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You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 36 of 38. Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Cyber capacity building efforts—which usually focus on strengthening a nation’s ability to adopt and develop cyber policies and strategies or improving their technical ability to detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents—have a direct and positive impact on international cyber stability and the security of U.S. citizens. Assistance directed at policy- and strategy-making increases states’ credibility and engagement in international discussions. It provides them with the national-level capabilities needed to implement the norms developed under the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, to conform with the standards of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention, to hold irresponsible actors accountable in cyberspace, and to develop a national-level approach to counter persistent cyber threats and build long-term resilience. Improving partner operational capabilities makes it more likely they will be able to combat transnational cybercrime threats, share useful cyber threat and incident information with the United States, and successfully partner with the United States in operations to disrupt malicious cyber activity. Over the last two decades, the Department of State has collaborated with other agencies, international partners, regional organizations, and the private sector to build cyber capacity abroad. Officials and private sector professionals from around the world participate in workshops on industrial control systems held with CISA. The United States assists efforts by the Organization of American States in areas such as cyber incident response, national cybersecurity strategy development and implementation, cybersecurity awareness, and cyber workforce development. The United States is a leading donor to Council of Europe programs designed to expand adoption of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention. The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), of which the United States is a founding and active member, provides a global platform to connect cyber policymakers, practitioners, and experts and to match assistance programs with recipients. Multiple agencies have supported international partners in using and adapting the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and the Department of State has supported international participation in the development of version 2.0 of the framework. The NICE Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework) has been leveraged to support talent development and management. The Department of Commerce, NIST, USAID, and the Department of State will engage international partners to promote the development of critical and emerging technology standards in areas such as best practices regarding data capture, processing, privacy, handling, and analysis; trustworthiness, verification, and assurance of AI systems and AI risk management; and content authentication and provenance, synthetic content detection, and content labeling. In addition, NIST has selected four algorithms designed to withstand cyberattacks by quantum computers and is developing standards for U.S. Government use. The Department of State will work with NIST to internationalize – including through ongoing engagements in international standards bodies – these post quantum cryptography standards so that organizations around the world can integrate them into their encryption infrastructure. They will also continue engaging international partners in developing and implementing cybersecurity best practices in areas such as Zero Trust, IoT cybersecurity, digital identity, operational technology, software security, and supply chain risk management. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 36 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 36 of 38. here here Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Cyber capacity building efforts—which usually focus on strengthening a nation’s ability to adopt and develop cyber policies and strategies or improving their technical ability to detect, respond to, and recover from cyber incidents—have a direct and positive impact on international cyber stability and the security of U.S. citizens. Assistance directed at policy- and strategy-making increases states’ credibility and engagement in international discussions. It provides them with the national-level capabilities needed to implement the norms developed under the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, to conform with the standards of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention, to hold irresponsible actors accountable in cyberspace, and to develop a national-level approach to counter persistent cyber threats and build long-term resilience. Improving partner operational capabilities makes it more likely they will be able to combat transnational cybercrime threats, share useful cyber threat and incident information with the United States, and successfully partner with the United States in operations to disrupt malicious cyber activity. Over the last two decades, the Department of State has collaborated with other agencies, international partners, regional organizations, and the private sector to build cyber capacity abroad. Officials and private sector professionals from around the world participate in workshops on industrial control systems held with CISA. The United States assists efforts by the Organization of American States in areas such as cyber incident response, national cybersecurity strategy development and implementation, cybersecurity awareness, and cyber workforce development. The United States is a leading donor to Council of Europe programs designed to expand adoption of the Budapest Cybercrime Convention. The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), of which the United States is a founding and active member, provides a global platform to connect cyber policymakers, practitioners, and experts and to match assistance programs with recipients. Multiple agencies have supported international partners in using and adapting the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and the Department of State has supported international participation in the development of version 2.0 of the framework. The NICE Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework) has been leveraged to support talent development and management. The Department of Commerce, NIST, USAID, and the Department of State will engage international partners to promote the development of critical and emerging technology standards in areas such as best practices regarding data capture, processing, privacy, handling, and analysis; trustworthiness, verification, and assurance of AI systems and AI risk management; and content authentication and provenance, synthetic content detection, and content labeling. In addition, NIST has selected four algorithms designed to withstand cyberattacks by quantum computers and is developing standards for U.S. Government use. The Department of State will work with NIST to internationalize – including through ongoing engagements in international standards bodies – these post quantum cryptography standards so that organizations around the world can integrate them into their encryption infrastructure. They will also continue engaging international partners in developing and implementing cybersecurity best practices in areas such as Zero Trust, IoT cybersecurity, digital identity, operational technology, software security, and supply chain risk management. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Empowering Global Cyber Resilience: United States' Efforts in Partner Cyber Capacity Building

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 33 of 38. Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware The proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware poses a significant threat to both U.S. national security—including counterintelligence interests—and to democratic values and human rights around the globe by enabling the surveillance, repression, and targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and other civil society members. In March 2023, President Biden signed an executive order limiting U.S. government operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States, or significant risks of improper use, including committing human rights abuses, by a foreign government or foreign person. At the same time, the Department of State launched a Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware with 10 other countries committed to undertaking concrete efforts to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, which an additional 6 countries joined in March 2024. Moving forward, the U.S. government will continue to work to disincentivize misuse and positively reshape the commercial spyware market by driving out or encouraging reform by businesses associated with the misuse of these tools. The Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to urge the countries that have already joined the Joint Statement to take concrete steps to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, induce additional countries to join, and persuade countries that misuse or enable the misuse of spyware to implement safeguards to deviate less from U.S. policy. The Department of State will continue to partner with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to promote accountability for those who misuse—or enable or benefit from the misuse—of commercial spyware through tools like sanctions, visa restrictions, and export controls. In addition, the Department of State will continue to elevate this issue in multilateral and public forums as well as engage closely with civil society, journalists, tech platforms, and the investment community. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 33 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 33 of 38. here here Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware The proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware poses a significant threat to both U.S. national security—including counterintelligence interests—and to democratic values and human rights around the globe by enabling the surveillance, repression, and targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and other civil society members. In March 2023, President Biden signed an executive order limiting U.S. government operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States, or significant risks of improper use, including committing human rights abuses, by a foreign government or foreign person. At the same time, the Department of State launched a Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware with 10 other countries committed to undertaking concrete efforts to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, which an additional 6 countries joined in March 2024. Moving forward, the U.S. government will continue to work to disincentivize misuse and positively reshape the commercial spyware market by driving out or encouraging reform by businesses associated with the misuse of these tools. The Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to urge the countries that have already joined the Joint Statement to take concrete steps to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, induce additional countries to join, and persuade countries that misuse or enable the misuse of spyware to implement safeguards to deviate less from U.S. policy. The Department of State will continue to partner with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to promote accountability for those who misuse—or enable or benefit from the misuse—of commercial spyware through tools like sanctions, visa restrictions, and export controls. In addition, the Department of State will continue to elevate this issue in multilateral and public forums as well as engage closely with civil society, journalists, tech platforms, and the investment community. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Tackling Spyware Misuse: United States' Efforts to Counter Commercial Spyware Proliferation

