Evercast

evercast

You probably like sandwiches as a snack, but what about being sandwiched by your competitors on Google Search? Elastic Email (a Mailchimp competitor) has been advertising on Google for months. Google Ads constitute ~40% of their ad spend, so they must get fantastic results there, right? WRONG!! If you Google Elastic Email right now, here’s what you’ll see: They. Got. Sandwiched! If you went ‘oooooof’, then you’re a marketer at heart and should read on. Google Likes Your Money - Not You. When Google opened up the bidding mechanism for ADs, the first casualty was Ethics. Until then, Marketers refrained from encroaching upon competitors’ branding, and any harmless banter was considered' a bold move’—remember the Cola Wars? But today, we’re all cutthroats over that $5 CPM. Thanks, Google! Sandwiches like the one above are the norm, not the exception, while Google laughs its way to the bank. So, what can you do? Become Antifragile To The Punches Whenever we search on Google, we at least glance at the ads before either scrolling past them or clicking on the one that catches our fancy.Now, a fantastic copy might get you the click - cos we’re all wary of deceptively tantalizing copy; what will get you the click and the best chance of conversion is —Brand Recall.If I recognize the AD that shows up on my intent search, there’s a 99% chance I’ll click on their AD instead of anything else.That’s the power of Brand Recall.So, if you’re getting sandwiched by a competitor outspending you on your target keywords, build better brand recall and see your results convert while their ADs remain unclicked! Command Brand Recall Instead of Praying For It HackerNoon has helped 4,000+ companies command Brand Recall in myriad ways, and here’s our boldest campaign offering yet: Site Takeover! The Premise is Simple: Enable our partner brands to capture everlasting Brand Recall without fearing getting sandwiched. At $25k a week, you get: A logo AD atop our homepage
A big-ass banner AD next to our top stories On a CPM basis, it’ll come out to $10,…and if you book a meeting here to confirm a purchase, you get a $5k flat discount per week you buy. If you’re getting sandwiched, that’s your silver bullet, but if you broke the sandwich another way, let us know in the comments. You probably like sandwiches as a snack, but what about being sandwiched by your competitors on Google Search? Elastic Email (a Mailchimp competitor) has been advertising on Google for months. Google Ads constitute ~40% of their ad spend, so they must get fantastic results there, right? WRONG!! If you Google Elastic Email right now, here’s what you’ll see: They. Got. Sandwiched! They. Got. Sandwiched! If you went ‘oooooof’, then you’re a marketer at heart and should read on. Google Likes Your Money - Not You. When Google opened up the bidding mechanism for ADs, the first casualty was Ethics. Until then, Marketers refrained from encroaching upon competitors’ branding, and any harmless banter was considered' a bold move’—remember the Cola Wars? But today, we’re all cutthroats over that $5 CPM. Thanks, Google! Sandwiches like the one above are the norm, not the exception, while Google laughs its way to the bank. So, what can you do? Become Antifragile To The Punches Whenever we search on Google, we at least glance at the ads before either scrolling past them or clicking on the one that catches our fancy. Now, a fantastic copy might get you the click - cos we’re all wary of deceptively tantalizing copy; what will get you the click and the best chance of conversion is — Brand Recall. If I recognize the AD that shows up on my intent search, there’s a 99% chance I’ll click on their AD instead of anything else. That’s the power of Brand Recall. So, if you’re getting sandwiched by a competitor outspending you on your target keywords, build better brand recall and see your results convert while their ADs remain unclicked! Command Brand Recall Instead of Praying For It HackerNoon has helped 4,000+ companies command Brand Recall in myriad ways, and here’s our boldest campaign offering yet: Site Takeover! The Premise is Simple: Enable our partner brands to capture everlasting Brand Recall without fearing getting sandwiched. At $25k a week, you get: A logo AD atop our homepage A big-ass banner AD next to our top stories A logo AD atop our homepage A big-ass banner AD next to our top stories On a CPM basis, it’ll come out to $10,…and if you book a meeting here to confirm a purchase, you get a $5k flat discount per week you buy. if you book a meeting here If you’re getting sandwiched, that’s your silver bullet, but if you broke the sandwich another way, let us know in the comments.

How You Like Them Sandwiches?

আপনি তাদের স্যান্ডউইচ কিভাবে পছন্দ করেন?

Wie gefallen Ihnen die Sandwiches?

¿Cómo te gustan los sándwiches?

Comment aimez-vous ces sandwichs ?

आपको ये सैंडविच कैसे पसंद हैं?

サンドイッチはお好きですか?

샌드위치는 어때요?

Como você gosta deles sanduíches?

Как вам такие сэндвичи?

Sandviçleri Nasıl Seversiniz?

Bạn thích bánh mì kẹp như thế nào?

