The mystery of how Pluto got a giant heart-shaped feature on its surface has finally been solved by an international team of astrophysicists. According to simulations, a collision between Pluto and a planetary body that happened relatively slowly and at an oblique angle left the impactor &quot;splatted&quot; ...

How Pluto got its 'heart' | University of Arizona News

Pluto TV, a global leader in free streaming television (FAST) has announced that a brand-new DesiPlay TV channel is now streaming in Canada.

PLUTO TV IN CANADA LAUNCHES VIACOM18's DESIPLAY TV, ITS FIRST HINDI FAST CHANNEL

Researchers believe the huge heart-shaped feature on the planet&#x27;s surface was likely caused by this.

Scientists solve mystery of why Pluto has a heart | National | ttownmedia.com

The most recognizable feature on Pluto is its &quot;heart,&quot; a relatively bright valentine-shaped area known as Tombaugh Regio.

We Finally Know How Pluto Got Its Heart: an Ancient Cosmic 'Splat' : ScienceAlert

Tombaugh Regio — the large, pale heart that dominates Pluto&#x27;s terrain — is made of nitrogen ice that accumulated after a huge, slow-motion impact, new research suggests.

Pluto's huge white 'heart' has a surprisingly violent origin, new study suggests | Live Science

Amy Kuessner, Pluto TV&#x27;s Executive Vice President of Programming, also explains what the future holds for the free ad-supported streamer.

10 Years Of Pluto TV And How The Underdog Became An Industry Leader

The large heart-shaped region may have formed after a massive but slow-moving object collided with Pluto at a strange angle.

Mystery of how Pluto got its heart finally "solved" by astrophysicists

The mystery of how Pluto got a giant heart-shaped feature on its surface has finally been solved by an international team of astrophysicists led by the University of Bern and members of the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) PlanetS. The team is the first to successfully reproduce ...

How Pluto Got Its Heart – Eurasia Review

Parks Associates, a leading market research and consulting firm, has announced significant findings about those streaming content in their latest study, “The Viewer Journey: Navigating Streaming Options,” during today’s NAB event. The study reveals a substantial increase in video consumption ...

U.S. Households Now Watch Over 43 Hours of Video Weekly, with Half Using Free Ad-supported Services Like Pluto TV, Tubi, & More | Cord Cutters News

One of the best free streaming services available anywhere, Pluto TV offers a vast selection of movies and shows catering to a wide spectrum of cinematic tastes. Among its library, five standout movies are essential viewing for any film aficionado or casual viewer looking to enjoy quality ...

Top Five Must-Watch Picks on Pluto TV | Cord Cutters News

Pluto

pluto

Mankind has already invented hundreds, if not thousands, of different political structures. Some of them have been successful, some have been questionable. But if we look more narrowly, our socio-political system has not changed much since antiquity. May the philosophers of the Enlightenment forgive us. However, technological development is still changing the rules of the game. And one of our society's major victories is decentralization on a completely different scale. However, it also suffers from "old problems”. In this article, we will talk about plutocracy and how it is destroying one of the best forms of bringing people together - the DAO. What is a plutocracy? Let us begin with the theory. Plutocracy is a form of government in which the rich and wealthy have significant influence and control over the political and economic spheres of society. The term "plutocracy" comes from the Greek words "plutos" (wealth) and "Kratos" (power). Some famous historical examples of the plutocratic rule include the Renaissance in Italy, where wealthy merchants and bankers controlled city-states (you've probably heard of the Medici family), and the Merchants' Guild in medieval Germany, which had considerable influence over economics and politics. If we talk about modern times, nothing has changed. Many countries are considered plutocratic because of the strong influence of the wealthy classes on the political process and economic decisions. For example, the United States is often associated with plutocracy because of the significant influence of large corporations and wealthy donors on elections and political decision-making. Similar concepts work in South Korea and Japan. All in all, without much explanation, it is clear why the power of the rich is not particularly good. Especially if you are a left-wing fanatic. However, we will give a few key examples. Why is plutocracy bad? Plutocracy can lead to greater inequality in society. Rich people have more opportunities and access to resources, which can create social divisions and economic inequalities. Inequality and social division: Plutocracy can undermine democratic principles and processes. Rich people can use their financial resources to manipulate elections, lobby for political decisions, and create unequal conditions for competition. Distortion of the democratic process: In a plutocratic system, wealthy people can avoid responsibility for their actions and evade control. They may be able to use their power and wealth to protect their interests and avoid fair punishment for corruption or abuse of power. Lack of responsibility and control: How does plutocracy affect the DAO? Most DAO models operate on the principle of "1 token - 1 vote. That is, the richest DAO members can control everything - without any resistance from other members. What can this lead to? To very different consequences. From the most minimal - when the opinion of less wealthy players is simply not taken into account. To the worst - when a group of dishonest members steal money or make decisions that are aimed at destroying the organization. Also, there are a lot of questions when the richest (and most powerful) member is the founder. Thus, the whole concept is lost. A similar situation was with EOS founder Dan Larimer when his DAO members began to complain en masse about the management (or rather, about the lack of efficiency). And another, but not less unpleasant situation is the underestimation of active, but less wealthy members. Often, it is on them that many of the processes in the DAO are held. Real problems To show the problem in real-time, we need to analyze the tokenomics of a fairly well-known project - Arbitrum DAO. As we can see, the Arbitrum team and investors jointly own 44% of the project's entire fund. Which is already more than their DAO Treasury. Note that these tokens do not participate in the voting. And this we are not even considering Individual Wallets. In the end, we have a very entertaining picture: The total number of tokens that take part in the voting is 56%. Of these, more than 80% are held by the team and investors. That is, a quorum of 51% is simply impossible to achieve without them, indicating total centralization. What does that mean? In the long run, especially in crisis situations, Arbitrum can dramatically cease to be a DAO and become a centralized system where all decisions are made by the team and investors. Is that a bad thing? No, but it's just not a DAO. With this example, we want to show that it is important not only to distribute the number of tokens fairly but also to build competent tokenomics. The kind that will really be DAO. How to defeat plutocracy in the DAO? We have come to the most important question - how and what to replace the principle of "one token - one vote. In fact, there are options. And there are quite a few of them. Quadratic Voting Quadratic Voting — is a voting methodology used in s (distributed autonomous organizations) and other systems for collective decision-making. In a quadratic voting system, each participant is assigned a certain number of votes, proportional to the square of the number of tokens he possesses. DAO The principle of quadratic voting is that participants are given the opportunity to "invest" their votes in certain proposals or decisions that they consider important. Each participant can distribute their votes among the various options, but the number of votes they can cast for each option decreases as the number of votes increases. The advantages of a quadratic voting system include: Because quadratic voting allows participants to concentrate their votes, it respects minorities and allows them to express their views more strongly. This can help prevent majority dominance and create fairer decision-making. Respect for Minorities: A quadratic voting system takes into account not only the number of tokens but also their value to each participant. This means that a participant with more tokens may still have more influence, but a participant who wants to strengthen their position can do so with more votes, which requires additional resources. Consideration of the value of the vote: The quadratic system also has disadvantages. Probably the most important one is the difficulty in constructing (error-free) and training DAO members in its use. Delegated Voting In this approach, participants can delegate their votes to other participants whom they trust or consider competent. Thus, participants can delegate their votes to experts or delegates to make decisions on their behalf. This allows participants who do not have sufficient expertise or time to participate effectively in the decision-making process. But it is worth bearing in mind that the solution to the problem of plutocracy here is "partial. After all, the plutocrat can still influence decisions. On the other hand - it would be much more effective if tokens from the treasury were delegated by the whole DAO, instead of lying idle. Qualitative Tokenomics Planning This is a problem we have already dealt with above in the Arbitrum case. But this problem exists in many projects. First of all, because many protocols were originally not DAO and switched to this structure in the process. But this kind of transition is not a snap of the fingers. We need to recycle everything, including tokenomics. Therefore, when creating a DAO, it is crucial to think about transparent and fair tokenomics that will not make the funders, investors, or holders of a large number of coins dominant. Custom unique systems Ultimately, DAO is your sandbox. And you can come up with any system that your community is comfortable with. For example, like the guys at Optimism Collective who use an interesting bicameral voting system. They have a "Token Chamber," which votes on project incentives, and protocol upgrades, and manages the treasury fund. And also a "Citizens House" that focuses on the distribution of retroactive funding for public goods generated from revenues collected by the Optimism network. Citizenship is provided by non-transferable tokens and over time will be distributed to an increasing number of citizens. Or maybe you'll like Element's dynamic governance council protocol. Element created a Governance Steering Council (GSC) with additional governance powers and responsibilities. It consists of members who have delegated at least 110,000 tokens, or 0.9% of the circulating supply. The membership threshold is set on a permanent, rolling basis, so the GSC is always open to anyone who has received enough authority. Board membership is dynamic on a blockchain basis, meaning delegated votes can change at any time, resulting in a change in membership. You can read more about these and other systems . here Instead of an afterword The DAO concept is still evolving and has not yet reached its peak. In fact, we can only see the beginnings of a future that is decentralized, stable, and fair. However, there are a lot of unresolved issues on the way. And the principle of voting is one of the most important. We understand that DAOs are individual and beautiful. But we still need to move toward some institutionalized principles that can be considered the "best." Or at least the most "right" ones. We'll see how it turns out, and whether we can beat plutocracy. Also published here.

