The Theory of Psychoanalysis by C. G. Jung, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book here. CHAPTER II
The precocious manifestations of sexual phantasy as cause of the shock now seemed to be the source of neurosis. This, logically, attributed to children a far more developed sexuality than had been hitherto admitted. Many cases of precocious sexuality had been recorded in literature long before the time of psychoanalysis. For instance, a girl of two years old with normal menstruation, or cases of boys of three and four and five years of age having normal erections, and so far ready for cohabitation. These were, however, curiosities. Great astonishment was caused when Freud began to attribute to the child, not only ordinary sexuality, but even polymorphic perverse sexuality; all this based upon the most exhaustive investigation. People inclined much too lightly to the superficial view, that all this was merely suggested to the patients, and was a highly disputable artificial product. Hence Freud’s[4] “Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory” not only provoked opposition, but even violent indignation. It is surely unnecessary to insist upon the fact that science is not furthered by indignation, and that arguments of moral resentment may perhaps please the moralist—that is his business—but not a scientific man, for whom truth must be the guide, and not moral indignation. If matters are really as Freud describes them, all indignation is absurd; if they are not so, again indignation will avail nothing. The conclusion as to what is the truth can only be arrived at on the field of observation and research, and nowhere else. The opponents of psychoanalysis with certain honorable exceptions, display rather ludicrously a somewhat pitifully inadequate realization of the situation. Although the psychoanalytic school could unfortunately learn nothing from their critics, as the criticism took no notice of its investigations, and although it could not get any useful hints, because the psychoanalytic method of investigation was, and still is unknown to these critics, it remains a serious duty for our school to explain thoroughly the contrast between the existing conceptions. It is not our endeavor to put forward a paradoxical theory contradicting all existing theories, but rather to introduce a certain category of new observations into science. Therefore we regard it as a duty to do whatever we can to promote agreement. It is true, we must renounce all hope of obtaining the approval of those who blindly oppose us, but we do hope to come to an understanding with scientific men. This will be my endeavor now in attempting to sketch the further intellectual development of the psychoanalytic conception, so far as the so-called sexual theory of the neuroses is concerned.
As I said, the finding of precocious sexual phantasies, which seemed the source of the neurosis, forced Freud to the view of a highly developed sexuality in infancy. As you know, the reality of this observation has been contested by many, who maintain that crude error, that narrow-minded delusion, misled Freud and his whole school, alike in Europe and in America, so that the Freudians saw things that never existed. They regarded them as people in the grip of an intellectual epidemic. I have to admit that I possess no way of defending myself against criticism of this kind. The only thing I can do is to refer to my own work, asking thoughtful persons if they discover there any clear indications of madness. Moreover, I must maintain that science has no right to start with the idea that certain facts do not exist. At the most one can say: “This seems very improbable—we want still more proofs and more research.” This is also our reply to the objection: “It is impossible to discover anything trustworthy by the psychoanalytic method, as this method is practically absurd.” No one believed in Galileo’s telescope, and Columbus discovered America on a false hypothesis. The psychoanalytic method may be full of errors, but this should not prevent its use. Many chronological and medical observations have been made with inadequate instruments. We must regard the objections to the method as pretexts until our opponents come to grip with the facts. It is there a decision must be reached—not by wordy warfare.
Our opponents also call hysteria a psychogenic disease. We believe that we have discovered the etiological determinants of this disease and we present, without fear, the results of our investigation to open criticism. Whoever cannot accept our results should publish his own analyses of cases. So far as I know, that has never been done, at least not in European literature. Under these circumstances, critics have no right to deny our conclusions a priori. Our opponents have likewise cases of hysteria, and those cases are surely as psychogenic as our own. There is nothing to prevent their pointing out the psychological determinants. The method is not the real question. Our opponents content themselves with disputing and reviling our researches, but they do not point out any better way.
Many other critics are more careful and more just, and do admit that we have made many valuable observations, and that the associations of ideas given by the psychoanalytic method will very probably stand, but they maintain that our point of view is wrong. The alleged sexual phantasies of childhood, with which we are here chiefly concerned, must not be taken, they say, as real sexual functions, being obviously something quite different, since at the approach of puberty the characteristic peculiarities of sexuality are acquired.