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 31 of 38. Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors For many countries, the greatest risk to their digital security and economies is online scams, criminal hacking, and other financial crimes. Ransomware in particular has emerged in recent years as a clear threat to national security, public safety, and economic prosperity. Operating from safe havens like the PRC, DPRK, Iran, Russia, and certain other countries, ransomware operators have disrupted government services, hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, and civil society entities. With some states using ransomware actors as proxies or turning a blind eye to their activities and the significant impact of their cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, it is increasingly clear that ransomware activity can threaten international peace and security. Digital solidarity is clearly expressed through the Department of State’s efforts to leverage its diplomatic capabilities to support the whole-of-government fight against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, including by building partner capacity; developing coalitions to prevent, disrupt, and punish criminal behavior; and fostering cooperation with the private sector. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice will continue to participate in the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force and to partner with private industry and international allies to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and resources, take down botnets, and seize cryptocurrency garnered from ransomware campaigns. For example, the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law Enforcement Network (GLEN) program—a long-standing partnership between the Departments of State and Justice—is a global law enforcement capacity-building network of DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) regional advisors, computer forensic analysts, and federal law enforcement agents. Twelve ICHIP attorney advisors are located around the world. The ICHIP advisor based in The Hague facilitated cooperation among the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Latvia in the largest ever takedown of the botnet and malware known as Qakbot in August 2023. The network also delivers training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners, prosecutors, and judicial authorities to combat intellectual property theft and cybercrime activity, as well as to assist in the collection and use of electronic evidence to combat all types of crime. The program improves U.S. security by reducing the use of foreign computing infrastructure for malicious activities targeting U.S. networks and by showing that no malicious actor can evade the rule of law. The GLEN has stood up five regional cryptocurrency working groups around the globe, which are dedicated to information sharing and capacity building to address criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, including in ransomware. Additional priorities for capacity building include Internet fraud and combating the growing scourge of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Department of State will continue to use its diplomatic engagements and capacity building to broaden and strengthen participation in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The CRI is a unique and geographically diverse coalition of nearly 60 countries, plus multilateral institutions such as the European Union, Interpol, and Organization of American States, committed to building collective resilience to ransomware, cooperating to disrupt ransomware and pursue the actors responsible, countering the illicit finance that underpins the ransomware ecosystem, and working with the private sector to defend against ransomware attacks. As a complement to the CRI, the Department of State, in coordination with the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force, will continue to develop bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to discourage states from sponsoring ransomware or permitting their territories to be used as safe havens by cyber criminals. The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including the voluntary norm that “states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructures are subject to malicious ICT acts,” in addition to “appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.” [5] Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 31 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 31 of 38. here here Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors For many countries, the greatest risk to their digital security and economies is online scams, criminal hacking, and other financial crimes. Ransomware in particular has emerged in recent years as a clear threat to national security, public safety, and economic prosperity. Operating from safe havens like the PRC, DPRK, Iran, Russia, and certain other countries, ransomware operators have disrupted government services, hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, and civil society entities. With some states using ransomware actors as proxies or turning a blind eye to their activities and the significant impact of their cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, it is increasingly clear that ransomware activity can threaten international peace and security. Digital solidarity is clearly expressed through the Department of State’s efforts to leverage its diplomatic capabilities to support the whole-of-government fight against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, including by building partner capacity; developing coalitions to prevent, disrupt, and punish criminal behavior; and fostering cooperation with the private sector. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice will continue to participate in the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force and to partner with private industry and international allies to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and resources, take down botnets, and seize cryptocurrency garnered from ransomware campaigns. For example, the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law Enforcement Network (GLEN) program—a long-standing partnership between the Departments of State and Justice—is a global law enforcement capacity-building network of DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) regional advisors, computer forensic analysts, and federal law enforcement agents. Twelve ICHIP attorney advisors are located around the world. The ICHIP advisor based in The Hague facilitated cooperation among the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Latvia in the largest ever takedown of the botnet and malware known as Qakbot in August 2023. The network also delivers training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners, prosecutors, and judicial authorities to combat intellectual property theft and cybercrime activity, as well as to assist in the collection and use of electronic evidence to combat all types of crime. The program improves U.S. security by reducing the use of foreign computing infrastructure for malicious activities targeting U.S. networks and by showing that no malicious actor can evade the rule of law. The GLEN has stood up five regional cryptocurrency working groups around the globe, which are dedicated to information sharing and capacity building to address criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, including in ransomware. Additional priorities for capacity building include Internet fraud and combating the growing scourge of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Department of State will continue to use its diplomatic engagements and capacity building to broaden and strengthen participation in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The CRI is a unique and geographically diverse coalition of nearly 60 countries, plus multilateral institutions such as the European Union, Interpol, and Organization of American States, committed to building collective resilience to ransomware, cooperating to disrupt ransomware and pursue the actors responsible, countering the illicit finance that underpins the ransomware ecosystem, and working with the private sector to defend against ransomware attacks. As a complement to the CRI, the Department of State, in coordination with the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force, will continue to develop bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to discourage states from sponsoring ransomware or permitting their territories to be used as safe havens by cyber criminals. The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including the voluntary norm that “states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructures are subject to malicious ICT acts,” in addition to “appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.” [5] [5] [5] Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Global Alliance Against Ransomware: United States and Allies' Strategies to Counter Criminal Actors

