If you’ve been following blockchain security for a while, you’ve probably noticed a recurring pattern: bridges tend to be prime targets for major exploits. In just a few years, more than $2.8 billion has been lost to bridge attacks. The Ronin Bridge hack alone drained over $624 million in March 2022—almost overnight. Those numbers aren’t just alarming; they’re instructive. more than $2.8 billion Ronin Bridge hack Bridges sit at a critical choke point in cross-chain infrastructure. If you’re building one—or trusting your funds to one—understanding their security risks isn’t optional. Four Common Security Vulnerabilities. Understanding where bridges fail is the first step toward building secure ones. These four vulnerabilities represent the most exploited attack vectors in bridge security, responsible for billions in losses. By examining each weakness and its real-world consequences, we can identify the patterns that lead to failures and implement defenses that actually work. Let's break down each vulnerability and explore practical solutions. 1. Validator Compromise Think of a bridge like a high-security vault that needs multiple keys to open. The system works well in theory, but challenges arise when attackers gain control of enough keys. That's what happened with Ronin Bridge. Attackers compromised 5 out of 9 validator keys, enough to control the entire bridge. They withdrew 173,600 ETH and 25.5 million USDC. Harmony's Horizon Bridge faced a similar situation: 2 out of 5 keys compromised, which led to over $100 million lost. The challenge here involves balancing speed and security. Fewer validators mean faster confirmations, but each validator becomes more critical to the system's integrity. How to address this: Distribute validator keys across independent organizations. Use MPC(Multi-Party Computation) or HSMs(Hardware Security Modules) so no single server holds a complete key. Set signature thresholds between 60-80% and implement time delays for large withdrawals. How to address this: Secure approach (Solidity): Secure approach (Solidity): // ✅ High threshold (70%) with timelock

contract SecureBridge {

    uint256 public requiredSignatures = 7;  // 7 out of 10
    uint256 public constant TIMELOCK = 1 hours;

    

    function executeWithdrawal(bytes32 txHash) external {

        Withdrawal storage w = withdrawals[txHash];
        require(w.signatureCount >= requiredSignatures);
        require(block.timestamp >= w.timestamp + TIMELOCK);
        IERC20(w.token).transfer(w.recipient, w.amount);

    }

} // ✅ High threshold (70%) with timelock

contract SecureBridge {

    uint256 public requiredSignatures = 7;  // 7 out of 10
    uint256 public constant TIMELOCK = 1 hours;

    

    function executeWithdrawal(bytes32 txHash) external {

        Withdrawal storage w = withdrawals[txHash];
        require(w.signatureCount >= requiredSignatures);
        require(block.timestamp >= w.timestamp + TIMELOCK);
        IERC20(w.token).transfer(w.recipient, w.amount);

    }

} Secure approach (Rust - Solana): Secure approach (Rust - Solana): // ✅ High threshold with timelock on Solana

pub fn execute_withdrawal(ctx: Context<Execute>) -> Result<()> {

    let withdrawal = &ctx.accounts.withdrawal;

    // Require 7 out of 10 signatures (70%)
    require!(withdrawal.signature_count >= 7);

    // Timelock: 1 hour
    require!(Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp >= withdrawal.timestamp + 3600);

    // Transfer tokens
    token::transfer(ctx.accounts.transfer_ctx(), withdrawal.amount)?;
    Ok(())

} // ✅ High threshold with timelock on Solana

pub fn execute_withdrawal(ctx: Context<Execute>) -> Result<()> {

    let withdrawal = &ctx.accounts.withdrawal;

    // Require 7 out of 10 signatures (70%)
    require!(withdrawal.signature_count >= 7);

    // Timelock: 1 hour
    require!(Clock::get()?.unix_timestamp >= withdrawal.timestamp + 3600);

    // Transfer tokens
    token::transfer(ctx.accounts.transfer_ctx(), withdrawal.amount)?;
    Ok(())

