It is the power of choice

Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People by Catharine Esther Beecher, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book . THE WILL. here CHAPTER XVIII. THE WILL. It is the which raises man to the dignity of an intellectual and moral being. Without this principle, he would be a creature of mere impulses and instincts. He would possess susceptibilities of happiness to be excited, and intellect to devise and discover the modes of securing enjoyment; but without governing principle, the soul would be led captive with each successive desire, or be the sport of chances whenever conflicting desires were awakened. power of choice He who formed man in his own perfect image left not his work without this balance-power to regulate the complicated springs of so wonderful an existence. Man is now not only the image of his Creator as lord of this lower world, but is, like him, the lord and master of his own powers. It has been shown that the constitution, both of mind and of the world, is such that it is impossible in the nature of things to gain every object which is the cause of enjoyment. There is a constant succession of selections to be made between different modes of securing happiness. A lesser good is given up for a greater, or some good relinquished altogether to avoid some consequent pain. Often, also, some painful state of mind is sought as the means of securing some future good, or of avoiding some greater evil. Thus men endure want, fatigue, and famine to purchase wealth. Thus the nauseous draught will be swallowed to avoid the pains of sickness; and thus the pleasures of domestic affection will be sacrificed to obtain honor and fame. The whole course of life is a constant succession of such decisions between different modes of securing happiness and of avoiding pain. Specific and Generic Volitions. In noticing the operation of mind, it will be seen that there is a foundation for two classes of volitions or acts of choice, which may be denominated and . specific generic A is one that secures some particular act, such as the moving of the arm or turning of the head. Such volitions are ordinarily consequent on some more general purpose of the mind, which they aid in accomplishing, and which is, therefore, denominated a . For example, a man chooses to make a certain journey: this is the generic volition, and, in order to carry it out, he performs a great variety of acts, each one of which aids in carrying out the generic decision. These specific acts of will, which tend to accomplish a more general purpose, may also be called , because they are controlled by a generic volition. specific volition generic volition subordinate It can be seen that the generic volitions may themselves become subordinate to a still more comprehensive purpose. Thus the man may decide to make a journey, which is a generic volition in reference to all acts subordinate to this end. But this journey may be a subordinate part of a more general purpose to make a fortune or to secure some other important end. It is frequently the case that a generic purpose, which relates to objects that require a long time and many complicated operations, exists when the mind seems almost unconscious of its power. For example, a man may form a generic purpose to enter a profession for which years will be required to prepare. And while his whole course of action is regulated by this decision, he engages in pursuits entirely foreign to it and which seem to engross his whole attention. These pursuits may sometimes be such as are antagonistic to his grand purpose, so as at least to imperil or retard its accomplishment. And yet this strong and quiet purpose remains, and is eventually carried out. It is the case, also, that a generic volition may be formed to be performed at some particular time and place, and then the mind becomes entirely unconscious of it till the appointed period and circumstances occur. Then the decision becomes dominant, and controls all other purposes. Thus a man may decide that, at a specified hour, he will stop his studies and perform certain gymnastic exercises. This volition is forgotten until the hour arrives, and then it recurs and is carried out. This phenomenon sometimes occurs in sleep. Some persons, in watching with the sick, will determine to wake at given hours to administer medicines; then they will sleep soundly till the appointed time comes, when they will waken and perform the predetermined actions. In regard to the of a generic purpose, we find that sometimes it is so distinct and definite as to be the subject of consciousness and memory. For example, a spendthrift, in some moment of suffering and despondency, may form a determination to commence a systematic course of thrift and economy, and may actually carry it out through all his future life. Such cases are often to be found on record or in everyday life. commencement In other cases, this quiet, hidden, but controlling purpose seems to be formed by unconscious and imperceptible influences, so that the mind can not revert to the specific time or manner when it originated. For example, a child who is trained from early life to speak the truth, can never revert to any particular moment when this generic purpose originated. It is sometimes the case, also, that a person will contemplate some generic volition before it occurs, while the process of its final formation seems almost beyond the power of scrutiny. For example, a man may be urged to relinquish one employment and engage in another. He reflects, consults, and is entirely uncertain how he shall decide. As time passes, he gradually inclines toward the proposed change, until, finally, he finds his determination fixed, he scarcely knows when or how. Thus it appears that generic volitions commence sometimes so instantaneously and obviously that the time and influences connected with them can be recognized. In other cases, the decision seems to be a gradual one, while in some