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Fortify Your Digital Defenses: Top Home Cybersecurity Strategies for Personal Protection

New York, NY, May 2024 - Buckle up, spacefarers! A revolutionary gaming experience is about to launch from the minds of WanderLabs, a visionary Web3 startup at the forefront of the next gaming revolution. Building on its unique position within the immersive entertainment sector, Wanderers is setting a new standard with its story-driven, rogue-lite PC game, developed in collaboration with Animoca Brands Blowfish Studios, set for release in early 2024 and available now for wishlist on EpicGames, Originating from the visionary minds of Nick Greenawalt and Jenna Greenfield, Wanderers has rapidly transformed from a pioneering digital collectible brand to a comprehensive science fiction gaming universe and platform built on web3. This transition underscores the power of web3 technology, fueling the platform's growth and innovation. Wanderers initially captured the market's attention in 2021 with its first animated NFT collection, generating $5M in revenue with an additional $20M spent by fans in secondary trading volume. WanderLabs was launched in 2022 to build the brand, platform, and gaming ecosystem raising $2M from Animoca Brands, the industry leader in Web3 gaming and tokenomics. Evolving beyond static JPG files, the brand's digital collectibles now play an integral role in its debut game. Greenfield states, “We were born out of web3; we started with a community from NFTs, but it can be so much more. And I think we're pioneering a whole new path that there is no playbook.” These collectibles, including Wandernauts, Planets, RAM, and more, unlock new dimensions of gameplay, allowing players to customize avatars, landscapes, spaceships, and utilities. RAM holders gained exclusive early access to the game's closed beta, which is now live. In the realm of gaming, Wanderers presents an epic narrative-driven adventure enriched with card collection and strategic deck building. Players are invited to "Suit up, strap in, and soar off" on an interstellar journey through a vast science fiction universe. This dynamic arena demands survival skills, teamwork, combat prowess, and a keen interest in discovering long-lost secrets. Incorporating minigames and the innovative use of digital wallets for exclusive access, Wanderers seamlessly blends traditional gaming with Web3 components, offering an unparalleled gaming experience. A New Era of Gaming: The Wanderer's Codex The introduction of the Wanderer's Codex, a dynamic Web3 platform, adds more dimensions to the Wanderer’s ecosystem. This platform facilitates cross-platform experiences and digital identities, providing an evolving utility and reward system for the community. It acts as a bridge between the game and digital collectibles, offering quests, trading cards, and leaderboards to enhance the gaming experience. Greenawalt and Greenfield have both highlighted the importance of community and the innovative use of Web3 to enrich the gaming experience, which is embodied in the Codex. Greenawalt emphasizes the unique aspects of ownership and interaction that Web3 enables, "The reason why we are participating in this space is because there are so many interesting elements of ownership and especially this on-chain history that, essentially, is a source of truth." This approach to gaming, where every digital item and interaction has a verifiable history and ownership, is fundamental to the Wanderer's Codex. For example, Greenawalt emphasizes that errors or mistakes made by developers on the backend can be turned into “deeper lore for our community and fans to play around with and become excited to create another unique layer of immersion.” It enables a level of player engagement and investment that goes beyond traditional gaming platforms. Greenfield speaks to the broader vision of creating a universe that resonates on a global scale, which the Codex helps facilitate: "What excites me the most about this is the potential we have on a global scale. The technology and cultural movement is borderless.” The Wanderer's Codex is a manifestation of this vision, allowing players from around the world to participate in a shared universe, contributing to and benefiting from the community through quests, trades, and competitions. Partnerships and Visionaries Wanderers isn't flying solo. Strategic partnerships with industry titans like Animoca Brands, Polygon, and OpenSea ensure the project has the resources and expertise to reach its full potential. Even veterans like Jamie King, co-founder of Rockstar Games, are lending their talents to help shape the strategy and vision. Wanderers isn't just a game; it's a groundbreaking vision for the future of gaming. Join the community, explore the universe, and be a part of something truly revolutionary. Suit up, strap in, and prepare to soar off on an interstellar journey unlike any other! Find out more at www.wanderers.ai This story was distributed by Jon Stojan Media under HackerNoon’s Brand As An Author Program. Learn more about the program here: https://business.hackernoon.com/brand-as-author New York, NY, May 2024 - Buckle up, spacefarers! A revolutionary gaming experience is about to launch from the minds of WanderLabs , a visionary Web3 startup at the forefront of the next gaming revolution. WanderLabs WanderLabs Building on its unique position within the immersive entertainment sector, Wanderers is setting a new standard with its story-driven, rogue-lite PC game, developed in collaboration with Animoca Brands Blowfish Studios, set for release in early 2024 and available now for wishlist on EpicGames, set for release in early 2024 and available now for wishlist on EpicGames, set for release in early 2024 and available now for wishlist on EpicGames, Originating from the visionary minds of Nick Greenawalt and Jenna Greenfield, Wanderers has rapidly transformed from a pioneering digital collectible brand to a comprehensive science fiction gaming universe and platform built on web3. This transition underscores the power of web3 technology, fueling the platform's growth and innovation. Wanderers initially captured the market's attention in 2021 with its first animated NFT collection, generating $5M in revenue with an additional $20M spent by fans in secondary trading volume. WanderLabs was launched in 2022 to build the brand, platform, and gaming ecosystem raising $2M from Animoca Brands, the industry leader in Web3 gaming and tokenomics. Evolving beyond static JPG files, the brand's digital collectibles now play an integral role in its debut game. Greenfield states, “We were born out of web3; we started with a community from NFTs, but it can be so much more. And I think we're pioneering a whole new path that there is no playbook.” “We were born out of web3; we started with a community from NFTs, but it can be so much more. And I think we're pioneering a whole new path that there is no playbook.” These collectibles, including Wandernauts, Planets, RAM, and more, unlock new dimensions of gameplay, allowing players to customize avatars, landscapes, spaceships, and utilities. RAM holders gained exclusive early access to the game's closed beta, which is now live. In the realm of gaming, Wanderers presents an epic narrative-driven adventure enriched with card collection and strategic deck building. Players are invited to "Suit up, strap in, and soar off" on an interstellar journey through a vast science fiction universe. This dynamic arena demands survival skills, teamwork, combat prowess, and a keen interest in discovering long-lost secrets. Incorporating minigames and the innovative use of digital wallets for exclusive access, Wanderers seamlessly blends traditional gaming with Web3 components, offering an unparalleled gaming experience. A New Era of Gaming: The Wanderer's Codex The introduction of the Wanderer's Codex, a dynamic Web3 platform, adds more dimensions to the Wanderer’s ecosystem. This platform facilitates cross-platform experiences and digital identities, providing an evolving utility and reward system for the community. It acts as a bridge between the game and digital collectibles, offering quests, trading cards, and leaderboards to enhance the gaming experience. Greenawalt and Greenfield have both highlighted the importance of community and the innovative use of Web3 to enrich the gaming experience, which is embodied in the Codex. Greenawalt emphasizes the unique aspects of ownership and interaction that Web3 enables, "The reason why we are participating in this space is because there are so many interesting elements of ownership and especially this on-chain history that, essentially, is a source of truth." This approach to gaming, where every digital item and interaction has a verifiable history and ownership, is fundamental to the Wanderer's Codex. For example, Greenawalt emphasizes that errors or mistakes made by developers on the backend can be turned into “deeper lore for our community and fans to play around with and become excited to create another unique layer of immersion.” "The reason why we are participating in this space is because there are so many interesting elements of ownership and especially this on-chain history that, essentially, is a source of truth." “deeper lore for our community and fans to play around with and become excited to create another unique layer of immersion.” It enables a level of player engagement and investment that goes beyond traditional gaming platforms. Greenfield speaks to the broader vision of creating a universe that resonates on a global scale, which the Codex helps facilitate: "What excites me the most about this is the potential we have on a global scale. The technology and cultural movement is borderless.” "What excites me the most about this is the potential we have on a global scale. The technology and cultural movement is borderless.” The Wanderer's Codex is a manifestation of this vision, allowing players from around the world to participate in a shared universe, contributing to and benefiting from the community through quests, trades, and competitions. Partnerships and Visionaries Wanderers isn't flying solo. Strategic partnerships with industry titans like Animoca Brands, Polygon, and OpenSea ensure the project has the resources and expertise to reach its full potential. Even veterans like Jamie King, co-founder of Rockstar Games, are lending their talents to help shape the strategy and vision. Wanderers isn't just a game; it's a groundbreaking vision for the future of gaming. Join the community, explore the universe, and be a part of something truly revolutionary. Suit up, strap in, and prepare to soar off on an interstellar journey unlike any other! Find out more at www.wanderers.ai This story was distributed by Jon Stojan Media under HackerNoon’s Brand As An Author Program. Learn more about the program here: https://business.hackernoon.com/brand-as-author This story was distributed by Jon Stojan Media under HackerNoon’s Brand As An Author Program. Learn more about the program here: https://business.hackernoon.com/brand-as-author https://business.hackernoon.com/brand-as-author https://business.hackernoon.com/brand-as-author