How Plutocracy Undermines the DAO

PLUTONIC AND METAMORPHIC ROCKS:—CLEAVAGE AND FOLIATION

What is your company in 2–5 words? Scientific approach to retail investing. Why is now the time for your company to exist? Pluto aspires to level the playing field by giving all traders access to the same tools and market intelligence that have long been reserved for the few. Today’s market conditions can certainly feel frightening, especially for less-experienced investors. Our automated trading platform aims to help retail investors make data-informed investing decisions amid market volatility. The more investors can reduce emotional bias from decision-making, the better the long-term outcome will be. What do you love about your team, and why are you the ones to solve this problem? I have an incredibly talented team of day traders, engineers and business visionaries. My team is passionate about giving everyday people the resources they need to take control of their finances and thrive. We’re looking forward to growing our headcount, scaling our business, and reaching even more traders. If you weren’t building your startup, what would you be doing? I’d likely still be working as a software engineer. My role at Bridgewater sparked my passion for economics, as I was very fortunate to learn from the Bridgewater team. Having this access allowed me to deepen my understanding of the markets and formulate my own beliefs on how the economy moves. After a year and a half at Bridgewater, I decided to move to California and build my own business, and the rest is history. At the moment, how do you measure success? What are your metrics? Our vision is massive: to revolutionize the financial world. To execute on this, we need to stay agile while focusing on long-term and high-quality standards. Pluto will be successful when we’ve changed the way people manage their money they reap the benefits of systematic decision-making. Our primary metric is the percentage of our clients making a profit or surpassing their benchmark. Currently, over 80% of our active portfolios meet this criteria. and In a few sentences, what do you offer to whom? Pluto is a free-to-use investing platform that helps retail investors automate trading in stocks and cryptocurrencies by curating a portfolio of "strategies" or rules for when to buy and sell. We have tools for traders who want to develop their own strategies and a marketplace for traders who want to shop for existing user-developed strategies. What’s most exciting about your traction to date? It’s amazing to reflect on how much we’ve evolved over the past year. In 12 months, we grew our headcount from 2 to 10 and raised $4.2M in seed funding. On November 1, we launched our live trading platform to thousands of users. Where do you think your growth will be next year? We designed our business model to maximize the number of strategies that are profitable. Over the next year, we hope to grow our revenue and expand our team to make automated trading accessible to more people. We’re also looking to expand the number of assets available on the platform. In the long term, we want to disrupt the way that retail traders think about investing. We have two main product goals for next year. The first is to release the strategy marketplace and supporting mobile experience. We’d also like to add support for trading US Equities (and possibly options). Tell us about your first paying customer and revenue expectations over the next year. Fees can make some strategies less profitable. Pluto differs from other brokerages or exchanges in that we charge a transparent and low fee on each order (8 cents + 10 BPS) instead of trading against our clients. Pluto also provides detailed reports on the impact of fees during strategy building. In the future, we will explore an optional profit-driven fee structure to better align Pluto's success with our customers.