This objection, being calmly and reasonably made, deserves to be taken seriously. Such objections must also have occurred to every one who has taken up analytic work, and there is reason enough for deep reflection.
The first difficulty arises with the conception of sexuality. If we take sexuality as meaning the fully-developed function, we must confine this phenomenon to maturity, and then, of course, we have no right to speak of sexuality in childhood. If we so limit our conception, then we are confronted again with new and much greater difficulties. The question arises, how then must we denominate all those correlated biological phenomena pertaining to the sexual functions sensu strictiori, as, for instance, pregnancy, childbirth, natural selection, protection of the offspring, etc. It seems to me that all this belongs to the conception of sexuality as well, although a very distinguished colleague did once say, “Childbirth is not a sexual act.” But if these things do pertain to this concept of sexuality, then there must also belong innumerable psychological phenomena. For we know that an incredible number of the pure psychological functions are connected with this sphere. I shall only mention the extraordinary importance of phantasy in the preparation for the sexual function. Thus we arrive rather at a biological conception of sexuality, which includes both a series of psychological phenomena as well as a series of physiological functions. If we might be allowed to make use of an old but practical classification, we might identify sexuality with the so-called instinct of the preservation of the species, as opposed in some way to the instinct of self-preservation.
Looking at sexuality from this point of view, we shall not be astonished to find that the root of the instinct of race-preservation, so extraordinarily important in nature, goes much deeper than the limited conception of sexuality would ever allow. Only the more or less grown-up cat actually catches mice, but the kitten plays at least as if it were catching mice. The young dog’s playful indications of attempts at cohabitation begin long before puberty. We have a right to suppose that mankind is no exception to this rule, although we do not notice similar things on the surface in our well brought-up children. Investigation of the children of the lower classes proves that they are no exceptions to the biological rule. It is of course infinitely more probable that this most important instinct, that of the preservation of the race, is already nascent in the earliest childhood, than that it falls at one swoop from heaven, full-fledged, at the age of puberty. The sexual organs also develop long before the slightest sign of their future function can be noticed. Where the psychoanalytic school speaks of sexuality, this wider conception of its function must be linked to it, and we do not mean simply that physical sensation and function generally designated by the term sexual. It might be said that, in order to avoid any misunderstanding on this point, the term sexuality should not be given to these preparatory phenomena in childhood. This demand is surely not justified, since the anatomical nomenclature is taken from the fully-developed system, and special names are not generally given to more or less rudimentary formations.
After all, the objections to the terminology do not spring so much from objective arguments, as from those tendencies which lie at the base of moral indignation. But then no objection can be made to the sex-terminology of Freud, as he rightly gives to the whole sexual development the general name of sexuality. But certain conclusions have been drawn which, so far as I can see, cannot be maintained.
When we examine how far back in childhood the first traces of sexuality reach, we have to admit implicitly that sexuality already exists ab ovo, but only becomes manifest a long time after intrauterine life. Freud is inclined to see in the function of taking the mother’s breast already a kind of sexuality. Freud was bitterly reproached for this view, but it must be admitted that it is very ingenious, if we follow his hypothesis, that the instinct of the preservation of the race has existed separately from the instinct of self-preservation ab ovo and has undergone a separate development. This way of thinking is not, however, a biological one. It is not possible to separate the two ways of manifestation of the hypothetical vital process, and to credit each with a different order of development. If we limit ourselves to judging by what we can actually observe, we must reckon with the fact that everywhere in nature we see that the vital processes in an individual consist for a considerable space of time in the functions of nutrition and growth only. We see this very clearly in many animals; for instance, in butterflies, which as caterpillars pass an asexual existence of nutrition and growth. To this stage of life we may allot both the intrauterine life and the extrauterine time of suckling in man. This time is marked by the absence of all sexual function; hence to speak of manifest sexuality in the suckling would be a contradictio in adjecto.