Wanderers: From Digital Collectibles to a Thriving Web3 Gaming Universe

ওয়ান্ডারার্স: ডিজিটাল সংগ্রহযোগ্য থেকে একটি সমৃদ্ধ ওয়েব3 গেমিং ইউনিভার্স

Wanderers: Von digitalen Sammlerstücken zu einem florierenden Web3-Gaming-Universum

Wanderers: de coleccionables digitales a un próspero universo de juegos Web3

Wanderers : des objets de collection numériques à un univers de jeu Web3 florissant

वांडरर्स: डिजिटल संग्रहणीय वस्तुओं से लेकर एक संपन्न वेब3 गेमिंग ब्रह्मांड तक

放浪者: デジタル コレクタブルから活気ある Web3 ゲームの世界へ

방랑자: 디지털 수집품부터 번성하는 Web3 게임 세계까지

Wanderers: de colecionáveis digitais a um próspero universo de jogos na Web3

Странники: от цифровых предметов коллекционирования к процветающей игровой вселенной Web3

Wanderers: Dijital Koleksiyonlardan Gelişen Web3 Oyun Evrenine

Những kẻ lang thang: Từ những bộ sưu tập kỹ thuật số đến một vũ trụ trò chơi Web3 thịnh vượng

流浪者：从数字收藏品到蓬勃发展的 Web3 游戏世界

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 37 of 38. Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently The demand for cybersecurity and cybercrime assistance, in particular cyber defense, incident response, and skills to combat criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, is growing in scale. After cyberattacks against Ukraine, Costa Rica, and Albania, the United States and its allies shared threat intelligence; facilitated operational collaboration; enabled access to commercial cybersecurity companies’ services, including hardware, software, and embedded technical support; and funded longer term capacity building. From these and other cases, the State Department has learned the importance of regular and close coordination across the U.S. government and with international partners, as well as the importance of mobilizing private-sector technology and expertise. Modernizing authorities and mechanisms to provide technology-related foreign assistance at the speed and scale necessary is crucial. We must adapt our foreign assistance resources and authorities to support long-term U.S. leadership and foster digital solidarity. Recognizing the urgent and growing need for additional tools to advance U.S. cyber and digital foreign policy, Congress created, through the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 and funded, through the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2024, the Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies Fund. This fund will provide the Department of State with authorities and dedicated funding to support strategically important cyber, digital, and technology-related foreign assistance programs. This is a significant step in advancing U.S. foreign policy. The Department will work to operationalize and implement these new authorities. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 37 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 37 of 38. here here Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently The demand for cybersecurity and cybercrime assistance, in particular cyber defense, incident response, and skills to combat criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, is growing in scale. After cyberattacks against Ukraine, Costa Rica, and Albania, the United States and its allies shared threat intelligence; facilitated operational collaboration; enabled access to commercial cybersecurity companies’ services, including hardware, software, and embedded technical support; and funded longer term capacity building. From these and other cases, the State Department has learned the importance of regular and close coordination across the U.S. government and with international partners, as well as the importance of mobilizing private-sector technology and expertise. Modernizing authorities and mechanisms to provide technology-related foreign assistance at the speed and scale necessary is crucial. We must adapt our foreign assistance resources and authorities to support long-term U.S. leadership and foster digital solidarity. Recognizing the urgent and growing need for additional tools to advance U.S. cyber and digital foreign policy, Congress created, through the Department of State Authorization Act of 2023 and funded, through the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2024, the Cyberspace, Digital Connectivity, and Related Technologies Fund. This fund will provide the Department of State with authorities and dedicated funding to support strategically important cyber, digital, and technology-related foreign assistance programs. This is a significant step in advancing U.S. foreign policy. The Department will work to operationalize and implement these new authorities. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Building Digital Resilience: US Efforts to Develop Rapid Cyber Assistance Tools

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 35 of 38. Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts For digital infrastructure to reach and effectively serve the public, countries need to have the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. It is not enough to promote secure, resilient technology infrastructure; an effective regulatory framework that is transparent, flexible, and technology neutral must be in place to ensure meaningful connectivity. Thus, U.S. foreign assistance focuses on developing and strengthening relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks as well as building local technical capacity and addressing workforce issues. The Department of State will continue to provide partners the expertise and training they need to develop and govern secure, rights-respecting digital ecosystems. Through technical assistance, ICT and telecom policy capacity building, and training grants, DCCP has facilitated pro-competitive legal and regulatory reforms. For example, Promoting American Approaches to ICT Policy and Regulation (ProICT), another DCCP activity led by the Department of State and USAID, has helped clear the way for new entrants into 5G markets and provided technical advisory support for a 5G spectrum auction. The Department of State, USAID, NTIA, and FCC, working with industry and the private sector, will continue to provide training programs and technical assistance to developing country officials involved in managing spectrum, deploying wireless and satellite technologies, and acquiring cloud services. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 35 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 35 of 38. here here Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts For digital infrastructure to reach and effectively serve the public, countries need to have the appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. It is not enough to promote secure, resilient technology infrastructure; an effective regulatory framework that is transparent, flexible, and technology neutral must be in place to ensure meaningful connectivity. Thus, U.S. foreign assistance focuses on developing and strengthening relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks as well as building local technical capacity and addressing workforce issues. The Department of State will continue to provide partners the expertise and training they need to develop and govern secure, rights-respecting digital ecosystems. Through technical assistance, ICT and telecom policy capacity building, and training grants, DCCP has facilitated pro-competitive legal and regulatory reforms. For example, Promoting American Approaches to ICT Policy and Regulation (ProICT), another DCCP activity led by the Department of State and USAID, has helped clear the way for new entrants into 5G markets and provided technical advisory support for a 5G spectrum auction. The Department of State, USAID, NTIA, and FCC, working with industry and the private sector, will continue to provide training programs and technical assistance to developing country officials involved in managing spectrum, deploying wireless and satellite technologies, and acquiring cloud services. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

