Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People by Catharine Esther Beecher, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book . THE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES. here CHAPTER XVII. THE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES. A brief reference has been made to those susceptibilities which are the subject of this chapter. These, from their importance, are entitled to a more enlarged consideration. Before proceeding, however, it is desirable to refer to the uses of the term , inasmuch as it often is employed with a vague comprehension of its signification. In its widest sense it signifies in distinction from those influences that produce involuntary results. moral whatever relates to the regulation of mind by motives In a more limited sense, it signifies . whatever relates to the regulation of mind in reference to the rules of right and wrong In the preceding pages it has been assumed that the grand object for which the Creator formed mind and all things is to produce , and that this design is so impressed on the human mind that the needless destruction of happiness is felt to be —that is, contrary or unfitted to the design of all things; while all that tends to promote happiness is felt to be right, or consistent with this plan. the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil wrong In order to a more clear view of this part of the subject, it is important to inquire as to the manner in which the ideas of and seem to originate. right wrong The young child first notices that certain actions of its own are regarded with smiles and tones of love and approval, while other acts occasion frowns and tones of displeasure. Next, it perceives that whatever gives pleasure to itself and to others is called and , while whatever causes unpleasant feelings is called and . Moreover, it notices that there is a right and wrong way to hold its spoon, to use its playthings, to put on its clothes, and to do multitudes of other things. It thus perceives, more and more, that there is some to regulate the use and action of all things, both animate and inanimate, and that such rules always have reference to some plan or design. good right bad wrong rule As its faculties develop and its observation enlarges, the general impression is secured that plans and contrivances of men are designed to promote enjoyment or to prevent discomfort, and are called good and right just so far as this is done. At the same time, all that tend to discomfort or pain are called bad and wrong. all In all the works of nature around, too, every thing that promotes enjoyment is called good and right, and the opposite is called evil and wrong. At last there is a resulting feeling that the great design of all things is to secure good and prevent evil, and that whatever is opposed to this is wrong, and unfitted to the object for which all things exist. The question whether this impression is owing solely to observation or partly to mental constitution is waived as of little practical consequence. But, in the experience of infancy and childhood, the is speedily developed. It is perceived that much of the good to be gained, if sought to excess, occasions pain, so that there must be a certain amount of self-denial practiced, which, to the young novice, sometimes involves disappointment and discomfort. It is also seen that frequently two or more enjoyments are offered which are incompatible, so that one must be relinquished to gain the other. It is perceived, also, that there is a constant calculation going on as to which will be the —that is, which will secure . And the child is constantly instructed that it must avoid excess, and must give up what is of less value to secure the greater good. All this training involves which are more or less painful, so that a young child will sometimes cry as it voluntarily gives up one kind of pleasure as the only mode of securing what is preferred. law of sacrifice best the most good with the least evil sacrifices It is perceived, also, that there is a constant of good and evil, so that a given amount of enjoyment cancels or repays for a certain amount of evil. When a great amount of enjoyment is purchased by a small degree of labor or trouble, the is deemed a good, and called right; on the contrary, when the evil involved exceeds a given amount in comparison to the good, the compound result is called evil and wrong. balancing compound result Thus is generated the impression that there is a law of sacrifice instituted requiring the greatest possible good with the least possible evil, and that this is the great design of all things. The impression is, not merely that we are to seek enjoyment and avoid pain, but that we are to seek the good with the evil, and that in doing this we are to obey the law of sacrifice and suffering, by which the greatest possible good by a certain amount of evil assumed. greatest possible least possible is to be bought voluntarily In regard to this great law of sacrifice, the highest part of it is discerned in the earliest experiences of life. The young child very soon perceives that its mother and its other friends are constantly making sacrifices for its own good, and bearing inconveniences and trouble for the good of those around. And those who perform such acts of benevolent self-sacrifice are praised, and their conduct is called good and right. is discerned to be the highest kind of good and right conduct in the estimation of all. Voluntary suffering to promote the welfare of others The first feature, then, in our moral nature is that which furnishes us the means of deciding on the rectitude of all voluntary action. impression of the great design of our Creator The second feature of our moral constitution is what is ordinarily called the . It is that susceptibility which is excited at the view of the conduct of others as causes of good or evil. sense of justice voluntary In all cases where free agents act to promote happiness, an emotion of approval arises, together with a desire of reward to the author of the good. On the contrary, when there is a voluntary destruction of happiness, there is an emotion of disapproval and a desire for retributive pain on the author of the wrong. These emotions are instinctive, and not at all regulated by reason in their inception. When an evil is done, an instant desire is felt ; and when it is found, an instant desire is felt . So irrational is this impulse, that children will exhibit anger and deal blows on inanimate objects that cause pain. Even mature minds are sometimes conscious of this impulse. to discover the cause to inflict some penalty It is the office of the intellect to judge whether the deed was a voluntary one, whether the agent intended the mischief, and whether a penalty will be of any use. The impulse to punish is never preceded by any such calculations. That this impulse is an implanted part of our constitution, and not the result of reason and experience, is seen in the delight manifested by young children in the narration of the nursery tale where the cruel uncle who murdered the Babes in the Wood receives the retributions of Heaven. Another feature in this sense of justice is the demanded between the evil done and the penalty inflicted. That this also is instinctive, and not the result of reason, is seen in the nursery, where children will approve of slight penalties for slight offenses, and severe ones for great ones, but will revolt from any very great disproportion between the wrong act and its penalty. As a general rule, both in the nursery and in the great