Q&A with Pluto Co-Founder and CEO Jacob Sansbury

In the blockchain and web3 space, it is common to see projects discuss autonomy, voting powers, and governance. These are some of the major driving forces that instil the community with hope for a new technological future– one that is fairer and more equal. However, there is a looming problem that holds back such ideals, stemming from how the industry acts and behaves. Beware Plutocracies One of the most exciting aspects of the blockchain industry is that it changes how communities congregate and organize themselves. This is known as , which has been around since the inception of Bitcoin, with miners voting on protocol changes and subsequently forming their own organisations. The fact that Bitcoin’s most instrumental figures have crucial voting powers is extremely significant as it allows them to shape the network into whatever they see fit. self-governance This is a revolutionary feature, but it has a major problem. Votes are not counted as one-per-person, but essentially one-per-mining rig. The Bitcoin protocol is unable to count votes based on the actual people voting– the votes of one lone miner will never be equal to the votes of a corporate miner who can afford hundreds of . This is how all proof-of-work blockchains function, although this issue is not limited to them– it is even more transparent with proof-of-stake chains, where money is used to validate blocks, and therefore measure votes. ASICs In other words, your finances determine how many votes you have. This leads to – systems where the wealthiest entities have the most leadership powers. The truth is the vast majority of blockchains are run by plutocratic means, as it is always those who can afford the most mining power, or who can validate the most transactions, that have the most votes. plutocracies To illustrate this, take a look at Bitcoin’s mining distribution. Despite having , 60% of the BTC mining hash rate . Ethereum is not much better, with 58% of the ETH mining hash rate . In other words, proof-of-work and proof-of-stake blockchains can easily foster monopolies, where mining corporations have the most power and influence. miners all across the globe belongs to just 4 mining pools belonging to 4 mining pools This issue has gotten worse with the emergence of , or assets designed specifically to provide voting power. governance tokens There is no Such Thing as a Fair Plutocratic System So long as the richest members of a community have the most influence, the voices of the poor will never be heard. The majority of the blockchain industry is guilty of this, as tons of projects offer control via governance tokens, increased mining capabilities, or staking money. This limits the democracy of a project. If votes are weighted, then it creates a hierarchy of voters, which always leaves some disadvantaged people at the bottom. vast Unequal distribution of votes may work in some select circumstances, such as how shareholder votes are counted in publicly listed companies, but when it comes to open networks that are designed for everybody, this cannot function as those with the most money are given a stronger voice, leaving the system open to abuse. Arguably, this violates , which demands all humans have equal rights. If there is no equality of votes, there can be no true democracy. article 1 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights Plutocracies also prevent truly decentralized systems from forming. It does not matter how geographically distributed a project’s users are if power is not equally distributed among those users. True decentralization requires conditions to be met. both Indifferent Developers This is a widespread problem within the blockchain and web3 space, yet it rarely gets discussed. Why? Because plutocracies make money. Developers are able to take advantage of this disparity by to their userbase. It seems as though the industry has distanced itself from engaging in this socio-political issue as a means of building profits. selling power The selling of governance is so rampant that it leads many to believe there is simply no solution to this type of power imbalance. On the rare occasion when this problem is discussed, it is common to hear people say there is no alternative, but this is not the case. There are blockchains that exist where votes are not counted by mining power, staking of coins, or any other financial metric, but rather by a person’s individuality. These are often referred to as blockchains. proof-of-person Understanding Proof-of-Person blockchains Proof-of-Person (PoP) blockchains find ways to validate each person without using mining power, money for staking, or by verifying personal documents. This is, without a doubt, tough to do in a decentralized setting, as there is no simple way to figure out if somebody is a real person or if they are voting twice when you do not have a centralized intermediary to validate each individual. In fact, this is the crux of most research within the PoP space. There are several methods of doing this, one is using a set of unique tests that are designed to be easy for a human, but hard for a machine, and hard for one human to do twice at the same time. These would be CAPTCHA-style tests that need to be solved by using common sense, making them perfect for humans, . Once somebody is determined to be a human, you can start treating them as a unique individual, providing them with voting capabilities. Any project using a PoP blockchain can then be confident that the people interacting with their tools are given fair and equal opportunities, all without anybody having to hand over deeply sensitive data. In an age where people are of data exploitation by tech companies, it is more important than ever that people do not compromise themselves by being forced to distribute documents such as passports, bank statements, or birth certificates. but a nightmare for AI rightfully wary Compassion as a Technological Driver Blockchain developers driven by the proof-of-person consensus are working to bring about technological change, instigated by the desire for a more compassionate system that cannot be exploited by bad actors. This makes them great solutions for bringing about social change. Once you start limiting votes to one-per-person, not only can you give users equal voting rights, but you can distribute wealth and resources between them. One of the most impressive use-cases of PoP blockchains is providing Universal Basic Income to its participants, helping and reduce stress without the need for means-testing or any intrusive weighting methods. lift people out of poverty PoP blockchains are also great for DAOs, as they allow users to make decisions without worrying about wealthier members having the loudest voice. This allows for votes that better reflect a community. Final Words Proof-of-person blockchains are the perfect tool for helping make the web a more dynamic and individual-focused space. They should not be a niche alternative to the status quo– they should be the norm. If we want the internet to become a fairer place, then we need more plutocracy-resistant measures– and the push for that should come from developers, influencers, and enthusiasts alike.