U.S. Initiatives in Digital Policy Capacity Building

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 18 of 38. Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Digital solidarity is further built and reinforced through the joint development, harmonization, and mutual recognition of rights-respecting approaches to data governance and digital trade. This work is currently ongoing through mechanisms such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the G7, OECD, TTC, and the Quad. The United States supports the trusted free flow of data and an open Internet with strong and effective protections for individuals’ human rights and privacy and measures to preserve governments’ abilities to enforce laws and advance policies in the public interest. Legitimate concerns about data privacy can be addressed through protective mechanisms that follow the data while at the same time facilitate cross-border data flows and strengthen global cooperation among enforcement authorities. The United States will continue championing trusted cross-border data flows by promoting data transfer mechanisms that improve interoperability between different data privacy regimes. Working alongside our interagency partners, the Department of State supported the negotiation and implementation of the EU- U.S. Data Privacy Framework; the development of the OECD Declaration on Trusted Government Access to Data Held by the Private Sector, which identifies commonalities in the privacy safeguards democratic governments follow when accessing data for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes; as well as initiatives on Data Free Flow with Trust at both the G7 and the OECD. The Department of State works with the Department of Justice to clarify application of the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act and to negotiate bilateral agreements under the act. Along with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the United States launched the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum in April 2022, building on the previously established Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CBPR system. The CBPR provides a data privacy certification backed by relevant authorities that facilitates data flows by promoting interoperable, enforceable data protection standards. Officials from the Departments of State and Commerce will continue efforts to bring new countries into the agreement, building on efforts such as workshops held in Kenya, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, UK, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Colombia, Fiji, and Barbados as well as ASEAN countries. While the United States and its likeminded trade partners share many of the same values, we often have differing approaches to how to regulate the digital economy. The U.S. government advocates for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches that target the challenges we face while providing the flexibility to realize the benefits of new and emerging technologies. Unilateral approaches in digital taxation and the imposition of network usage fees often do not address the core issues of accessibility and fairness expressed by their proponents. Additionally, the rise of a growing digital sovereignty narrative that has been embraced by some of our close partners and allies has the potential to undermine key digital economy and cybersecurity objectives. The Department of State, working with other agencies, will continue to argue against data localization, network usage fees, digital services taxes as well as other market access barriers that contribute to the perception of increased control, but in reality often can undermine growth and security objectives. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 18 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 18 of 38. here Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Digital solidarity is further built and reinforced through the joint development, harmonization, and mutual recognition of rights-respecting approaches to data governance and digital trade. This work is currently ongoing through mechanisms such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the G7, OECD, TTC, and the Quad. The United States supports the trusted free flow of data and an open Internet with strong and effective protections for individuals’ human rights and privacy and measures to preserve governments’ abilities to enforce laws and advance policies in the public interest. Legitimate concerns about data privacy can be addressed through protective mechanisms that follow the data while at the same time facilitate cross-border data flows and strengthen global cooperation among enforcement authorities. The United States will continue championing trusted cross-border data flows by promoting data transfer mechanisms that improve interoperability between different data privacy regimes. Working alongside our interagency partners, the Department of State supported the negotiation and implementation of the EU- U.S. Data Privacy Framework; the development of the OECD Declaration on Trusted Government Access to Data Held by the Private Sector, which identifies commonalities in the privacy safeguards democratic governments follow when accessing data for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes; as well as initiatives on Data Free Flow with Trust at both the G7 and the OECD. The Department of State works with the Department of Justice to clarify application of the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act and to negotiate bilateral agreements under the act. Along with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the United States launched the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum in April 2022, building on the previously established Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CBPR system. The CBPR provides a data privacy certification backed by relevant authorities that facilitates data flows by promoting interoperable, enforceable data protection standards. Officials from the Departments of State and Commerce will continue efforts to bring new countries into the agreement, building on efforts such as workshops held in Kenya, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, UK, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Colombia, Fiji, and Barbados as well as ASEAN countries. While the United States and its likeminded trade partners share many of the same values, we often have differing approaches to how to regulate the digital economy. The U.S. government advocates for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches that target the challenges we face while providing the flexibility to realize the benefits of new and emerging technologies. Unilateral approaches in digital taxation and the imposition of network usage fees often do not address the core issues of accessibility and fairness expressed by their proponents. Additionally, the rise of a growing digital sovereignty narrative that has been embraced by some of our close partners and allies has the potential to undermine key digital economy and cybersecurity objectives. The Department of State, working with other agencies, will continue to argue against data localization, network usage fees, digital services taxes as well as other market access barriers that contribute to the perception of increased control, but in reality often can undermine growth and security objectives. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

The U.S. Advocates for Trusted Data Flows and Multistakeholder Digital Governance

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 17 of 38. ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Digital solidarity recognizes the necessity of the domestic governance of digital and emerging technologies but seeks to develop shared mechanisms that will help maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet as well as trusted cross-border data flows. It works to foster democratic values-based and rights-respecting policies. To advance the NSS and the NCS effectively, promoting, building, and maintaining a secure digital ecosystem must be accompanied by efforts to make digital and data governance compatible across allies and partners through greater alignment, mutual recognition, and reciprocity of policies. The Department of State, along with other federal agencies, is building and reinforcing digital solidarity through support for the trusted flow of data; advocacy for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches to digital and data governance; and the promotion of shared values and governance principles for critical and emerging technologies. The Department of State, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, is expanding its capacity to engage in international standards development organizations and to coordinate with industry and civil society to ensure robust participation by U.S. stakeholders in standards setting processes and other international fora. The United States is also working with allies and partners to advance a common, rights-respecting vision for the digital future; negotiate a rights-respecting cybercrime treaty; and defend information integrity. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 17 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 17 of 38. here ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Digital solidarity recognizes the necessity of the domestic governance of digital and emerging technologies but seeks to develop shared mechanisms that will help maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet as well as trusted cross-border data flows. It works to foster democratic values-based and rights-respecting policies. To advance the NSS and the NCS effectively, promoting, building, and maintaining a secure digital ecosystem must be accompanied by efforts to make digital and data governance compatible across allies and partners through greater alignment, mutual recognition, and reciprocity of policies. The Department of State, along with other federal agencies, is building and reinforcing digital solidarity through support for the trusted flow of data; advocacy for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches to digital and data governance; and the promotion of shared values and governance principles for critical and emerging technologies. The Department of State, in collaboration with the Department of Commerce and other agencies, is expanding its capacity to engage in international standards development organizations and to coordinate with industry and civil society to ensure robust participation by U.S. stakeholders in standards setting processes and other international fora. The United States is also working with allies and partners to advance a common, rights-respecting vision for the digital future; negotiate a rights-respecting cybercrime treaty; and defend information integrity. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Safeguarding Digital Rights and Data Flows Across Borders

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here.. This part is 11 of 38. ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Digital solidarity recognizes the necessity of the domestic governance of digital and emerging technologies but seeks to develop shared mechanisms that will help maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet as well as trusted cross-border data flows. It works to foster democratic values-based and rights-respecting policies. In close coordination with allies, partners, the private sector, and civil society, the Department of State continues to campaign for open, interoperable, secure, trusted, and reliable telecommunication networks, especially on fifth-generation wireless networks (5G). The White House, Department of State, USAID, Department of Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are engaged in discussions with allies and partners about deploying 5G mobile networks using trusted vendors and the future of 6G. Digital technologies are not limited to wireless technologies, and the Department of State and other agencies are coordinating with allies and partners on the development, deployment, and security of cloud infrastructure and data centers, undersea cables, and satellite communications. In addition, at all UN bodies the United States aims to promote—at a high level—the development, deployment, and use of rights-respecting digital technologies. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here.. This part is 11 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here .. This part is 11 of 38. here ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Digital solidarity recognizes the necessity of the domestic governance of digital and emerging technologies but seeks to develop shared mechanisms that will help maintain an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet as well as trusted cross-border data flows. It works to foster democratic values-based and rights-respecting policies. In close coordination with allies, partners, the private sector, and civil society, the Department of State continues to campaign for open, interoperable, secure, trusted, and reliable telecommunication networks, especially on fifth-generation wireless networks (5G). The White House, Department of State, USAID, Department of Commerce, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are engaged in discussions with allies and partners about deploying 5G mobile networks using trusted vendors and the future of 6G. Digital technologies are not limited to wireless technologies, and the Department of State and other agencies are coordinating with allies and partners on the development, deployment, and security of cloud infrastructure and data centers, undersea cables, and satellite communications. In addition, at all UN bodies the United States aims to promote—at a high level—the development, deployment, and use of rights-respecting digital technologies. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Advancing an Open, Inclusive, and Secure Digital Ecosystem