family of mature minds, the greater the wrong done, the stronger the desire for a penalty, and the more severe the punishment demanded. proportion Another very important point of consideration is the universal feeling of mankind that the for wrong-doing are , and that it is an act of love as well as of justice to add to these penalties. Thus the parent who forbids his child to eat green fruit will not trust to the results of the natural penalty, but restrain by the fear of the immediate and more easily conceived penalty of chastisement. natural penalties not sufficient So, in the great family of man, the natural penalties for theft are not deemed sufficient, but severe penalties for the protection of property are added. This particular is the foundation of certain distinctions that are of great importance, which will now be pointed out. We find the terms " and " used in two different relations. In the first and widest sense they signify not only the penalties of human law, but those which, by the constitution of nature, inevitably follow certain courses of conduct. reward punishment natural consequences Thus an indolent man is said to receive poverty as a punishment, and it is in this sense that his children are said to be punished for the faults of their father. The violations of natural law are punished without any reference to the question whether the evil-doer intended the wrong, or whether he sinned in ignorance, or whether this ignorance was involuntary and unavoidable. The question of the justice or injustice of such natural penalties involves the great question of the right and wrong of the system of the universe. Is it just and right for the Creator to make a system in which all free agents shall be thus led to obedience to its laws by penalties as well as rewards, by fear as well as by hope? This question will not be discussed here. Most discussions as to rewards and penalties ordinarily relate to the penalties by which parents, teachers, and magistrates enforce obedience to natural or to statute law. just added In these questions reference is always had to the of such rewards and penalties in securing obedience. If experience has shown that certain penalties do secure obedience to wise and good laws, either of nature or of human enactment, then they are considered just. If they do not, they are counted unwise and unjust. probable results So, if certain penalties are needlessly severe—that is to say, if a less penalty will secure equal obedience, then this also decides so severe a penalty to be unjust. In deciding on the rectitude of the penalties of human enactments, it is always assumed to be unjust to punish for any lack of knowledge and obedience when the subject had to know and to obey. If will not secure the act required of a free agent, then a penalty inflicted for disobedience is always regarded as unjust. The only seeming exception to this is the case where a person, by voluntary means, has deprived himself of ability to obey. But in such cases the punishment is felt to be right, not because he does not obey when he has no power, but because he has voluntarily deprived himself of this power. And he is punished for destroying his ability to obey, and not for violating the law. no power a choice to obey These things in human laws, then, are always demanded to make a penalty appear to the moral sense of mankind, namely, that the subject have power to obey, and that he has opportunity to know the law, and is not ignorant by any voluntary and improper neglect. just In all questions of justice, therefore, it is important to discriminate between those penalties that are inherent as a part of the great system of the universe, and for which the Creator alone is the responsible cause, and those which result from voluntary institutions of which men are the authors. In connection with this subject, it is important to recognize the distinction that exists in regard to two classes of right and wrong actions. The first class includes those which are wrong in their nature and in all supposable cases, such, for example, as the wanton infliction of needless pain, or the breach of plighted faith, or the returning of love and kindness with ungrateful treatment. In all possible suppositions, the mind revolts from such actions as wrong and deserving of penalties. It is this class of actions which, without any reasoning, the mind never fails to disapprove, and to desire should be visited with retributive penalties. The other class of right and wrong acts derive their estimate solely from the circumstances in which they occur. For example, a man is angry and beats a little child. Now the question whether his feelings and action are right or wrong depends entirely on circumstances. If the child has done no evil and the person knew it, his feelings and actions are wrong. But if the person is a father correcting his child for some heinous fault and with only a suitable degree of anger, then the feeling and action are right. There is another mode of estimating conduct by which the same act may have two opposite characters, according to the in which it is regarded. For example, a good parent may give wrong medicine to his child, or punish an innocent one, believing him to be guilty. relation In such cases the act is right as it respects the motive or intention, and wrong as it respects the nature of the action. It is sometimes the case that a man may do a right action with a bad motive, and a wrong action with a good motive. Thus the same act is right in one relation, and wrong in another. It is important that this distinction should be borne in mind. The next feature in our moral constitution is the susceptibility which is excited by the intellectual judgment of our own feelings and conduct as either right or wrong. In case we decide them to be right, we experience an emotion of self-approval which is very delightful; but if we decide that they are wrong, we experience an immediate penalty in a painful emotion called . This emotion is always proportioned to the amount of evil done, and the consciousness that it was done knowingly and intentionally. No suffering is more keen than the highest emotions of this kind, while their pangs are often enduring and unappeasable. Sometimes there is an attending desire to inflict retribution on one's self as a mode of alleviating this distress. remorse This susceptibility is usually denominated . Sometimes this word is used to include both the intellectual judgment of our conduct as right or wrong, and the consequent emotions of approval or remorse; sometimes it refers to the susceptibility alone. Either use is correct, as in the connection in which it is employed the distinction can ordinarily be easily made. conscience This analysis of our moral constitution furnishes means for a clear definition of such terms as , , , and the like. obligated ought ought not A person is obligated or ought to do a thing when he has the intellect to perceive that it is right, and the moral susceptibilities just described. When he is destitute either of the intellect or of these susceptibilities, he ceases to be a moral and accountable being. He can no longer be made to feel any moral obligations. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Catharine Esther Beecher (2017). Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/55531/pg55531-images.html This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at , located at . www.gutenberg.org https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html

THE MORAL SUSCEPTIBILITIES.

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