您喜欢这些三明治吗？

185 Stories To Learn About Ai Applications

Chaos in Code: AI Assistants Clash in a Battle for Digital Supremacy

This paper is under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv Authors: (1) H. Wen, Department of Economics, University of Bath; (2) T. Huang, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Roehampton; (3) D. Xiao, School of Mathematical Sciences. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Relevant Blockchain Technologies Basic Model Advanced Models for Real-World Scenarios Monte Carlo Simulations Conclusions Future Investigations, and References 6. Conclusions Building on the insights drawn from our Monte Carlo simulation results, this culminating section distills our findings and teases out the intricate nuances that emerged throughout our study. We commence by probing the bedrock of our model—Intrinsic Incentive Mechanisms for Integrity-driven Ratings—which underscores the spontaneous motivations driving genuine ratings. Progressing further, we then delineate the Incentive Mechanisms for Actions, shedding light on the various levers and pulleys that can be manipulated to promote desired agent behaviors. As a summary to the contribution incentive mechanisms, a crucial balancing act then comes into focus as we navigate the dynamics of Balancing Stakeholders’ Shares and Network Effects, emphasizing the delicate equilibrium necessary for a thriving ecosystem. Rounding off our discourse, we elevate our gaze to a holistic vista, capturing the grand vision of the The Everlasting Reputation System as a Universal Sustainable Oracle, which places our system in the broader context of the blockchain oracle landscape. 6.1. Intrinsic Incentive Mechanisms for Integrity-driven Ratings In the realm of online ratings, ensuring integrity-driven feedback is pivotal. Our system’s design incorporates a mechanism that penalizes agents whose ratings diverge from the consensus, especially when they have staked a significant amount. This is instrumental in thwarting malicious actors. Vendors offering subpar products or services, contemplating artificially boosting their ratings or undermining their rivals, confront imminent hefty losses. Even if spurious reviews momentarily influence the consensus, integrity-driven reviews, over time, can redress the balance. This may relegate their staked ratings to the minority, inflicting substantial losses. Concurrently, vendors deliberating on posting negative reviews against competitors with top-notch products or services encounter an analogous predicament. Considering that the majority of consumers are predisposed to furnish positive feedback for high-caliber products or services, a malevolent negative review can swiftly be overshadowed, culminating in substantial losses for the deceitful vendor. This architecture ensures that, viewed through the lens of economic incentives, agents are propelled to rate with an integrity-driven mindset grounded in their firsthand experiences. Venturing into game theory, while agents may kick off with endeavors to ascertain the predominant sentiment, the game is poised to settle into a state where the lion’s share of agents unambiguously rate driven by their integrity-driven experience. This resonates with specific game theoretic models where cyclical guessing games gravitate towards the integrity-driven modus operandi espoused by autonomous participants [88]. Such findings not only bolster our theoretical postulations but also accentuate the tangible applicability of our blockchain-anchored reputation system. By synergizing individual motivations with the overarching system mechanics, we unfurl a resilient platform wherein integrity-driven ratings gain momentum, while duplicitous manipulations face retribution. 6.2. Incentive Mechanisms for Actions From our Monte Carlo Simulations (MCS) results and interpretations, we’ve distilled core insights on action-related staking behaviors within a blockchain-based reputation system: A clear distinction arises when comparing the adaptive model, which includes learning and adjustment mechanisms, to its non-learning counterparts in the context of staking on actions. Agents receiving positive feedback often increase their stakes, aiming to maximize their rewards. Conversely, those encountering negative outcomes tend to reduce their stakes to minimize losses. The trends observed in high-staking scenarios further reinforce these findings. Agents reaping positive benefits amplify their staking commitments, whereas those on the receiving end of negative feedback tend to retract. This pattern is akin to free-market behaviors where tasks naturally shift towards more proficient agents, sidelining the less adept ones. The introduction of features such as the option for agents to skip rounds and the utilization of non-random consumer selection provides deeper insights into staking behaviors. Notably, tasks are predominantly assigned to agents who commit significant credit points, an indicator of their dedication or skill set in specific roles. Agents with higher stakes simplify the selection criteria for consumers, giving them a competitive advantage and attracting newcomers. As a result, our blockchain-based reputation system effectively manages an onchain marketplace, steering clear of the fake rating problems common in traditional platforms. In summary, these findings highlight the platform’s intrinsic mechanisms for encouraging integrity and cultivating a beneficial relationship between consumers and providers. Importantly, the ability of our platform to counter fake reviews gives it a competitive edge, drawing in users and third-party vendors from competing systems. This positive feedback not only enhances the platform’s reputation but also leverages the network effect [89, 90], strengthening its market presence. 6.3. Balancing Stakeholders’ Shares and Network Effects Through our simulations, which incorporate contribution incentive mechanisms, we elucidate the potential equilibriums in credit point distributions. While external incentives may reduce the shares of existing stakeholders, they can simultaneously enhance the intrinsic value of each credit point via the network effect. There is a pivotal balance, achievable through judiciously crafted mechanisms and DAO governance, where an optimal outcome that serves all stakeholders’ interests can be realized. The aim is to crystallize this equilibrium and possibly enshrine it within a constitutional framework, thus establishing a robust foundation for the reputation system’s functionality. 6.4. The Everlasting Reputation System as a Universal Sustainable Oracle The rapid progression of blockchain technology has opened new horizons for decentralized applications. Within this paradigm, the oracle problem—the challenge of securely and reliably transmitting external data to the blockchain—emerges as a significant hurdle. Although Chainlink’s decentralized oracle aimed to address this, it faces challenges concerning long-term sustainability and potential dilution of asset value. Drawing from the inherent features of blockchain such as transparency and immutability, the everlasting reputation system presents a straightforward and sustainable solution to the universal oracle problem. It is anchored in a decentralized, collective rating mechanism, making it organically adaptive to supply real-world data to smart contracts, thereby functioning as a dynamic oracle network. The reputation system’s intrinsic advantage stems from its foundational principles. It endows participants with a robust and enduring incentive to rate transparently and honestly. This distinct methodology yields unparalleled advantages. For consumers, it acts as a guiding beacon, steering them to vendors who meet their anticipated standards. For vendors, it stands as a defensive shield against unfounded negative feedback from malevolent competitors, enabling them to foster and uphold their credibility. As the system magnetically draws an escalating number of consumers and vendors, its network effect burgeons. This amplifying network effect continually reinforces the oracle. Moreover, its adaptability and universality negate the need for complex, case-specific designs. As it intuitively attracts diverse users and data providers, the reputation system is poised to rival other oracles like Chainlink. Furthermore, with the potential integration of cryptographic tools such as Ring Signatures and ZeroKnowledge Proofs (ZKPs) to the reputation system, the oracle offers enhanced privacy adaptability: : Ring Signatures allow for digital signing by a group member, disclosing that a group member signed it but concealing the signer’s identity. Within oracles, this protects data providers’ identities. Specifically, as oracle providers feed data to smart contracts, using Ring Signatures ensures that the data’s specific provider remains undisclosed, offering oracle participants a layer of privacy. 1. Ring Signature Oracles : ZKPs let a prover authenticate a statement’s veracity to a verifier without revealing further relevant information about the statement. In oracles, ZKPs protect the data contents submitted to smart contracts, permitting data verification without unveiling the data’s detailed specifics. By integrating ZKPs, the system can effortlessly merge with existing blockchain frameworks, ensuring data privacy without compromising its accuracy or truth. 2. ZKP Oracles The evolving nature of the reputation system, driven by agent participation and feedback, epitomizes a self-tuning mechanism. Incorporating a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) in future phases will endow the oracle with perpetual evolution, distinguishing it from static oracle systems reliant on manual interventions or enhancements. 6.4.1. Advantageous Scenarios for the Universal Sustainable Oracle : Integration of Ring Signatures and ZKPs makes this system ideal for applications demanding high data confidentiality, such as banking transactions, confidential business dealings, legal documents, medical records, and private voting mechanisms. 1. Privacy-Sensitive Applications : Precise data is the lifeblood of DeFi. The reputation-based oracle can enhance financial protocols with reliable market data, optimizing the efficacy of platforms related to lending, borrowing, trading, or even risk management and insurance. 2. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) : The reputation system, with its emphasis on transparency and accuracy, can ensure product authenticity throughout supply chains. Industries prioritizing authenticity like agriculture, pharmaceuticals, electronics, luxury goods, and even art and antiques can greatly benefit. 3. Supply Chain Management In summary, rooted in blockchain principles and supplemented with ZKPs, the everlasting reputation system offers a comprehensive solution to the pertinent oracle dilemma. As blockchain garners wider acceptance, the need for a trustworthy oracle will surge, positioning this model as a leading contender that harmoniously blends data privacy, reliability, and durability.

Key Takeaways from an Intrinsic Integrity-Driven Rating Model for Sustainable Reputation
System