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 9 of 38. Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Competition, consumer choice, vibrant private sector investment, and a robust civil society are the hallmarks of an open, inclusive, and secure digital ecosystem. The Department of State cannot accomplish its objectives without strong partnerships with the private sector, civil society, academic, and technical communities. New innovations spring from the private sector, and the decisions tech companies make on how their systems are developed and deployed have profound implications for how U.S. values and interests are realized—including protecting users’ safety and privacy. U.S. officials rely on a range of private sector, academic, and civic actors for insights into technology developments, and private sector and trade association stakeholders often provide early warning of discriminatory regulations that explicitly target American companies. Trusted technology suppliers, including small- and medium-sized enterprises, are essential partners in efforts to expand connectivity through open, secure, and resilient networks across the globe. Civil society groups are working to ensure that individuals can access and pursue opportunities online free from unlawful surveillance and privacy-invasive data collection practices and are working to counter harmful propaganda and disinformation in digital spaces. Civil society and the technical community are often the first to recognize, warn of, and seek solutions to threats to human rights online and offline. As Internet freedom continues to decline in parts of the world, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and the journalists covering their activism are often leading the push back in digitally repressive societies, often at great personal risk. Additionally, civil society, the academic and technical community, and private sector actors play a crucial role in upholding the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, which is increasingly under threat. The private sector, civil society, and the technical community are essential in helping defend against malicious cyber activities. In 2022, the private sector aided Albania in the wake of Iranian cyberattacks and, during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, technology firms and cybersecurity companies provided services, tools, and threat intelligence to help Ukraine defend government and critical infrastructure networks. They migrated data storage and cloud hosting services to counteract Russian efforts to erase critical data and provided Internet and telecommunication services that helped keep government agencies and businesses operating. Non-governmental organizations and academic research groups have exposed the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware against journalists, activists, and marginalized groups. Public-private partnerships are essential to cyber and digital diplomacy, and they need to be flexible and adaptable. Cyber defense may require new ways to scale, supply, and license cyber defense services and products in a crisis and may be difficult to launch and sustain in a different regional context. Repressive governments are developing new methods to control digital technologies and to manipulate and interfere with information flows. To address these and other evolving challenges, the Department of State will continue to expand contact with and solicit input from a wide range of civil society and private sector actors. In addition, the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to advance a multistakeholder approach to digital and data governance. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 9 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 9 of 38. here Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Competition, consumer choice, vibrant private sector investment, and a robust civil society are the hallmarks of an open, inclusive, and secure digital ecosystem. The Department of State cannot accomplish its objectives without strong partnerships with the private sector, civil society, academic, and technical communities. New innovations spring from the private sector, and the decisions tech companies make on how their systems are developed and deployed have profound implications for how U.S. values and interests are realized—including protecting users’ safety and privacy. U.S. officials rely on a range of private sector, academic, and civic actors for insights into technology developments, and private sector and trade association stakeholders often provide early warning of discriminatory regulations that explicitly target American companies. Trusted technology suppliers, including small- and medium-sized enterprises, are essential partners in efforts to expand connectivity through open, secure, and resilient networks across the globe. Civil society groups are working to ensure that individuals can access and pursue opportunities online free from unlawful surveillance and privacy-invasive data collection practices and are working to counter harmful propaganda and disinformation in digital spaces. Civil society and the technical community are often the first to recognize, warn of, and seek solutions to threats to human rights online and offline. As Internet freedom continues to decline in parts of the world, civil society activists, human rights defenders, and the journalists covering their activism are often leading the push back in digitally repressive societies, often at great personal risk. Additionally, civil society, the academic and technical community, and private sector actors play a crucial role in upholding the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, which is increasingly under threat. The private sector, civil society, and the technical community are essential in helping defend against malicious cyber activities. In 2022, the private sector aided Albania in the wake of Iranian cyberattacks and, during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, technology firms and cybersecurity companies provided services, tools, and threat intelligence to help Ukraine defend government and critical infrastructure networks. They migrated data storage and cloud hosting services to counteract Russian efforts to erase critical data and provided Internet and telecommunication services that helped keep government agencies and businesses operating. Non-governmental organizations and academic research groups have exposed the threat posed by the proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware against journalists, activists, and marginalized groups. Public-private partnerships are essential to cyber and digital diplomacy, and they need to be flexible and adaptable. Cyber defense may require new ways to scale, supply, and license cyber defense services and products in a crisis and may be difficult to launch and sustain in a different regional context. Repressive governments are developing new methods to control digital technologies and to manipulate and interfere with information flows. To address these and other evolving challenges, the Department of State will continue to expand contact with and solicit input from a wide range of civil society and private sector actors. In addition, the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to advance a multistakeholder approach to digital and data governance. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Building Strong Partnerships for Digital Diplomacy and Cyber Defense

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 10 of 38. Building Digital Solidarity The United States believes digital technologies can and should be used to put people on a path to prosperity, solve global challenges, and build a better future for all. The Department of State will work with allies, partners, and stakeholders to promote an affirmative vision for cyber and digital technologies: one in which people around the world use cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect human rights, gender equity and equality, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. As part of this approach, the United States, allies, and partners will demonstrate the advantages of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet; serve as the partner of choice in the research, design, development, and deployment of digital and emerging technologies; and jointly impose consequences for behavior that runs counter to internationally accepted norms of state behavior. The Department of State will also work with and support emerging economies’ efforts to improve cybersecurity and increase their cyber-resilience. Each of the Strategy’s four action areas—promote, build, and maintain an open, inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem; align rights-respecting approaches to digital governance; advance responsible state behavior, counter malicious activity, and offer mutual support; and strengthen digital and cyber capacity building assistance—reflects aspects of the Department of State’s vision of digital solidarity. Moving forward, the Department of State will work to bring a wide range of partners across the globe into the process of building and extending digital solidarity. We welcome all those who seek to develop and deploy technologies that are open and secure, promote inclusive growth, foster resilient and democratic societies, and empower all, including the most vulnerable. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 10 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 10 of 38. here Building Digital Solidarity The United States believes digital technologies can and should be used to put people on a path to prosperity, solve global challenges, and build a better future for all. The Department of State will work with allies, partners, and stakeholders to promote an affirmative vision for cyber and digital technologies: one in which people around the world use cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect human rights, gender equity and equality, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. As part of this approach, the United States, allies, and partners will demonstrate the advantages of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet; serve as the partner of choice in the research, design, development, and deployment of digital and emerging technologies; and jointly impose consequences for behavior that runs counter to internationally accepted norms of state behavior. The Department of State will also work with and support emerging economies’ efforts to improve cybersecurity and increase their cyber-resilience. Each of the Strategy’s four action areas—promote, build, and maintain an open, inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem; align rights-respecting approaches to digital governance; advance responsible state behavior, counter malicious activity, and offer mutual support; and strengthen digital and cyber capacity building assistance—reflects aspects of the Department of State’s vision of digital solidarity. Moving forward, the Department of State will work to bring a wide range of partners across the globe into the process of building and extending digital solidarity. We welcome all those who seek to develop and deploy technologies that are open and secure, promote inclusive growth, foster resilient and democratic societies, and empower all, including the most vulnerable. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

United for Digital Progress: Promoting Solidarity in Cyber and Digital Technologies

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs Proofs A GCD configuration records explicitly all the dependencies among the block occurrences in it, with one exception – if the same block message is sent to the same agent by several agents, the configuration does not record which of the messages was received. Hence the cordial dependency graph has some nondeterminism. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs Proofs A GCD configuration records explicitly all the dependencies among the block occurrences in it, with one exception – if the same block message is sent to the same agent by several agents, the configuration does not record which of the messages was received. Hence the cordial dependency graph has some nondeterminism.

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: Proofs

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs 5 Future Work & Discussion Grassroots dissemination for sovereign cryptocurrencies. While the Grassroots Dissemination protocol GD is better-suited for implementing sovereign cryptocurrencies than the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD, it should be refined to support a genuinelypractical implementation, allowing an agent to: (i) Follow another agent starting from an arbitrary block (not from its initial block), in particular from the first block recording a transaction between the two agents. (ii) Unfollow an agent, for example when financial relations between the two have ended, permanently or temporarily. Such extensions to GD are possible with little additional implementation effort and with some additional mathematical effort for specifying them and proving them correct. Grassroots and the Internet. Formally, the underlying Internet protocol stack is not grassroots, as IP addresses are allocated top-down, with a central entity (IANA) at the top. Does this mean that striving for grassroots protocols is futile? We do not think so. First, the full benefits of grassroots protocols can be reaped as long as IANA does not abuse IP address allocation and Internet access is not restricted or abused. Second, if the local regime restricts access to servers/services, but does not shut-down the Internet, grassroots protocols may still operate. Third, mobile mesh networks or SPANs (Smartphone ad-hoc networks) [1] allow communities to communicate in times of strife (e.g. demonstrations against the regime) without an Internet provider (but current designs are vulnerable [1]). Extending the UDP-based Cordial Grassroots Dissemination protocol to a mobile mesh protocol is a goal of our future research. Achieving it would realize the original vision of Xerox PARC’s Bayou [10] project, of peer-to-peer update upon physical proximity. Acknowledgements. Ehud Shapiro is the Incumbent of The Harry Weinrebe Professorial Chair of Computer Science and Biology at the Weizmann Institute. I thank Nimrod Talmon and Oded Naor for their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript and Idit Keidar for pointing me to related work. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs 5 Future Work & Discussion Grassroots dissemination for sovereign cryptocurrencies. While the Grassroots Dissemination protocol GD is better-suited for implementing sovereign cryptocurrencies than the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD, it should be refined to support a genuinelypractical implementation, allowing an agent to: (i) Follow another agent starting from an arbitrary block (not from its initial block), in particular from the first block recording a transaction between the two agents. (ii) Unfollow an agent, for example when financial relations between the two have ended, permanently or temporarily. Such extensions to GD are possible with little additional implementation effort and with some additional mathematical effort for specifying them and proving them correct. Grassroots and the Internet. Formally, the underlying Internet protocol stack is not grassroots, as IP addresses are allocated top-down, with a central entity (IANA) at the top. Does this mean that striving for grassroots protocols is futile? We do not think so. First, the full benefits of grassroots protocols can be reaped as long as IANA does not abuse IP address allocation and Internet access is not restricted or abused. Second, if the local regime restricts access to servers/services, but does not shut-down the Internet, grassroots protocols may still operate. Third, mobile mesh networks or SPANs (Smartphone ad-hoc networks) [1] allow communities to communicate in times of strife (e.g. demonstrations against the regime) without an Internet provider (but current designs are vulnerable [1]). Extending the UDP-based Cordial Grassroots Dissemination protocol to a mobile mesh protocol is a goal of our future research. Achieving it would realize the original vision of Xerox PARC’s Bayou [10] project, of peer-to-peer update upon physical proximity. Grassroots and the Internet. Acknowledgements. Ehud Shapiro is the Incumbent of The Harry Weinrebe Professorial Chair of Computer Science and Biology at the Weizmann Institute. I thank Nimrod Talmon and Oded Naor for their comments on an earlier version of the manuscript and Idit Keidar for pointing me to related work. Acknowledgements.