instances the process can be traced, and in others it is entirely unnoticed or forgotten. It is in reference to such generic purposes that the of men is estimated. An honest man is one who has a fixed purpose to act honestly in all circumstances. A truthful man is one who has such a purpose to speak the truth at all times. moral character In such cases, the degree in which such a purpose controls all others is the measure of a man's moral character in the estimate of society. The history of mankind shows a great diversity of moral character dependent on such generic volitions. Some men possess firm and reliable moral principles in certain directions, while they are very destitute of them in others. Thus it will be seen that some have formed a very decided purpose in regard to honesty in business affairs, who yet are miserable victims to intemperance. Others have cultivated a principle called , that restrains them from certain actions regarded as mean, and yet they may be frequenters of gambling saloons and other haunts of vice. honor In the religious world, too, it is the case that some who are very firm and decided on all points of religious observances and in the cultivation of devotional emotions, are guilty of very mean actions, such as some worldly men of honor would not practice at the sacrifice of a right hand. On Causes of Volition. It becomes, then, a most interesting subject of inquiry as to the which decide these diversities of moral purposes, and also the causes which operate to give them more or less control over other principles. causes But, preliminary to this, it is necessary to secure some discriminating accuracy in regard to the signification of the word in its various uses. cause This term, in its widest sense, signifies " ." This is the leading idea which is included in every use of the word. that without which a change will not take place, and with which it will take place But there is a foundation for three classes of causes which may be denominated , and . producing causes, occasional causes deciding causes A is that which produces a change by the constitution of nature, so that in the given circumstances there is no power to do otherwise. producing cause are those circumstances which are indispensable to the action of producing causes. Occasional causes Thus, when fire is applied to your powder, the fire is the producing cause of the explosion, while the act of contact between the fire and powder is the occasional cause. In regard to the action of mind in volition, the mind itself is the producing cause, while excited desires and objects to excite those desires are the occasional causes. Or, in other words, mind is the producing cause of its own volitions, and motives are the occasional causes. On Deciding Causes of Volition. But inasmuch as mind always has the power to choose in of two or more directions, the question arises as to , and which may be called . Whenever it is asked, " did a person choose to do thus?" the meaning is, What were the causes that influenced him to decide thus? either the causes which decide the direction of volitions deciding causes Why Now these causes are ascertained, as all others are, by experience. Men are always stating to each other, as well as noticing in their own experience, the causes which decide their determinations. First, in certain cases, where two or more objects are presented, of which only one can be taken, the cause assigned for the direction of the choice may be that . A vast proportion of human volitions are decided simply by the fact that one object seems a greater good or excites a stronger desire than any other, and is thus the strongest motive. one excited a stronger desire than the other But there are other cases where, of the objects presented, one excites the strongest desire, while the judgment perceives that another will secure a . For example, in case of a sick person, there may be placed a favorite drink that excites a very strong desire, and beside it may stand a nauseous medicine. In this case, the invalid may feel the strongest desire for the drink, and yet choose the medicine as the greater good in its final results. greater good on the whole In such cases, what decides the direction of a volition is the judgment of the mind, that the object chosen, though it does not excite the strongest desire, is still the greater good. Another deciding cause of volition is the nature of the . For example, when it is asked why did a man forsake domestic life and become a soldier, the deciding cause may be that he had a strong constitutional love of the excitement and glory connected with that profession, and but little susceptibility for the quiet enjoyments of domestic life. constitutional susceptibilities It is sometimes the case that a child, from its birth, seems to possess a natural love for truth, so that instructions on that point are scarcely needed. In another case, in the same family, and under exactly the same training, will be found a child who has the contrary propensity, so that it costs years of careful training to form a principle of veracity. The same constitutional variety will be found in reference to other virtues. Another deciding cause of volition are . The existence of a , for example, will induce the formation of virtuous purposes that would never have existed but for this. A child who began life with strong propensities to certain faults, by a wise and careful training may secure habits that are fully equal in power to the same constitutional traits in another child. Often, in the result, it can not be seen whether the generic purpose to be truthful, for example, resulted mainly from natural constitution or from the formation of habits. the habits habit of obedience The will itself also is more or less regulated by this principle. When a child is trained constantly to submit to fixed rules, the will acquires increased ease and facility in doing it. On the contrary, a mind that is never controlled grows more and more