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here This part is 25 of 38. ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners At the UN and regional security bodies, the United States, along with its allies and partners, is working to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace based on a UN General Assembly-endorsed framework, underpinned by the applicability of existing international law, adherence to globally accepted and voluntary norms of state behavior in peacetime, development and implementation of confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace, and a commitment to building states’ capacities to implement the elements of the framework. Despite a global consensus on the framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace, the norms are not self-enforcing. Some states act in ways contrary to it. When a state engages in significant destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing malicious cyber activity contrary to the framework, responsible states must cooperate to hold that irresponsible state accountable. Digital solidarity in this context is demonstrated by sustained mutual support and coordinated campaigns. The United States and its partners share cyber threat information to help build resilience to and disrupt malicious activities; show solidarity to victims by helping respond to significant incidents, thereby signaling to adversaries they cannot isolate a target country through malicious operations; and ensure accountability for destructive, disruptive, and otherwise destabilizing cyber activities in concert with likeminded countries. The United States and some allies also have affirmed the application to cyberspace of their respective mutual defense treaty obligations. In addition, the Department of State and other federal agencies are working with allies and partners to disrupt ransomware and other criminal networks and safeguard democratic processes and institutions. Looking forward, the United States will continue efforts like these to advance responsible behavior in cyberspace, and counter threats to cyberspace and our critical infrastructure by building coalitions and engaging partners. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here This part is 25 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here This part is 25 of 38. here ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners At the UN and regional security bodies, the United States, along with its allies and partners, is working to advance responsible state behavior in cyberspace based on a UN General Assembly-endorsed framework, underpinned by the applicability of existing international law, adherence to globally accepted and voluntary norms of state behavior in peacetime, development and implementation of confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace, and a commitment to building states’ capacities to implement the elements of the framework. Despite a global consensus on the framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace, the norms are not self-enforcing. Some states act in ways contrary to it. When a state engages in significant destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing malicious cyber activity contrary to the framework, responsible states must cooperate to hold that irresponsible state accountable. Digital solidarity in this context is demonstrated by sustained mutual support and coordinated campaigns. The United States and its partners share cyber threat information to help build resilience to and disrupt malicious activities; show solidarity to victims by helping respond to significant incidents, thereby signaling to adversaries they cannot isolate a target country through malicious operations; and ensure accountability for destructive, disruptive, and otherwise destabilizing cyber activities in concert with likeminded countries. The United States and some allies also have affirmed the application to cyberspace of their respective mutual defense treaty obligations. In addition, the Department of State and other federal agencies are working with allies and partners to disrupt ransomware and other criminal networks and safeguard democratic processes and institutions. Looking forward, the United States will continue efforts like these to advance responsible behavior in cyberspace, and counter threats to cyberspace and our critical infrastructure by building coalitions and engaging partners. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Global Coalition Unites to Combat Cyber Threats and Ensure Responsible State Behavior

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 10 of 38. Building Digital Solidarity The United States believes digital technologies can and should be used to put people on a path to prosperity, solve global challenges, and build a better future for all. The Department of State will work with allies, partners, and stakeholders to promote an affirmative vision for cyber and digital technologies: one in which people around the world use cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect human rights, gender equity and equality, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. As part of this approach, the United States, allies, and partners will demonstrate the advantages of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet; serve as the partner of choice in the research, design, development, and deployment of digital and emerging technologies; and jointly impose consequences for behavior that runs counter to internationally accepted norms of state behavior. The Department of State will also work with and support emerging economies’ efforts to improve cybersecurity and increase their cyber-resilience. Each of the Strategy’s four action areas—promote, build, and maintain an open, inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem; align rights-respecting approaches to digital governance; advance responsible state behavior, counter malicious activity, and offer mutual support; and strengthen digital and cyber capacity building assistance—reflects aspects of the Department of State’s vision of digital solidarity. Moving forward, the Department of State will work to bring a wide range of partners across the globe into the process of building and extending digital solidarity. We welcome all those who seek to develop and deploy technologies that are open and secure, promote inclusive growth, foster resilient and democratic societies, and empower all, including the most vulnerable. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 10 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 10 of 38. here Building Digital Solidarity The United States believes digital technologies can and should be used to put people on a path to prosperity, solve global challenges, and build a better future for all. The Department of State will work with allies, partners, and stakeholders to promote an affirmative vision for cyber and digital technologies: one in which people around the world use cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect human rights, gender equity and equality, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. As part of this approach, the United States, allies, and partners will demonstrate the advantages of an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet; serve as the partner of choice in the research, design, development, and deployment of digital and emerging technologies; and jointly impose consequences for behavior that runs counter to internationally accepted norms of state behavior. The Department of State will also work with and support emerging economies’ efforts to improve cybersecurity and increase their cyber-resilience. Each of the Strategy’s four action areas—promote, build, and maintain an open, inclusive, secure, and resilient digital ecosystem; align rights-respecting approaches to digital governance; advance responsible state behavior, counter malicious activity, and offer mutual support; and strengthen digital and cyber capacity building assistance—reflects aspects of the Department of State’s vision of digital solidarity. Moving forward, the Department of State will work to bring a wide range of partners across the globe into the process of building and extending digital solidarity. We welcome all those who seek to develop and deploy technologies that are open and secure, promote inclusive growth, foster resilient and democratic societies, and empower all, including the most vulnerable. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

United for Digital Progress: Promoting Solidarity in Cyber and Digital Technologies

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This is the table of links with all parts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Introduction The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats
Competing Internet Norms
Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom
Challenges of the Digital Economy
The Future of AI Technologies Governance
Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Building Digital Solidarity ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem

Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability


ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners

Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity


ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners

Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware


ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity

Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Conclusion This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This is the table of links with all parts. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This is the table of links with all parts. here This is the table of links with all parts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface Preface Preface Introduction Introduction Introduction The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges The Digital World: Opportunities and Challenges Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Competing Internet Norms Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Challenges of the Digital Economy The Future of AI Technologies Governance Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Cyber Attacks and National Security Threats Competing Internet Norms Competing Internet Norms Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Threats to Internet and Digital Freedom Challenges of the Digital Economy Challenges of the Digital Economy The Future of AI Technologies Governance The Future of AI Technologies Governance Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Working with the Private Sector and Civil Society Building Digital Solidarity Building Digital Solidarity Building Digital Solidarity ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem

Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners

Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners

Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity

Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks
Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables
Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks
Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem ACTION AREA 1: Promote, Build, and Maintain an Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Digital Ecosystem Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 1: Promote Development and Adoption of Open, Inclusive, Secure, and Resilient Telecommunication Networks Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 2: Further Common Understandings and Shared Principles for the Secure Use and Trustworthiness of Cloud Services, Data Centers, and Related Infrastructure Technologies Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 3: Enhance Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 4: Pursue Shared Interests in the Development, Use, Resilience, and Security of Satellite Communication Networks Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability Line of Effort 5: Enhance the International Telecommunication Union’s Effectiveness, Transparency, and Accountability ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance
Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies
Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial
Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes
Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future
Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty
Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners ACTION AREA 2: Align Rights-Respecting Approaches to Digital and Data Governance with International Partners Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 2: Promote Common Understandings of Trust, Interoperable Standards, and Shared Values and Governance Principles for Critical and Emerging Technologies Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 3: Ensure International Standards Processes are Transparent, Open, Inclusive, and Impartial Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 4: Expand and Diversify Civil Society Participation in Multistakeholder Processes Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 5: Advance a Common, Rights-Respecting Vision for the Digital Future Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 6: Negotiate a Rights-Respecting Cybercrime Treaty Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity Line of Effort 7: Defend Information Integrity ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN
Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity
Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity
Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable
Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain
Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors
Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions
Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners ACTION AREA 3: Advance Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace and Counter Threats to Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure by Building Coalitions and Engaging Partners Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 1: Pursue Action-Oriented Discussions Focused on Norm Implementation at the UN Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 3: Support Allies and Partners Amid Malicious Activity Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 5: Affirm Application of Mutual Defense Treaties with Certain Allies to the Cyber Domain Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 7: Safeguard Democratic Processes and Institutions Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts
Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity ACTION AREA 4: Strengthen and Build International Partner Digital Policy and Cyber Capacity Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 1: Support and Expand Digital Policy, Legal, and Regulatory Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 2: Augment Partner Cyber Capacity Building Efforts Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Line of Effort 3: Develop New Tools to Deliver Digital and Cyber Assistance Quickly and Efficiently Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