This paper is under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv Authors: (1) H. Wen, Department of Economics, University of Bath; (2) T. Huang, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Roehampton; (3) D. Xiao, School of Mathematical Sciences. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Relevant Blockchain Technologies Basic Model Advanced Models for Real-World Scenarios Monte Carlo Simulations Conclusions Future Investigations, and References Abstract In the era of digital markets, the challenge for consumers is discerning quality amidst information asymmetry. While traditional markets use brand mechanisms to address this issue, transferring such systems to internet-based P2P markets—where misleading practices like fake ratings are rampant—remains challenging. Current internet platforms strive to counter this through verification algorithms, but these efforts find themselves in a continuous tug-of-war with counterfeit actions. Exploiting the transparency, immutability, and traceability of blockchain technology, this paper introduces a robust reputation voting system grounded in it. Unlike existing blockchain-based reputation systems, our model harnesses an intrinsically economically incentivized approach to bolster agent integrity. We optimize this model to mirror real-world user behavior, preserving the reputation system’s foundational sustainability. Through Monte-Carlo simulations, using both uniform and power-law distributions enabled by an innovative inverse transform method, we traverse a broad parameter landscape, replicating real-world complexity. The findings underscore the promise of a sustainable, transparent, and formidable reputation mechanism. Given its structure, our framework can potentially function as a universal, sustainable oracle for offchain-onchain bridging, aiding entities in perpetually cultivating their reputation. Future integration with technologies like Ring Signature and Zero Knowledge Proof could amplify the system’s privacy facets, rendering it particularly influential in the ever-evolving digital domain. Keywords: blockchain, reputation system, sustainable oracle, agent, credit point, integrity-driven rating, incentive mechanisms, Monte-Carlo simulation 1. Introduction Information asymmetry [1] introduces challenges for consumers trying to select products or services that best fit their needs. In traditional retail markets, consumers gravitate towards brands they trust based on personal experiences, the experiences of others, or advertisements [2]. Each brand embodies a certain value that can be monetized in open markets. Offering products or services that fall short of their targeted consumers’ expectations can diminish this brand value. These brand mechanisms [3] serve to benefit both consumers and producers in retail and even broader traditional market sectors [4]. With the increased convenience and diversity they provide, online products and services are becoming the preferred choice for many consumers. A notable trend in this domain is the rise of third-party P2P offerings on internet platforms [5]. This rapidly growing sector includes a wide array of services. Modern internet platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao, Anyvan, ClickMechanic, and Mybuilder have transformed the way third-party service providers engage with consumers. Essentially, these platforms enable vendors to showcase their products or services, allowing customers to easily browse, compare, and purchase. Central to these operations is the role of customer reviews. A high number of positive reviews can significantly boost the attractiveness of a vendor, influencing other potential customers’ purchasing decisions. Conversely, negative reviews can deter future sales. This significant influence has, however, paved the way for manipulative tactics. The prevalence of deceptive practices, such as fake ratings and click farming, is notably higher online compared to traditional markets [6, 7, 8]. For instance, some vendors might engage in ’review farming,’ where they either purchase their products to leave positive reviews or hire individuals to write misleadingly favorable reviews for them. On the darker side, there might be instances of vendors leaving malicious negative reviews for competitors to tarnish their reputation. Hence, the establishment of reliable brand mechanisms presents substantial challenges. Given this scenario, verifying authentic consumer actions and crafting efficient reputation mechanisms become critical. While online platforms have the capability to employ algorithms to filter genuine from deceptive actions, thus allowing third-party producers to construct a legitimate reputation, the efficacy of such methods remains questionable. A persistent tension exists between the deceptive maneuvers of some third-party producers and the countermeasures introduced by platform verification algorithms. This dynamic essentially forms a cyclical battle. Present solutions might demand trade-offs, potentially compromising user privacy or other desirable attributes [9]. While machine learning offers a promising avenue [10], its implementation requires either an initial training phase with assured genuine user data or a substantial development period before it becomes truly effective. The advent of blockchain technology, pioneered by Satoshi Nakamoto [11], and augmented by Nick Szabo’s concept of the smart contract [12]—brought to fruition by Vitalik Buterin through Ethereum in 2014 [13]—has paved the way for innovative on-chain reputation systems.[1] Oracles play a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the real-world and blockchain technology, as they provide the crucial link by which off-chain data can be accessed and utilized by on-chain smart contracts. This function is imperative given that blockchains natively cannot access information outside their network. In 2017, Chainlink introduced its oracle mechanism [14], significantly amplifying the capabilities of decentralized systems. Its renowned use-case for price feeds laid the foundation for the blossoming of Decentralized Finance [15, 16]. Essentially, oracles act as third-party intermediaries, relaying external data to smart contracts. Chainlink’s decentralized oracle network assures the authenticity and integrity of data relayed into the blockchain. This is achieved by sourcing data from a plethora of independent oracles and consolidating their responses, mitigating risks associated with singular data points and enhancing the reliability and security of smart contracts dependent on external data. Yet, the functioning of these oracles primarily relies on incentive mechanisms, most notably vesting incentives—taking, for instance, the native asset ”Link” transitioning from non-circulation to circulation. Over a period, these incentives might have the potential to dilute the value for all participants. As the pool of these rewards nears depletion, apprehensions about the system’s enduring viability come to the fore. Successive enhancements, like Chainlink 2.0 [17], along with other contemporary solutions, have endeavored to surmount this challenge. Nonetheless, their effectiveness is a subject of continued discussion. While these refined models and strategies demonstrate potential, their ability to maintain prolonged and unwavering effectiveness remains under examination [18]. Hence, forging a truly sustainable oracle infrastructure becomes essential to fortifying the link between the real-world and blockchain technology. Recent studies have illuminated various dimensions of blockchain technology, notably the blockchainbased reputation systems [19, 20]. While these endeavors are commendable, some of them appear more theoretical and might encounter challenges when catering to all dynamic agent[2] interactions. Others have opted for centralized selection of trusted nodes, potentially introducing vulnerabilities associated with single points of failure [21, 22, 23, 24]. Mechanisms aiming to emulate real-world settings sometimes lean on intricate processes for identifying agent types and monitoring their on-chain activities. These processes occasionally overshadow more direct incentive mechanisms that have demonstrated spontaneous efficacy [25]. Some proposed economic incentive structures seem to lean on increasing blockchain asset ”numbers”, which might be susceptible to dilution over time [26], instead of furnishing concrete advantages. As mechanism designs grow in complexity, they might inadvertently elevate intervention costs or introduce unpredictabilities. Relying heavily on uncertainties akin to those proposed by chaos theory [27]—inspired by the renowned ”Butterfly Effect” [28]—might tread on delicate ground. While there appear to be promising solutions, such as ”Truth” [29]—a blockchain-aided reputation system aimed at obviating the need to trust e-commerce platforms and ensuring feedback authenticity and anonymity—the system is not without its potential shortcomings. ”Truth” introduces a hybrid model wherein the centralized e-commerce platform remains in charge of traditional trading services, but the blockchain oversees the authentication of feedback. Although ”Truth” presents an innovative approach to the age-old problem of authenticating e-commerce feedback, certain aspects warrant deeper scrutiny. For example, the paper does not adequately address the motivations that would drive consumers to engage in the feedback process. Understanding these incentives is vital for ensuring widespread adoption and sincere feedback. Furthermore, the system seems to overlook potential malicious behaviors by sellers, such as posting negative feedback against competitors or hiring fictitious consumers to generate positive reviews. While transactions may take place through the prescribed channels, there is a potential for compensating these ”hired” consumers via alternative methods, thereby circumventing the system’s safeguards. For ”Truth” to fully realize its potential and to demonstrate its effectiveness in real-world settings, these concerns need to be addressed in future versions or research Given these challenges, there’s merit in exploring a more streamlined, basic model that inherently incentivizes agent behavior integrity and fosters sustainability [30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. Initial evaluations of this model could employ Monte-Carlo simulations across vast parameter domains, capturing real-world intricacies. It’s essential to note that this rudimentary model need not capture every intricate detail of real-world scenarios. A basic reputation system, even if it offers only a singular credibility rating, can be invaluable in myriad applications. This value is realized when the reputation information it delivers is accurate and trustworthy, allowing users to rely on it rather than turning to other platforms that struggle to filter out low-cost fake ratings, as previously discussed. Building upon a well-defined basic model foundation allows for iteration and enhancement. By integrating corrective components to the foundational equations, we can preserve core incentives while refining the model towards an everlasting reputation system to mirror real-world scenarios more accurately. Ensuring this model’s competitive advantage over other platforms or blockchain solutions amplifies its resilience and sustainability. This strategy not only highlights the model’s practical utility but, as adoption grows, leverages the network effect. Widespread integration of our system fortifies commercial barriers against replication, making it increasingly arduous for potential competitors to emulate our unique model and its benefits. While the applications of the everlasting reputation system continue to expand across various domains and demographics, this system can function as a sustainable oracle network with demonstrated reliability. The integration of Ring Signatures [35, 36, 37, 38, 39] and Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) [40, 41, 42] can further enhance the privacy dimensions of such oracle mechanisms, especially in situations where privacy is paramount. Ring Signatures allow for digital signature from a group member without disclosing the identity of the specific signer. ZKPs represent an advanced cryptographic technique enabling agents to substantiate certain claims (like their assets or states) without disclosing the specifics. The structure of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the relevant blockchain technologies. Following this, the basic model is presented in Section 3, which lays the foundation for understanding the incentive mechanisms that promote self-motivated integrity among agents. We then refine this basic model in Section 4 to mirror real-world scenarios more closely, ensuring that the incentives for integrity-driven ratings are preserved. After building a robust theoretical base, Section 5 uses Monte Carlo simulations to validate our propositions, followed by a detailed analysis and discussion of the results. Our findings from the simulations are summarized in Section 6, where we underscore that our reputation system functions effectively as a universal sustainable oracle. Finally, potential directions for future research are proposed in Section 7. [1] In our model, the term ”reputation system” is used generically to denote the alternative solution we propose. However, in practical application scenarios, it might also be referred to as a ”platform.” The two terms can be used interchangeably. [2] In our model, we employ the term ”agent” to represent entities involved in the system. Conversely, in real-world application scenarios, we refer to them as ”users”. Throughout this paper, the term ”agent” is used in the context of the model while ”user” is employed in the context of real-world applications. Both terms can be considered interchangeable in many scenarios.

