, Mercedes Benz, Stellantis, etc., will go bankrupt in the next 5-7 years. VW has said their core brand is and they’re on shipping next generation software for vehicles. no longer competitive years behind How did we get here? If you went back in time and showed Henry Ford any car from the 20th century, he would be able to wrap his head around it. There would be an internal combustion engine, a highway map jammed in the glovebox, and an immediate trip to the mechanic when anything isn’t working. Fast forward to today and imagine Henry hopping in a Tesla Cybertruck. Unless someone showed him how to use the Tesla app, he might not even be able to unlock it and start driving. The idea that computers thousands of miles away could send an update to the drive-by-wire system or autopilot would seem like witchcraft. So, where’s this all headed? The Cybertruck is the most tangible proof that three of the biggest transformations in 100 years are going up the S-curve at the same time: EVs, Autonomy (AI), and Connectivity. We’ll demystify these trends here and introduce some of the opportunities that are emerging for both automakers and completely new business models and applications. Electric Vehicles Most automakers started taking EVs seriously after the Tesla Model S launched in 2012, and since those companies operate on 10-year product cycles, their first real efforts came to market this year. Except for Toyota (they primarily stuck with hybrids), the transition is not going great for any of the legacy automakers. Tesla has a 60% (and climbing) EV market share in the US, and Chinese OEMs like BYD Company are eating their lunch in international markets. Things don’t seem to be looking up as they're walking back expectations for Gen2/3 vehicle sales and delaying spending. Autonomy (AI) This is the biggest unknown, as it's primarily driven by software improvements vs. hardware. Most legacy OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) have given up on their own "Full Stack" AV Plans and are relying on tech from Mobileye. If (BIG IF) can get to a profitable/scalable robotaxi deployment that people don't hate in San Francisco or Phoenix, then there is likely a path towards automating 2-3% of the total trips. Waymo Connectivity Connected cars are unlocking novel use cases (and new attack surfaces). To get a sense of the possibilities, watch this Tesla club set a new record by in the Finnish countryside to perform a coordinated holiday light show. assembling 687 vehicles This also opened a digital Pandora’s Box when it comes to privacy. With such rich data being collected from vehicles, the attack surface broadens, and vulnerabilities are unfortunately commonplace. In recent years, there has been a nonstop stream of disclosures from legacy automakers about customer data being compromised. In 2021, that an unauthorized third party obtained limited personal information about 3.3 million customers. In 2022, a data leak affecting 1.6 million prospective and actual customers, including names, street addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers. Only this year, that they were victims of a decade-long data leak that exposed the data of 2.15 million customers. Volkswagen announced Mercedes-Benz disclosed Toyota reported The capability gap between legacy auto and new “Software Native” players is huge here: Mobile apps people actually want to use are built on one platform. Connected vehicle services for insurance/maintenance. OTA (Over The Air) updates to fix issues and add features. What's the path forward? Where are the opportunities? Legacy OEMs need to differentiate vs. trying to copy Tesla. Toyota has done this by sticking with Hybrids and partnering (Aurora Innovation & May Mobility) instead of buying AV companies. Ford is doubling down on commercial vehicles with Ford Pro. Many OEMs are building their own “walled garden” developer platforms. , and Tesla is migrating an emerging ecosystem of 3rd party apps to a that will allow developers to access data directly from vehicles rather than having to rely on their servers. GM has shared some access to theirs new protocol The problem with this approach is that it’s hard to command developer attention when the biggest OEM (Toyota) only has 15% of the vehicles on the road, and the vast majority of them are unaddressable because they still aren’t connected to the internet. This brings us to the open and permissionless approach - after all, when you buy the car, shouldn’t you own the data from it and use whatever apps you want? Car Wars: The Drivers Strike Back There are some new approaches to create a more resilient system where drivers and fleets are in control of their data - has built an open, connected vehicle network that puts car owners in the digital driver’s seat, giving data back to drivers and helping them earn rewards. DIMO Like Roku for TVs, DIMO goes “over the top” of OEMs to allow any car to connect: Using a that plugs right into a car’s or, more simply, by linking with the native connected car service like the Tesla app or FordPass, drivers can collect and store their own car data directly. hardware device OBD2 port Today, this gives users comprehensive monitoring of all reported vehicle systems right in a mobile app or on the web for fleets. Everything from odometer, battery health, location, fuel level, and VIN number, to useful utilities like reading confusing error codes, estimating the car’s valuation, or estimating battery capacity. Demystifying valuable vehicle metrics and putting them in the hands of the user is the first step to a more transparent automotive industry. However, leveling up insights into your vehicle is only half of DIMO’s approach to car ownership. With such sensitive data on user driving habits, adopting the legacy strategy of storing this information on centralized corporate servers feels dangerous and antiquated. Cars On-Chain That’s why DIMO chose to build an open network and anchor to a blockchain. This gives users with ownership of the network transparency into how their vehicle data is used and, most importantly, the ability to share it with any application they want. vehicle identity DIMO users are rewarded for the longevity of their connection with the network and not necessarily the amount of time or miles driven. This incentivizes maintaining good-faith participation in the network and discourages reward farming. By having a car connected to the DIMO Network, users earn a in $DIMO tokens. There are also opportunities for earning additional rewards by transacting with DIMO apps and services - like an airline reward point for your automotive spending. weekly baseline issuance The DIMO Marketplace is a collection of service providers that offer automotive solutions for drivers in the DIMO Network. By browsing the DIMO Marketplace in the mobile app, users can see partners that have offered tools and services valuable to car owners. For example, is a digital insurance broker. DIMO users can leverage Marble to check for potential insurance savings and receive $DIMO tokens for utilizing the service. This sort of mutually beneficial ecosystem has never existed in the auto industry before today. Marble Typically, drivers are at the whim of big businesses that view consumers as the product. Additionally, the data that is maintained in the DIMO application can be invaluable when leveraging these services. In the past when visiting the mechanic, problems with the vehicle could be a total mystery. Now, with a quick glance at the car’s health in the DIMO app, a repair shop could easily assess that low battery voltage is causing ignition issues or suboptimal tire pressure is resulting in fuel inefficiency. A path (highway?) forward In the same way that there was a monumental shift in perspective when the internet was popularized, or smartphones were widely adopted, it is time to rethink the way we approach car ownership. It has been observed time and time again that open networks benefit the end user. DIMO envisions a future where driving doesn’t have to be so lonely because each car is sharing data and being rewarded for its contributions. If cars are closer to supercomputers than a vintage Model T, then why shouldn’t we be as conscientious about data privacy, transparency, and analytics as we are with our phones or laptops?