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: Future Work & Discussion

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs B All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots As a strawman, we recall the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD from [24] and argue that it is not grassroots. We assume a given payloads function X that maps each set of agents P to a set of payloads X (P). For example, X could map P to all strings signed by members of P; or to all messages sent among members of P, signed by the sender and encrypted by the public key of the recipient; or to all financial transactions among members of P. Remember that here P are not ‘miners’ serving transactions by other agents, but are the full set of agents, all participating the in protocol. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs B All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots As a strawman, we recall the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD from [24] and argue that it is not grassroots. We assume a given payloads function X that maps each set of agents P to a set of payloads X (P). For example, X could map P to all strings signed by members of P; or to all messages sent among members of P, signed by the sender and encrypted by the public key of the recipient; or to all financial transactions among members of P. Remember that here P are not ‘miners’ serving transactions by other agents, but are the full set of agents, all participating the in protocol.

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs References 1 Martin R Albrecht, Jorge Blasco, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, and Lenka Mareková. Mesh messaging in large-scale protests: Breaking bridgefy. In Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pages 375–398. Springer, 2021. 2 Juan Benet. Ipfs-content addressed, versioned, p2p file system. arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.3561, 2014. 3 Sonja Buchegger, Doris Schiöberg, Le-Hung Vu, and Anwitaman Datta. Peerson: P2p social networking: early experiences and insights. In Proceedings of the Second ACM EuroSys Workshop on Social Network Systems, pages 46–52, 2009. 4 Vitalik Buterin et al. A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform. white paper, 3(37), 2014. 5 Manuel Castells. The city and the grassroots: a cross-cultural theory of urban social movements. Number 7. Univ of California Press, 1983. 6 Miguel Castro, Barbara Liskov, et al. Practical byzantine fault tolerance. In OsDI, volume 99, pages 173–186, 1999. 7 Gregory Chockler, Roie Melamed, Yoav Tock, and Roman Vitenberg. Constructing scalable overlays for pub-sub with many topics. In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 109–118, 2007. 8 Gregory Chockler, Roie Melamed, Yoav Tock, and Roman Vitenberg. Spidercast: a scalable interest-aware overlay for topic-based pub/sub communication. In Proceedings of the 2007 inaugural international conference on Distributed event-based systems, pages 14–25, 2007. 9 Bram Cohen. Incentives build robustness in bittorrent. In Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer systems, volume 6, pages 68–72. Berkeley, CA, USA, 2003. 10 Alan Demers, Karin Petersen, Mike Spreitzer, Doug Terry, Marvin Theimer, and Brent Welch. The bayou architecture: Support for data sharing among mobile users. In 1994 First Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, pages 2–7. IEEE, 1994. 11 Bitcoin Developer. P2p network, Retrieved 20222. URL: https://developer.bitcoin.org/ devguide/p2p_network.html. 12 Ethereum Developer. go-ethereum/params/bootnodes.go, Retrieved 2023. URL: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/master/params/bootnodes.go. 13 Adem Efe Gencer, Soumya Basu, Ittay Eyal, Robbert van Renesse, and Emin Gün Sirer. Decentralization in bitcoin and ethereum networks. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 439–457. Springer, 2018. 14 Gabriele Goldacker. Digitale souveränität [white paper of kompetenzzentrum öffentliche it (öfit)]. retrieved april 20, 2021, 2017. 15 Idit Keidar, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Oded Naor, and Alexander Spiegelman. All you need is dag, 2021. arXiv:2102.08325. 16 Idit Keidar, Oded Naor, and Ehud Shapiro. Cordial miners: A family of simple and efficient consensus protocols for every eventuality. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09174, 2022. 17 Antony Lewis. A gentle introduction to self-sovereign identity. 2017. URL: https://bitsonblocks.net/2017/05/17/a-gentle-introduction-to-self-sovereign-identity/. 18 Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2019. 19 Romualdo Pastor-Satorras, Claudio Castellano, Piet Van Mieghem, and Alessandro Vespignani. Epidemic processes in complex networks. Reviews of modern physics, 87(3):925, 2015. 20 Julia Pohle and Thorsten Thiel. Digital sovereignty. Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, 9(4):1–19, 2020. 21 Aravindh Raman, Sagar Joglekar, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nishanth Sastry, and Gareth Tyson. Challenges in the decentralised web: The mastodon case. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference, pages 217–229, 2019. 22 Vinay Setty, Maarten van Steen, Roman Vitenberg, and Spyros Voulgaris. Poldercast: Fast, robust, and scalable architecture for p2p topic-based pub/sub. In ACM/IFIP/USENIX International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms and Open Distributed Processing, pages 271–291. Springer, 2012. 23 Devavrat Shah et al. Gossip algorithms. Foundations and Trends® in Networking, 3(1):1–125, 2009. 24 Ehud Shapiro. Multiagent transition systems: Protocol-stack mathematics for distributed computing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.13650, 2021. 25 Ehud Shapiro. Sovereign personal cryptocurrencies: A grassroots foundation for a digital economy. arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.05619, 2022. 26 Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguiça, Carlos Baquero, and Marek Zawirski. Conflict-free replicated data types. In Symposium on Self-Stabilizing Systems, pages 386–400. Springer, 2011. 27 Robert Shostak, Marshall Pease, and Leslie Lamport. The byzantine generals problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401, 1982. 28 Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M Frans Kaashoek, and Hari Balakrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications. ACM SIGCOMM computer communication review, 31(4):149–160, 2001. 29 Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K Reiter, Guy Golan Gueta, and Ittai Abraham. Hotstuff: Bft consensus with linearity and responsiveness. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 347–356, 2019. 30 Shoshana Zuboff. The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power: Barack Obama’s books of 2019. Profile books, 2019. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs References 1 Martin R Albrecht, Jorge Blasco, Rikke Bjerg Jensen, and Lenka Mareková. Mesh messaging in large-scale protests: Breaking bridgefy. In Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pages 375–398. Springer, 2021. 2 Juan Benet. Ipfs-content addressed, versioned, p2p file system. arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.3561, 2014. 3 Sonja Buchegger, Doris Schiöberg, Le-Hung Vu, and Anwitaman Datta. Peerson: P2p social networking: early experiences and insights. In Proceedings of the Second ACM EuroSys Workshop on Social Network Systems, pages 46–52, 2009. 4 Vitalik Buterin et al. A next-generation smart contract and decentralized application platform. white paper, 3(37), 2014. 5 Manuel Castells. The city and the grassroots: a cross-cultural theory of urban social movements. Number 7. Univ of California Press, 1983. 6 Miguel Castro, Barbara Liskov, et al. Practical byzantine fault tolerance. In OsDI, volume 99, pages 173–186, 1999. 7 Gregory Chockler, Roie Melamed, Yoav Tock, and Roman Vitenberg. Constructing scalable overlays for pub-sub with many topics. In Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 109–118, 2007. 8 Gregory Chockler, Roie Melamed, Yoav Tock, and Roman Vitenberg. Spidercast: a scalable interest-aware overlay for topic-based pub/sub communication. In Proceedings of the 2007 inaugural international conference on Distributed event-based systems, pages 14–25, 2007. 9 Bram Cohen. Incentives build robustness in bittorrent. In Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer systems, volume 6, pages 68–72. Berkeley, CA, USA, 2003. 10 Alan Demers, Karin Petersen, Mike Spreitzer, Doug Terry, Marvin Theimer, and Brent Welch. The bayou architecture: Support for data sharing among mobile users. In 1994 First Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, pages 2–7. IEEE, 1994. 11 Bitcoin Developer. P2p network, Retrieved 20222. URL: https://developer.bitcoin.org/ devguide/p2p_network.html. 12 Ethereum Developer. go-ethereum/params/bootnodes.go, Retrieved 2023. URL: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/master/params/bootnodes.go. 13 Adem Efe Gencer, Soumya Basu, Ittay Eyal, Robbert van Renesse, and Emin Gün Sirer. Decentralization in bitcoin and ethereum networks. In International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, pages 439–457. Springer, 2018. 14 Gabriele Goldacker. Digitale souveränität [white paper of kompetenzzentrum öffentliche it (öfit)]. retrieved april 20, 2021, 2017. 15 Idit Keidar, Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias, Oded Naor, and Alexander Spiegelman. All you need is dag, 2021. arXiv:2102.08325. 16 Idit Keidar, Oded Naor, and Ehud Shapiro. Cordial miners: A family of simple and efficient consensus protocols for every eventuality. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09174, 2022. 17 Antony Lewis. A gentle introduction to self-sovereign identity. 2017. URL: https://bitsonblocks.net/2017/05/17/a-gentle-introduction-to-self-sovereign-identity/. 18 Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2019. 19 Romualdo Pastor-Satorras, Claudio Castellano, Piet Van Mieghem, and Alessandro Vespignani. Epidemic processes in complex networks. Reviews of modern physics, 87(3):925, 2015. 20 Julia Pohle and Thorsten Thiel. Digital sovereignty. Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, 9(4):1–19, 2020. 21 Aravindh Raman, Sagar Joglekar, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nishanth Sastry, and Gareth Tyson. Challenges in the decentralised web: The mastodon case. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference, pages 217–229, 2019. 22 Vinay Setty, Maarten van Steen, Roman Vitenberg, and Spyros Voulgaris. Poldercast: Fast, robust, and scalable architecture for p2p topic-based pub/sub. In ACM/IFIP/USENIX International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms and Open Distributed Processing, pages 271–291. Springer, 2012. 23 Devavrat Shah et al. Gossip algorithms. Foundations and Trends® in Networking, 3(1):1–125, 2009. 24 Ehud Shapiro. Multiagent transition systems: Protocol-stack mathematics for distributed computing. arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.13650, 2021. 25 Ehud Shapiro. Sovereign personal cryptocurrencies: A grassroots foundation for a digital economy. arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.05619, 2022. 26 Marc Shapiro, Nuno Preguiça, Carlos Baquero, and Marek Zawirski. Conflict-free replicated data types. In Symposium on Self-Stabilizing Systems, pages 386–400. Springer, 2011. 27 Robert Shostak, Marshall Pease, and Leslie Lamport. The byzantine generals problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, 4(3):382–401, 1982. 28 Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M Frans Kaashoek, and Hari Balakrishnan. Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications. ACM SIGCOMM computer communication review, 31(4):149–160, 2001. 29 Maofan Yin, Dahlia Malkhi, Michael K Reiter, Guy Golan Gueta, and Ittai Abraham. Hotstuff: Bft consensus with linearity and responsiveness. In Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 347–356, 2019. 30 Shoshana Zuboff. The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power: Barack Obama’s books of 2019. Profile books, 2019.