Introducing an Intrinsic Integrity-Driven Rating Model for a Sustainable Reputation
System

একটি টেকসই খ্যাতির জন্য একটি অন্তর্নিহিত সততা-চালিত রেটিং মডেল প্রবর্তন করা হচ্ছে
পদ্ধতি

Einführung eines intrinsischen, integritätsorientierten Bewertungsmodells für eine nachhaltige Reputation
System

Presentación de un modelo de calificación basado en la integridad intrínseca para una reputación sostenible
Sistema

Présentation d’un modèle de notation intrinsèque axé sur l’intégrité pour une réputation durable
Système

स्थायी प्रतिष्ठा के लिए एक आंतरिक अखंडता-संचालित रेटिंग मॉडल का परिचय
प्रणाली

持続可能な評判を実現するための本質的な誠実性を重視した評価モデルの導入
システム

지속 가능한 평판을 위한 본질적인 청렴도 중심 평가 모델 도입
체계

Apresentando um modelo de classificação baseado na integridade intrínseca para uma reputação sustentável
Sistema

Представляем внутреннюю рейтинговую модель, основанную на честности, для устойчивой репутации
Система

Sürdürülebilir Bir İtibar için İçsel Dürüstlük Odaklı Derecelendirme Modelinin Tanıtılması
Sistem

Giới thiệu Mô hình xếp hạng dựa trên tính chính trực nội tại để có được danh tiếng bền vững
Hệ thống

引入内在诚信驱动的评级模型以实现可持续的声誉
系统

Web3 is often touted as one of the runner-ups for solving many of the problems with the current Internet.  However, like many technologies that are surrounded by the fluff of hype, the truth about what it actually is, does, and will do is shrouded behind layers of obscure visions, fundraising, and human-induced drama therein. This article will provide a constructive look at what an actual architecture looks like and how it can be actualized. Furthermore, it will be compared to “web2“, or the current web.  This will mostly be from a development standpoint, which stands to answer the everlasting question: web3 What does “building on web3“ or “being a web3 developer“ even mean in a real context? A Primer to Web3 (And What Web2 Is) I am using the term web3, not because this is what the ‘final‘ version of the web will look like, but because it is a useful abstraction that is used to describe a multitude of different concepts. As a precursor, web3 does not comprise of blockchain; it represents a more fundamental change with the custodial control and representations of one’s digital presence.  The traditional narrative goes as follows: only Web1, or the 1990s, enabled a read-only web.  At the time, technologies such as hypertext markup language (HTML) were the innovations to watch out for.  Quickly, the world evolved to a content-first internet - with useful, collaborative web apps becoming commonplace with the likes of Facebook, Google, and many others. Beautiful UI and UX became the forefront of the internet - a place where suddenly, many people of infinitely many backgrounds were connected on a common ground.  Best of all, these services were free of cost - enabling an extremely low barrier to entry.  This is what became known as web2, where users could both consume and contribute content to the World Wide Web. However, as the years would soon prove, it wasn’t that free.  When you sign up for any of these services, you are giving one thing: your data.  Anything you post online is not actually yours but at the mercy of the service provider that you’re entrusting your digital presence with. all In other words, you don’t really the digital representation of yourself.  You are paying for UI and UX with your data! own As one can imagine, this also became a problem.  Not only from a social aspect but also a computational aspect - with the epicenters of computing being held in the hands of a select few, who could refuse you access if they deemed it by their standards. Traditional Architecture (“Web2“) The aforementioned problem is rooted in one single concept - the architecture.  At a high, non-technical level, all services work mostly the same way.  Once you sign up, you are usually bound by the legal terms and conditions of that specific provider.  You, the user, are subject to the , which controls your access to a particular service. service provider It’s time to introduce a word that, to web3 folk, won’t be all that foreign: . Once you sign up, you are also under the jurisdiction of this particular service.  This service can effectively do anything it likes with your digital presence. In a more technical sense, it is often that these services depend on other service providers, who themselves are centralized authorities. governance On Web2 Compute Companies that provide computing in the form of infrastructure and servers are essentially providing the ‘raw material‘ for these services to run in the first place.  If these companies are compromised in some fashion, there is a potential cascading effect that can affect many other services as well. Needless to say, this presents a fundamental lack of architectural integrity within these systems. There are two primary factors that are missing from web2 architectures: and .  Protocols that are , i.e., have inherent integrity, and that are , can recover quickly and effectively, are needed in today’s digital world. resilience robustness robust resilient Web3 Architecture Web3 is effectively the backbone that rearranged the puzzle pieces of web2 into a more sovereign, user-oriented methodology.   The notion of a governing service provider is cut out entirely, with the user in total control of their actions.  The help of various technologies, such as public key cryptography, digital signatures, and other cryptographic primitives, form the basis of verifying someone’s right to access a particular service. Notice I did not specifically highlight decentralization. is important, yes, but it should not be the primary goal. A system that is decentralized can present issues of its own. Decentralization too There are new paradigms and technologies that are introduced, such as blockchains, emphasis on Byzantine fault tolerance, distributed systems, and the like, but these systems are here for one thing: to provide . resilience Instead of being bound by the service provider’s whims, a user can simply prove through a combination of cryptographic primitives and verification that they have the right to access a particular service. trustless The notion of trustlessless is meant to reduce the need for trust in intermediaries in the first place. As stated, the idea is to actually the amount of trust in a service provider.  This essentially means that you do not need to inherently trust them -  you simply either do, or don’t have access to the service. reduce As before, we stated that compute is generated by a few large companies.  In the Web3 paradigm, compute is generated by a network of validators, who are constantly ensuring the state of a given network is in a good state. trustlessly Web3 systems (usually with blockchains as a foundation) are made up of a distributed network of nodes.  These nodes are responsible for authoring, validating, and persisting data over a period of time.   The result you get is computation, which you can trust. Disclaimer: I am a , but it really is a fantastic web3 technology stack. technical educator at the Web3 Foundation When we look for web3 systems to build on, it’s important to evaluate a slightly different set of criteria: is the of the compute that it generates? What quality this compute economically secure? Is this compute economical in the sense of it being scalable and affordable? Is In many ways, these questions are also questions for “Web2“, as reliability for a given system is important in any context, i.e., for a Web2 solution, you may also ask if it is scalable, economical, and reliable. Don’t be shy - contribute! There is still a way to go for both the developer and user experience for web3 as a whole.  The paradigm is rooted in good faith, but execution is still in the works.  This is a huge positive - there is a lot to work on and a lot of room for innovation.  Tackling common problems, such as interoperability, authentication, DX, or UX all have many opportunities for one to swoop in with a unique solution. This article was obviously very high level - I look forward to writing more technically oriented content in the future.  If you ever want to chat, hit me up on . X Stay safe!

A Normie Intro to Web3 in 2023 (And How it Differs from Web2)

