Enforce

enforce

Authors:
(1) Christopher D. Clack, Centre for Blockchain Technologies, Department of Computer Science, University College London;
(2) Vikram A. Bakshi, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays;
(3) Lee Braine, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays. Table of Links Abstract and 1 Introduction 2 Foundations and 2.1 Terminology — “smart contracts” 2.2 Automation 2.3 Enforceability 2.4 The semantics of contracts 3 Smart Contract Templates 3.1 Templates and Parameters 3.2 The design landscape for Smart Contract Templates 4 Summary and Further Work and References 2.3 Enforceability Given a smart contract must be “enforceable” [15], what are the elements that must be enforced? And how? First we consider what must be enforced: 2.3.1 What to enforce What needs to be enforced is different for smart contract code and smart legal contracts: • For smart contract code, the key requirement is that the code should run successfully and accurately within a reasonable time. If the technology platform is in complete control of all of the actions of the smart contract code then these actions should occur faithfully and without undue delay. Things that could go wrong (and therefore require “enforcement”) include technical issues within the platform and issues that take place outside of the platform — an obvious example would be the physical delivery of goods. • For smart legal contracts, things can be considerably more complex. Typically a legal contract would include rights and obligations that accrue to the different parties and are legally enforceable. These are often expressed in complex, context-sensitive, legal prose and may cover not just individual actions but also time-dependent and sequencedependent sets of actions. There may also be overriding obligations on one or more of the parties such that a lack of action could be deemed to be a wrong-performance or non-performance of the contract. 2.3.2 How to enforce Enforcement might be achieved via traditional or non-traditional methods: • Traditional means of enforcement include a variety of dispute resolution methods such as binding (or non-binding) arbitration, or recourse to the courts of law. There is an established body of law, and the methods by which parties can resolve disputes are well known. For illegal acts, courts are for example empowered (to different extents, according to jurisdiction) to impose fines, sequester assets, or deprive the wrong-doer of liberty. For disputes relating to contracts, the courts have extensive experience of adjudicating on issues of contract wrong-performance and non-performance, of awarding damages or other reliefs as appropriate, and in some cases assisting in the enforcement of payment of damages. • Non-traditional methods of enforcement may also be imagined. For example, there is currently debate and experimentation on enforcing the actions of smart contract code at a network level without the need for dispute resolution. This is a fundamentally different notion of enforcement that is often expressed in terms of “tamper-proof” technology, with the assumption that in a perfect implementation of the system wrong-performance or non-performance become impossible. “Tamper-proof” technology is typically described in terms of distributed networks of computers that are unstoppable and in a technological sense cannot fail regardless of malicious acts, power cuts, network disruption, natural catastrophies or any other conceivable event. For example, a “permissionless” shared ledger might make use of tamper-proof technology. Swanson [18] gives a good overview of many of the complex issues that arise with permissioned and permissionless distributed consensus systems. With such a system, it is assumed that a software agent, once started, could not be stopped. For truly “unstoppable” software agents, code must be defined to take the appropriate action in response to various dynamic states that might occur (such as another party defaulting on a required payment). In a truly unstoppable “tamper-proof” version of the system, all such possibilities would have to be anticipated and appropriate actions determined in advance. Although some groups are actively pursuing tamper-proof smart contract code, our preference is for smart legal contracts that are enforceable by traditional legal methods for reasons including: • In a system with enforcement by tamper-proof network consensus, there would be no “executive override” provisions. Agreements, once launched as smart contract code, could not be varied. But it is common for provisions of an agreement to be varied dynamically — for example, to permit a client to defer paying interest, or to permit a payment holiday, or to permit the rolling-up of interest over a period. Unless every possible variation is coded in advance, none of this would be possible in a tamper-proof system. • Enforcement by network consensus can only apply to the fulfilment of obligations, or the exercising of rights, that are under the control of the network. However, objects and actions in the physical world are unlikely to be under full (if any) control of the network. • Mainelli and Milne [14] observe that smart contract code “that involved payments would require posting collateral to be completely automated. This locking-up of collateral would lead to a serious reduction in leverage and pull liquidity out of markets. Markets might become more stable, but the significant reduction in leverage and consequent market decline would be strongly resisted by market participants.” This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Christopher D. Clack, Centre for Blockchain Technologies, Department of Computer Science, University College London; (2) Vikram A. Bakshi, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays; (3) Lee Braine, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays. Authors: Authors: (1) Christopher D. Clack, Centre for Blockchain