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: References

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs 4 Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty We describe applications of Grassroots Dissemination that support digital sovereignty by not depending on or employing any third-party resources other than the network itself, and thus provide motivation for implementing the Grassroots Dissemination protocol. 4.1 Grassroots Twitter-Like Social Networking Here we illustrate how a Twitter-like grassroots social network can be realised on top of Grassroots Dissemination. Recall that any block (p, i, x) is uniquely identified by its creator p and index i, provided the creator is not equivocating. The Twitter-like realization employs two types of payloads, tweet(x), where x is any text string, and respond(p, i, x), which includes the text string x as a response to the p-block with index i. With Grassroots Dissemination, an agent p will observe any tweet and any response by every agent that p follows. But, p will not observe responses to tweets of agents that it follows, if p does not follow the respondents. This behavior could be desirable, if indeed p prefers not to hear these respondents; or undesirable, if p does not know the respondents but would be interested to hear what they have to say. This can be addressed by adding a third type of payload, echo(b), where b is a block. With this construct an agent p could echo responses to its own tweets, for the benefit the agents that follow p but not the respondents. Doing so could induce an agent to enlarge the set of agents it follows, if it finds agents whose echoed responses are of interest. This completes the high-level description of how to implement serverless Twitter-like social networking with grassroots dissemination. 4.2 Grassroots WhatsApp-Like Social Networking Here we illustrate how a WhatsApp-like grassroots social network can be realised on top of Grassroots Dissemination, using the same three payload types, tweet, respond, and echo. A group is initiated by p creating block b with a special tweet that declares the group formation and invites friends to join the group. All communications in the group are direct or indirect responses to b. While all group members are friends of p, they may not necessarily follow each other. Therefore, p echoes all direct or indirect responses to b by members of the group. This way every group member can follow the group and contribute to it, and a user-interface can make group communication look and feel like a regular messaging group. The group founder p can easily add or remove agents by echoing or ceasing to echo their responses to b. A group like this is public in that any follower of p can follow the group. If p wishes the group to be private, it can secretly share a new key-pair with all members of the group (as p knows their public key), and have all group communication be encrypted and decipherable only by group members. If a member leaves an encrypted group, p has to share a new key-pair with the remaining group members. Another way to ensure privacy is to initiate a separate blocklace for each new group. This line of thought will be investigated in a separate paper. 4.3 Grassroots Sovereign Cryptocurrencies Sovereign cryptocurrencies were introduced in reference [25], with an implementation by the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD (Appendiex B). However, sovereign cryptocurrencies do not need all-to-all dissemination: It is enough that dissemination ‘follows the money’. This can be achieved by people adhering to the following conservative principle: Transact only with friends, and only hold coins created by a friend (not the sovereigns include not only people but also legal persons such as banks, corporations, municipalities and states; hence a person its bank may be ‘friends’ in this technical sense and hold each other’s coins). The key operation of sovereign cryptocurrencies is coin redemption, which provides for fungibility, equivocation-exclusion, credit-risk management, coin-trading, chain payments and arbitrage. With it, an agent p that holds a q-coin requests q to redeem this coin for another coin q holds. Making and serving this request requires bi-directional communication between p and q, which can happen by default with Grassroots Dissemination if p and q are friends. Thus, by following this principle, the Grassroots Dissemination protocol GD can provide a correct implementation of sovereign cryptocurrencies. Transacting with non-friends is also possible through ‘direct messages’ (the Send transition), but without the ability to verify that the other party is following the protocol. Proving this formally requires the entire mathematical machinery of sovereign cryptocurrencies [25] and is beyond the scope of this paper. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs 4 Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty We describe applications of Grassroots Dissemination that support digital sovereignty by not depending on or employing any third-party resources other than the network itself, and thus provide motivation for implementing the Grassroots Dissemination protocol. 4.1 Grassroots Twitter-Like Social Networking 4.1 Grassroots Twitter-Like Social Networking Here we illustrate how a Twitter-like grassroots social network can be realised on top of Grassroots Dissemination. Recall that any block (p, i, x) is uniquely identified by its creator p and index i, provided the creator is not equivocating. The Twitter-like realization employs two types of payloads, tweet(x), where x is any text string, and respond(p, i, x), which includes the text string x as a response to the p-block with index i. With Grassroots Dissemination, an agent p will observe any tweet and any response by every agent that p follows. But, p will not observe responses to tweets of agents that it follows, if p does not follow the respondents. This behavior could be desirable, if indeed p prefers not to hear these respondents; or undesirable, if p does not know the respondents but would be interested to hear what they have to say. This can be addressed by adding a third type of payload, echo(b), where b is a block. With this construct an agent p could echo responses to its own tweets, for the benefit the agents that follow p but not the respondents. Doing so could induce an agent to enlarge the set of agents it follows, if it finds agents whose echoed responses are of interest. This completes the high-level description of how to implement serverless Twitter-like social networking with grassroots dissemination. 4.2 Grassroots WhatsApp-Like Social Networking 4.2 Grassroots WhatsApp-Like Social Networking Here we illustrate how a WhatsApp-like grassroots social network can be realised on top of Grassroots Dissemination, using the same three payload types, tweet, respond, and echo. A group is initiated by p creating block b with a special tweet that declares the group formation and invites friends to join the group. All communications in the group are direct or indirect responses to b. While all group members are friends of p, they may not necessarily follow each other. Therefore, p echoes all direct or indirect responses to b by members of the group. This way every group member can follow the group and contribute to it, and a user-interface can make group communication look and feel like a regular messaging group. The group founder p can easily add or remove agents by echoing or ceasing to echo their responses to b. A group like this is public in that any follower of p can follow the group. If p wishes the group to be private, it can secretly share a new key-pair with all members of the group (as p knows their public key), and have all group communication be encrypted and decipherable only by group members. If a member leaves an encrypted group, p has to share a new key-pair with the remaining group members. Another way to ensure privacy is to initiate a separate blocklace for each new group. This line of thought will be investigated in a separate paper. 4.3 Grassroots Sovereign Cryptocurrencies 4.3 Grassroots Sovereign Cryptocurrencies Sovereign cryptocurrencies were introduced in reference [25], with an implementation by the All-to-All Dissemination protocol AD (Appendiex B). However, sovereign cryptocurrencies do not need all-to-all dissemination: It is enough that dissemination ‘follows the money’. This can be achieved by people adhering to the following conservative principle: Transact only with friends, and only hold coins created by a friend (not the sovereigns include not only people but also legal persons such as banks, corporations, municipalities and states; hence a person its bank may be ‘friends’ in this technical sense and hold each other’s coins). The key operation of sovereign cryptocurrencies is coin redemption, which provides for fungibility, equivocation-exclusion, credit-risk management, coin-trading, chain payments and arbitrage. With it, an agent p that holds a q-coin requests q to redeem this coin for another coin q holds. Making and serving this request requires bi-directional communication between p and q, which can happen by default with Grassroots Dissemination if p and q are friends. Thus, by following this principle, the Grassroots Dissemination protocol GD can provide a correct implementation of sovereign cryptocurrencies. Transacting with non-friends is also possible through ‘direct messages’ (the Send transition), but without the ability to verify that the other party is following the protocol. Proving this formally requires the entire mathematical machinery of sovereign cryptocurrencies [25] and is beyond the scope of this paper.

Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty

This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license.
Authors:
(1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction
Grassroots Protocols
Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination
Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty
Future Work & Discussion
References
A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems
B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots
C. Proofs 2 Grassroots Protocols Informally, when agents operate according to a grassroots protocol (i) the possible behaviors and interactions of an isolated community of agents are not constrained by placing the community within a larger community and (ii) agents in an isolated community, when placed within a larger community, may have behaviors and interactions not possible when in isolation. In particular, agents may interact with each other across community boundaries. This notion supports the grassroots deployment of a distributed system – autonomous independent instances deployed at different locations and over time that can possibly (but not necessarily) interoperate once interconnected. Asynchronous distributed multiagent transition systems. We formalize this intuitive notion of a grassroots protocol using asynchronous distributed multiagent transition system [24]. See Appendix A for a brief introduction; we repeat below essential definitions and results. Assume a set Π of agents, each equipped with a single and unique key-pair, and identify an agent p ∈ Π by its public key. While the set of all agents Π could in principle be infinite (think of all the agents that are yet to be born), when we refer to a particular set of agents P ⊆ Π we assume P to be finite. Note that the trivial liveness requirement entails the standard one: A run is live if for every agent p that is enabled infinitely often, the run has infinitely many p-transitions. A transition system is asynchronous if progress by other agents cannot prevent an agent from taking an already-enabled transition. Observation 9. An all-to-all dissemination protocol cannot be grassroots. Sufficient condition for a protocol to be grassroots. Here we define certain properties of a protocol and prove that satisfying them is sufficient for the protocol to be grassroots. Theorem 12 (Grassroots Protocol). An asynchronous, interactive, and non-interfering protocol is grassroots. We note that blockchain consensus protocols with hardcoded miners, e.g. the seed miners of Bitcoin [11] or the bootnodes of Ethereum [12], and permissioned consensus protocols with a predetermined set of participants such as Byzantine Atomic Broadcast [27, 16], are all interfering, as additional participants may be required and/or cannot be ignored. However, Theorem 12 and the examples above do not imply that ordering consensus protocols cannot be grassroots. The problem is not with the consensus protocol as such, but with the choice of its participants. If participants in an instance of an ordering consensus protocol are determined by the agents themselves via a grassroots protocol, rather than being provided externally and a priori as in standard permissioned consensus protocols, or are required to include a predetermined set of initial participants as in Bitcoin and Ethereum, then the participants can reach consensus without violating grassroots. Devising grassroots consensus protocols is a subject of future work. Next, we present the Grassroots Dissemination protocol and prove it to be grassroots. 2.2 The Grassroots Dissemination Protocol The All-to-All Dissemination protocol is asynchronous and interactive, and this is also true of Grassroots Dissemination. But, unlike All-to-All Dissemination, in the Grassroots Dissemination protocol dissemination occurs only among friends. Moreover, agents are free to choose their friends. Hence, additional agents may be ignored by a given group of agents without violating agent liveness, implying that Grassroots Dissemination is also non-interfering and thus grassroots, as proven below. We assume a given payloads function X that maps each set of agents P to a set of payloads X (P). For example, X could map P to all strings signed by members of P; or to all messages sent among members of P, signed by the sender and encrypted by the public key of the recipient; or to all financial transactions among members of P. Remember that here P are not ‘miners’ serving transactions by other agents, but are the full set of agents participating the in protocol. 2.3 Grassroots Implementation Here we define the notion of a grassroots implementation and prove that having a grassroots implementation is a sufficient condition for a protocol to be grassroots. First we recall the notion of implementation among multiagent transition systems [24] (See also Appendix A) The following theorem shatters the hope of a non-grassroots protocol to have a grassroots implementation, and can be used to prove that a protocol is grassroots by providing it with a grassroots implementation. Theorem 20 (Grassroots Implementation). A protocol that has a grassroots implementation is grassroots. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED license. Authors: Authors: (1) Ehud Shapiro,  Department of Computer Science and Applied Math, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel and ehud.shapiro@weizmann.ac.il. Table of Links Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs Abstract and Introduction Abstract and Introduction Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Protocols Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Grassroots Implementation of Grassroots Dissemination Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Applications of Grassroots Dissemination Supporting Digital Sovereignty Future Work & Discussion Future Work & Discussion References References A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems A. Preliminaries: Asynchronous Distributed Multiagent Transition Systems B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots B. All-to-All Dissemination is not Grassroots C. Proofs C. Proofs 2 Grassroots Protocols Informally, when agents operate according to a grassroots protocol (i) the possible behaviors and interactions of an isolated community of agents are not constrained by placing the community within a larger community and (ii) agents in an isolated community, when placed within a larger community, may have behaviors and interactions not possible when in isolation. In particular, agents may interact with each other across community boundaries. This notion supports the grassroots deployment of a distributed system – autonomous independent instances deployed at different locations and over time that can possibly (but not necessarily) interoperate once interconnected. Asynchronous distributed multiagent transition systems. We formalize this intuitive notion of a grassroots protocol using asynchronous distributed multiagent transition system [24]. See Appendix A for a brief introduction; we repeat below essential definitions and results. Assume a set Π of agents, each equipped with a single and unique key-pair, and identify an agent p ∈ Π by its public key. While the set of all agents Π could in principle be infinite (think of all the agents that are yet to be born), when we refer to a particular set of agents P ⊆ Π we assume P to be finite. Note that the trivial liveness requirement entails the standard one: A run is live if for every agent p that is enabled infinitely often, the run has infinitely many p-transitions. A transition system is asynchronous if progress by other agents cannot prevent an agent from taking an already-enabled transition. Observation 9. An all-to-all dissemination protocol cannot be grassroots. Observation 9. An all-to-all dissemination protocol cannot be grassroots. Sufficient condition for a protocol to be grassroots. Here we define certain properties of a protocol and prove that satisfying them is sufficient for the protocol to be grassroots. Sufficient condition for a protocol to be grassroots. Theorem 12 (Grassroots Protocol). An asynchronous, interactive, and non-interfering protocol is grassroots. Theorem 12 We note that blockchain consensus protocols with hardcoded miners, e.g. the seed miners of Bitcoin [11] or the bootnodes of Ethereum [12], and permissioned consensus protocols with a predetermined set of participants such as Byzantine Atomic Broadcast [27, 16], are all interfering, as additional participants may be required and/or cannot be ignored. However, Theorem 12 and the examples above do not imply that ordering consensus protocols cannot be grassroots. The problem is not with the consensus protocol as such, but with the choice of its participants. If participants in an instance of an ordering consensus protocol are determined by the agents themselves via a grassroots protocol, rather than being provided externally and a priori as in standard permissioned consensus protocols, or are required to include a predetermined set of initial participants as in Bitcoin and Ethereum, then the participants can reach consensus without violating grassroots. Devising grassroots consensus protocols is a subject of future work. Next, we present the Grassroots Dissemination protocol and prove it to be grassroots. 2.2 The Grassroots Dissemination Protocol 2.2 The Grassroots Dissemination Protocol The All-to-All Dissemination protocol is asynchronous and interactive, and this is also true of Grassroots Dissemination. But, unlike All-to-All Dissemination, in the Grassroots Dissemination protocol dissemination occurs only among friends. Moreover, agents are free to choose their friends. Hence, additional agents may be ignored by a given group of agents without violating agent liveness, implying that Grassroots Dissemination is also non-interfering and thus grassroots, as proven below. We assume a given payloads function X that maps each set of agents P to a set of payloads X (P). For example, X could map P to all strings signed by members of P; or to all messages sent among members of P, signed by the sender and encrypted by the public key of the recipient; or to all financial transactions among members of P. Remember that here P are not ‘miners’ serving transactions by other agents, but are the full set of agents participating the in protocol. 2.3 Grassroots Implementation 2.3 Grassroots Implementation Here we define the notion of a grassroots implementation and prove that having a grassroots implementation is a sufficient condition for a protocol to be grassroots. First we recall the notion of implementation among multiagent transition systems [24] (See also Appendix A) The following theorem shatters the hope of a non-grassroots protocol to have a grassroots implementation, and can be used to prove that a protocol is grassroots by providing it with a grassroots implementation. Theorem 20 (Grassroots Implementation). A protocol that has a grassroots implementation Theorem 20 is grassroots.