Resisting Plutocracies In The World of Blockchain And Web3

is an upcoming space-faring Role Playing Game (RPG) that is being built on the Solana blockchain. Gameplay elements will include raids and space battles. The game will also feature Virtual Reality (VR) gameplay aspects as well as world-building and mission creation and vehicle rentals. Plutonians Players will be able to own blockchain-based assets inside the game. The game is also being built with a modular approach, making it possible for modders, developers, and gamers to create their own worlds, missions, and tools. Story The story takes place in outer space and revolves around The Order of the Nineteen, a collective of aliens based on one of Pluto's moons (maybe where the game gets the name “Plutonians” from). The Order of the Nineteen aims to build a free market in intergalactic trade. However, they face opposition from the Interplanetary Union, an Earth-based governmental organization that wants to control trade across the galaxy. The Interplanetary Union wants to maintain a centralized, intergalactic market with trade only being able to take place through their "Republic Credits" currency. On the other hand, the Order of the Nineteen want to create a decentralized, free-market with their "Strange Coin" currency. Gameplay Plutonians will be released as a free-to-play single-player RPG. Players will receive their first ship and embark on quests as a space-faring pirates. Gameplay elements include space exploration and raids as well as attacking and looting enemy spaceships. The game will be played from a Virtual Reality (VR) perspective, inside of an open-world galaxy. Even though the game will start out as a single-player RPG, the game aims to transition into a Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) with Player-vs-Player (PvP) battles and raids. The multiplayer version of the game will be accessible after players complete a number of single-player missions. Next, they'll be able to build their own missions using the level editor tools, they'll also be able to play missions created by other community members. In order to explore the galaxy, players will need to fuel their ships by burning Plutonium 328, a crypto token also known as PU328. Larger spaceships will burn more tokens so players will need to choose their missions carefully. Missions with higher rewards should be prioritized to ensure efficient use of their spaceships. On the other hand, larger ships also store more cargo than smaller ones, this allows players to take on larger scale missions and carry more loot. In-game spaceships will be NFTs that can be traded, swapped, or sold to other players. There will also be an in-game marketplace where players can buy ships of different classes, ranging from regular Spaceships to Mega Cruisers. Players will be able to own multiple ships which can be used for missions, sold, or rented out to other players, similar to the scholarship programs found on popular P2E games like Axie Infinity. Spaceships will be upgradable with modular weapons and transportation tools. These upgrades can help players during quests and in-game battles. Players will be able to create additional worlds, stories, and missions for the game through the world and story-building tools inside the game. This will help players to create community-based content with creators being given the right to license their content for use in additional gaming projects. Conclusion Plutonians looks like an interesting addition to the latest range of blockchain-based games. It’s a virtual reality RPG game that intends to grow into an MMORPG with players being able to create their own in-game content. Transferable NFT-based assets are another interesting feature of the game, as well as the ability to customize and upgrade these in-game assets.