The United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy

Tiktok Inc., and ByteDance LTD., v. Merrick B. Garland Update Court Filing, retrieved on May 7, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part in this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. Case Number: [Redacted] Plaintiffs: Tiktok Inc., and Bytedance LTD. Defendant: Merrick B. Garland Filing Date: May 7, 2024 Location: In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit TABLE OF CONTENTS Jurisdictional Statement Background and Nature of Proceedings A. TikTok Is a Speech Platform Used by 170 Million Americans. B. The Government Previously Made Unlawful Attempts to Ban TikTok. C. A Divestiture that Severs TikTok’s U.S. Operations From the Rest of the Globally Integrated TikTok Business Is Not Commercially, Technologically, or Legally Feasible. D. The Act Bans TikTok and Other ByteDance Applications. E. Congress Disregarded Alternatives to Banning TikTok, Such as the National Security Measures Petitioners Negotiated with the Executive Branch. Grounds On Which Relief Is Sought Ground 1: Violation of the First Amendment Ground 2: Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder Ground 3: Violation of Equal Protection Ground 4: Unconstitutional Taking Requested Relief About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings.
This court case retrieved on May 7, 2024, from sf16-va.tiktokcdn.com is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. Lead image by Nik on Unsplash Tiktok Inc., and ByteDance LTD., v. Merrick B. Garland Update Court Filing, retrieved on May 7, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series. You can jump to any part in this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. Tiktok Inc., and ByteDance LTD., v. Merrick B. Garland Update Court Filing, retrieved on May 7, 2024, is part of HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series . You can jump to any part in this filing here . This is the table of links with all parts. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here Case Number: [Redacted] Case Number: Plaintiffs: Tiktok Inc., and Bytedance LTD. Plaintiffs: Defendant: Merrick B. Garland Defendant: Filing Date: May 7, 2024 Filing Date: Location: In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Location: TABLE OF CONTENTS Jurisdictional Statement Jurisdictional Statement Jurisdictional Statement Background and Nature of Proceedings Background and Nature of Proceedings A. TikTok Is a Speech Platform Used by 170 Million Americans. A. TikTok Is a Speech Platform Used by 170 Million Americans. B. The Government Previously Made Unlawful Attempts to Ban TikTok. B. The Government Previously Made Unlawful Attempts to Ban TikTok. C. A Divestiture that Severs TikTok’s U.S. Operations From the Rest of the Globally Integrated TikTok Business Is Not Commercially, Technologically, or Legally Feasible. C. A Divestiture that Severs TikTok’s U.S. Operations From the Rest of the Globally Integrated TikTok Business Is Not Commercially, Technologically, or Legally Feasible. D. The Act Bans TikTok and Other ByteDance Applications. D. The Act Bans TikTok and Other ByteDance Applications. E. Congress Disregarded Alternatives to Banning TikTok, Such as the National Security Measures Petitioners Negotiated with the Executive Branch. E. Congress Disregarded Alternatives to Banning TikTok, Such as the National Security Measures Petitioners Negotiated with the Executive Branch. Grounds On Which Relief Is Sought Grounds On Which Relief Is Sought Ground 1: Violation of the First Amendment Ground 1: Violation of the First Amendment Ground 2: Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder Ground 2: Unconstitutional Bill of Attainder Ground 3: Violation of Equal Protection Ground 3: Violation of Equal Protection Ground 4: Unconstitutional Taking Ground 4: Unconstitutional Taking Requested Relief Requested Relief About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on May 7, 2024, from sf16-va.tiktokcdn.com is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on May 7, 2024, from sf16-va.tiktokcdn.com is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. sf16-va.tiktokcdn.com Lead image by Nik on Unsplash Lead image by Nik on Unsplash Nik on Unsplash