Technologies, Department of Computer Science, University College London; (2) Vikram A. Bakshi, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays; (3) Lee Braine, Investment Bank CTO Office, Barclays. Table of Links Abstract and 1 Introduction Abstract and 1 Introduction 2 Foundations and 2.1 Terminology — “smart contracts” 2 Foundations and 2.1 Terminology — “smart contracts” 2.2 Automation 2.2 Automation 2.3 Enforceability 2.3 Enforceability 2.4 The semantics of contracts 2.4 The semantics of contracts 3 Smart Contract Templates 3 Smart Contract Templates 3.1 Templates and Parameters 3.1 Templates and Parameters 3.2 The design landscape for Smart Contract Templates 3.2 The design landscape for Smart Contract Templates 4 Summary and Further Work and References 4 Summary and Further Work and References 2.3 Enforceability Given a smart contract must be “enforceable” [15], what are the elements that must be enforced? And how? First we consider what must be enforced: 2.3.1 What to enforce What needs to be enforced is different for smart contract code and smart legal contracts: • For smart contract code, the key requirement is that the code should run successfully and accurately within a reasonable time. If the technology platform is in complete control of all of the actions of the smart contract code then these actions should occur faithfully and without undue delay. Things that could go wrong (and therefore require “enforcement”) include technical issues within the platform and issues that take place outside of the platform — an obvious example would be the physical delivery of goods. smart contract code, smart contract code, • For smart legal contracts , things can be considerably more complex. Typically a legal contract would include rights and obligations that accrue to the different parties and are legally enforceable. These are often expressed in complex, context-sensitive, legal prose and may cover not just individual actions but also time-dependent and sequencedependent sets of actions. There may also be overriding obligations on one or more of the parties such that a lack of action could be deemed to be a wrong-performance or non-performance of the contract. smart legal contracts smart legal contracts 2.3.2 How to enforce Enforcement might be achieved via traditional or non-traditional methods: • Traditional means of enforcement include a variety of dispute resolution methods such as binding (or non-binding) arbitration, or recourse to the courts of law. There is an established body of law, and the methods by which parties can resolve disputes are well known. For illegal acts, courts are for example empowered (to different extents, according to jurisdiction) to impose fines, sequester assets, or deprive the wrong-doer of liberty. For disputes relating to contracts, the courts have extensive experience of adjudicating on issues of contract wrong-performance and non-performance, of awarding damages or other reliefs as appropriate, and in some cases assisting in the enforcement of payment of damages. Traditional Traditional • Non-traditional methods of enforcement may also be imagined. For example, there is currently debate and experimentation on enforcing the actions of smart contract code at a network level without the need for dispute resolution. This is a fundamentally different notion of enforcement that is often expressed in terms of “tamper-proof” technology, with the assumption that in a perfect implementation of the system wrong-performance or non-performance become impossible. • Non-traditional • Non-traditional “Tamper-proof” technology is typically described in terms of distributed networks of computers that are unstoppable and in a technological sense cannot fail regardless of malicious acts, power cuts, network disruption, natural catastrophies or any other conceivable event. For example, a “permissionless” shared ledger might make use of tamper-proof technology. Swanson [18] gives a good overview of many of the complex issues that arise with permissioned and permissionless distributed consensus systems. With such a system, it is assumed that a software agent, once started, could not be stopped. For truly “unstoppable” software agents, code must be defined to take the appropriate action in response to various dynamic states that might occur (such as another party defaulting on a required payment). In a truly unstoppable “tamper-proof” version of the system, all such possibilities would have to be anticipated and appropriate actions determined in advance. Although some groups are actively pursuing tamper-proof smart contract code, our preference is for smart legal contracts that are enforceable by traditional legal methods for reasons including: • In a system with enforcement by tamper-proof network consensus, there would be no “executive override” provisions. Agreements, once launched as smart contract code, could not be varied. But it is common for provisions of an agreement to be varied dynamically — for example, to permit a client to defer paying interest, or to permit a payment holiday, or to permit the rolling-up of interest over a period. Unless every possible variation is coded in advance, none of this would be possible in a tamper-proof system. • Enforcement by network consensus can only apply to the fulfilment of obligations, or the exercising of rights, that are under the control of the network. However, objects and actions in the physical world are unlikely to be under full (if any) control of the network. • Mainelli and Milne [14] observe that smart contract code “that involved payments would require posting collateral to be completely automated. This locking-up of collateral would lead to a serious reduction in leverage and pull liquidity out of markets. Markets might become more stable, but the significant reduction in leverage and consequent market decline would be strongly resisted by market participants.” This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv

Smart Contract Templates:
Foundations, Design and Research - Enforceability

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 6 of 22. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here C. The Stored Communications Act As the government has acknowledged in this litigation, “[t]he SCA was enacted to extend to electronic records privacy protections analogous to those provided by the Fourth Amendment.” Gov’t Br. at 29 (citing S. Comm. on Judiciary, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, S. Rep. No. 99‐541, at 5 (1986)). The SCA provides privacy protection for users of two types of electronic services—electronic communication services (“ECS”) and remote computing services (“RCS”)—then probably more distinguishable than now.[13] See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1213–14 (2004).  An ECS generally operated by providing the user access to a central computer system through which to send electronic messages over telephone lines. S. Rep. No. 99‐541, at 8.  If the intended recipient also subscribed to the service, the provider temporarily stored the message in the recipient’s electronic “mail box” until the recipient “call[ed] the company to retrieve its mail.” Id. If the intended recipient was not a subscriber, the service provider could print the communication on paper and complete delivery by postal service or courier. Id.; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA‐CIT‐293, Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties 47–48 (1985).[14] An RCS generally operated either by providing customers with access to computer processing facilities in a “time‐sharing arrangement,” or by directly processing data that a customer transmitted electronically to the provider by means of electronic communications, and transmitting back the requested results of particular operations.  S. Rep. No. 99‐541, at 10–11.  We will refer to Microsoft and other providers of ECS and RCS jointly as “service providers,” except where the distinction makes a difference. As to both services, the Act imposes general obligations of non‐disclosure on service providers and creates several exceptions to those obligations.  Thus, its initial provision, § 2701, prohibits unauthorized third parties from, among other things, obtaining or altering electronic communications stored by an ECS, and imposes criminal penalties for its violation.  Section 2702 restricts the circumstances in which service providers may disclose information associated with and contents of stored communications to listed exceptions, such as with the consent of the originator or upon notice to the intended recipient, or pursuant to § 2703.  Section 2703 then establishes conditions under which the government may require a service provider to disclose the contents of stored communications and related obligations to notify a customer whose material has been accessed. Section 2707 authorizes civil actions by entities aggrieved by violations of the Act, and makes “good faith reliance” on a court warrant or order “a complete defense.”  18 U.S.C. § 2707(e).[15] Regarding governmental access in particular, § 2703 sets up a pyramidal structure governing conditions under which service providers must disclose stored communications to the government.  Basic subscriber and transactional information can be obtained simply with an administrative subpoena.[16] 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Other non‐content records can be obtained by a court order (a “§ 2703(d) order”), which may be issued only upon a statement of “specific and articulable facts showing . . . reasonable grounds to believe that the contents or records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  § 2703(c)(2), (d).  The government may also obtain some user content with an administrative subpoena or a § 2703(d) order, but only if notice is provided to the service provider’s subscriber or customer. § 2703(b)(1)(B).  To obtain “priority stored communications” (our phrase), as described below, the Act generally requires that the government first secure a warrant that has been issued “using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,” or using State warrant procedures, both of which require a showing of probable cause. [17] Priority stored communications fall into two categories: For electronic communications stored recently (that is, for less than 180 days) by an ECS, the government must obtain a warrant.  § 2703(a).  For older electronic communications and those held by an RCS, a warrant is also required, unless the Government is willing to provide notice to the subscriber or customer.  § 2703(b)(1)(A). As noted, § 2703 calls for those warrants issued under its purview by federal courts to be “issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled “Search and Seizure,” addresses federal warrants.  It directs “the magistrate judge or a judge of a state court of record” to issue the warrant to “an officer authorized to execute it.” Rule 41(e)(1).  And insofar as territorial reach is concerned, Rule 41(b) describes the extent of the power of various authorities (primarily United States magistrate judges) to issue warrants with respect to persons or property located within a particular federal judicial district.  It also allows magistrate judges to issue warrants that may be executed outside of the issuing district, but within another district of the United States.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(2), (b)(3).  Rule 41(b)(5) generally restricts the geographical reach of a warrant’s execution, if not in another federal district, to “a United States territory,  possession, or commonwealth,” and various diplomatic or consular missions of the United States or diplomatic residences of the United States located in a foreign state. [13] See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (in ECPA Title I, defining “electronic communications service” as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications”); § 2711(2) (in ECPA Title II, the SCA, defining “remote computing service” as “the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system”). [14] For example, in 1984, Federal Express entered the e‐mail market with a service that provided for two‐hour delivery of facsimile copies of e‐mail messages up to five pages in length.  U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liberties, at 47. [15] Other provisions of the Act address, among other things, preservation of backup data (§ 2704); delaying notice to a customer whose information has been accessed (§ 2705); cost reimbursement for assembling data demanded under the Act (§ 2706); and exclusivity of remedies that the Act provides to a person aggrieved by its violation (§ 2708). [16] An “administrative subpoena” is “a subpoena issued by an administrative agency to compel an individual to provide information to the agency.”  Administrative subpoena, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). To obtain such a subpoena, the government need not demonstrate probable cause.  See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 136, 139‐40 (2d Cir. 2009). [17] Thus, § 2703, “Required disclosure of customer communications or records,” provides in part as follows: (a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in electronic storage.―A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction.    A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic communication system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under subsection (b) of this section. (b) Contents of wire or electronic communications in a remote computing service.—(1) A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection— (A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity— (i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or (ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title. . . . (g) Presence of officer not required.‐‐Notwithstanding section 3105 of this title, the presence of an officer shall not be required for service or execution of a search warrant issued in accordance with this chapter requiring disclosure by a provider of electronic communications service or remote computing service of the contents of communications or records or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