THOUGHTS ON SCIENCE

This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: (1) Ruta Jawale; (2) Dakshita Khurana. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Technical Overview Preliminaries Unclonable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the CRS Model Unclonable NIZK in the Quantum Ramdon Oracle Model Unclonable Signatures of Knowledge References References [Aar09] Scott Aaronson. Quantum copy-protection and quantum money. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, CCC 2009, Paris, France, 15-18 July 2009, pages 229–242. IEEE Computer Society, 2009. [AC13] Scott Aaronson and Paul F. Christiano. Quantum money from hidden subspaces. Theory Comput., 9:349–401, 2013. [AGKZ20] Ryan Amos, Marios Georgiou, Aggelos Kiayias, and Mark Zhandry. One-shot signatures and applications to hybrid quantum/classical authentication. 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[BL20] Anne Broadbent and S´ebastien Lord. Uncloneable quantum encryption via oracles. In Steven T. Flammia, editor, 15th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography, TQC 2020, June 9-12, 2020, Riga, Latvia, volume 158 of LIPIcs, pages 4:1–4:22. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum f ¨ur Informatik, 2020. [BS16] Shalev Ben-David and Or Sattath. Quantum tokens for digital signatures. CoRR, abs/1609.09047, 2016. [BS17] Shalev Ben-David and Or Sattath. Quantum tokens for digital signatures. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., page 94, 2017. [BS23a] Mohammed Barhoush and Louis Salvail. How to sign quantum messages, 2023. [BS23b] Mohammed Barhoush and Louis Salvail. Powerful primitives in the bounded quantum storage model, 2023. [CKS10] Jan Camenisch, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Claudio Soriente. Solving revocation with efficient update of anonymous credentials. In Juan A. Garay and Roberto De Prisco, editors, Security and Cryptography for Networks, 7th International Conference, SCN 2010, Amalfi, Italy, September 13-15, 2010. Proceedings, volume 6280 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 454–471. Springer, 2010. [CL06] Melissa Chase and Anna Lysyanskaya. On signatures of knowledge. In Cynthia Dwork, editor, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2006, 26th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 20-24, 2006, Proceedings, volume 4117 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 78–96. Springer, 2006. [CLLZ21] Andrea Coladangelo, Jiahui Liu, Qipeng Liu, and Mark Zhandry. Hidden cosets and applications to unclonable cryptography. In Tal Malkin and Chris Peikert, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2021 - 41st Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2021, Virtual Event, August 16-20, 2021, Proceedings, Part I, volume 12825 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 556–584. Springer, 2021. [CW19] Xavier Coiteux-Roy and Stefan Wolf. Proving erasure. In IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, ISIT 2019, Paris, France, July 7-12, 2019, pages 832–836, 2019. [FGH+12] Edward Farhi, David Gosset, Avinatan Hassidim, Andrew Lutomirski, and Peter W. Shor. Quantum money from knots. In Shafi Goldwasser, editor, Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science 2012, Cambridge, MA, USA, January 8-10, 2012, pages 276–289. ACM, 2012. [FLS90] Uriel Feige, Dror Lapidot, and Adi Shamir. Multiple non-interactive zero knowledge proofs based on a single random string (extended abstract). In 31st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, St. Louis, Missouri, USA, October 22-24, 1990, Volume I, pages 308–317. IEEE Computer Society, 1990. [FM18] Honghao Fu and Carl A. Miller. Local randomness: Examples and application. Phys. Rev. A, 97:032324, Mar 2018. [GMR89] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM J. Comput., 18(1):186–208, 1989. [Got03] Daniel Gottesman. Uncloneable encryption. Quantum Inf. Comput., 3(6):581–602, 2003. [GZ20] Marios Georgiou and Mark Zhandry. Unclonable decryption keys. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., page 877, 2020. [HMNY21] Taiga Hiroka, Tomoyuki Morimae, Ryo Nishimaki, and Takashi Yamakawa. Quantum encryption with certified deletion, revisited: Public key, attribute-based, and classical communication. In Mehdi Tibouchi and Huaxiong Wang, editors, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2021, pages 606–636, Cham, 2021. Springer International Publishing. [HMNY22] Taiga Hiroka, Tomoyuki Morimae, Ryo Nishimaki, and Takashi Yamakawa. Certified everlasting zero-knowledge proof for QMA. CRYPTO, 2022. https://ia.cr/2021/1315. [IBM23] IBM. Cost of a data breach report 2023. Technical report, IBM, 2023. [Kan18] Daniel M. Kane. Quantum money from modular forms. CoRR, abs/1809.05925, 2018. [KN23] Fuyuki Kitagawa and Ryo Nishimaki. One-out-of-many unclonable cryptography: Definitions, constructions, and more. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., page 229, 2023. [KT20] Srijita Kundu and Ernest Y. Z. Tan. Composably secure device-independent encryption with certified deletion, 2020. [LS19] Alex Lombardi and Luke Schaeffer. A note on key agreement and noninteractive commitments. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/279, 2019. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/279. [LZ19] Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry. Revisiting post-quantum fiat-shamir. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 - 39th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18-22, 2019, Proceedings, Part II, volume 11693 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 326–355. Springer, 2019. [MST21] Christian Majenz, Christian Schaffner, and Mehrdad Tahmasbi. Limitations on uncloneable encryption and simultaneous one-way-to-hiding. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., page 408, 2021. [Por22] Alexander Poremba. Quantum proofs of deletion for learning with errors. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/295, 2022. https://ia.cr/2022/295. [PS19] Chris Peikert and Sina Shiehian. Noninteractive zero knowledge for NP from (plain) learning with errors. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 - 39th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18-22, 2019, Proceedings, Part I, volume 11692 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 89–114. Springer, 2019. [Sah99] Amit Sahai. Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosenciphertext security. In 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’99, 17-18 October, 1999, New York, NY, USA, pages 543–553. IEEE Computer Society, 1999. [SCO+01] Alfredo De Santis, Giovanni Di Crescenzo, Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, and Amit Sahai. Robust non-interactive zero knowledge. In Joe Kilian, editor, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2001, 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 19-23, 2001, Proceedings, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 566–598. Springer, 2001. [SCP00] Alfredo De Santis, Giovanni Di Crescenzo, and Giuseppe Persiano. Necessary and sufficient assumptions for non-iterative zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for all NP relations. In Ugo Montanari, Jos´e D. P. Rolim, and Emo Welzl, editors, Automata, Languages and Programming, 27th International Colloquium, ICALP 2000, Geneva, Switzerland, July 9-15, 2000, Proceedings, volume 1853 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 451–462. Springer, 2000. [SP92] Alfredo De Santis and Giuseppe Persiano. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge without interaction (extended abstract). In 33rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, 24-27 October 1992, pages 427–436. IEEE Computer Society, 1992. [Unr14] Dominique Unruh. Revocable quantum timed-release encryption. In Phong Q. Nguyen and Elisabeth Oswald, editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2014 - 33rd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Copenhagen, Denmark, May 11-15, 2014. Proceedings, volume 8441 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 129–146. Springer, 2014. [Unr17] Dominique Unruh. Post-quantum security of fiat-shamir. In Tsuyoshi Takagi and Thomas Peyrin, editors, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2017 - 23rd International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, Hong Kong, China, December 3-7, 2017, Proceedings, Part I, volume 10624 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 65–95. Springer, 2017. [Wie83] Stephen Wiesner. Conjugate coding. SIGACT News, 15(1):78–88, 1983. [Zha19a] Mark Zhandry. How to record quantum queries, and applications to quantum indifferentiability. In Alexandra Boldyreva and Daniele Micciancio, editors, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2019 - 39th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18-22, 2019, Proceedings, Part II, volume 11693 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 239–268. Springer, 2019. [Zha19b] Mark Zhandry. Quantum lightning never strikes the same state twice. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2019 - 38th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Darmstadt, Germany, May 19-23, 2019, Proceedings, Part III, volume 11478 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 408–438. Springer, 2019. A A Reduction Between Unclonability Definitions A.1 In the CRS model For completeness, here we repeat the definitions of unclonability. Definition A.1. (Unclonable Security for Hard Instances). A proof (Setup, Prove,Verify) satisfies unclonable security if for every language L with corresponding relation RL, for every polynomialsized quantum circuit family {Cλ}λ∈N, and for every hard distribution {Xλ,Wλ}λ∈N over RL, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, Definition A.2. (1-to-2 Unclonable Extractability) A proof (Setup, Prove,Verify) satisfies unclonable security there exists a QPT extractor E which is an oracle-aided circuit such that for every language L with corresponding relation RL and for every non-uniform polynomial-time quantum adversary A, for every instance-witness pair (x, w) ∈ RL and λ = λ(|x|), such that there is a polynomial p(·) satisfying: there is also a polynomial (·) such that q Any protocol satisfying Definition A.2 also satisfies Definition A.1. Claim A.3. . Suppose there exists a protocol Π = ( ) satisfying Definition A.2. Proof Setup, Prove, Verify Consider the extractor E guaranteed by Definition A.2. Given a sample (x, w) ← (X ,W), we will show that there is a polynomial p ′ (·) such that which suffices to contradict hardness of the distribution (X ,W), as desired. Towards showing that Equation (37) holds, recall by Definition A.2 that for every NP instance-witness pair (x, w) such that there is a polynomial p(·) satisfying: there is also a polynomial (·) such that q This implies that there is a polynomial (·) such that for every (x, w) ∈ S, q This, combined with Equation (36) implies that which proves Equation (37) as desired. A.2 In the QRO model For completeness, here we repeat the definitions of unclonability. Definition A.4. (Unclonable Security for Hard Instances). A proof ( ) satisfies unclonable security with respect to a quantum random oracle O if for every language L with corresponding relation RL, for every polynomial-sized quantum oracle-aided circuit family {Cλ}λ∈N, and for every hard distribution {Xλ,Wλ}λ∈N over RL, there exists a negligible function l(·) such that for every λ ∈ N, Prove, Verify neg Definition A.5. (1-to-2 Unclonable Extractability) A proof ( ) satisfies unclonable security with respect to a quantum random oracle O there exists a QPT extractor E which is an oracle-aided circuit such that for every language L with corresponding relation RL and for every non-uniform polynomial-time quantum adversary A, for every instance-witness pair (x, w) ∈ RL and λ = λ(|x|), such that there is a polynomial p(·) satisfying: Prove, Verify there is also a polynomial (·) such that q Any protocol satisfying Definition A.5 also satisfies Definition A.4. Claim A.6. Suppose there exists a protocol Π = (Prove,Verify) satisfying Definition A.5. Proof. Let S denote the set of instance-witness pairs {(x, w) ∈ (X ,W)} that satisfy First, we claim that Suppose not, then by Equation (41), contradicting Equation (40). Thus, Equation (42) must be true. Consider the extractor E guaranteed by Definition A.5. Given a sample (x, w) ← (X ,W), we will show that there is a polynomial p ′ (·) such that which suffices to contradict hardness of the distribution (X ,W), as desired. Towards showing that Equation (43) holds, recall by Definition A.5 that for every NP instance-witness pair (x, w) such that there is a polynomial p(·) satisfying: there is also a polynomial (·) such that q This along with Equation (40) implies that there is a polynomial (·) such that for every (x, w) ∈ S, q This, combined with Equation (42) implies that which proves Equation (43) as desired.

