Table of Links Abstract and 1. Introduction Abstract and 1. Introduction 1.1 Our Approach 1.1 Our Approach 1.2 Our Results & Roadmap 1.2 Our Results & Roadmap 1.3 Related Work 1.3 Related Work Model and Warmup and 2.1 Blockchain Model
2.2 The Miner
2.3 Game Model
2.4 Warm Up: The Greedy Allocation Function


The Deterministic Case and 3.1 Deterministic Upper Bound
3.2 The Immediacy-Biased Class Of Allocation Function


The Randomized Case


Discussion and References Model and Warmup and 2.1 Blockchain Model
2.2 The Miner
2.3 Game Model
2.4 Warm Up: The Greedy Allocation Function Model and Warmup and 2.1 Blockchain Model Model and Warmup and 2.1 Blockchain Model 2.2 The Miner 2.2 The Miner 2.3 Game Model 2.3 Game Model 2.4 Warm Up: The Greedy Allocation Function 2.4 Warm Up: The Greedy Allocation Function The Deterministic Case and 3.1 Deterministic Upper Bound
3.2 The Immediacy-Biased Class Of Allocation Function The Deterministic Case and 3.1 Deterministic Upper Bound The Deterministic Case and 3.1 Deterministic Upper Bound 3.2 The Immediacy-Biased Class Of Allocation Function 3.2 The Immediacy-Biased Class Of Allocation Function The Randomized Case The Randomized Case The Randomized Case Discussion and References Discussion and References Discussion and References A. Missing Proofs for Sections 2, 3
B. Missing Proofs for Section 4
C. Glossary A. Missing Proofs for Sections 2, 3 A. Missing Proofs for Sections 2, 3 B. Missing Proofs for Section 4 B. Missing Proofs for Section 4 C. Glossary C. Glossary A: Missing Proofs for Sections 2, 3 We now note that a few facts that hold true for any n when x1 ≥ ℓ + ϵ: We separate to several subcases: B Missing Proofs for Section 4 We now compare ALG and ADV ’s performance in different steps along the adversary schedule, separating the steps before n and the last two steps. ALG ADV Step i < n. Step i < n. ALG expected performance: ALG Notice that this amortization of considering the i + 1 is only relevant for ADV, as ALG in such case necessarily has no transactions remaining to choose from at step i + 1. i ADV ALG i where the last transition is since for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the expression We now move on to analyze steps n, n + 1. n, n ALG expected performance at step n, n + 1: n, n As the base case, consider k = n. Then, k n For the inductive step, We thus need to show that With this potential function, we can thus write at step i, i C Glossary A summary of all symbols and acronyms used in the paper. C.1 Symbols ψ Transaction schedule function. ψ x Allocation function. x B Predefined maximal block-size, in bytes. B λ Miner discount factor. λ ϕ Transaction fee of some transaction, in tokens. ϕ T Miner planning horizon. T ℓ Immediacy ratio for our non-myopic allocation rule. µ TTL of past transactions. µ α Miner’s relative mining power, as a fraction. u Miner revenue. α t TTL of a transaction. t tx A transaction. tx C.2 Acronyms mempool memory pool mempool PoS Proof-of-Stake PoS PoW Proof-of-Work PoW QoS quality of service QoS TFM transaction fee mechanism TFM TTL time to live TTL Authors:
(1) Yotam Gafni, Weizmann Institute (yotam.gafni@gmail.com);
(2) Aviv Yaish, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (aviv.yaish@mail.huji.ac.il). Authors: Authors: (1) Yotam Gafni, Weizmann Institute (yotam.gafni@gmail.com); (2) Aviv Yaish, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (aviv.yaish@mail.huji.ac.il). This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv available on arxiv [2] The argument of [CCFJST06] is done by showing conditions that hold for any fixed x ∈ [−1, 0], and so they hold for any fixed x ∈ [−λ, 0] as well.

Part of HackerNoon's growing list of open-source research papers, promoting free access to academic material.

The Math Behind Blockchain Scheduling and Transaction Fee Mechanisms

About Author

Comments

TOPICS

THIS ARTICLE WAS FEATURED IN

Related Stories

15 Common Types of Unethical Behavior Found in Open-Source Projects

Modeling Miner Incentives in Discounted Transaction Fee Mechanisms

The Algorithmic Evolution of Blockchain Fee Design

How Auction Theory Shapes Smarter Blockchain Transaction Fee Models

How the Greedy Algorithm Shapes Miner Rewards in Blockchain Networks

Why “Immediacy Bias” Might Be the Secret to Faster, Smarter Blockchain Transactions

15 Common Types of Unethical Behavior Found in Open-Source Projects

Modeling Miner Incentives in Discounted Transaction Fee Mechanisms

The Algorithmic Evolution of Blockchain Fee Design

How Auction Theory Shapes Smarter Blockchain Transaction Fee Models

How the Greedy Algorithm Shapes Miner Rewards in Blockchain Networks

Why “Immediacy Bias” Might Be the Secret to Faster, Smarter Blockchain Transactions

Light-Mode

Classic

Newspaper

Minty

Dark-Mode

Neon Noir

Minty

HN StartUps