The Pyramidal Structure Governing Access of User Data by Law Enforcement Agencies

Apple vs. FBI (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on February 16, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 17 of 17. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here II. Search Procedure for digital Devices 4. In searching digital devices or forensic copies thereof, law enforcement personnel executing this search warrant will employ the following procedure: a. Law enforcement personnel or other individuals assisting law enforcement personnel (the "search team") will, in their discretion, either search the digital device (s) on-site or seize and transport the device (s) to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory or similar facility to be searched at that location. The search team shall complete the search as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 60 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If additional time is needed, the government may seek an extension of this time period from the Court on or before the date by which the search was to have been completed. b. The search team will conduct the search only by using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only the specific items to be seized under this warrant. i. The search team may subject all of the data contained in each digital device capable of containing any of the items to be seized to the search protocols to determine whether the device and any data thereon falls within the list of items to be seized. The search team may also search for and attempt to recover deleted, "hidden," or encrypted data to determine, pursuant to the search protocols, whether the data falls within the list of items to be seized. ii. The search team may use tools to exclude normal operating system files and standard third-party software that do not need to be searched. c. When searching a digital device pursuant to the specific search protocols selected, the search team shall make and retain notes regarding how the search was conducted pursuant to the selected protocols. d. If the search team, while searching a digital device, encounters immediately apparent contraband or other evidence of a crime outside the scope of the items to be seized, the team shall immediately discontinue its search of that device pending further order of the Court and shall make and retain notes detailing how the contraband or other evidence of a crime was encountered, including how it was immediately apparent contraband or evidence of a crime. e. If the search determines that a digital device does not contain any data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government will, as soon as is practicable, return the device and delete or destroy all forensic copies thereof. f. If the search determines that a digital device does contain data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government may make and retain copies of such data, and may access such data at any time. g. If the search determines that a digital device is (1) itself an item to be seized and/or (2) contains data falling within the list of items to be seized, the government may retain forensic copies of the digital device but may not access them (after the time for searching the device has expired) absent further court order. h. The government may retain a digital device itself until further order of the Court or one year after the conclusion of the criminal investigation or case (whichever is latest), only if the device is determined to be an instrumentality of an offense under investigation or the government, within 14 days following the time period authorized by the Court for completing the search, obtains an order from the Court authorizing retention of the device (or while an application for such an order is pending). Otherwise, the government must return the device. Notwithstanding the above, after the completion of the search of the digital devices, the government shall not access digital data falling outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order of the Court. i. Notwithstanding the above, after the completion of the search of the digital devices, the government shall not access digital data falling outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order of the Court. 5. In order to search for data capable of being read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel are authorized to seize the following items: a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further or store evidence of the offense (s) listed above; b. Any equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding, or storage of digital data; c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of storing digital data; d. Any documentation, operating logs, or reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device; e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, or other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device; f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles, or similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes, or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device. 6. The special procedures relating to digital devices found in this warrant govern only the search of digital devices pursuant to the authority conferred by this warrant and do not apply to any search of digital devices pursuant to any other court order. 7. The government is allowed to share the information obtained from this search (to include copies of digital media) with any government agency investigating, or aiding in the investigation of, this case or related matters. Continue Reading Here. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15-0451M retrieved on September 25, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. archive.epic.org