averse to yielding to any regulating principle. Another deciding cause of volition is such as excites one class of desires, while other sensibilities have no appropriate objects to stimulate them. a combination of circumstances For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to drink and gamble? The cause assigned may be the presence of liquor and of tempting companions, and the want of objects to excite higher susceptibilities. He had no wise friends, no business, and no higher sources of enjoyment immediately around him. Another deciding cause of volition is the existence of . For example, it may be asked, Why did a man choose to give up his liberty and property when he could have secured them by false testimony? The answer may be that he was a truthful man or a virtuous man—that is, he had formed a strong generic purpose to speak the truth or to act right on all occasions. principle or generic purpose Another deciding cause of volition is the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example. This is the most powerful of all the influences which secure and sustain generic volitions, as will be illustrated more at large in future pages. Causes that regulate the Power of Generic Volitions. The next inquiry relates to the causes which regulate the of generic volition. power Among those causes, the most prominent is that natural force of will which is strictly constitutional. Some minds are formed by the Creator with great energy and great pertinacity of will, so that when a purpose is formed, all subordinate volitions needful to carry out this purpose seem easily controlled. Other minds, on the contrary, possess a naturally feeble will, so that no generic volition has a strong and steady control, but is constantly interrupted in its power over subordinate volitions, or is easily changed by conflicting desires. In one case the person is denominated a man of firm purpose or a man of a strong will. In the other case he is called a man of yielding temperament or a weak character. The remaining causes that give strength to a generic purpose are most of those that have been enumerated as causes of the of volition, or . These are the constitutional susceptibilities—the habits—the surrounding circumstances—the existence of love and gratitude toward other minds, and the reflex influence of such minds in the bestowal of their love, sympathy, teachings, and example. direction deciding causes In all this variety of influences that decide those generic volitions which are the foundation of moral character, it must be remembered that in every case the mind has the power to choose that which the judgment decides to be the greatest good on the whole for itself and for the commonwealth. How one Mind causes Volitions in another Mind. In this connection, it is important to secure exact ideas of what is meant when one mind is spoken of as of the volitions of another mind. the cause Of course, in this relation, no mind can be the cause of volition in any mind but itself. It must be, then, either as or as causes that we can influence other minds. producing occasional deciding The only mode by which we can regulate the volitions of other minds is by . the employment of motives to stimulate desire, or by changing the constitutional susceptibilities In the first case, men have power to so combine circumstances of temptation as to affect the most excitable and powerful sensibilities, or they can remove those objects and influences that sustain moral principle, or by a long course of training they can form habits and induce principles. The combinations of motive influences that one mind can bring to bear on another, as temptations to right or wrong action, are almost infinite. The other mode is by . This can sometimes be effected to a certain degree by education and the formation of habits. It can be still more directly effected through the physical organization. For example, a child may be trained to use coffee, tea, alcohol, or tobacco, till the nervous system is shattered, and then a placid temper becomes excitable, a generous nature grows sour and selfish, an active nature becomes indolent, and multitudes of other disastrous changes are the result. changing the constitutional susceptibilities These are the only two modes in which one mind is ever regarded as the cause of right or wrong volition in other minds. On a Ruling Purpose. The most important of all the voluntary phenomena is the fact that, while there can be a multitude of these quiet and hidden generic purposes in the mind, it is also possible to form which shall be the dominant or controlling one, to which all the other volitions, both generic and specific, shall become subordinate. In common parlance, this would be called the . It may also be called the or . This consists in the permanent choice of some one mode of securing happiness as the or grand object of life. one ruling passion ruling purpose controlling principle chief end We have set forth on preceding pages the chief sources of happiness and of suffering to the human mind. Now in the history of our race we find that each one of these modes of enjoyment have been selected by different individuals as the chief end of their existence—as the mode of seeking enjoyment, to which they sacrifice every other. Some persons have chosen the pleasures of eating, drinking, and the other grosser enjoyments of sense. Others have chosen those more elevated and refined pleasures that come indirectly from the senses in the emotions of taste. Others have devoted themselves to intellectual enjoyments as their chief resource for happiness. Others have selected the exercise of physical and moral power, as in the case of conquerors and physical heroes, or of those who have sought to control by moral power, as rulers and statesmen. Others have made the attainment of the esteem, admiration, and love of their fellow-creatures their chief end. Others, still, have devoted themselves to the promotion of happiness around them as