Unclonable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge: References

This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license. Authors: (1) Ruta Jawale; (2) Dakshita Khurana. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Technical Overview Preliminaries Unclonable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge in the CRS Model Unclonable NIZK in the Quantum Ramdon Oracle Model Unclonable Signatures of Knowledge References Abstract A non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof enables verification of NP statements without revealing secrets about them. However, an adversary that obtains a NIZK proof may be able to clone this proof and distribute arbitrarily many copies of it to various entities: this is inevitable for any proof that takes the form of a classical string. In this paper, we ask whether it is possible to rely on quantum information in order to build NIZK proof systems that are impossible to clone. We define and construct unclonable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (of knowledge) for NP. Besides satisfying the zero-knowledge and proof of knowledge properties, these proofs additionally satisfy unclonability. Very roughly, this ensures that no adversary can split an honestly generated proof of membership of an instance x in an NP language L and distribute copies to multiple entities that all obtain accepting proofs of membership of x in L. Our result has applications to unclonable signatures of knowledge, which we define and construct in this work; these non-interactively prevent replay attacks. 1 Introduction Zero-knowledge (ZK) [GMR89] proofs allow a prover to convince a verifier about the truth of an (NP) statement, without revealing secrets about it. These are among the most widely used cryptographic primitives, with a rich history of study. . ZK proofs for NP are typically defined via the simulation paradigm. A simulator is a polynomial-time algorithm that mimics the interaction of an adversarial verifier with an honest prover, given only the statement, i.e., x ∈ L, for an instance x of an NP language L. A protocol satisfies zero-knowledge if it admits a simulator that generates a view for the verifier, which is indistinguishable from the real view generated by an honest prover. This captures the intuition that any information obtained by a verifier upon observing an honestly generated proof, could have been generated by the verifier “on its own” by running the simulator. Enhancing Zero-knowledge Despite being widely useful and popular, there are desirable properties of proof systems that (standard) simulation-based security does not capture. For example, consider (distributions over) instances x of an NP language L where it is hard to find an NP witness w corresponding to a given instance x. In an “ideal” world, given just the description of one such NP statement x ∈ L, it is difficult for an adversary to find an NP witness w, and therefore to output any proofs of membership of x ∈ L. And yet, upon obtaining a single proof of membership of x ∈ L, it may suddenly become feasible for an adversary to make many copies of this proof, thereby generating several correct proofs of membership of x ∈ L. Unfortunately, this attack is inevitable for classical non-interactive proofs: given any proof string, an adversary can always make multiple copies of it. And yet, there is hope to prevent such an attack quantumly, by relying on the no-cloning principle. Indeed, a recent series of exciting works have combined cryptography with the no-cloning principle to develop quantum money [Wie83, AC13, FGH+12, Zha19a, Kan18], quantum tokens for digital signatures [BS16], quantum copy-protection [Aar09, AP21, ALL+21, CLLZ21], unclonable encryption [Got03, BL20, AK21, MST21, AKL+22], unclonable decryption [GZ20], one-outof-many unclonable security [KN23], and more. In this work, we combine zero-knowledge and unclonability to address a question first posed by Aaronson [Aar09]: Can we construct unclonable quantum proofs? How do these proofs relate to quantum money or copy-protection? 1.1 Our Results We define and construct unclonable non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK). We obtain a construction in the common reference string (CRS) model, as well as one in the quantum(-accessible) random oracle model (QROM). The CRS model allows a trusted third-party to set up a structured string that is provided to both the prover and verifier. On the other hand, the QROM allows both parties quantum access to a truly random function O. In what follows, we describe our contributions in more detail. 1.1.1 Definitional Contributions Before discussing how we formalize the concept of unclonability for NIZKs, it will be helpful to define hard distributions over NP instance-witness pairs. . Informally, an efficiently samplable distribution over instance-witness pairs of a language L is a “hard” distribution if given an instance sampled randomly from this distribution, it is hard to find a witness. Then, unclonable security requires that no adversary given an instance x sampled randomly from the distribution, together with an honestly generated proof, can output two accepting proofs of membership of x ∈ L. Hard Distributions over Instance-Witness Pairs More specifically, a hard distribution (X ,W) over RL satisfies the following: for any polynomialsized (quantum) circuit family {Cλ}λ∈N, For the sake of simplifying our subsequent discussions and definitions, let us fix a NP language L with corresponding relation R. Let (X ,W) be some hard distribution over R. For NIZKs satisfying standard completeness, soundness and ZK, we define a simple, natural variant of unclonable security as follows. Informally, a proof system satisfies unclonable security if, given an honest proof for an instance and witness pair (x, w) sampled from a hard distribution (X ,W), no adversary can produce two proofs that verify with respect to x except with negligible probability. A Weaker Definition: Unclonable Security. (Unclonable Security of NIZK). A NIZK proof (Setup, Prove,Verify) satisfies unclonable security if for every language L and every hard distribution (X ,W) over RL, for every poly-sized circuit family {Cλ}λ∈N, Definition 1.1. In the definition above, we aim to capture the intuition that one of the two proofs output by the adversary can be the honest proof they received, but the adversary cannot output any other correct proof for the same statement. Of course, such a proof is easy to generate if the adversary is able to find the witness w for x, which is exactly why we require hardness of the distribution (X ,W) to make the definition non-trivial. We also remark that unclonable security of proofs necessitates that the proof π keep hidden any witnesses w certifying membership of x in L, as otherwise an adversary can always clone the proof π by generating (from scratch) another proof for x given the witness w. A Stronger Definition: Unclonable Extractability. We can further strengthen the definition above to require that any adversary generating two (or more) accepting proofs of membership of x ∈ L given a single proof, must have generated one of the two proofs “from scratch” and must therefore “know” a valid witness w for x. This will remove the need to refer to hard languages. In more detail, we will say that a proof system satisfies unclonable extractability if, from any adversary A that on input a single proof of membership of x ∈ L outputs two proofs for x, then we can extract a valid witness w from A for at least one of these statements with high probability. Our (still, simplified) definition of unclonable extractability is as follows. (Unclonable Extractability.). A proof (Setup, Prove,Verify) satisfies unclonable security there exists a QPT extractor E which is an oracle-aided circuit such that for every language L with corresponding relation RL and for every non-uniform polynomial-time quantum adversary A, for every instance-witness pair (x, w) ∈ RL and λ = λ(|x|), such that there is a polynomial p(·) satisfying: Definition 1.2 there is also a polynomial q(·) such that In fact, in the technical sections, we further generalize this definition to consider a setting where the adversary obtains an even larger number (say k−1) input proofs on instances x1, . . . , xk−1, and outputs k or more proofs. Then we require the extraction of an NP witness corresponding to any proofs that attempt to “clone” honestly generated proofs (i.e. the adversary outputs two or more proofs w.r.t. the same instance xi ∈ {x1, . . . , xk−1}). All our theorem statements hold w.r.t. this general definition. Finally, we also consider definitions and constructions in the quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM); these are natural generalizations of the definitions above, so we do not discuss them here. We also show that the latter definition of unclonable extractability implies the former, i.e. unclonable security. Informally, this follows because the extractor guaranteed by the definition of extractability is able to obtain a witness w for x from any adversary, which contradicts hardness of the distribution (X ,W). We refer the reader to Appendix A for a formal proof of this claim. 