How the U.S. Law Enforcement Executes Search Warrants for Digital Devices 

Ransomware is one of the biggest cybersecurity threats facing the world today, and it affects more than just businesses. Many of these attacks target police departments, highlighting the need for better cybersecurity in law enforcement. As cybercrime has grown, law enforcement agencies — from local police departments to the FBI — have prioritized cracking down on online criminals. However, many of these agencies are now in a different position in this dynamic. Ransomware gangs aren’t just evading the police but targeting them. The State of Police Ransomware Attacks Ransomware has in the past few years, and attacks against law enforcement agencies are no different. In 2021, the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police made headlines for falling victim to a ransomware attack demanding $4 million. Attackers leaked hundreds of sensitive internal documents online after the department refused to pay the ransom. risen across the board That same year, cybercriminals from the Dade City, Florida, police department. It refused, and the attackers leaked crime scene photos in revenge. At least nine other law enforcement agencies faced ransomware attacks from 2020 through mid-2021. demanded a $450,000 ransom Ransomware risks continue to threaten law enforcement agencies today. In February 2023, the U.S. Marshals affecting sensitive information over ongoing investigations and agency employees. The same month, the FBI had to contain malicious activity on its network. Had the agency not acted as quickly as it did, it could’ve led to a similar incident. fell victim to a ransomware attack Ransomware Risks for Law Enforcement Ransomware is damaging in any context, but police attacks are particularly pressing. Law enforcement agencies face all the same dangers of a business when these incidents occur, plus an additional layer of urgency, given the nature of their work. Sensitive Data Exposure One of the biggest reasons why ransomware gangs like to target law enforcement is that they carry highly sensitive data. In addition to holding personally identifiable information (PII) on many citizens, police departments have electronic evidence, protected witnesses’ identities, and data on secret operations. Exposing this data could put people in danger, undermine trust in authorities, or hinder ongoing investigations. Even if things don’t reach those extremes, leakage can still have serious consequences. In the Washington, D.C., case, the leaked information included the , which other cybercriminals can use for phishing or identity theft. cellphone numbers and addresses of two dozen officers Agencies like the FBI hold even more sensitive information. In these cases, ransomware attacks could become a matter of national security, as attackers could pass data on government cybersecurity systems or the identities of undercover agents to other criminals. Disrupted Emergency Services Ransomware attacks against police departments and their partner organizations could also stop people from getting needed help. An agency that loses access to mission-critical systems or files may be unable to contact parties or perform services, leaving the citizens they protect vulnerable. A 2018 ransomware attack of the city’s automated emergency dispatching system. 911 dispatchers could still contact police, fire, and health services but had to rely on slower, manual methods as the ransomware took the electronic system offline. Emergency services were able to recover before long, but the incident highlights the destructive potential of these attacks. led to a 17-hour shutdown A larger, more effective ransomware attack could take emergency services offline for hours or even days. Even though backup systems would still work, police officers may be unable to respond as quickly as normal. In some situations, those delays could be a matter of life or death. Financial Losses Just like businesses, police forces face financial ransomware risks, too. These attacks have cost over the past ten years, and they’re only growing costlier. Those expenses have far-reaching implications when they affect public agencies like law enforcement. more than $1 billion Police departments are tax-funded, so their recovery costs reflect on the taxpayers. Monetary losses in these agencies translate into shortfalls for the public they serve. They may also make it harder for agencies to remain within their annual budgets, leading to a higher economic burden on taxpayers or cutting programs that could help the public. A police department that must shrink its budget to recuperate from ransomware losses may put off new tech purchases that could make emergency systems more accessible to citizens. Alternatively, it could come at the expense of programs to boost response efficiency or public safety. How Cybersecurity in Law Enforcement Can Improve Given the high risks of police ransomware, cybersecurity in law enforcement agencies must improve. Here are a few ways police departments can bolster their cybersecurity to prevent and mitigate ransomware attacks. Spotting phishing attempts is , as most attacks start this way. Law enforcement agencies should train all employees on common signs of phishing so they don’t fall for these scams. All workers should also know best practices like never clicking on unsolicited links and not sending sensitive information over email. crucial in avoiding ransomware Considering how sensitive police data is, agencies must also implement advanced monitoring solutions. Artificial intelligence (AI) can continuously monitor networks for suspicious activity to isolate potential threats quickly and accurately. This continuous monitoring should include user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) and work alongside zero-trust network architecture. Law enforcement cybersecurity must also include extensive backup systems. That includes keeping offline, air-gapped copies of all sensitive information and having a formal plan for responding to emergencies. These procedures should be detailed, include communications protocol, and cover several backup strategies for multiple scenarios. Police departments should rehearse them regularly to ensure everyone knows how to respond. Law Enforcement Agencies Need Better Cybersecurity Ransomware risks are running high across all industries, and government agencies are no exception. Criminals target police departments with increasing frequency and severity, and law enforcement officials must take the time to improve their cybersecurity. Failure to do so could put the public at risk. Police ransomware protection is a complex but achievable goal. Departments that stay on top of cybercrime trends and keep up with advancing security technology can keep their employees and jurisdictions safe.