Let's Look at Plutonians: The Intergalactic Space-faring RPG

Coin holder voting, both for governance of technical features, and for more extensive use cases like deciding who runs validator nodes and who receives money from development bounty funds, is unfortunately continuing to be popular, and so it seems worthwhile for me to write another post explaining why I (and and others) do not consider it wise for Ethereum (or really, any base-layer blockchain) to start adopting these kinds of mechanisms in a tightly coupled form in any significant way. Vlad Zamfir I wrote about the issues with tightly coupled voting last year, that focused on theoretical issues as well as focusing on some practical issues experienced by voting systems over the previous two years. Now, the latest scandal in DPOS land seems to be substantially worse. Because the delegate rewards in EOS are now so high (5% annual inflation, about $400m per year), the competition on who gets to run nodes has essentially become yet another frontier of US-China geopolitical economic warfare. in a blog post tooltip And that’s not my own interpretation; I quote from : this article (original in Chinese) EOS supernode voting: multibillion-dollar profits leading to crypto community inter-country warfare Looking at community recognition, Chinese nodes feel much less represented in the community than US and Korea. Since the EOS.IO official Twitter account was founded, there has never been any interaction with the mainland Chinese EOS community. For a listing of the EOS officially promoted events and interactions with communities see the picture below. tooltip With no support from the developer community, facing competition from Korea, the Chinese EOS supernodes have invented a new strategy: buying votes. The article then continues to describe further strategies, like forming “alliances” that all vote (or buy votes) for each other. Of course, it does not matter at all who the specific actors are that are buying votes or forming cartels; this time it’s some Chinese pools, it was “members located in the USA, Russia, India, Germany, Canada, Italy, Portugal and many other countries from around the globe”, next time it could be totally anonymous, or run out of a smartphone snuck into Trendon Shavers’s prison cell. What matters is that blockchains and cryptocurrency, originally founded in a vision of using technology to escape from the failures of human politics, have essentially all but replicated it. Crypto is a reflection of the world at large. last time The EOS New York community’s response seems to be that they have issued a strongly worded letter to the world stating that . Hmm, what other major political entity has ? And how has that been going for them lately? buying votes will be against the constitution made accepting bribes a violation of the constitution The second part of this article will involve me, an armchair economist, hopefully convincing you, the reader, that yes, bribery is, in fact, bad. There are actually people who dispute this claim; the usual argument has something to do with market efficiency, as in “isn’t this good, because it means that the nodes that win will be the nodes that can be the cheapest, taking the least money for themselves and their expenses and giving the rest back to the community?” The answer is, kinda yes, but in a way that’s centralizing and vulnerable to rent-seeking cartels and explicitly contradicts many of the explicit promises made by most DPOS proponents along the way. Let us create a toy economic model as follows. There are a number of people all of which are running to be delegates. The delegate slot gives a reward of $100 per period, and candidates promise to share some portion of that as a bribe, equally split among all of their voters. The actual N delegates (eg. N = 35) in any period are the N delegates that received the most votes; that is, during every period a threshold of votes emerges where if you get more votes than that threshold you are a delegate, if you get less you are not, and the threshold is set so that N delegates are above the threshold. We expect that voters vote for the candidate that gives them the highest expected bribe. Suppose that all candidates start off by sharing 1%; that is, equally splitting $1 among all of their voters. Then, if some candidate becomes a delegate with K voters, each voter gets a payment of 1/K. The candidate that it’s most profitable to vote for is a candidate that’s expected to be in the top N, but is expected to earn the fewest votes within that set. Thus, we expect votes to be fairly evenly split among 35 delegates. Now, some candidates will want to secure their position by sharing more; by sharing 2%, you are likely to get twice as many votes as those that share 1%, as that’s the equilibrium point where voting for you has the same payout as voting for anyone else. The extra guarantee of being elected that this gives is definitely worth losing an additional 1% of your revenue when you do get elected. We can expect delegates to bid up their bribes and eventually share something close to 100% of their revenue. So the outcome seems to be that the delegate payouts are largely simply returned to voters, making the delegate payout mechanism close to meaningless. But it gets worse. At this point, there’s an incentive for delegates to form alliances (aka political parties, aka cartels) to coordinate their share percentages; this reduces losses to the cartel from chaotic competition that accidentally leads to some delegates not getting enough votes. Once a cartel is in place, it can start bringing its share percentages down, as dislodging it is a hard coordination problem: if a cartel offers 80%, then a new entrant offers 90%, then to a voter, seeking a share of that extra 10% is not worth the risk of either (i) voting for someone who gets insufficient votes and does not pay rewards, or (ii) voting for someone who gets too many votes and so pays out a reward that’s excessively diluted. tooltip Sidenote: used approval voting, where you can vote for as many candidates as you want; it should be pretty obvious that with even slight bribery, the equilibrium there is that everyone just votes for everyone. Bitshares DPOS Furthermore, even if cartel mechanics come into play, there is a further issue. This equilibrium of coin holders voting for whoever gives them the most bribes, or a cartel that has become an entrenched rent seeker, contradicts explicit promises made by DPOS proponents. don’t Quoting “ ”: Explain Delegated Proof of Stake Like I’m 5 If a Witness starts acting like an asshole, or stops doing a quality job securing the network, people in the community can remove their votes, essentially firing the bad actor. Voting is always ongoing. From “ ”: EOS: An Introduction By custom, we suggest that the bulk of the value be returned to the community for the common good - software improvements, dispute resolution, and the like can be entertained. In the spirit of “eating our own dogfood,” the design envisages that the community votes on a set of open entry contracts that act like “foundations” for the benefit of the community. Known as Community Benefit Contracts, the mechanism highlights the importance of DPOS as enabling direct on-chain governance by the community (below). The flaw in all of this, of course, is that the average voter has only a very small chance of impacting which delegates get selected, and so they only have a very small incentive to vote based on any of these high-minded and lofty goals; rather, their incentive is to vote for whoever offers the highest and most reliable bribe. Attacking is easy. If a cartel equilibrium does not form, then an attacker can simply offer a share percentage slightly higher than 100% (perhaps using fee sharing or some kind of “starter promotion” as justification), capture the majority of delegate positions, and then start an attack. If they get removed from the delegate position via a hard fork, they can simply restart the attack again with a different identity. The above is not intended purely as a criticism of DPOS consensus or its use in any specific blockchain. Rather, the critique reaches much further. There has been a large number of projects recently that extol the virtues of extensive on-chain governance, where on-chain coin holder voting can be used not just to vote on protocol features, but also to control a bounty fund. Quoting a : blog post from last year Anyone can submit a change to the governance structure in the form of a code update. An on-chain vote occurs, and if passed, the update makes its way on to a test network. After a period of time on the test network, a confirmation vote occurs, at which point the change goes live on the main network. They call this concept a “self-amending ledger”. Such a system is interesting because it shifts power towards users and away from the more centralized group of developers and miners. On the developer side, anyone can submit a change, and most importantly, everyone has an economic incentive to do it. Contributions are rewarded by the community with newly minted tokens through inflation funding. This shifts from the current Bitcoin and Ethereum dynamics where a new developer has little incentive to evolve the protocol, thus power tends to concentrate amongst the existing developers, to one where everyone has equal earning power. In practice, of course, what this can easily lead to is funds that offer kickbacks to users who vote for them, leading to the exact scenario that we saw above with DPOS delegates. In the best case, the funds will simply be returned to voters, giving coin holders an interest rate that cancels out the inflation, and in the worst case, some portion of the inflation will get captured as economic rent by a cartel. Note also that the above is not a criticism of on-chain voting; it does not rule out systems like futarchy. However, futarchy is untested, but coin voting tested, and so far it seems to lead to a high risk of economic or political failure of some kind - far too high a risk for a platform that seeks to be an economic base layer for development of decentralized applications and institutions. all is So what’s the alternative? The answer is what we’ve been saying all along: . is fundamentally about the use of economic incentives together with cryptography to design and secure different kinds of systems and applications, including consensus protocols. The goal is simple: to be able to measure the security of a system (that is, the cost of breaking the system or causing it to violate certain guarantees) in dollars. Traditionally, the security of systems often depends on trust assumptions: the system works if 2 of 3 of Alice, Bob and Charlie are honest, and we trust Alice, Bob and Charlie to be honest because I know Alice and she’s a nice girl, Bob registered with FINCEN and has a money transmitter license, and Charlie has run a successful business for three years and wears a suit. cryptoeconomics Cryptoeconomics social Social trust assumptions can work well in many contexts, but they are difficult to universalize; what is trusted in one country or one company or one political tribe may not be trusted in others. They are also difficult to quantify; how much money does it take to manipulate social media to favor some particular delegate in a vote? Social trust assumptions seem secure and controllable, in the sense that “people” are in charge, but in reality they can be manipulated by economic incentives in all sorts of ways. Cryptoeconomics is about trying to reduce social trust assumptions by creating systems where we introduce explicit economic incentives for good behavior and economic penalties for ban behavior, and making mathematical proofs of the form “in order for guarantee X to be violated, at least these people need to misbehave in this way, which means the minimum amount of penalties or foregone revenue that the participants suffer is Y”. to accomplish precisely this objective in the context of proof of stake consensus. Yes, this does mean that you can’t create a “blockchain” by concentrating the consensus validation into 20 uber-powerful “supernodes” and you have to to make a design that intelligently breaks through and navigates existing tradeoffs and achieves massive scalability in a still-decentralized network. But the reward is that you don’t get a network that’s constantly liable to breaking in half or becoming economically captured by unpredictable political forces. Casper is designed actually think All content written by me is by default released freely under the . WTFPL