} 2. Smart Contract Vulnerabilities Strong key management is important, but contract-level vulnerabilities remain a significant concern, and due to this, reentrancy attacks persist in production systems. The Nomad Bridge hack in August 2022 shows how logic errors can have serious consequences. Their contract accepted a Merkle root of zero as valid, allowing attackers to craft messages that passed validation. This straightforward oversight resulted in $190 million in losses. How to address this: Use well-tested libraries like OpenZeppelin for standard patterns. Implement multiple audits and bug bounty programs. Follow the checks-effects-interactions pattern and add circuit breakers for emergencies. How to address this: 3. Oracle Manipulation Bridges rely on external data, prices, proofs, and cross-chain events. When this data can be manipulated, it creates security vulnerabilities. Consider a scenario:  A bridge checks collateral values using a price oracle. An attacker uses a flash loan to inflate a token's price on a low-liquidity exchange temporarily. The oracle reflects this artificial price, and the attacker uses inflated collateral values to their advantage. Consider a scenario: Vulnerable approach (Solidity): Vulnerable approach (Solidity): // ❌ Single oracle source - easily manipulated
function getCollateralValue() internal view returns (uint256) {
    uint256 price = oracle.getPrice(token);  // Single source!
    return amount * price / 1e18;
} // ❌ Single oracle source - easily manipulated
function getCollateralValue() internal view returns (uint256) {
    uint256 price = oracle.getPrice(token);  // Single source!
    return amount * price / 1e18;
} This happened with Mango Markets, resulting in $117 million in losses. The attacker manipulated the MNGO token price with flash loans, posted it as collateral, and borrowed against tokens that had artificially inflated values. How to address this: The best way to address this is to use decentralized oracle networks like Chainlink (EVM) or Reflector oracle (Stellar) or Pyth/Switchboard (Solana) with multiple independent data sources. How to address this: Implement time-weighted average pricing (TWAP) to resist flash manipulation, and add circuit breakers that pause operations if prices move unexpectedly. Secure approach (Solidity): Secure approach (Solidity): // ✅ Multiple oracles with deviation checks

function getCollateralValue() internal view returns (uint256) {

    uint256 chainlinkPrice = chainlinkOracle.getPrice(token);
    uint256 uniswapTWAP = getUniswapTWAP(token);

    // Verify prices are within 5% of each other
    uint256 deviation = abs(chainlinkPrice - uniswapTWAP) * 100 / chainlinkPrice;
    require(deviation <= 5, "Price deviation too high");

    

    // Use the lower price (conservative)
    return amount * min(chainlinkPrice, uniswapTWAP) / 1e18;

} // ✅ Multiple oracles with deviation checks

function getCollateralValue() internal view returns (uint256) {

    uint256 chainlinkPrice = chainlinkOracle.getPrice(token);
    uint256 uniswapTWAP = getUniswapTWAP(token);

    // Verify prices are within 5% of each other
    uint256 deviation = abs(chainlinkPrice - uniswapTWAP) * 100 / chainlinkPrice;
    require(deviation <= 5, "Price deviation too high");

    

    // Use the lower price (conservative)
    return amount * min(chainlinkPrice, uniswapTWAP) / 1e18;

} Building on rust chain?, here is a secure approach (Rust - Solana with Pyth and Switchboard): Building on rust chain?, here is a secure approach (Rust - Solana with Pyth and Switchboard): // ✅ Multiple oracle sources on Solana

pub fn get_collateral_value(ctx: &Context<CheckCollateral>) -> Result<u64> {

    // Get prices from two independent oracles
    let pyth_price = get_pyth_price(&ctx.accounts.pyth_feed)?;
    let switchboard_price = get_switchboard_price(&ctx.accounts.switchboard_feed)?;

    

    // Check deviation (max 5%)
    let deviation = abs(pyth_price - switchboard_price) * 100 / pyth_price;
    require!(deviation <= 5, BridgeError::PriceDeviationTooHigh);

    

    // Use the lower price
    let price = min(pyth_price, switchboard_price);
    Ok(collateral_amount * price)

