Table of Links Abstract and 1. Introduction Abstract and 1. Introduction Related Work


Preliminaries
3.1 TFMs: Desirable Properties
3.2 Groves’ Redistribution Mechanism (RM)


IDEAL-TFRM: Impossibility of Achieving Strictly Positive Redistribution Index


Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanism (TFRM)


R-TFRM: A TFRM Robust to Miner Manipulation
6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue


R2-TFRM: Robust and Rational TFRM


Conclusion and References Related Work Related Work Related Work Preliminaries
3.1 TFMs: Desirable Properties
3.2 Groves’ Redistribution Mechanism (RM) Preliminaries Preliminaries 3.1 TFMs: Desirable Properties 3.1 TFMs: Desirable Properties 3.2 Groves’ Redistribution Mechanism (RM) 3.2 Groves’ Redistribution Mechanism (RM) IDEAL-TFRM: Impossibility of Achieving Strictly Positive Redistribution Index IDEAL-TFRM: Impossibility of Achieving Strictly Positive Redistribution Index IDEAL-TFRM: Impossibility of Achieving Strictly Positive Redistribution Index Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanism (TFRM) Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanism (TFRM) Transaction Fee Redistribution Mechanism (TFRM) R-TFRM: A TFRM Robust to Miner Manipulation
6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue R-TFRM: A TFRM Robust to Miner Manipulation R-TFRM: A TFRM Robust to Miner Manipulation 6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue 6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue R2-TFRM: Robust and Rational TFRM R2-TFRM: Robust and Rational TFRM R2-TFRM: Robust and Rational TFRM Conclusion and References Conclusion and References Conclusion and References A. Proofs for Results from Section 4 and 5 A. Proofs for Results from Section 4 and 5 B. Proofs for Results from Section 6 B. Proofs for Results from Section 6 C. Proofs for Results from Section 7 C. Proofs for Results from Section 7 6 R-TFRM: A TFRM ROBUST TO MINER MANIPULATION Using Claims 3 and 4, we reformulate the linear program in Figure 3 so that it is independent of the bid vectors. Figure 4 presents this reformulated LP. Optimal worst-case Redistribution Fraction. We next provide the analytical solution to the linear program in Figure 4 and thereby also state the optimal worst-case fraction redistributed. Optimal worst-case Redistribution Fraction. 6.1 R-TFRM: Analyzing Impact of Miner Manipulation on Rebate and Miner Revenue From Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we see that in R-TFRM, the fraction of payments redistributed to the top-k users, i.e., 𝑘/𝑛, is the same for honest and strategic miner. This implies that R-TFRM is resilient to miner manipulation while being worst-case optimal. Authors:
(1) Sankarshan Damle, IIIT, Hyderabad, Hyderbad, India (sankarshan.damle@research.iiit.ac.in);
(2) Manisha Padala, IISc, Bangalore, Bangalore, India (manishap@iisc.ac.in);
(3) Sujit Gujar, IIIT, Hyderabad, Hyderbad, India (sujit.gujar@iiit.ac.in). Authors: Authors: (1) Sankarshan Damle, IIIT, Hyderabad, Hyderbad, India (sankarshan.damle@research.iiit.ac.in); (2) Manisha Padala, IISc, Bangalore, Bangalore, India (manishap@iisc.ac.in); (3) Sujit Gujar, IIIT, Hyderabad, Hyderbad, India (sujit.gujar@iiit.ac.in). This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv available on arxiv

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Protecting Rebates from Miner Games with R-TFRM

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