Governance, Part 2: Plutocracy Is Still Bad

Systems, by their nature, exist to bring order, consistency, and logic to the chaos of complexity. They promise to solve problems at scale and allow for outcomes that are reliable and repeatable. On-chain governance was supposed to represent the supposedly sacrosanct cornerstone of decentralized technologies - to solve humanity's governance challenges. And yet, after over a decade of experimentation, it has consistently failed to live up to the promise. It remains the unsolved puzzle in a decentralized world, a paradox of sorts. But why is that the case? In abstract terms, governance is defined as the system through which decisions are made and enforced. It serves as a method of power distribution, ways of allocating resources, and resolving conflicts. Governance represents the final leap in the decentralized space. It's when a system can run itself - a collective intelligence wherein no central authority pulls the strings. The sad thing is that the failure of on-chain governance is not theoretical in its promise but rather in its implementation. The very thing it tries to solve, which is coordinating decentralized decision-making, appears to fall apart when put into practice. The Tyranny of Incentives The first fracture in the system derives from a player that usually remains hidden: incentives. In decentralized governance, players act out of their self-interest, driven by profit, social status, or ideological affinity. The notion of distributed power crumbles when the incentives become misaligned - or are hijacked by short-term thinking. Why would participants vote for long-term stability when short-term gains give them far more lucrative rewards? Worse yet, how do you prevent those in the most powerful positions (I mean whales and early adopters) from concentrating control and making a plutocratic nightmare out of the decentralized dream? This is a human failure, not a technological one, as decentralized governance relies on human actors behaving in ways that value collective outcomes. However, it doesn't provide systems resilient enough to allow for greed, ignorance, or apathy. The absence of a central authority does not eradicate power. It merely changes where power resides in unpredictable ways. As the saying goes, "If everyone is in charge, then no one is." UX: The Interface of Governance The complexity of blockchain governance is alluring to technologists, while the average user recoils at the opacity of the mechanics involved. That's a deeper problem than whether or not the interfaces are user-friendly. The problem is really that most users lack either cognitive bandwidth or interest to participate deeply in governance. Governance of blockchain is not something that comes to the top of every average person's life. Voting on protocols, changing parameters, and debating minor details of network upgrades are activities quite removed from everyday concerns. Governance as an experience becomes an operation, not an empowerment means. Just as under traditional systems of political government, where voter turnout is minimal, the same is true with decentralized governance - the few loud voices drowned out in the ambient noise of general apathy and disinterest. A system developed for mass participation turns out, almost paradoxically, to be a domain of specialists that undermines decentralization. The Eternal Dance of Complexity and Simplicity It thus makes a robust but adaptive system under decentralized governance. The tension between the other degree of complexity-simplicity may be irreconcilable: governance needs to reflect the intricacies of the system it governs, yet when it becomes complex, fewer people can understand and engage with it. It creates a governance model that either ends up: Too shallow (dumbed down to the point of complete insignificance)
Too obtuse (most people get completely excluded from meaningful involvement) Nobody has walked that tightrope. Too simple and you lose nuance and control. Too complex, and you lose accessibility and trust. The Ghost in the System: Humanity Perhaps most profoundly, though, the problem is that decentralized governance systems are (at their core) systems. They can codify rules and enforce decisions. They can distribute tokens and apportion rights. But they can't reckon with the raw, messy unpredictability of human nature. Governance isn't just a question of voting and consensus. It's a question of ethics, of conflict resolution, of trust. Of the way people negotiate individual needs with the collective good. There is, perhaps, a reason why traditional forms of governance—flawed as they are—have endured. They are not systems of pure logic but rather systems that accommodate the irrational, emotional, and often contradictory nature of human beings. Decentralized governance faces an upward struggle of adaptation in a world resistant to codifying human behavior. On-chain governance promises the ability to operate without trust, without the fallibility of human leaders whereas It is precisely trust that keeps traditional governance systems working. It's the unseen glue binding participants to the system even when the latter fails. In all these processes, on-chain governance has forgotten this most basic of human ingredients in its drive towards decentralization. While automating trust, it seems to have forgotten the simple fact that trust is not a technological problem; rather, it is a relational issue. Conclusion The failure of decentralized governance does not come from technological limitations. The system itself is the only problem: a paradox in decentralization conflicted with the very basic human need for structure, leadership, and ironically, governance. On-chain governance's future might not be in more complex algorithms or wiser contracts but in embracing the idea that decentralization is not a perfect solution. Governance, because of its very nature, requires compromise, trust, and human intervention. Systems, by their nature, exist to bring order, consistency, and logic to the chaos of complexity. They promise to solve problems at scale and allow for outcomes that are reliable and repeatable. On-chain governance was supposed to represent the supposedly sacrosanct cornerstone of decentralized technologies - to solve humanity's governance challenges. And yet, after over a decade of experimentation, it has consistently failed to live up to the promise. It remains the unsolved puzzle in a decentralized world, a paradox of sorts. But why is that the case? But why is that the case? In abstract terms, governance is defined as the system through which decisions are made and enforced. It serves as a method of power distribution, ways of allocating resources, and resolving conflicts. Governance represents the final leap in the decentralized space. It's when a system can run itself - a collective intelligence wherein no central authority pulls the strings. The sad thing is that the failure of on-chain governance is not theoretical in its promise but rather in its implementation. The very thing it tries to solve, which is coordinating decentralized decision-making, appears to fall apart when put into practice. The Tyranny of Incentives The first fracture in the system derives from a player that usually remains hidden: incentives. In decentralized governance, players act out of their self-interest, driven by profit, social status, or ideological affinity. The notion of distributed power crumbles when the incentives become misaligned - or are hijacked by short-term thinking. Why would participants vote for long-term stability when short-term gains give them far more lucrative rewards? Worse yet, how do you prevent those in the most powerful positions (I mean whales and early adopters) from concentrating control and making a plutocratic nightmare out of the decentralized dream? This is a human failure, not a technological one, as decentralized governance relies on human actors behaving in ways that value collective outcomes. However, it doesn't provide systems resilient enough to allow for greed, ignorance, or apathy. The absence of a central authority does not eradicate power. It merely changes where power resides in unpredictable ways. As the saying goes, "If everyone is in charge, then no one is." UX: The Interface of Governance The complexity of blockchain governance is alluring to technologists, while the average user recoils at the opacity of the mechanics involved. That's a deeper problem than whether or not the interfaces are user-friendly. The problem is really that most users lack either cognitive bandwidth or interest to participate deeply in governance. Governance of blockchain is not something that comes to the top of every average person's life. Voting on protocols, changing parameters, and debating minor details of network upgrades are activities quite removed from everyday concerns. Governance as an experience becomes an operation, not an empowerment means. Just as under traditional systems of political government, where voter turnout is minimal, the same is true with decentralized governance - the few loud voices drowned out in the ambient noise of general apathy and disinterest. A system developed for mass participation turns out, almost paradoxically, to be a domain of specialists that undermines decentralization. The Eternal Dance of Complexity and Simplicity It thus makes a robust but adaptive system under decentralized governance. The tension between the other degree of complexity-simplicity may be irreconcilable: governance needs to reflect the intricacies of the system it governs, yet when it becomes complex, fewer people can understand and engage with it. It creates a governance model that either ends up: Too shallow (dumbed down to the point of complete insignificance) Too obtuse (most people get completely excluded from meaningful involvement) Too shallow (dumbed down to the point of complete insignificance) Too obtuse (most people get completely excluded from meaningful involvement) Nobody has walked that tightrope. Too simple and you lose nuance and control. Too complex, and you lose accessibility and trust. Nobody has walked that tightrope. Too simple and you lose nuance and control. Too complex, and you lose accessibility and trust. The Ghost in the System: Humanity Perhaps most profoundly, though, the problem is that decentralized governance systems are (at their core) systems. They can codify rules and enforce decisions. They can distribute tokens and apportion rights. But they can't reckon with the raw, messy unpredictability of human nature. Governance isn't just a question of voting and consensus. It's a question of ethics, of conflict resolution, of trust. Of the way people negotiate individual needs with the collective good. There is, perhaps, a reason why traditional forms of governance—flawed as they are—have endured. They are not systems of pure logic but rather systems that accommodate the irrational, emotional, and often contradictory nature of human beings. Decentralized governance faces an upward struggle of adaptation in a world resistant to codifying human behavior. On-chain governance promises the ability to operate without trust, without the fallibility of human leaders whereas It is precisely trust that keeps traditional governance systems working. It's the unseen glue binding participants to the system even when the latter fails. In all these processes, on-chain governance has forgotten this most basic of human ingredients in its drive towards decentralization. While automating trust, it seems to have forgotten the simple fact that trust is not a technological problem; rather, it is a relational issue. Conclusion The failure of decentralized governance does not come from technological limitations. The system itself is the only problem: a paradox in decentralization conflicted with the very basic human need for structure, leadership, and ironically, governance. On-chain governance's future might not be in more complex algorithms or wiser contracts but in embracing the idea that decentralization is not a perfect solution. Governance, because of its very nature, requires compromise, trust, and human intervention.