Remember the Smartphone Wars? The Auto Industry is About to Make Them Look Like a Snowball Fight

স্মার্টফোন যুদ্ধের কথা মনে আছে? অটো ইন্ডাস্ট্রি তাদের স্নোবলের লড়াইয়ের মতো দেখাতে চলেছে৷

Erinnern Sie sich an die Smartphone-Kriege? Die Autoindustrie ist dabei, sie wie eine Schneeballschlacht aussehen zu lassen

¿Recuerdas la guerra de los teléfonos inteligentes? La industria automotriz está a punto de hacer que parezcan una pelea de bolas de nieve

Vous vous souvenez de la guerre des smartphones ? L’industrie automobile est sur le point de les faire ressembler à une bataille de boules de neige

स्मार्टफ़ोन युद्ध याद है? ऑटो उद्योग उन्हें एक स्नोबॉल लड़ाई की तरह दिखाने वाला है

スマホ戦争を覚えていますか？自動車業界は雪合戦のように見せかけている

스마트폰 전쟁을 기억하시나요? 자동차 산업이 눈싸움처럼 보이게 만들려고 한다

Lembra das guerras dos smartphones? A indústria automobilística está prestes a fazer com que pareçam uma luta de bolas de neve

Помните «войны смартфонов»? Автомобильная промышленность собирается превратить их в игру в снежки

Akıllı Telefon Savaşlarını hatırlıyor musunuz? Otomotiv Endüstrisi Onları Kartopu Savaşı Gibi Göstermek Üzere

Bạn có nhớ cuộc chiến điện thoại thông minh không? Ngành công nghiệp ô tô sắp biến chúng giống như một cuộc chiến ném tuyết