} // ✅ Multiple oracle sources on Solana

pub fn get_collateral_value(ctx: &Context<CheckCollateral>) -> Result<u64> {

    // Get prices from two independent oracles
    let pyth_price = get_pyth_price(&ctx.accounts.pyth_feed)?;
    let switchboard_price = get_switchboard_price(&ctx.accounts.switchboard_feed)?;

    

    // Check deviation (max 5%)
    let deviation = abs(pyth_price - switchboard_price) * 100 / pyth_price;
    require!(deviation <= 5, BridgeError::PriceDeviationTooHigh);

    

    // Use the lower price
    let price = min(pyth_price, switchboard_price);
    Ok(collateral_amount * price)

} 4. Consensus-Level Exploits Bridges inherit the security characteristics of the blockchains they connect. Vulnerabilities in the underlying chain affect bridge security regardless of implementation quality. The Binance Smart Chain bridge exploit in October 2022 illustrates this challenge. Attackers identified a vulnerability in how Tendermint handles Merkle proofs. They exploited this to forge a deposit on BSC, then withdrew $600 million in BNB. How to address this: Require sufficient confirmations on the source chain before releasing funds. For high-value transfers, prioritize established chains with proven security records. Deploy independent watchers that verify transactions through alternative methods. How to address this: Building Robust Security Now that we understand the vulnerabilities, let's focus on building defenses that actually work. Securing a bridge isn't about implementing one perfect solution; it's about layering multiple defenses so that if one fails, others remain intact. These interconnected security measures work together to create a system that's resilient against attacks. Here's how to build comprehensive protection: 1. Key Management Distribute keys across different organizations. Use HSMs with strong physical security. Implement MPC so no single server holds a complete key. Set signature thresholds at 60-80%. 2. Code Quality Conduct multiple independent audits. Establish bug bounty programs. Use proven frameworks (OpenZeppelin for EVM and stellar), Anchor for Solana. Apply comprehensive testing, including fuzzing. 3. Oracle Design Implement multiple independent data sources. Use time-weighted averaging. Include circuit breakers for unusual conditions. For EVM chains, use Chainlink. For Stellar use Reflector. For Solana, use Pyth and Switchboard together. Final Thoughts Bridges provide essential infrastructure for the multi-chain ecosystem, but they face significant security challenges. The industry has learned important lessons, that’s over $2.8 billion worth of lessons. The path forward is clear, which includes: distributed key management, thoroughly audited code, robust oracle design, and most especially comprehensive monitoring. distributed key management thoroughly audited code robust oracle design comprehensive monitoring. Security needs to be a foundational consideration, not an afterthought. It should inform architectural decisions from the earliest stages of development. Taking the time to implement proper security measures protects users and builds trust in cross-chain infrastructure. The stakes are high, but with careful attention to these security principles, bridges can provide the reliable cross-chain functionality that the ecosystem needs.

This story contains new, firsthand information uncovered by the writer.

This story contains AI-generated text. The author has used AI either for research, to generate outlines, or write the text itself. 

Building Secure Blockchain Bridges: Common Vulnerabilities and Solutions

About Author

Comments

TOPICS

THIS ARTICLE WAS FEATURED IN

Related Stories

Gas Inefficiencies Developers Don't Notice Until It's Too Late

Gas Inefficiencies Developers Don't Notice Until It's Too Late

Event-Driven Payroll Processing Using Function-as-a-Service Architectures

Learn Technical Storytelling This Halloween at the Spells & Syntax Workshop

4 DeFi Security Risks Explained: Understanding Common Vulnerabilities

4 Enterprise Cybersecurity Trends in 2021

Gas Inefficiencies Developers Don't Notice Until It's Too Late

Gas Inefficiencies Developers Don't Notice Until It's Too Late

Event-Driven Payroll Processing Using Function-as-a-Service Architectures

Learn Technical Storytelling This Halloween at the Spells & Syntax Workshop

4 DeFi Security Risks Explained: Understanding Common Vulnerabilities

4 Enterprise Cybersecurity Trends in 2021

Light-Mode

Classic

Newspaper

Minty

Dark-Mode

Neon Noir

Minty

HN StartUps