How Ransomware Impacts Law Enforcement

International Law Enforcement Agencies Collaborate Global Takedown of Largest Cybercriminal Marketplace, Genesis In a groundbreaking and unprecedented move, an international task force of law enforcement agencies united in a global operation across 17 countries to dismantle Genesis, a nefarious cybercriminal empire that reigned supreme in the dark web. With meticulous coordination spanning across borders and jurisdictions, the operation culminated in a dramatic and resounding victory, as the Genesis platform was swiftly seized and several key players in its illicit operation were apprehended in a stunning display of justice prevailing against the forces of cybercrime. The magnitude of this historic takedown reverberates throughout the cyber underworld, serving as a resolute warning to those who dare to engage in illegal activities on the dark web. Since its inception in 2019, this malevolent force had brazenly enabled a wide array of illegal transactions, ranging from the trade of stolen credit card information, personal data, drugs, weapons, and all manner of illicit goods and services. With its cloak of anonymity, Genesis had become a notorious breeding ground for cybercriminals to carry out their nefarious deeds with impunity, posing a dire threat to cybersecurity and law enforcement efforts worldwide. Its heinous activities had festered and grown, wreaking havoc in the virtual domain and beyond, until the day of reckoning finally arrived. In a heart-stopping display of global cooperation, an international coalition of law enforcement agencies from across the globe united in a relentless pursuit of justice against Genesis. The stakes were high as authorities from the United States, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and other nations orchestrated a meticulously coordinated operation to take down this criminal behemoth. With lightning speed and unwavering determination, search warrants were executed, assets were seized, and suspects were apprehended in a stunning display of force against the malevolent forces behind Genesis. The magnitude of this multinational effort sent shockwaves through the criminal underworld, leaving no doubt that the long arm of the law had reached out to deliver a resounding blow to those who thought they could operate with impunity in the dark recesses of the cyber realm. The fall of Genesis has reverberated across the digital landscape, heralded as a resounding triumph in the relentless battle against cybercrime. Why This Is Important It serves as a resolute warning to everywhere that law enforcement agencies will stop at nothing to protect the digital realm from their nefarious activities. cybercriminals The victory over Genesis stands as a beacon of hope in the ongoing fight against cybercrime, a testament to the unwavering resolve of those who tirelessly combat this ever-evolving threat to our digital world. In a joint statement, the law enforcement agencies involved in the operation emphasized the importance of international collaboration in combatting cybercrime. They highlighted the complexities of investigating and dismantling such sophisticated criminal networks that operate across borders and jurisdictions. The operation also sends a clear message to cybercriminals that law enforcement agencies are determined to track down and prosecute those involved in illegal activities on the dark web. It serves as a warning to other cybercriminals that their illicit activities will not go unpunished, and law enforcement agencies will continue to work tirelessly to disrupt and dismantle their operations. News Summary The , the largest cybercriminal marketplace on the dark web, is a major achievement for international law enforcement agencies. global takedown of Genesis It demonstrates the power of global cooperation in combatting cybercrime and serves as a warning to cybercriminals that their illegal activities will not go unpunished. However, the fight against cybercrime is an ongoing challenge, and law enforcement agencies must continue to work together, adapt to evolving threats, and invest in cybersecurity capabilities to protect individuals, businesses, and societies from the damaging impact of cybercrime.