On-Chain Governance: A Paradox of Decentralization and Human Nature

SINGAPORE, Singapore, September 20th, 2024/Chainwire/--Mantle’s flagship game, Catizen, officially launched its token, $CATI, on multiple exchanges today, including Binance, OKX, Bybit, Gate.io, and Bitget. As the most profitable mini-game on Telegram, Catizen seamlessly integrates Telegram with The Open Network / TON (L1) and Mantle Network (L2). $CATI, as the universal token of the Catizen ecosystem, is issued on both the TON and Mantle. It can be used in the mini-app center and open tasks, providing users with the opportunity to participate in the Launchpool “Stake to Earn,” further promoting the development of the entire gaming ecosystem. The $CATI token will exist in a parallel relationship on TON and Mantle, with a maximum supply of 1 billion tokens on each. However, the actual total supply will remain at 1 billion across the two blockchains through a locking mechanism. Currently, cross-chain transfers of $CATI can be done through Bybit exchange. The balance between the two chains is maintained through mutual locking contracts. For example, if Catizen airdrops 10 million $CATI to Mantle game users, 990 million $CATI of the 1 billion on Mantle Network will enter the locking contract, while 10 million $CATI of the 1 billion on TON will enter the locking contract to ensure that the total circulation on both chains remains capped at 1 billion. Since receiving Mantle EcoFund’s major investment in February 2023, Catizen, developed by Pluto Studio, has skyrocketed in popularity, becoming one of the most successful blockchain games globally, with over 36 million players. Catizen’s success can be reflected in the following impressive metrics: Over $30 million in revenue generated within just 6 months Over 7 million Daily Active Users (DAU) 3 million on-chain users, with over 600,000 on the Mantle blockchain Over 1 million paying users, with an Average Revenue per Paying User (ARPPU) of $27, totaling $27 million in revenue More than 1 million MNT and 40 million $FISH tokens distributed as rewards exclusively to Mantle Catizen users High-quality transactions: users bind wallets, sign contracts, and pay gas fees in MNT or TON for each transaction. More than half of the wallets hold at least $10 or more in assets By providing exclusive benefits through the Mantle and TON, Catizen has demonstrated its unparalleled ability to onboard users into Web3 on a massive scale, leading the next wave of Web3 gaming economies. For more information: Catizen on Mantle statistics: $CATI airdrop details: About Mantle Mantle Ecosystem comprises an Ethereum layer 2 (L2) — Mantle Network, a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) — Mantle Governance, one of the largest on-chain treasuries — Mantle Treasury, and an Ether (ETH) liquid staking protocol — Mantle LSP: all built on Ethereum. Mantle token ($MNT) is the unified product and governance token of the ecosystem. Mantle’s first core product is Mantle Network, an Ethereum L2. Mantle Network strives to be compatible with the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Mantle Network’s modular architecture separates transaction execution, data availability, and transaction finality into modules — which can be individually upgraded and adopt the latest innovations. Mantle Network is the first L2 to partner with ETH restaking protocol EigenLayer for the data availability module. By adopting a rollup architecture, Mantle Network is secured by Ethereum. As the world’s first DAO-spawned L2, Mantle Network is pioneering a vision for the mass adoption of token-governed technologies. The current mainnet version, Mantle Network Mainnet v2 Tectonic (Mantle v2 Tectonic), went live on March 15, 2024. Mantle Network’s infrastructure is meticulously designed to handle the demands of the web3 gaming stack, enabling the creation of a connected and expansive gaming universe where assets have real value beyond a single game's ecosystem. Closely intertwined with Mantle initiatives such as Hyperplay, Mantle Network’s ecosystem of expertise and resources facilitates a streamlined process for developers to build and deploy their gaming projects. To support the next-generation of innovators, builders, and developers, Mantle is growing its ecosystem via Mantle Grants Program and Mantle EcoFund, a catalyzed capital pool of $200M. Mantle’s Showcase Apps program lends additional support and publicity to ecosystem projects in categories such as real world assets (RWA). For more information, readers can please visit: Website | X/Twitter | Devs X/Twitter | Discord | Telegram | YouTube | Blog | GitHub About Catizen Catizen is a revolutionary gaming bot on Telegram that seamlessly integrates the messaging app Telegram with multiple blockchains, including TON and Mantle Network. It redefines Web 3.0 experiences by enabling mobile payments with both crypto currencies and fiat currencies. By tapping into Telegram's vast user base, Catizen aims to create a Web 3.0 traffic hub on an unprecedented scale. Additionally, Catizen is evolving into a Mini-app Center, integrating features from launchpool platforms, such as early access to new projects, token-based activities, transaction capabilities, along with short videos and e-commerce functionalities. This innovative approach will attract and engage users through gamification and strategic Play-to-Airdrop initiatives, transforming how users access and engage with the Web 3.0 ecosystem. For more information, readers can please visit:  X | Official Website | Telegram | Telegram Chat | Bot Contact Mantle's Communications Team Mantle windrangerlabs@wachsman.com This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. SINGAPORE, Singapore, September 20th, 2024/Chainwire/--Mantle’s flagship game, Catizen, officially launched its token, $CATI, on multiple exchanges today, including Binance, OKX, Bybit, Gate.io, and Bitget. As the most profitable mini-game on Telegram, Catizen seamlessly integrates Telegram with The Open Network / TON (L1) and Mantle Network (L2). $CATI, as the