The most we can do is to ask if, among the life-functions of the suckling, there are any that have not the character of nutrition, or of growth, and hence could be termed sexual. Freud points out the unmistakable emotion and satisfaction of the child while suckling, and compares this process with that of the sexual act. This similarity leads him to assume the sexual quality in the act of suckling. This conclusion is only admissible if it can be proved that the tension of the need, and its gratification by a release, is a sexual process. That the act of suckling has this emotional mechanism proves, however, just the contrary. Therefore we can only say this emotional mechanism is found both in nutrition and in the sexual function. If Freud by analogy deduces the sexual quality of sucking from this emotional mechanism, then his biological empiricism would also justify the terminology qualifying the sexual act as a function of nutrition. This is unjustifiably exceeding the bounds in either case. It is evident that the act of sucking cannot be qualified as sexual.
We are aware, however, of functions in the suckling stage which have apparently nothing to do with the function of nutrition, such as sucking the finger, and its many variations. This is perhaps the place to discuss whether these things belong to the sexual sphere. These acts do not subserve nutrition, but produce pleasure. Of that there is no doubt, but nevertheless it is disputable whether this pleasure which comes by sucking should be called by analogy a sexual satisfaction. It might be called equally pleasure by nutrition. This latter qualification has even the further justification that the form and kind of pleasure belong entirely to the function of nutrition. The hand which is used for sucking finds in this way preparation for future use in feeding one’s self. Under these circumstances nobody will be inclined by a petitio principii to characterize the first manifestation of human life as sexual. The statement which we make that the act of sucking is attended by a feeling of satisfaction leaves us in doubt whether the sucking does contain anything else but the character of nutrition. We notice that the so-called bad habits shown by a child as it grows up are closely linked with early infantile sucking, such for instance as putting the finger in the mouth, biting the nails, picking the nose, ears, etc. We see, too, how closely these habits are connected with later masturbation. By analogy, the conclusion that these infantile habits are the first step to onanism, or to actions similar to onanism, and are therefore of a well-marked sexual character cannot be denied: it is perfectly justified. I have seen many cases in which a correlation existed between these childish habits and later masturbation. If this masturbation takes place in later childhood, before puberty, it is nothing but an infantile bad habit. From the fact of the correlation between masturbation and the other childish bad habits, we conclude that these habits have a sexual character, in so far as they are used to obtain physical satisfaction from the child’s own body.
This new standpoint is comprehensible and perhaps necessary. It is only a few steps from this point of view to regarding the infant’s act of sucking as of a sexual character. As you know, Freud took the few steps, but you have just heard me reject them. We have come to a difficulty which is very hard to solve. It would be relatively easy if we could accept two instincts side by side, each an entity in itself. Then the act of sucking the breast would be both an action of nutrition and a sexual act. This seems to be Freud’s conception. We find in adults the two instincts separated, yet existing side by side, or rather we find that there are two manifestations, in hunger, and in the sexual instinct. But at the sucking age, we find only the function of nutrition, rewarded by both pleasure and satisfaction. Its sexual character can only be argued by a petitio principii, for the facts show that the act of sucking is the first to give pleasure, not the sexual function. Obtaining pleasure is by no means identical with sexuality. We deceive ourselves if we think that in the suckling both instincts exist side by side, for then we project into the psyche of the child the facts taken from the psychology of adults. The existence of the two instincts side by side does not occur in suckling, for one of these instincts has no existence as yet, or, if existing, is quite rudimentary. If we are to regard the striving for pleasure as something sexual, we might as well say paradoxically that hunger is a sexual striving, for this instinct seeks pleasure by satisfaction. If this were true, we should have to give our opponents permission to apply the terminology of hunger to sexuality. It would facilitate matters, were it possible to maintain that both instincts existed side by side, but it contradicts the observed facts and would lead to untenable consequences.
Before I try to resolve this opposition, I must first say something more about Freud’s sexual theory, and its transformations.
We have already reached the conclusion, setting out from the idea of the shock being apparently due to sexual phantasies, that the child must have, in contradiction to the views hitherto prevailing, a nearly fully formed sexuality, and even a polymorphic perverse sexuality. Its sexuality does not seem concentrated on the genital functions or on the other sex, but is occupied with its own body; whence it is said to be auto-erotic. If its sexual instinct is directed to another person, no distinction, or but the very slightest, is made as to sex. It can, therefore, be very easily homo-sexual. In place of non-existing local sexual function there exists a series of so-called bad habits, which from this standpoint look like a series of perversities, since they have the closest analogy with the later perversities. In consequence of this way of regarding the subject, sexuality, whose nature is ordinarily regarded as a unit, becomes decomposed into a multiplicity of isolated striving forces. Freud then arrived at the conception of the so-called “erogenous zones,” by which he understood mouth, skin, anus, etc. (It is, of course, a universal tacit presumption that sexuality has its origin in the sexual organs.)
