How the first round of FOMO3D was won is a type of attack in where an attacker submits transactions that deliberately fill up the block’s gas limit and stall other transactions. To ensure inclusion of their transactions by miners, the attacker can choose to pay higher transaction fees. By controlling the amount of gas spent by their transactions, the attacker can influence the number of transactions that get to be included in the block. Block stuffing blockchains To control the amount of gas spent by the transaction, the attacker utilizes a special contract. There is a function in the contract which takes as input the amount of gas that the attacker wants to burn. The function runs meaningless instructions in a loop, and either returns or throws an error when the desired amount is burned. For example let’s say that the average gas price has been 5 Gwei in the last 10 blocks. In order to exert influence over the next block, the attacker needs to submit transactions with gas prices higher than that, say 100 Gwei. The higher the gas price, the higher the chance of inclusion by miners. The attacker can choose to divide the task of using 8,000,000 gas — current gas limit for blocks — into as many transactions as they want. This could be 80 transactions with 100,000 gas expenditure, or 4 transactions with 2,000,000 gas expenditure. Deciding on how to divide the task is a matter of maximizing the chance of inclusion, and depends on the factors outline below. Miners’ strategy for selecting transactions Miners want to maximize their profit by including transactions with highest fees. In the current PoW implementation of Ethereum, mining the block takes significantly more time than executing the transactions. So let’s assume all transactions in the pool are trivially executed as soon as they arrive and miners know the amount of gas each one uses. For miners, maximizing profit is an . Miners want to choose a subset of the transaction pool that gives them maximum profit per block. Since there are at least tens of thousands of transactions in the pool at any given time, the problem can’t be solved by brute-forcing every combination. Miners use algorithms that test a feasible number of combinations and select the one giving the highest reward. optimum packing problem A block stuffer’s main goal is to target the selection process by crafting a set of transactions that has the highest chance of being picked up by miners in a way that will deplete blocks’ gas limits. They can’t devise a 100% guaranteed strategy since each miner can use a different algorithm, but they can find a sweet spot by testing out the whole network. (In a PoS system, our assumptions would be wrong since executing transactions is not trivial compared to validating blocks. Validators would need to develop more complex strategies depending on the PoS implementation.) The transactions the attacker wants to stall: It could be so that the attacker wants to stall transactions with a specific contract. If the function calls to that contract use a distinctively high amount of gas, say between 300,000 and 500,000, then the attacker has to stuff the block in a way that targets that range. For example, the attacker can periodically submit n transactions with very high prices where {T₁, T₂,…, Tₙ₋₁, Tₙ} If the attacker is targeting transactions within a range of , they can choose the first transactions to deplete gas in short steps, and submit to deplete the remaining gas with a relatively higher price. Note that the revenue from including a single transaction is (R_lower, R_upper) n-1 8,000,000 -R_upper Tₙ R_upper As gas usage decreases, the probability of being picked up by miners decreases, so prices should increase to compensate. Example: Fomo3D is a gambling game where players buy keys from a contract and their money goes into a pot. At the beginning of each round, a time counter is initiated which starts counting back from 24 hours. Each bought key adds 30 seconds to the counter. When the counter hits 0, the last player to have bought a key wins the majority of the pot and the rest is distributed to others. The way the pot is distributed depends on the team that the winner belongs to. Fomo3D Key price increases with increasing key supply, which makes it harder and harder to buy a key and ensures the round will end after some point. In time, the stakes increase and the counter reduces to a minimum, like 2 minutes. At this point, the players pay both high gas and key prices to be “it” and win the game. Players bots to buy keys for them, and winning becomes a matter of coding the right strategy. As you can understand from the subject, the first round was won through a block stuffing attack. program On August 22 2018, the address won 10,469 ETH from the first round by following the strategy I outlined above. The winner managed to be the last buyer in block and managed to stall transactions with Fomo3D until block for 175 seconds, ending the round. Some details: 0xa16…f85 6191896 6191909 Fomo3D Long contract address: 0xA62…Da1 Last transaction by the winner before the attack starts: 0x7a0…349 Transaction ending the round and firing the event which distributes the pot: onBuyAndDistribute 0xa14…012 Transaction where winner withdraws the prize: 0xe08…508 Contract used for block stuffing: 0x18e…801 Other addresses possibly belonging to the winner: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 0x3c3…f27 0xc6a…3e2 0x81e…0ac 0xc96…590 0xd27…642 0x18d…a9a 0x87c…4ef 0x9da…0cf 0x7dd…c4c 0xb1d…aef 0x1a6…d56 0xf6e…059 0x1dd…a69 0x061…63b 0x00c…776 0xa94…eb8 0xf03…1f2 Other contracts possibly deployed by the winner for testing prior to the attack: , , , , 0xaf1…eae 0x0c0…5ad 0x88e…d04 0x4f4…6f8 0x487…4e5 The user addresses above were scraped from the Ethereum transaction graph as being linked to a primary account which supplied them with funds. The contract addresses were scraped from 0-valued transactions sent from user addresses. These have a of 1, there may be other addresses involved with greater distances. distance Below are details of the last 4 blocks preceding the end of the round. The rows highlighted with yellow are transactions submitted by the attacker. The crossed out rows are failed transactions. All transactions by the attacker were submitted with a 501 Gwei gas price, and stuffing a single block costed around 4 ETH. The calls to buy keys generally spend around 300,000~500,000 gas, depending on which function was called. Below, you see the successfully stuffed block 6191906. . Block 6191906 View the original post it if you want clickable addresses. Block 6191907 was a close call for the winner, because their transactions picked up for the block did not amount up to 8,000,000 and the other transaction was a call to Fomo3D by an opponent to buy keys. Note that it has a gas price of 5559 Gwei, which means either the bot or person who submitted the transaction was presumably aware of the attack. The transaction failed due to low gas limit, presumably due to a miscalculation by the bot or the person. Block 6191907 Transactions in block 6191908 belonged to the attacker except for one irrelevant transfer. This block is also considered successfully stuffed, since the 7,970,000 gas usage by the attacker leaves no space for a call to buy keys. Block 6191908 By block 6191909, the counter has struck zero — more like current UTC time surpassed the round end variable stored in the contract — and any call to Fomo3D would be the one to end the round and distribute the pot. And the first transaction in the block is — wait for it — a call to Fomo3D to buy keys by the opponent whose transaction failed a few blocks earlier, submitted with 5562 Gwei. So the guy basically paid 1.7 ETH to declare the attacker the winner! Block 6191909 Another thing to note is that the attacker probably crafted the spender contract to stop the attack when the round has ended, presumably to cut costs. So the 37,633 gas used by the contract are probably to call the Fomo3D contract to check round status. All these point out to the fact that the attacker is an experienced programmer who knows their way around Ethereum. , you can see the details of the 100 blocks preceding the end of the round, with the additional information of ABI calls and events fired in transactions. Here Since the end of the first round, 2 more rounds ended with attacks similar to this one. I didn’t analyze all of them because it’s too much for this post, but here are some details if you want to do it yourselves. View the original post it if you want clickable addresses. A thing to note in the following rounds is that participation in the game and amount of pot gradually decreased, presumably owing to the fact that the way of beating the game has been systematized. Although anyone can attempt such an attack, knowing how it will be won takes the “fun” factor out of it. Credit: Although I’ve found previous instances of the term “block stuffing” online, Nic Carter is the first one to use it in this context. Originally published at osolmaz.com on October 18, 2018. Visit it if you want clickable addresses in tables.

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