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: Grassroots Protocols

Grassroots Distributed Systems for Digital Sovereignty: Abstract and Introduction

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This is the table of links with all parts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Introduction The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats
Competing Internet Norms
Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom
Challenges of the Digital Economy
The Future of AI Technologies Governance
Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Building Digital Solidarity ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem

Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability


ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners

Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity


ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners

Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware


ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity

Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Conclusion This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This is the table of links with all parts. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This is the table of links with all parts. here This is the table of links with all parts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Preface Preface Introduction Introduction Introduction The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Competing Internet Norms Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Challenges of the Digital Economy The Future of AI Technologies Governance Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Competing Internet Norms Competing Internet Norms Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Challenges of the Digital Economy Challenges of the Digital Economy The Future of AI Technologies Governance The Future of AI Technologies Governance Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Building Digital Solidarity Building Digital Solidarity Building Digital Solidarity ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem

Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners

Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners

Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity

Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

The United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here.This part is 7 of 38. Challenges of the Digital Economy Some 2.6 billion people still do not have access to the Internet, leaving a third of the world unconnected. This situation presents an economic development challenge for many countries and a strategic challenge for the United States and its allies and partners. Left unaddressed, the digital divide not only imperils efforts to build a strong digital ecosystem, but also threatens to increase income inequality and instability in emerging economies. The digital divide disproportionately affects women and other marginalized groups. For example, 80 percent of women in low-income countries do not use the Internet. [4] As the world has increasingly digitalized, countries around the world are grappling with how to approach the digital economy in a way that takes advantages of its benefits, addresses its risks, and expands its reach to more people. Governments are developing differing regulatory approaches to a range of policy issues, such as protecting children’s safety, health, and privacy, tackling TFGBV, addressing anti-competitive behavior, guaranteeing equitable access to connectivity and technology, building trusted digital infrastructure, and promoting trusted cross-border data flows. A growing number of countries are promoting digital public infrastructure (DPI) as critical to achieving economic growth, good governance, and the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). The definition of DPI is evolving, but generally encompasses networked open technology standards designed for the public interest, an enabling regulatory environment, and a community of market players driving innovation. While some of the most prominent models have included digital identification, digital payments, and data platforms for sharing and storing data, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. DPI models need to be grounded in safeguards, including human rights protections, and such models should be interoperable. U.S. government and private sector actors seek to leverage data and the digital economy for positive economic and social benefits: preserving openness while protecting privacy, promoting safety, and mitigating harms. The Department of State, working with other agencies, looks to shape markets and safeguard innovation from regulatory excesses. Although there is an increasing willingness by some countries to embrace narratives of digital sovereignty and protectionism by blocking access to their markets, unduly preventing cross-border data flows, and preferencing domestic manufacturers and service providers, we continue international engagement to enhance interoperability, security, and market access. Many states are promoting digital technologies for economic growth while trying to maintain autonomy and neutrality. They are looking to build digital infrastructure quickly and cheaply and seeking assistance to combat cybercrime and develop cybersecurity capacities. Yet the PRC government distorts markets to advantage PRC-based hardware, software, and services suppliers that compromise the security of the customer. By contrast, the United States seeks to provide the emerging and developing world with financially sound alternatives to unsustainable initiatives. The Department of State is committed to working with allies and partners to offer and deploy secure technologies that allow countries and civic actors around the world to build digital infrastructure and improve cybersecurity across sectors, offering direct benefits to governments while helping to ensure the protection of the human rights and privacy of their citizens that will enable an inclusive digital economy. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here.This part is 7 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here .This part is 7 of 38. here Challenges of the Digital Economy Some 2.6 billion people still do not have access to the Internet, leaving a third of the world unconnected. This situation presents an economic development challenge for many countries and a strategic challenge for the United States and its allies and partners. Left unaddressed, the digital divide not only imperils efforts to build a strong digital ecosystem, but also threatens to increase income inequality and instability in emerging economies. The digital divide disproportionately affects women and other marginalized groups. For example, 80 percent of women in low-income countries do not use the Internet. [4] [4] [4] As the world has increasingly digitalized, countries around the world are grappling with how to approach the digital economy in a way that takes advantages of its benefits, addresses its risks, and expands its reach to more people. Governments are developing differing regulatory approaches to a range of policy issues, such as protecting children’s safety, health, and privacy, tackling TFGBV, addressing anti-competitive behavior, guaranteeing equitable access to connectivity and technology, building trusted digital infrastructure, and promoting trusted cross-border data flows. A growing number of countries are promoting digital public infrastructure (DPI) as critical to achieving economic growth, good governance, and the UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). The definition of DPI is evolving, but generally encompasses networked open technology standards designed for the public interest, an enabling regulatory environment, and a community of market players driving innovation. While some of the most prominent models have included digital identification, digital payments, and data platforms for sharing and storing data, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. DPI models need to be grounded in safeguards, including human rights protections, and such models should be interoperable. U.S. government and private sector actors seek to leverage data and the digital economy for positive economic and social benefits: preserving openness while protecting privacy, promoting safety, and mitigating harms. The Department of State, working with other agencies, looks to shape markets and safeguard innovation from regulatory excesses. Although there is an increasing willingness by some countries to embrace narratives of digital sovereignty and protectionism by blocking access to their markets, unduly preventing cross-border data flows, and preferencing domestic manufacturers and service providers, we continue international engagement to enhance interoperability, security, and market access. Many states are promoting digital technologies for economic growth while trying to maintain autonomy and neutrality. They are looking to build digital infrastructure quickly and cheaply and seeking assistance to combat cybercrime and develop cybersecurity capacities. Yet the PRC government distorts markets to advantage PRC-based hardware, software, and services suppliers that compromise the security of the customer. By contrast, the United States seeks to provide the emerging and developing world with financially sound alternatives to unsustainable initiatives. The Department of State is committed to working with allies and partners to offer and deploy secure technologies that allow countries and civic actors around the world to build digital infrastructure and improve cybersecurity across sectors, offering direct benefits to governments while helping to ensure the protection of the human rights and privacy of their citizens that will enable an inclusive digital economy. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

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