Everything You Need to Know About TikTok's Lawsuit Against the United States

WOMBO, the makers of viral AI avatar apps, and io.net, a pioneer in decentralized GPU compute networks, have just struck a partnership that represents a major step towards expanding the possibilities of AI computing. This collaboration comes at a time when artificial intelligence (AI) is pushing the boundaries of technology. This agreement marks a significant step forward in the development of artificial intelligence's computing capabilities. This cooperation not only represents a milestone in the development of artificial intelligence-powered applications, but it also addresses the issue of restricted processing capacity that many AI startups are now confronting. It is anticipated that over 200 million copies of WOMBO's applications have been downloaded from the Google App Store and for iOS. The firm's most popular and successful apps are WOMBO, Dream, and WOMBO Me. Because they need a significant quantity of processing power, they have found themselves drawn to io.net's cutting-edge decentralized GPU computing network. Io.net emerges as a pioneering force, offering decentralized, geo-distributed computing networks with the potential to transform the artificial intelligence infrastructure. Io.net is a pioneering organization. The ability of WOMBO to employ Apple silicon chip clusters as fuel for its machine learning (ML) models is critical to the success of this collaboration. This would help artificial intelligence enterprises overcome the challenges of cloud computing, such as high cost and limited accessibility. Partnership Goals and Technology The partnership between WOMBO and io.net comes against the background of the AI industry's battle with high cloud computing operational costs and a restricted supply of hardware. The novel technology developed by Io.net aggregates decentralized and geographically dispersed GPUs, enabling clusters to be deployed on demand for a fraction of the typical cost. This strategy has opened up new avenues of opportunity for WOMBO, allowing it to grow its AI applications more effectively and efficiently. WOMBO CEO Ben-Zion Benkhin expressed his enthusiasm for the partnership, stating, “We are excited about partnering with io.net to help bring unused computing power and put it to use in groundbreaking AI applications - together, our teams have the potential to put a serious dent in the GPU supply shortage.” This sentiment captures the collaborative spirit and the ambitious vision shared by both companies to overcome the challenges of GPU supply constraints. Tapping into Apple’s Silicon Chips Central to this strategic alliance is an innovative endeavor that utilizes the extraordinary capabilities of Apple silicon chip clusters. This initiative is poised to leverage the Neural Engine capabilities on Apple’s chips along with io.net’s mega-clustering capabilities, tapping into hundreds of millions of consumer devices for AI workloads. This approach not only showcases the technical synergy between WOMBO and io.net but also highlights the potential for scalable AI application development on a global scale. Final Thoughts Io.net is a decentralized physical infrastructure network (DePIN) that develops and administers decentralized GPU clusters produced on demand from sources distributed throughout the globe. Through its infrastructure of over 520 thousand graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs), io.net democratizes access to GPU computing power, lowering prices and extending opportunities for both engineers and enterprises. This network has been optimized for use cases that need high processing demand and low latency, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning activities, as well as cloud gaming, by inventing a new compute network standard. In terms of artificial intelligence, the partnership between WOMBO and io.net represents a change towards computer solutions that are more environmentally friendly, accessible, and efficient. This cooperation, which employs distributed computing and the power of Apple silicon processors, not only prepares the path for WOMBO's future growth but also sets a pattern for how artificial intelligence firms might overcome limitations in computing capacity and cost. Don’t forget to like and share the story! Vested Interest Disclosure: This author is an independent contributor publishing via our business blogging program. HackerNoon has reviewed the report for quality, but the claims herein belong to the author. #DYOR. WOMBO, the makers of viral AI avatar apps, and io.net, a pioneer in decentralized GPU compute networks, have just struck a partnership that represents a major step towards expanding the possibilities of AI computing. This collaboration comes at a time when artificial intelligence (AI) is pushing the boundaries of technology. This agreement marks a significant step forward in the development of artificial intelligence's computing capabilities. This cooperation not only represents a milestone in the development of artificial intelligence-powered applications, but it also addresses the issue of restricted processing capacity that many AI startups are now confronting. It is anticipated that over 200 million copies of WOMBO's applications have been downloaded from the Google App Store and for iOS. The firm's most popular and successful apps are WOMBO, Dream, and WOMBO Me. Because they need a significant quantity of processing power, they have found themselves drawn to io.net's cutting-edge decentralized GPU computing network. Io.net emerges as a pioneering force, offering decentralized, geo-distributed computing networks with the potential to transform the artificial intelligence infrastructure. Io.net is a pioneering organization. The ability of WOMBO to employ Apple silicon chip clusters as fuel for its machine learning (ML) models is critical to the success of this collaboration. This would help artificial intelligence enterprises overcome the challenges of cloud computing, such as high cost and limited accessibility. Partnership Goals and Technology The partnership between WOMBO and io.net comes against the background of the AI industry's battle with high cloud computing operational costs and a restricted supply of hardware. The novel technology developed by Io.net aggregates decentralized and geographically dispersed GPUs, enabling clusters to be deployed on demand for a fraction of the typical cost. This strategy has opened up new avenues of opportunity for WOMBO, allowing it to grow its AI applications more effectively and efficiently. WOMBO CEO Ben-Zion Benkhin expressed his enthusiasm for the partnership, stating, “We are excited about partnering with io.net to help bring unused computing power and put it to use in groundbreaking AI applications - together, our teams have the potential to put a serious dent in the GPU supply shortage.” This sentiment captures the collaborative spirit and the ambitious vision shared by both companies to overcome the challenges of GPU supply constraints. Tapping into Apple’s Silicon Chips Central to this strategic alliance is an innovative endeavor that utilizes the extraordinary capabilities of Apple silicon chip clusters. This initiative is poised to leverage the Neural Engine capabilities on Apple’s chips along with io.net’s mega-clustering capabilities, tapping into hundreds of millions of consumer devices for AI workloads. This approach not only showcases the technical synergy between WOMBO and io.net but also highlights the potential for scalable AI application development on a global scale. Final Thoughts Io.net is a decentralized physical infrastructure network (DePIN) that develops and administers decentralized GPU clusters produced on demand from sources distributed throughout the globe. Through its infrastructure of over 520 thousand graphics processing units (GPUs) and central processing units (CPUs), io.net democratizes access to GPU computing power, lowering prices and extending opportunities for both engineers and enterprises. This network has been optimized for use cases that need high processing demand and low latency, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning activities, as well as cloud gaming, by inventing a new compute network standard. In terms of artificial intelligence, the partnership between WOMBO and io.net represents a change towards computer solutions that are more environmentally friendly, accessible, and efficient. This cooperation, which employs distributed computing and the power of Apple silicon processors, not only prepares the path for WOMBO's future growth but also sets a pattern for how artificial intelligence firms might overcome limitations in computing capacity and cost. Don’t forget to like and share the story! Vested Interest Disclosure: This author is an independent contributor publishing via our business blogging program. HackerNoon has reviewed the report for quality, but the claims herein belong to the author. #DYOR. Vested Interest Disclosure: This author is an independent contributor publishing via our business blogging program . HackerNoon has reviewed the report for quality, but the claims herein belong to the author. #DYOR. Vested Interest Disclosure: business blogging program business blogging program

Breaking Barriers in AI Development: WOMBO and io.net Unite to Tackle GPU Shortage

