This story draft by @escholar has not been reviewed by an editor, YET.
Authors:
(1) Nicholas A. G. Johnson ([email protected]);
(2) Theo Diamandis ([email protected]);
(3) Alex Evans ([email protected]);
(4) Henry de Valence ([email protected]);
(5) Guillermo Angeris ([email protected]).
1.1 Symmetric pure strict equilibrium
2 Batched decentralized exchanges
We introduced concave pro-rata games and established several useful properties under relatively mild conditions. In particular, we showed the existence of a unique equilibrium that is symmetric and pure. This equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a single variable, unimodal optimization problem. We further established that the price of anarchy is Ω(n) in the number of players, relative to the optimal ‘fair’ allocation. We illustrated how concave pro-rata games connect to a recent proposal for a batched decentralized exchange and numerically studied the behavior of agents engaged in such a game in the iterated setting for a specific form of utility function. Future work includes further study of the optimal arbitrage problem for batched decentralized exchanges.
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This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license.