1.1.2 Realizations of Unclonable NIZK, and Relationship with Quantum Money We obtain realizations of unclonable NIZKs in both the common reference string (CRS) and the quantum random oracle (QRO) models, assuming public-key quantum money mini-scheme and other (post-quantum) standard assumptions. We summarize these results below. (Informal). Theorem 1.3 Assuming public-key quantum money mini-scheme, public-key encryption, perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitments, and adaptively sound NIZK proofs for NP, there exists an unclonable NIZKPoK scheme in the CRS model. (Informal). Theorem 1.4 Assuming public-key quantum money mini-scheme and honest verifier zeroknowledge proofs of knowledge (HVZKPoKs) for NP, there exists an unclonable NIZKPoK scheme in the QROM. (Informal). Theorem 1.5 Assuming public-key quantum money mini-scheme, public-key encryption, postquantum perfectly binding and computationally hiding commitments, and simulation-sound NIZK proofs for NP, there exists an unclonable signature of knowledge in the CRS model. Our work builds unclonable NIZKs for NP by relying on any (public-key) quantum money scheme (mini-scheme), in conjuction with other assumptions such as NIZKs for NP. Since constructions of public-key quantum money minischeme are only known based on post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation [AC13, Zha19b], it is natural to wonder whether the reliance on quantum money is inherent. We show that this is indeed the case, by proving that unclonable NIZKs in fact imply public-key quantum money mini-scheme. Is Quantum Money necessary for Unclonable NIZKs? (Informal). Theorem 1.6 Unclonable NIZKs for NP imply public-key quantum money mini-scheme. 1.1.3 Applications A (classical) signature scheme asserts that a message m has been signed on behalf of a public key pk. However, in order for this signature to be authenticated, the public key pk must be proven trustworthy through a certification chain rooted at a trusted public key PK. However, as [CL06] argue, this reveals too much information; it should be sufficient for the recipient to only know that there exists a public key pk with a chain of trust from PK. To solve this problem, [CL06] propose signatures of knowledge which allow a signer to sign on behalf of an instance x of an NP-hard language without revealing its corresponding witness w. Such signatures provide an anonymity guarantee by hiding the pk of the sender. Unclonable Signatures of Knowledge. While this is ideal for many applications, anonymity presents the following downside: a receiver cannot determine whether they were the intended recipient of this signature. In particular, anonymous signatures are more susceptible to replay attacks. Replay attacks are a form of passive attack whereby an adversary observes a signature and retains a copy. The adversary then leverages this signature, either at a later point in time or to a different party, to impersonate the original signer. The privacy and financial consequences of replay attacks are steep. They can lead to data breach attacks which cost millions of dollars annually and world-wide [IBM23]. In this work, we construct a signature of knowledge scheme which is the first non-interactive signature in the CRS model that is naturally secure against replay attacks. Non-interactive, replay attack secure signatures have seen a lot of recent interest including a line of works in the bounded quantum storage model [BS23b] and the quantum random oracle model [BS23a]. Our construction is in the CRS model and relies on the hardness of NP problems, plausible cryptographic assumptions, and the axioms of quantum mechanics. We accomplish this by defining unclonable signatures of knowledge: if an adversary, given a signature of a message m with respect to an instance x, can produce two signatures for m which verify with respect to the same instance x, then our extractor is able to extract a witness for x. Our construction involves showing that an existing compiler can be augmented using unclonable NIZKs to construct unclonable signatures of knowledge. The authors of [CL06] construct signatures of knowledge from CPA secure dense cryptosystems [SP92, SCP00] and simulationsound NIZKs for NP [Sah99, SCO+01]. Signatures of knowledge are signature schemes in the CRS model for which we associate an instance x in a language L. This signature is simulatable, so there exists a simulator which can create valid signatures without knowledge of a witness for x. Additionally, the signature is extractable which means there is an extractor which is given a trapdoor for the CRS and a signature, and is able to produce a witness for x. We show that, by switching the simulation-sound NIZKs for unclonable simulation-extractable NIZKs (and slightly modifying the compiler), we can construct unclonable signatures of knowledge. . A recent exciting line of work obtains certified deletion for time-lock puzzles [Unr14], non-local games [FM18], information-theoretic proofs of deletion with partial security [CW19], encryption schemes [BI20, BK23], device-independent security of one-time pad encryption with certified deletion [KT20], public-key encryption with certified deletion [HMNY21], commitments and zero-knowledge with certified everlasting hiding [HMNY22], and fully-homomorphic encryption with certified deletion [Por22, BK23, BKP23, BGG+23]. While certified everlasting deletion of secrets has been explored in the context of interactive zero-knowledge proofs [HMNY22], there are no existing proposals for non-interactive ZK satisfying variants of certified deletion. Our work provides a pathway to building such proofs. Relationship with Revocation In this work, we construct a quantum revocable anonymous credentials protocol by way of the hardness of NP problems, plausible cryptographic assumptions, and the axioms of quantum mechanics. Our work follows a line of work on (classical) revocation for anonymous credentials schemes [BCC+09, CKS10, AN11]. In particular, our construction involves noting that NIZK proof systems that are unclonable can also be viewed as supporting a form of certified deletion/revocation, where in order to delete, an adversary must simply return the entire proof. In other words, the (quantum) certificate of deletion is the proof itself, and this certificate can be verified by running the NIZK verification procedure on the proof. The unclonability guarantee implies that an adversary cannot keep with itself or later have the ability to generate another proof for the same instance x. In the other direction, in order to offer certifiable deletion, a NIZK must necessarily be unclonable. To see why, note that if there was an adversary who could clone the NIZK, we could use this adversary to obtain two copies, and provably delete one of them. Even though the challenger for the certifiable deletion game would be convinced that its proof was deleted, we would still be left with another correct proof. 1.2 Related Works This work was built upon the foundations of and novel concepts introduced by prior literature. We will briefly touch upon some notable such results in this section. Unclonable encryption [Got03, BL20, AK21, MST21, AKL+22] imagines an interaction between three parties in which one party receives a quantum ciphertext and splits this ciphertext in some manner between the two remaining parties. At some later point, the key of the encryption scheme is revealed, yet both parties should not be able to simultaneouly recover the underlying message. While our proof systems share the ideology of unclonability, we do not have a similar game-based definition of security. This is mainly due to proof systems offering more structure which can take advantage of to express unclonability in terms of simulators and extractors. Unclonable Encryptions. Prior work [BS17] defines and constructs signature tokens which are signatures which involve a quantum signing token which can only be used once before it becomes inert. The setting they consider is where a client wishes to delegate the signing process to a server, but does not wish the server to be able to sign more than one message. They rely on quantum money [AC13] and the no-cloning principle to ensure the signature can only be computed once. For our unclonable signatures of knowledge result, we focus on the setting where a client wishes to authenticate themselves to a server and wants to prevent an adversary from simultaneously, or later, masquerading as them. Signature Tokens. The authors of [AGKZ20] introduce the notion of one-shot signatures which extend the concept of signature tokens to a scenario where the client and server only exchange classical information to create a one-use quantum signature token. They show that these signatures can be plausibly constructed in the CRS model from post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation. Unless additional measures for security, which we discussed in our applications section, are employed, classical communication can be easily copied and replayed at a later point. In contrast, we prevent an adversary from simultaneously, or later, authenticating with the client’s identity. One-shot Signatures. Our QROM results are heavily inspired by the recent post-quantum Fiat-Shamir result [LZ19] which proves the post-quantum security of NIZKs in the compressed quantum(-accessible) random oracle model (compressed QROM). These classical NIZKs are the result of applying Fiat-Shamir to post-quantum sigma protocols which are HVZKPoKs. We further extend, and crucially rely upon, their novel proof techniques to prove extractability (for PoK) and programmability (for ZK) to achieve extractability and programmability for some protocols which output quantum proofs. Post-quantum Fiat-Shamir.