还记得智能手机大战吗？汽车行业即将让他们看起来像一场打雪仗

Smartphones have become integral to modern life since the launch of Apple’s first iPhone in 2007. They hold much of our personal information and give us access to services and apps like email, mobile banking, and social media. Years later, arrived in our smartphones. The technology, which refers to computer systems or machines that perform tasks that usually require human intelligence, has since advanced. AI is now powered by a variety of applications, including: artificial intelligence (AI) Machine learning (ML) algorithms detect patterns in data to make predictions and improve over time based on new inputs. Natural language processing (NLP) analyses and generates human language. Computer vision identifies and interprets visual inputs like images and video. Robotics integrates AI to make automated machines that can move and interact with the physical world. It’s no wonder that technology companies across the globe are heavily investing in AI, some to specifically improve a consumer’s smartphone experience through virtual assistants and other services. Here are : some numbers Google has invested $30.7 billion in AI to improve its search engine and virtual assistant, Google Assistant. Facebook has invested $22.1 billion to improve the social media platform’s user experience (UX). Amazon has invested $10 billion to improve its delivery services and voice assistant, Alexa. Microsoft has invested $10 billion to improve its products and services, including voice recognition. Let’s look at how our smartphones already integrate AI. Virtual assistants Apple pioneered mobile virtual assistants when it launched Siri in 2011. Afterward, Google Assistant, Huawei’s Celia, Samsung’s Bixby, and others joined the competition. They rely on natural language processing and machine learning, two subsets of AI, to improve performance over time. A virtual assistant, also called an AI assistant or digital assistant, can understand human voice commands, engage in two-way conversations with a user, and complete day-to-day tasks, including making a phone call, adding an event to your calendar, or checking the weather. Virtual assistants are primarily available on smartphones and home automation devices (such as Amazon’s Alexa). However, Samsung’s Bixby is also incorporated into some smart refrigerators. You can search the entire internet by making a voice command to your virtual assistant, and search engines offer better results because they understand natural language, not just keywords. Facial Recognition Facial recognition, also called facial detection and Face ID, uses computer vision to find and identify human faces in digital images and video. It is now commonly used to unlock your smartphone, access locked apps such as mobile banking, and make digital wallet payments. Facial recognition first became available on Samsung phones as early as 2011. However, it was not very secure as it used 2D images, so a printed photo of your face or even one displayed on another phone could trick the technology. Later, Apple took over the technology with the launch of the iPhone X in 2017. Face ID works by illuminating your face with infrared light and projecting 30,000 infrared points onto your face to build a detailed 3D map of your features. Apple said: “The probability that a random person in the population could look at your iPhone or iPad Pro and unlock it using Face ID is approximately 1 in 1,000,000 with a single enrolled appearance.” By 2024, biometric facial recognition hardware will be deployed on over mobile devices, accounting for 90% of smartphones. 800 million Recommendations and Suggestions AI consistently analyses your smartphone usage, browsing history, and other data and insights to predict content that might be of interest to you or to recommend apps, products, and more. App suggestions are another advancement but aren’t as widely used yet. Both Apple and Google continue investigating how their operating systems can guess why you’ve unlocked your smartphone from factors including the time of day and location. For example, if you’ve plugged in or connected your earphones/headphones, your smartphone might suggest opening Spotify, Apple Music, or Audible. Another instance is if it’s 8 a.m. on a weekday and you’re at home, your smartphone might suggest Google Maps or Apple Maps, predicting that you want to know the traffic on your route to work. Augmented Reality Augmented reality (AR) is software that combines a real-world environment with digital overlays to offer an interactive experience. AR powers several mobile apps, including games such as Pokemon Go - where an avatar is placed on a map of the player’s real-world surroundings - and furniture shopping apps such as Wayfair - which lets you visualize new furniture in a physical room with their ‘View in Room’ feature. Photography Many recent smartphones, such as the and Pixel 6 Pro, now have AI cameras that use tools to combine the capabilities of a professional camera with features that were previously only available in editing software. Here are some examples: Google Pixel 6 Optical flow technology rapidly snaps multiple pictures and then uses AI software to combine them into a single image without blurring. AI powers Pixel’s Night Sight feature, where photos shot in low light can still look bright and clear. AI software in Pixel phones can also fix the exposure of high-contrast photos, where shadows make one part of the image look dark, and bright light makes another part look washed out. Image Search Computer vision identifies and interprets visual inputs like images and video and can, therefore, offer image search. You can use the ASOS app to search for an item of clothing or pair of shoes you want or the Amazon app to search for a product using an image from your camera or camera roll of a similar product. Whilst Image Search on the Google app can be used the same (searching a wide range of online clothing retailers), it can also be used to find the original artist of an image or where a household product is from. Predictive Text A smartphone keyboard can use natural language processing to learn from your writing style over time and offer next-word suggestions, making typing faster and easier. Compared to other aspects of AI, predictive text is straightforward because the rules of a language are universal. If you type “Are” into a message or search box, the chances are the next word will be “you” or “there’ - and then there are only a limited number of words that suitably follow. Wrapping Up AI technology and applications make our smartphones more responsive and human-like. Virtual assistants, predictive text, facial recognition, personalized recommendations and suggestions, and other AI-powered features enhance how we interact with our devices. , an author and internationally recognized AI expert, said: “ ” Bernard Marr The future of the smartphone is all about AI. AI is allowing our phones to become more personalized and more helpful. At the same time, AI is helping to solve some of the biggest problems with smartphones today – like battery life.

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