**LONDON, United Kingdom, April 11th, 2024/Chainwire/--**Metacade, the leading blockchain gaming platform, takes a monumental leap forward with the integration of multi-chains into its ecosystem. This Omni-layer development provides universal application reach, resolving blockchain fragmentation and empowering builders across diverse chains. The rapid integration of the Metacade Tournament Platform with the Base Layer 2 Rollup within 12 hours showcases Metacade's technical prowess and underscores a commitment to delivering best-in-class solutions for partners and players. The decision to introduce multi-chain functionality highlights Metacade's vision to create the largest Web3 gaming platform, grounded in open market principles. "We recognize that speed and low transaction costs are crucial for builders. However, game development hinges on intricate blockchain solutions," states CEO Russell Bennett. "For Metacade to achieve genuine inclusivity, our success depends on an adaptable infrastructure, regardless of the blockchain utilized.” The multi-chain approach considers scalability for partner road maps, allowing existing projects to remain on their native chain while maintaining platform security through an optimistic-based rollup. What began as a vision to connect Web3 game developers with seasoned players has become an omni-layer movement to unify games across chains and provide fluid liquidity, expanding economic opportunities for builders and players alike. A multi-chain infrastructure will optimize liquidity access, mitigate inefficiencies, and simplify asset trading processes. It offers an efficient on-ramp for gaming partners to facilitate the use of their tokens regardless of where the core of their liquidity is situated. This pivotal development future proofs Metacade’s robust, diverse, and accessible ecosystem. For more information on Metacade and its multi-chain expansion, users can visit the new website: metacade.co. About METACADE Metacade is a seamless Web3 Gaming platform connecting developers and players through plug-and-play community initiatives. Providing an unfair advantage through early access, dev-player collaborations, and financial rewards. Contact Elly Bradbury Metacade marketing@metacade.co This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. **LONDON, United Kingdom, April 11th, 2024/Chainwire/--**Metacade, the leading blockchain gaming platform, takes a monumental leap forward with the integration of multi-chains into its ecosystem. This Omni-layer development provides universal application reach, resolving blockchain fragmentation and empowering builders across diverse chains. The rapid integration of the Metacade Tournament Platform with the Base Layer 2 Rollup within 12 hours showcases Metacade's technical prowess and underscores a commitment to delivering best-in-class solutions for partners and players. The decision to introduce multi-chain functionality highlights Metacade's vision to create the largest Web3 gaming platform, grounded in open market principles. Base Base "We recognize that speed and low transaction costs are crucial for builders. However, game development hinges on intricate blockchain solutions," states CEO Russell Bennett. "We recognize that speed and low transaction costs are crucial for builders. However, game development hinges on intricate blockchain solutions," states CEO Russell Bennett. "For Metacade to achieve genuine inclusivity, our success depends on an adaptable infrastructure, regardless of the blockchain utilized.” "For Metacade to achieve genuine inclusivity, our success depends on an adaptable infrastructure, regardless of the blockchain utilized.” The multi-chain approach considers scalability for partner road maps, allowing existing projects to remain on their native chain while maintaining platform security through an optimistic-based rollup. What began as a vision to connect Web3 game developers with seasoned players has become an omni-layer movement to unify games across chains and provide fluid liquidity, expanding economic opportunities for builders and players alike. A multi-chain infrastructure will optimize liquidity access, mitigate inefficiencies, and simplify asset trading processes. It offers an efficient on-ramp for gaming partners to facilitate the use of their tokens regardless of where the core of their liquidity is situated. This pivotal development future proofs Metacade’s robust, diverse, and accessible ecosystem. For more information on Metacade and its multi-chain expansion, users can visit the new website: metacade.co . metacade.co metacade.co About METACADE Metacade is a seamless Web3 Gaming platform connecting developers and players through plug-and-play community initiatives. Providing an unfair advantage through early access, dev-player collaborations, and financial rewards. Metacade Metacade Contact Elly Bradbury Metacade marketing@metacade.co This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here. This story was distributed as a release by Chainwire under HackerNoon’s Business Blogging Program. Learn more about the program here . here here

Metacade Unchains Web3 Gaming: Multi-Chain Integration Unites the Industry

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 21 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here C. Third Claim for Relief: Monopolization of the Smartphone Market in the United States in Violation of Sherman Act § 2 211. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 210 above. 212. Smartphones in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and Apple has monopoly power in that market. 213. Apple has willfully monopolized the smartphone market in the United States through an exclusionary course of conduct and the anticompetitive acts described herein. Each of Apple’s actions individually and collectively increased, maintained, or protected its smartphone monopoly. 214. Apple’s anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited to, its contractual restrictions against app creation, distribution, and access to APIs that have impeded apps and technologies including, but not limited to, super apps, cloud streaming, messaging, wearables, and digital wallets. The areas identified in this complaint reflect a non-exhaustive list of recent anticompetitive acts but as technology advances, both the technologies impeded and the specific manner of impediment may shift in response to technological and regulatory change consistent with Apple’s past conduct. 215. While each of Apple’s acts is anticompetitive in its own right, Apple’s interrelated and interdependent actions have had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect that has harmed competition and the competitive process. 216. Apple’s anticompetitive acts have had harmful effects on competition and consumers. 217. Apple’s exclusionary conduct lacks a procompetitive justification that offsets the harm caused by Apple’s anticompetitive and unlawful conduct. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

United States Alleges Apple's Monopolization of US Smartphone Market Violates Sherman Act

United States v. Apple INC Court Filing, retrieved on March 21, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 19 of 25. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here A. First Claim for Relief: Monopolization of the Performance Smartphone Market in the United States in Violation of Sherman Act § 2 199. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 198 above. 200. Performance smartphones in the United States is a relevant antitrust market, and Apple has monopoly power in that market. 201. Apple has willfully monopolized the performance smartphone market in the United States through an exclusionary course of conduct and the anticompetitive acts described herein. Each of Apple’s actions individually and collectively increased, maintained, or protected its performance smartphone monopoly. 202. Apple’s anticompetitive acts include, but are not limited to, its contractual restrictions against app creation, distribution, and access to APIs that have impeded apps and technologies including, but not limited to, super apps, cloud streaming, messaging, wearables, and digital wallets. The areas identified in this complaint reflect a non-exhaustive list of recent anticompetitive acts but as technology advances, both the technologies impeded and the specific manner of impediment may shift in response to technological and regulatory change consistent with Apple’s past conduct. 203. While each of Apple’s acts is anticompetitive in its own right, Apple’s interrelated and interdependent actions have had a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect that has harmed competition and the competitive process. Apple’s anticompetitive acts have had harmful effects on competition and consumers. 204. Apple’s exclusionary conduct lacks a procompetitive justification that offsets the harm caused by Apple’s anticompetitive and unlawful conduct. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 21, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. justice.gov

United States Slams Apple for Sherman Act Violation

USA v. Samuel Bankman-Fried Court Filing, retrieved on March 15, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 18 of 33. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here D. The “Relocating,” “Outside the United States,” or “Sophisticated Means” Enhancement Applies The defendant objects, based on his own trial testimony, to the recommendation in the PSR that a two-level enhancement applies for locating FTX outside of the United States. (Def. Mem. at 24). There is no merit to this objection. Pursuant to Section 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) of the Guidelines, a two-level enhancement is warranted if (a) “the defendant relocated, or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory officials,” (b) “a substantial part of a fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States,” or (c) the offense “involved sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10). The “relocating” enhancement is appropriate where the defendant “moved his scheme … in an effort to avoid detection.” Warner v. United States, 21 F. App’x 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2001). A two-level increase is appropriate based on each of these bases for the enhancement. The defendant relocated FTX and Alameda outside of the United States in part to take advantage of the more permissive regulatory environment that allowed FTX.com to offer cryptocurrency derivative products that are not lawful to sell as a U.S.-based company offering its products to U.S. retail customers without an appropriate license from the CFTC. (Accord GX-913 (defendant’s testimony before the U.S. House seeking to “work with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission” so that FTX US could offer margined derivative products to U.S. customers)). In any event, the defendant does not dispute that a substantial part of the fraudulent scheme was committed from outside the United States, and that the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means. Both are plainly true. Therefore, the enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) applies. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt n.9(B) (“Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts” can be “sophisticated means,” as can an “especially complex or especially intricate offense”). Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 15, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. storage.courtlistener