International Law Enforcement Agencies Take Down Genesis Marketplace

Let’s look at a scenario together. You want to enforce a constraint, for instance, one where any new record must have a unique name, title, etc, but you are not sure where to enforce it exactly. Do you do it at the application level or level? DB Let’s try and get to the bottom of this together. Application level vs database level For me, instituting  your constraints at the DB level is a must, the reason why is that the database could be accessed from many places. So, if you set the constraint over your application level that means if anything else accesses your DB directly, it won't respect your rules. Moreso, most databases carry out the uniqueness validation more efficiently so it's better to have your constraints there. Application level Database level Pros * No migration needed * Force the constraints no matter what client * Handles the indexes behind the scene * Central place to enforce all your rules Cons Extra logic to check the uniqueness Assuming that your case is coverable by the DB of your choice, I would definitely recommend using your DB to enforce your constraints. And all you need to do is to handle the failure on your application level as most DB clients return error codes, something like the below: if ( err && err.code !== 11000 ) {
    console.log(err);
    res.send('duplicate record, u need to focus user!!!');
    return;
  } Of course, I would also recommend wrapping your errors but that's a topic for later. Status code Should the status code be anything besides 4xx? Well well, 4xx means that the user needs to perform some action or in other words, it’s the user's fault that this happened, so it should be 4xx. Which one of the 4xx? Now you might be wondering why not use 400 instead of 409. The thing is, your status code should be clean and actually reflect the status, so if you used 400 code for everything that means the FE has to do extra work with your error responses, then why not make it easy for your API number 1 users and just return 409 Conclusion It's important to simplify your logic and make sure that the data integrity rules are set for all clients and that they are returning the appropriate response status code at all times. Also published here.

Knowing Where and When to Enforce the Uniqueness of Your Data

Twitter v. Elon Musk Court Filing by Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, July 12, 2022 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 30 of 31. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here Feature Image: HackerNoon’s Stable Diffusion AI, prompt “breach of contract” CAUSE OF ACTION Breach of Contract — Specific Performance & Injunction 148. Twitter repeats and incorporates by reference the allegations above. 149. The merger agreement is a valid and enforceable contract. 150. Twitter has fully performed all of its obligations under the merger agreement to date, and is ready, willing, and able to continue so performing. 151. Defendants have breached the merger agreement by, among other things, violating Sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.8, and 6.10. 152. In Section 9.9(a), each of the parties agreed that, without posting bond or other undertaking, the other parties “shall be entitled to an injunction, specific performance and other equitable relief to prevent breaches of this Agreement and to enforce specifically the terms and provisions hereof, in addition to any other remedy to which they are entitled at law or in equity.” 153. In Section 9.9(b), the parties expressly “acknowledged and agreed that the Company shall be entitled to specific performance or other equitable remedy to enforce Parent and Acquisition Sub’s obligations to cause the Equity Investor to fund the Equity Financing, or to enforce the Equity Investor’s obligation to fund the Equity Financing directly, and to consummate the Closing” if three conditions are met: (i) all of the conditions set forth in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 have or will be satisfied at the closing; (ii) the debt financing has been funded or will be funded at the closing if the equity financing is funded; and (iii) the company has confirmed that the closing will occur. 154. All of the conditions set forth in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 have been satisfied or waived, or are expected to be satisfied or waived at the closing, and the closing will occur if the debt and equity financing are funded, which funding is solely within the control of defendants. 155. Twitter has suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable harm as a result of defendants’ breaches. Continue reading here

Musk breached a 'valid and enforceable contract' with Twitter, per lawsuit 

Musk incumplió un 'contrato válido y exigible' con Twitter, según demanda

Musk a rompu un "contrat valide et exécutoire" avec Twitter, par procès

मस्क ने प्रति मुकदमा ट्विटर के साथ 'वैध और लागू करने योग्य अनुबंध' का उल्लंघन किया

訴訟によると、マスクはツイッターとの「有効で執行可能な契約」に違反した

Musk violou um 'contrato válido e executável' com o Twitter, por ação judicial

Musk đã vi phạm 'hợp đồng hợp lệ và có hiệu lực thi hành' với Twitter, theo một vụ kiện

根据诉讼，马斯克违反了与 Twitter 的“有效且可执行的合同”

Twitter v. Elon Musk Court Filing by Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, July 12, 2022 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This is part 13 of 31. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS III - The Final, Agreed-upon Term Deals G. Specific Performance 54. Twitter may seek specific performance, an injunction, or other equitable relief to enforce any of defendants’ obligations under the merger agreement. Id. § 9.9(a). It has the specific power to compel Musk to fund the equity financing and close the merger, provided the closing conditions are met (or are capable of being met at the time of closing), the debt financing (which is already committed) has been or will be funded at the closing, and the company is itself prepared to close. Id. § 9.9(b). Continue reading here

Twitter May Enforce Musk to Close Deal as long as It Met Closing Conditions, per Lawsuit 

Twitter puede obligar a Musk a cerrar un trato siempre que cumpla con las condiciones de cierre, según la demanda

Twitter peut obliger Musk à conclure l'accord tant qu'il respecte les conditions de clôture, par poursuite

ट्विटर मई मस्क को डील बंद करने के लिए मजबूर कर सकता है, जब तक कि यह प्रति मुकदमा बंद होने की स्थिति में है

訴訟によると、Twitter は成約条件を満たしている限り、Musk に取引を成立させる可能性がある

Twitter pode forçar Musk a fechar negócio, desde que atenda às condições de fechamento, por processo judicial