Unclonable Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge: Abstract and Introduction

Let's learn about via these 30 free stories. They are ordered by most time reading created on HackerNoon. Visit the to find the most read stories about any technology. Smart Home /Learn Repo 1. 5 Most Pointless Smart Life Devices to Stay Away From A selected review of the most frustratingly pointless smart life devices available today. 2. How Smart are our Homes Getting? Smart spaces will become an essential part of our lives, he says. Smart homes are changing our lives in the same way as wearable devices. 3. All You Need To Know About UX Design In The Ambient Computing Era Ambient/Ubiquitous computing is a concept that circumscribes many terms together. It can be considered as a magnificent amalgam of software, hardware products and user experience with a major component of human-machine interaction and learning, all of these things becoming the aim of using a computer or any internet-enabled device, without necessarily deliberately using it. 4. Best Ways to Conserve Electricity and Save Money with Household Tech You just can't put enough information into one article to elucidate the processes of going green with solar electricity, so we're getting to break it into three steps. This first article is "Step One, Determining your Current Use." In it, we'll check out the way to determine what proportion of energy you employ at the present and the way to lower your consumption. 5. What the New CHIP Standard Means for Smart Home Startups When most people hear the word “chip” in the context of a smart home, they immediately imagine the microchips at the heart of their smart devices. But whereas chips power the brains of an individual smart device, CHIP will power the brains of an entire smart home. CHIP will offer huge conveniences to consumers, but its openness may make it harder for hardware startups to build ecosystems and defend against inexpensive knock-offs. 6. How to Build An Alexa Home Automation System How to make an IoT-based Smart Home with Arduino IoT Cloud & Alexa using NodeMCU ESP8266 to control 4 home appliances with voice commands. 7. How to Connect Your Soundbar to External Components It only takes a few minutes to connect your soundbar to your TV and get it running. But what if you want to set it up for another device, such as a gaming console or a Blu-ray player? Here, we go through the details such as the cables you need and settings you may have to change in your TV’s menu. 8. Big Tech Is Acquiring Access to Your Health & Home SMART HOMES: THE FINAL FRONTIER 9. Detecting Humans in Smart Homes with Computer Vision Learn more about OpenCV, how you can use it to identify and track people in real-time, and what challenges you can meet. 10. The Internet of Things will Transform these 7 Industries The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of physical objects, including vehicles, medical devices and home appliances, that use sensors and APIs to connect to one another and exchange data over the internet. 11. No Safety Nets in the Real World The Dark Side of the Smart Revolution 12. What Are The Cybersecurity Risks Associated With Personal Devices? Let's look at some of the most significant risks posed by your personal digital devices, and what we can do to boost your security. 13. How IoT And Edge Computing Influence Various Industries From healthcare to lifestyle, everything is being influenced by emerging technologies like IoT and edge computing. Moreover, as data remains the foundation of today’s economy, businesses can use these emerging technologies to offer a more personalized experience to their customers. 14. Using IoT to Solve Housing Problems and Improve Safety IoT can help manage air quality and emissions at industrial sites, improve control over electricity, water, and heat meters, and more. 15. Self-Isolation and Electricity: 3 Problems That May Arise Quarantine has drastically affected our routine. Companies have switched to remote work, employees have no choice but to work from home and get used to a new rhythm of life. Now as never before we all rely on uninterrupted Internet access. Sudden power outages reduce our productivity and affect the work schedule. 16. Smart Home Technology Sales Projected At $317 Revenue By 2026 Housewares have become more intelligent than ever, and the sales of smart home technologies are on the rise. 17. Technology To Make You Feel Safer Online Cybercrimes continue to be rampant and most people continue to wonder about their safety and that of their information. 18. How Technology Changing Our Homes Do you remember the pre-technology homes? Hard to recollect, right? Technology has changed our lives most remarkably and it is still transforming at a rapid space. 19. Smart homes are getting mainstream: 85% of Americans bought a smart device in 2020 According to the Safewise study, 85% of Americans bought a smart home device in 2020, and three-quarters of them were 44 or younger. 20. 12 Ways To Enforce IoT Security In Your Smart House IoT security in home automation is critical to avert data theft & infiltration of devices. Here are some ways that can help you out. 21. Smart Home Technologies that Will Raise the Value of your Home Smart homes are rapidly becoming popular across different demographics, and all for good reasons. For starters, smart security systems can detect break-in attempts and alert the authorities even in your absence. Some smart detectors can detect smoke, moisture level, carbon monoxide among other factors that can harm the home. Smart devices save money and allow convenience and efficiency in a huge way. In addition, smart home devices are easy to install. You only need the right tools and instructions to get started. 22. How to Take an Advantage Of Home Automation A couple of weeks ago I created an automation to change the light in my living room for when I played video games. 23. Major Reasons Why You Have Wi-Fi Dead Zones In the event that you have certain rooms or regions in your home where the Wi-Fi signal is moderate or nearly non-existent, you may have a Wi-Fi no man’s land. Does it take everlastingly to stack a page on the PC in your room? Is it practically difficult to watch Netflix in the cellar? No man’s lands and moderate zones can cause your gushing sticks, PCs, and savvy home gadgets to run ineffectively, conflictingly, or in some cases, not under any condition. 24. The Rapid Fire Adoption of Smart Home Tech A look at the smart homes and smart devices of the future, lead by Millennials and Gen Z generations. 25. DIY Tutorial: How to Create Motorized Shades for Your Smart Home Inexpensive motorized shades are a holy grail for DIY smart home enthusiasts. Many have tried and failed to produce a product that is comparable to the market. 26. Ajax Interacting With Security Systems Champion: Type 5 Certification Scheme Type 5 Certification Scheme is the most ruthless quality control in the security industry. Learn how Ajax smart wireless alarm goes through it 27. Connecting to Schlage's New WiFi Locks Is Not Easy I like Schlage’s smartlocks, and have used them for years. Built by a company with a long history of making reasonably secure, reliable locks, I’ve used several of their Z-Wave locks over the years, but Z-Wave is…Z-Wave. Proprietary until recently, a PIA to troubleshoot, and while the technology held a lot of promise on paper, in reality it’s been the cause for many a swear word to erupt from my mouth (I realize this is partially due to the controllers I’ve used over the years). 28. Top 10 Innovations in IoT, HealthTech, Fraud Prevention and More While 2020 might not have gotten off to the best of starts, hope lies in the future as we prepare for a new and exciting list of technology and software development yet to come. Tech companies across the world have been working tirelessly to provide consumers with an exciting array of innovations that will shape the world. 29. Home Gadgets that Drive Adults Crazy The HN team discussed their favorite smart home gadgets and what developments they wish to see available on the market. 30. Energy Savings Strategies for Smart Homes Let’s explore some energy-saving strategies for smart homes that you can deploy today and make your homes green and energy-efficient. 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