SBF's Fraud Scheme Outside the United States

United States and European Union Forge Alliance to Safeguard Trade and Security

মার্কিন যুক্তরাষ্ট্র এবং ইউরোপীয় ইউনিয়ন বাণিজ্য ও নিরাপত্তা রক্ষায় জোট গঠন করে

Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Europäische Union schmieden ein Bündnis zum Schutz von Handel und Sicherheit

Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea forjan alianza para salvaguardar el comercio y la seguridad

Les États-Unis et l’Union européenne forgent une alliance pour sauvegarder le commerce et la sécurité

संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका और यूरोपीय संघ ने व्यापार और सुरक्षा की सुरक्षा के लिए गठबंधन बनाया

米国と欧州連合、貿易と安全保障を守るための同盟を結ぶ

미국과 유럽연합은 무역과 안보를 보호하기 위해 동맹을 맺었습니다.

Estados Unidos e União Europeia formam aliança para salvaguardar o comércio e a segurança

США и Европейский Союз создают альянс для защиты торговли и безопасности

ABD ve Avrupa Birliği Ticareti ve Güvenliği Korumak İçin İttifak Kuruyor

Hoa Kỳ và Liên minh Châu Âu thành lập liên minh để bảo vệ thương mại và an ninh

美国和欧盟结成联盟以保障贸易和安全

Content Overview Abbreviations and Acronyms Executive Summary Introduction & Purpose What is Resilience? Conceptualization of the Framework Definitions of Key Framework Elements Societal Dimensions Cross-Cutting Enablers Relationship with Essential Government Functions How to Use the Resilience Grand Pathways Framework Audience & Value of Framework Use Case 1: Identifying Gaps in Infrastructure as a Result of SARS CoV 2 (COVID-19) Use Case 2: Texas Winter Storm and Power Crisis – Cascading Failures Future Efforts Appendix 1: Grand Pathways Framework and the Application to Essential Government Function This was originally published in March 2023 on It has been broken-up into bite sized sections, each with unique headlines and AI-generated lead images, in line with the provisions of whitehouse.gov. Creative Commons 3.0. Lead image . source

The United States Resilience Science and Technology Grand Pathways Framework - Content Overview

The court filing for USA v. eBay dated January 11, 2024, is part of . You can navigate any part of this filing using the links provided below. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series Case Number: xxx United States of America Plaintiffs: eBay Defendant: January 11, 2024 Filing Date: United States District Court District of Massachusetts Location: TABLE OF CONTENTS General Allegations EcommerceBytes Events Preceding the Harassment and Intimidation Campaign Fidomaster Walker's West The Harassment and Intimidation Campaign Actions in Furtherance of the Harassment and Intimidation Campaign Executive 2's Receipt of lnformation Regarding the Harassment and Intimidation Campaign COUNTS ONE AND TWO COUNTS THREE AND FOUR COUNT FIVE COUNT SIX About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on January 11, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. ecommercebytes.com

United States Criminally Charges eBay Over Disturbing Harassment Claims

In an era where traditional journalism is continually challenged by the surging tide of social media and citizen journalism, a radical shift is underway. The rise of decentralized platforms and the influence of key figures like Mario Nawfal and Elon Musk are paving the way for a new kind of journalistic landscape, potentially revolutionized by initiatives like Intention Alliance. The Need for a Transparent, Decentralized Income Source for Journalists In the current media ecosystem, traditional journalism struggles with financial sustainability, often relying on ad revenue dictated by opaque algorithms and corporate interests. This reliance compromises journalistic integrity and independence. The rise of decentralized journalism, as exemplified by figures like Mario Nawfal, presents a solution but also introduces a new challenge: How can decentralized journalists sustain themselves financially in a way that's transparent, decentralized, and resistant to censorship? The Power of Decentralized Platforms and Bitcoin The key lies in the intersection of decentralized platforms and cryptocurrency. Platforms like X (formerly Twitter), revolutionized by leaders like Elon Musk, are fertile grounds for this new journalism form. Musk's advocacy for "citizen journalism" and his influence on platforms like X can catalyze a shift towards a more open, decentralized media space. Intention Alliance – Monetizing Intentions in Journalism This is where Intention Alliance comes in. By integrating its model and technology with platforms like X, journalists can monetize their work through direct engagement with their audience. In the proposed "Intention Marketplaces," consumers can financially support journalism they trust and value using Bitcoin. This system turns every interaction – a read, a like, a share – into a microtransaction, transferring Bitcoin earned in the Intention Marketplace to journalists, empowering them to earn a living through the very act of decentralized reporting. Bridging Decentralized Journalism and Bitcoin Mario Nawfal's ascent in the realm of social media and decentralized journalism, coupled with his experience in the cryptocurrency space, positions him uniquely to champion this cause. His ability to draw attention from industry giants like Elon Musk, coupled with his understanding of the crypto dynamics, can help foster a supportive ecosystem for this new journalism paradigm. A New Era of Journalism The integration of the Intention Alliance model on X could herald a transformative era for journalism. It promises a future where journalists are directly supported by their audience, ensuring editorial independence and integrity. This model could incentivize quality reporting and empower journalists to serve the public interest without corporate or political pressures. Digital Renaissance through Decentralization Imagine a world where journalism is freed from the shackles of traditional revenue models, where readers directly fund the stories they find valuable, and where journalistic integrity is not just an ideal but a financially viable reality. This is the digital renaissance that the collaboration of Intention Alliance, Mario Nawfal, and platforms like X, under the visionary guidance of leaders like Elon Musk, can achieve. In this envisioned future, journalists are no longer at the mercy of centralized platforms or opaque funding sources. They are empowered, independent, and supported by a community that values truth, transparency, and the power of decentralized technology. This is not just a shift in how journalism is funded and consumed; it's a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between the news and its audience, a renaissance of trust and integrity in the digital age.