Twitter có thể buộc Musk phải đóng giao dịch miễn là nó đáp ứng các điều kiện kết thúc, theo vụ kiện

根据诉讼，Twitter 可能会强制马斯克在满足成交条件的情况下完成交易

The police department detects and prevents the time and punishes the felons. Most of the time, police officers face unknown threats looming around to disrupt the peace of society. Whenever we hear data science, we think of all the industries except law enforcement. Regardless of what we perceive, using is usual. Data Science is a field in which the data is studied to focus on improving the outcomes, whether it is a production company or society. With the proper study of data, law enforcement can easily prevent crime and take the accused into custody. data science in law enforcement Data Science For Law Enforcement Although data science seems a new field of study, Law enforcement has unknowingly utilized it for a long time. There are many cases where city cops have analyzed the places where the majority of the crime occurs and the time when it happens. With such analysis, the patrolling had been increased in those areas at a specific hour of the day, and the crime rate got reduced easily. Let's look at some specific applications of data science in Law Enforcement. Crime Detection With Data Science Historically, law enforcement agencies were a disjointed data-sharing matrix. The Installation of the National Crime Information Center, Software for crime mapping, and other assisting management tools like CompStat and OneDOJ have improved the condition. Gathering information from social media has given an upper hand to the data scientist at law enforcement agencies. Such information provides law enforcement agencies an idea of a felony tracking someone's search on Google for learning something unusual that may cause harm to society or to the person itself. Such information can also help gather evidence post the crime is conducted. Moreover, text analytics during the interrogation may also help to understand the nature of the accused, which helps to predict which accused should be further interrogated. NLP In Law Enforcement Law enforcement does not just rely upon static data; accurate analysis of the crime requires understanding the answers of the witness, audio recording, and camera footage. That's where NLP plays an important role. AI can analyze emotional distress, but the human element is reasonably necessary. The report on Natural language processing contains computational linguistics and computational psychology. Body Cams Everyone owns smartphones nowadays, but body cam is mandatory for police officers in the United States as they can't perform their duties carrying a mobile phone. This video can be too lengthy, or the quality can be inappropriate because of constant movement. In such cases, data scientists can assist in shortening the length of the videos with the help of AI to detect a specific zone in the video which requires alertness. After establishing the alert, the video can be used for further analysis. Moreover, facial recognition can also help with AI tools to notify the cop on duty to remain alert in suspicious situations. Crime Detection With Data Science By now, it should be clear that algorithmic accuracy is primarily determined by the skill of the statistician or data scientist and the quality of the data. There are numerous statistical models available for use in law enforcement. The list below is not exhaustive; instead, it is a starting point rather than a detailed description of all possible crime detection models. Furthermore, only broad descriptions are provided because a comprehensive examination of when, how, and why each statistical tool is used is outside the scope of this article. This is a well-liked machine learning method (and data science). It is a straightforward binary classification technique that can get trickier. The likelihood of repeat offenders could be estimated using a logistic regression model. Logistic regression: Additionally, cluster analysis can rate the likelihood of crime and identify whether neighborhoods will experience more excellent or lower crime rates. Several clustering techniques are available, including hierarchical, centroid-based, distribution-based, and density-based. One or more clustering tools can be employed on the basis of the type of data and the purpose of the analysis. Clustering algorithms: One of several machine learning and AI models that uses biologically inspired frameworks is CNN. Essentially, the structure of this model mimics the layers between input and output values found in the visual brain using neuronal-type nodes. CNN is a well-liked method for video and image analysis. Convolutional Neural Networks: Despite being frequently utilized for video analysis, CDBNs can also be used for audio analysis. This is particularly valid when the study's input values (or values) are high-dimensional data. Several layers make up CBNs, only one of which is visible. In data science for law enforcement, CDBNs can help categorize the likelihood of who is speaking and what is being said in audio recordings. Convolutional Deep Belief Networks: RNNs have been employed in the past to recognize voice and text (or handwriting). Within the RNN classification, LTSM networks have also been applied to voice recognition and speech-to-text tasks. RNNs could be used by law enforcement to recreate different sorts of audio transcripts, like witness and victim interviews, and analyze emergency calls. Recurrent Neural Networks: Conclusion Data is certainly not new for justice and authority, but technological advancement has made it more accurate and enhanced. Leveraging , Law Enforcement agencies can build software and algorithms to keep their data safe. In the hour of need, those data can be retrieved to solve cases and maintain social harmony. data science consulting services

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