their chief interest. Others have devoted themselves to the service of God, or what they conceived to be such, and sometimes by the most miserable life of asceticism and self-torture. Others have made it their main object in life to obey the laws of rectitude and virtue. In all these cases, the of the person, in the view of all observers, has been decided by this dominant volition, and exactly in proportion to the supremacy with which it has all other purposes. moral character actually controlled Some minds seem to have no chief end of life. Their existence is a succession of small purposes, each of which has its turn in controlling the life. Others have a strong, defined, and all-controlling principle. Now experience shows that both of these classes are capable, the one of and the other of such a purpose. For example, in a time of peace and ease there is little to excite the mind strongly; but let a crisis come where fortune, reputation, and life are at stake, and men and women are obliged to form generic decisions involving all they hold dear, and many minds that have no controlling purpose immediately originate one, while those whose former ruling aims were in one direction change them entirely to another. forming changing This shows how it is that days of peril create heroes, statesmen, and strong men and women. The hour of danger calls all the energies of the soul into action. Great purposes are formed with the strongest desire and emotion. Instantly the whole current of thought, and all the co-existing desires and emotions, are conformed to these purposes. The experience of mankind proves that a dominant generic purpose may , and actually control all other generic and specific volitions. extend to a whole life Mode of Controlling the Intellect, Desires, and Emotions. We will now consider some of the modes by which the will controls the intellect, desires, and emotions. We have seen, in previous pages, the influence which desire and emotion exert in making both our perceptions and conceptions more vivid. Whatever purpose or aim in life becomes an object of strong desire, is always distinctly and vividly conceived, while all less interesting objects are more faint and indistinct. We have also seen that whenever any conception arises it always brings connected objects, according to certain laws of association, forming a new and complex picture. Whenever the mind is under the influence of a controlling purpose, the object of pursuit is always than any other. This interest always fastens on those particulars in any mental combination that are connected with the ruling purpose and seem fitted to promote it, making them more vivid. Around these selected objects their past associated ideas begin to cluster, forming other complex pictures. In all these combinations, those ideas most consonant with the leading interest of the mind become most vivid, and the others fade away. more interesting The grand method, then, for is by the generic decisions of the mind as to the modes of seeking enjoyment. regulating the thoughts In regard to the power of the mind over its own desires and emotions, it is very clear that these sensibilitiescan not be regulated by direct specific volitions. Let any person try to produce love, fear, joy, hope, or gratitude by simply choosing to have them arise, and it is soon perceived that no such power exists. But there are modes by which the mind can control its susceptibilities. The first method is by directing attention to those objects of thought which are fitted to call forth such emotions. For example, if we wish to awaken the emotion of fear, we can place ourselves in circumstances of danger, or call up ideas of horror and distress. If we wish to call forth emotions of gratitude, we can direct attention to acts of kindness to ourselves calculated to awaken such feelings. If we wish to excite desire for any object, we can direct attention to those qualities in that object that are calculated to excite desire. In all these cases the mind can, by an act of will, to subjects calculated to excite emotion and desire. indirect direct its attention The other mode of regulating the desires and emotions is by . For example, let a man of business, who has never had any interest in commerce, decide to invest all his property in foreign trade. As soon as this is done, the name of the ship that bears his all can never be heard or seen but it excites some emotion. A storm, that before would go unnoticed, awakens fear; the prices in the commercial markets, before unheeded, now awaken fear or afford pleasure. And thus multitudes of varied desires and emotions are called into existence by this one generic volition. the direction of our generic volitions One result of a purpose to deny an importunate propensity is frequently seen in the immediate or gradual diminution of that desire. For example, if a person is satisfied that a certain article of food is injurious, and resolves on , it will be found that the desire for it is very much reduced, far more so than when the effort is to diminish the indulgence. total abstinence When a generic purpose is formed that involves great interests, it is impossible to prevent the desires and emotions from running consonant with this purpose. The only mode of changing this current is to give up this generic purpose and form another. Thus, if a man has devoted his whole time and energies to money-making, it is impossible for him to prevent his thoughts and feelings from running in that direction. He must give up this as his chief end, and take a nobler object, if he would elevate the whole course of his mental action. These are the principal phenomena of the grand mental faculty which is the controlling power of the mind, and on the regulation of which all its other powers are dependent. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Catharine Esther Beecher (2017). Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. 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