Decentralization of Journalism: How Intention Alliance, Mario Nawfal, and Elon Musk Could Unite

The Gaming Revolution: READYgg and Aptos Labs Transforming the Digital Landscape In a groundbreaking move, has teamed up with to usher in a new era of gaming. This partnership is more than a mere collaboration; it represents a paradigm shift, bringing 15 million Web2 gamers into the burgeoning realm of Web3 gaming. This initiative, set in motion by READYgg’s extensive network and Aptos' cutting-edge blockchain technology, marks a seismic shift in the gaming industry. READYgg Aptos Labs READYgg: The Gateway to Web3 Gaming , a leader in blockchain and game development technology, has been at the forefront of the transition from traditional gaming to the Web3 domain. By signing over 20 major Web2 publishers, the company boasts a staggering 200 million monthly active users across a diverse library of 2,000 games. The integration of these titles into the Web3 ecosystem represents a monumental step towards merging the familiar with the revolutionary. READYgg Pioneering Titles Making the Leap Among the exciting titles transitioning to Web3 are the roguelike dungeon crawler "Runestone Keeper" and the action-packed "Rescue Robots Sniper Survival". Additionally, platforms like Minijuegos and ToroFun are not just making the shift but are also incorporating innovative NFT-based loyalty systems. This move underscores the commitment to enhancing the gaming experience with Web3 elements, offering players a unique and enriched playing environment. Aptos Labs: The Backbone of the New Gaming Experience Aptos Labs, co-founded by industry visionaries Mo Shaikh and Avery Ching, brings to the table its next-generation Layer 1 blockchain technology. Known for its breakthroughs in network tooling and usability, Aptos is poised to provide the necessary infrastructure for this ambitious endeavor. The partnership will leverage the Aptos blockchain's fast time-to-finality, a crucial feature for ensuring seamless gameplay in the Web3 space. A Network Built for the Future The Aptos Network, with its innovative programming language and technology, is designed to evolve continuously. This characteristic is vital in a landscape as dynamic and rapidly changing as blockchain gaming. The commitment of Aptos to enhance performance and user safeguards aligns perfectly with READYgg's vision of a seamless transition to Web3 gaming. The Synergy of READYgg and Aptos This collaboration between and is more than just a technical alliance. It is a union of visions, where both entities aim to democratize access to Web3 gaming. READYgg brings to the table its robust tools and ecosystem designed to facilitate the creation of Web3 games. In contrast, Aptos provides the technological backbone with its high-performance blockchain. READYgg Aptos Labs Funding the Future READYgg, through its $RDYX token, offers potential funding or grants to publishers entering the Web3 realm. This initiative, combined with Aptos' predictable usage fees, provides a stable and supportive environment for publishers transitioning to blockchain-based gaming. The Voices Behind the Vision David S. Bennahum, CEO & Co-Founder of READYgg, emphasizes the company's commitment to bridging Web2 games with Web3. His vision of seamlessly integrating traditional gamers into the blockchain world is now becoming a reality. Christina Macedo, COO & Co-Founder of READYgg, highlights the ease of transition for millions of Web2 gamers, ensuring that the focus remains on fun and engagement, free from the complexities often associated with blockchain technologies. Mo Shaikh, Co-Founder & CEO of Aptos Labs, underscores the partnership's potential to accelerate the delivery of high-quality Web3 games and user experiences, enriching the gaming landscape with unique and ownable assets. The Broader Impact: A Gateway to Emerging Markets READYgg's vision extends beyond just integrating existing gamers into Web3. It aims to open doors for billions, especially in emerging markets, to access and appreciate the new gaming world. The company's tools and ecosystem are designed to democratize Web3 game creation, paving the way for true mass adoption. A New Chapter in Gaming The READYgg and Aptos Labs partnership is more than a technological advancement; it is a cultural shift. By bringing 15 million Web2 gamers into the fold of Web3, they are not just changing how games are played; they are redefining the gaming experience itself. This initiative promises to bring unparalleled user experiences, on par or even superior to traditional Web2 gaming, setting a new standard for the industry. As the worlds of Web2 and Web3 converge, the future of gaming looks brighter and more exciting than ever. Don’t forget to like and share the story! : Vested Interest Disclosure This author is an independent contributor publishing via our . Be it through direct compensation, media partnerships, or networking, the author has a vested interest in the company/ies mentioned in this story. HackerNoon has reviewed the report for quality, but the claims herein belong to the author. #DYOR brand-as-author program

Bridging Worlds: READYgg and Aptos Labs Unite to Revolutionize Web3 Gaming

ব্রিজিং ওয়ার্ল্ডস: READYgg এবং Aptos ল্যাবস Web3 গেমিংকে বিপ্লব করতে একত্রিত হয়েছে

Brückenschlag zwischen Welten: READYgg und Aptos Labs vereinen sich, um Web3-Gaming zu revolutionieren

Uniendo mundos: READYgg y Aptos Labs se unen para revolucionar los juegos Web3

Bridging Worlds : READYgg et Aptos Labs s'unissent pour révolutionner le jeu Web3

ब्रिजिंग वर्ल्ड्स: रेडीग और एप्टोस लैब्स वेब3 गेमिंग में क्रांति लाने के लिए एकजुट हुए

世界の橋渡し: READYgg と Aptos Labs が連携して Web3 ゲームに革命を起こす

세계 연결: READYgg와 Aptos Labs가 연합하여 Web3 게이밍에 혁명을 일으키다

Bridging Worlds: READYgg e Aptos Labs se unem para revolucionar os jogos Web3

Соединяя миры: READYgg и Aptos Labs объединяются, чтобы совершить революцию в играх Web3

Dünyalar Arasında Köprü Kuruyor: READYgg ve Aptos Labs Web3 Oyunlarında Devrim Yaratmak İçin Birleşiyor

Kết nối các thế giới: READYgg và Aptos Labs hợp tác để cách mạng hóa trò chơi Web3

连接世界：READYgg 和 Aptos Labs 联手革新 Web3 游戏

Microsoft v. United States (2016) Court Filing, retrieved on July 14, 2016, is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing here. This is the table of links with all parts. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series Case Number: 14‐2985 Plaintiff: Microsoft Defendant: United States Circuit Judge: Judge Lynch and Susan L. Carney District Judge: Honorable Victor A. Bolden Filing Date: October 11, 2016 Location: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit TABLE OF CONTENT INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND I. Microsoft’s Web‐Based E‐mail Service II. Procedural History III. Statutory Background A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 B. The Technological Setting in 1986 C. The Stored Communications Act DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review II. Whether the SCA Authorizes Enforcement of the Warrant as to Customer Content Stored in Ireland A. Analytic Framework B. Morrison and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality C. Whether the SCA’s Warrant Provisions Contemplate Extraterritorial Application Plain Meaning of the SCA The SCA’s Use of the Term of Art “Warrant” Relevance of Law on “Subpoenas” D. Discerning the “Focus” of the SCA The SCA’s Warrant Provisions Other Aspects of the Statute Legislative History E. Extraterritoriality of the Warrant CONCLUSION CONCLUSION - I CONCLUSION -II CONCLUSION -III About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case No. 15–777 retrieved on September 27, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. cases.justia.com

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