universal token of the Catizen ecosystem, is issued on both the TON and Mantle. It can be used in the mini-app center and open tasks, providing users with the opportunity to participate in the Launchpool “Stake to Earn,” further promoting the development of the entire gaming ecosystem. The $CATI token will exist in a parallel relationship on TON and Mantle, with a maximum supply of 1 billion tokens on each. However, the actual total supply will remain at 1 billion across the two blockchains through a locking mechanism. Currently, cross-chain transfers of $CATI can be done through Bybit exchange. The balance between the two chains is maintained through mutual locking contracts. For example, if Catizen airdrops 10 million $CATI to Mantle game users, 990 million $CATI of the 1 billion on Mantle Network will enter the locking contract, while 10 million $CATI of the 1 billion on TON will enter the locking contract to ensure that the total circulation on both chains remains capped at 1 billion. Since receiving Mantle EcoFund’s major investment in February 2023, Catizen, developed by Pluto Studio, has skyrocketed in popularity, becoming one of the most successful blockchain games globally, with over 36 million players. Catizen’s success can be reflected in the following impressive metrics: Over $30 million in revenue generated within just 6 months Over $30 million in revenue generated within just 6 months Over 7 million Daily Active Users (DAU) Over 7 million Daily Active Users (DAU) 3 million on-chain users, with over 600,000 on the Mantle blockchain Over 1 million paying users, with an Average Revenue per Paying User (ARPPU) of $27, totaling $27 million in revenue Over 1 million paying users, with an Average Revenue per Paying User (ARPPU) of $27, totaling $27 million in revenue More than 1 million MNT and 40 million $FISH tokens distributed as rewards exclusively to Mantle Catizen users More than 1 million MNT and 40 million $FISH tokens distributed as rewards exclusively to Mantle Catizen users High-quality transactions: users bind wallets, sign contracts, and pay gas fees in MNT or TON for each transaction. More than half of the wallets hold at least $10 or more in assets High-quality transactions: users bind wallets, sign contracts, and pay gas fees in MNT or TON for each transaction. More than half of the wallets hold at least $10 or more in assets By providing exclusive benefits through the Mantle and TON, Catizen has demonstrated its unparalleled ability to onboard users into Web3 on a massive scale, leading the next wave of Web3 gaming economies. For more information: Catizen on Mantle statistics : Mantle statistics $CATI airdrop details : $CATI airdrop details About Mantle Mantle Ecosystem comprises an Ethereum layer 2 (L2) — Mantle Network, a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) — Mantle Governance, one of the largest on-chain treasuries — Mantle Treasury, and an Ether (ETH) liquid staking protocol — Mantle LSP: all built on Ethereum. Mantle token ($MNT) is the unified product and governance token of the ecosystem. Mantle’s first core product is Mantle Network, an Ethereum L2. Mantle Network strives to be compatible with the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Mantle Network’s modular architecture separates transaction execution, data availability, and transaction finality into modules — which can be individually upgraded and adopt the latest innovations. Mantle Network is the first L2 to partner with ETH restaking protocol EigenLayer for the data availability module. By adopting a rollup architecture, Mantle Network is secured by Ethereum. As the world’s first DAO-spawned L2, Mantle Network is pioneering a vision for the mass adoption of token-governed technologies. The current mainnet version, Mantle Network Mainnet v2 Tectonic (Mantle v2 Tectonic), went live on March 15, 2024. Mantle Network’s infrastructure is meticulously designed to handle the demands of the web3 gaming stack, enabling the creation of a connected and expansive gaming universe where assets have real value beyond a single game's ecosystem. Closely intertwined with Mantle initiatives such as Hyperplay, Mantle Network’s ecosystem of expertise and resources facilitates a streamlined process for developers to build and deploy their gaming projects. To support the next-generation of innovators, builders, and developers, Mantle is growing its ecosystem via Mantle Grants Program and Mantle EcoFund, a catalyzed capital pool of $200M. Mantle’s Showcase Apps program lends additional support and publicity to ecosystem projects in categories such as real world assets (RWA). For more information, readers can please visit: Website | X/Twitter | Devs X/Twitter | Discord | Telegram | YouTube | Blog | GitHub Website Website X/Twitter X/Twitter Devs X/Twitter Devs X/Twitter Discord Discord Telegram Telegram YouTube YouTube Blog Blog GitHub GitHub About Catizen Catizen is a revolutionary gaming bot on Telegram that seamlessly integrates the messaging app Telegram with multiple blockchains, including TON and Mantle Network. It redefines Web 3.0 experiences by enabling mobile payments with both crypto currencies and fiat currencies. By tapping into Telegram's vast user base, Catizen aims to create a Web 3.0 traffic hub on an unprecedented scale. Additionally, Catizen is evolving into a Mini-app Center, integrating features from launchpool platforms, such as early access to new projects, token-based activities, transaction capabilities, along with short videos and e-commerce functionalities. This innovative approach will attract and engage users through gamification and strategic Play-to-Airdrop initiatives, transforming how users access and engage with the Web 3.0 ecosystem. For more information, readers can please visit: X | Official Website | Telegram | Telegram Chat | Bot X Official Website Telegram Telegram Chat Bot Contact Mantle's Communications Team Mantle windrangerlabs@wachsman.com This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here . here

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