The term “erogenous zone” reminds us of “spasmo-genic zones,” and the underlying image is at all events the same; just as the spasmo-genic zone is the place whence the spasm arises, so the erogenous zone is the place whence arises an affluent to sexuality. Based upon the model of the genital organs as the anatomical origin of sexuality, the erogenous zones must be conceived as being so many genitals out of which the streams of sexuality flow together. This is the condition of the polymorphic perverse sexuality of childhood. The expression “perverse” seems to be justified by the close analogy with the later perversities which present, so to speak, but a new edition of certain early infantile perverse habits. They are very often connected with one or other of the different erogenous zones, and are the cause of those exchanges in sex, which are so characteristic for childhood.
According to this view, the later normal and monomorphic sexuality is built up out of several components. The first division is into homo- and hetero-sexual components, to which is linked an auto-erotic component, as also there are components of the different erogenous zones. This conception can be compared with the position of physics before Robert Mayer, when only isolated forces, having elementary qualities, were recognized, whose interchanges were little understood. The law of the conservation of energy brought order into the inter-relationship of the forces, at the same time abolishing the conception of those forces as absolute elements, but regarding them as interchangeable manifestations of one and the same energy.
Conceptions of great importance do not arise only in one brain, but are floating in the air and dip here and there, appearing even under other forms, and in other regions, where it is often very difficult to recognize the common fundamental idea. Thus it happened with the splitting up of sexuality into the polymorphic perverse sexuality of childhood.
Experience forces us to accept a constant exchange of isolated components as we notice more and more that, for instance, perversities exist at the expense of normal sexuality, or that the increase of certain kinds of sex-manifestations causes corresponding deficiencies of another kind. To make the matter clearer, let me give you an instance: A young man had a homo-sexual phase lasting for some years, during which time women had no interest for him. This abnormal condition changed gradually toward his twentieth year and his erotic interest became more and more normal. He began to take great interest in girls, and soon the last traces of his homo-sexuality were conquered. This condition lasted several years, and he had some successful love-affairs. Then he wished to get married; he had here to suffer a great disappointment, as the girl to whom he proposed refused him. During the ensuing phase he absolutely abandoned the idea of marriage. After that he experienced a dislike of all women, and one day he discovered that he was again perfectly homo-sexual, that is, young men had an unusually irritating influence upon him. To regard sexuality as composed of a fixed hetero-sexual component, and a like homo-sexual element, will never suffice to explain this case, for the conception of the existence of fixed components excludes any kind of transformation.
To understand the case, we have to admit a great mobility of the sexual components, which even goes so far that one of the components can practically disappear completely, whilst the other comes to the front. If only substitution took place, if for instance the homo-sexual component entered the unconscious, leaving the field of consciousness to the hetero-sexual component, modern scientific knowledge would lead us to conclude that equivalent effects arose from the unconscious sphere. Those effects would have to be conceived as resistances against the activity of the hetero-sexual component, as a repugnance towards women.
Experience tells us nothing about this. There have been some small traces of influences of this kind, but of such slight intensity that they cannot be compared with the intensity of the former homo-sexual component. On the conception that has been outlined, it is also incomprehensible how this homo-sexual component, regarded as so firmly fixed, can ever disappear without leaving active traces. To explain things, the process of development is called in, forgetting that this is only a word and explains nothing. You see, therefore, the urgent necessity of an adequate explanation of such a change of scene. For this we must have a dynamic hypothesis. Such commutations are only conceivable as dynamic or energic processes. I cannot conceive how manifestations of functions can disappear if I do not accept a change in the relation of one force to another. Freud’s theory did have regard to this necessity in the conception of components. The presumption of isolated functions existing side by side began to be somewhat weakened, more in practice than theoretically. It was replaced by an energic conception. The term chosen for this conception is “libido.”
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