Value and Riches, their Distinctive Properties

On The Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, by David Ricardo is part of the HackerNoon Books series. You can jump to any chapter in this book here . Chapter XVIII: Value and Riches, their distinctive properties CHAPTER XVIII. VALUE AND RICHES, THEIR DISTINCTIVE PROPERTIES. "A man is rich or poor," says Adam Smith, "according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy the necessaries, conveniences, and amusements of human life." Value then essentially differs from riches, for value depends not on abundance, but on the difficulty or facility of production. The labour of a million of men in manufactures, will always produce the same value, but will not always produce the same riches. By the invention of machinery, by improvements in skill, by a better division of labour, or by the discovery of new markets, where more advantageous exchanges may be made, a million of men may produce double, or tre ble the amount of riches, of "necessaries, conveniences, and amusements," in one state of society, that they could produce in another, but they will not on that account add any thing to value; for every thing rises or falls in value, in proportion to the facility or difficulty of producing it, or in other words, in proportion to the quantity of labour employed on its production. Suppose with a given capital, the labour of a certain number of men produced 1000 pair of stockings, and that by inventions in machinery, the same number of men can produce 2000 pair, or that they can continue to produce 1000 pair, and can produce besides 500 hats; then the value of the 2000 pair of stockings; or of the 1000 pair of stockings, and 500 hats, will be neither more nor less than that of the 1000 pair of stockings before the introduction of machinery; for they will be the produce of the same quantity of labour. But the value of the general mass of commodities will nevertheless be diminished; for although the value of the increased quantity produced in consequence of the improvement will be the same exactly as the value would have been of the less quantity that would have been produced, had no improvement taken place, an effect is also produced on the portion of goods still unconsumed, which were manufactured previously to the improvement; the value of those goods will be reduced, inasmuch as they must fall to the level, quantity for quantity, of the goods produced under all the advantages of the improvement: and the society will, notwithstanding the increased quantity of its commodities, notwithstanding its augmented riches, and its augmented means of enjoyment, have a less amount of value. By constantly increasing the facility of production, we constantly diminish the value of some of the commodities before produced, though by the same means we not only add to the national riches, but also to the power of future production. Many of the errors in political economy have arisen from errors on this subject, from considering an increase of riches, and an increase of value, as meaning the same thing, and from unfounded notions as to what constituted a standard measure of value. One man considers money as a standard of value, and a nation grows richer or poorer, according to him, in proportion as its commodities of all kinds can exchange for more or less money. Others represent money as a very convenient medium for the purpose of barter, but not as a proper measure by which to estimate the value of other things: the real measure of value according to them is corn, and a country is rich or poor, according as its commodities will exchange for more or less corn. There are others again, who consider a country rich or poor, according to the quantity of labour that it can purchase. But why should gold, or corn, or labour, be the standard measure of value, more than coals or iron?—more than cloth, soap, candles, and the other necessaries of the labourer?—why, in short, should any commodity, or all commodities together, be the standard, when such a standard is itself subject to fluctuations in value? Corn, as well as gold, may from difficulty or facility of production, vary 10, 20, or 30 per cent., relatively to other things; why should we always say, that it is those other things which have varied, and not the corn? That commodity is alone invariable, which at all times requires the same sacrifice of toil and labour to produce it. Of such a commodity we have no knowledge, but we may hypothetically argue and speak about it, as if we had; and may improve our knowledge of the science, by shewing distinctly the absolute inapplicability of all the standards which have been hitherto adopted. But supposing either of these to be a correct standard of value, still it would not be a standard of riches, for riches do not depend on value. A man is rich or poor, according to the abundance of necessaries and luxuries, which he can command; and whether the exchangeable value of these for money, for corn, or for labour, be high or low, they will equally contribute to the enjoyment of their possessor. It is through confounding the ideas of value and wealth, or riches, that it has been asserted, that by diminishing the quantity of commodities, that is to say, of the necessaries, conveniences, and enjoyments of human life, riches may be increased. If value were the measure of riches this could not be denied, because by scarcity the value of commodities is raised; but if Adam Smith be correct, if riches consist in necessaries and enjoyments, then they cannot be increased by a diminution of quantity. It is true, that the man in possession of a scarce commodity is richer, if by means of it he can command more of the necessaries and enjoyments of human life; but as the general stock out of which each man's riches are drawn, is diminished in quantity, by all that any individual takes from it, other men's shares must necessarily be reduced in proportion as this favoured individual is able to appropriate a greater quantity to himself. Let water become scarce, says Lord Lauderdale, and be exclusively possessed by an individual, and you will increase his riches, because water will then have value; and if wealth be the aggregate of individual riches, you will by the same means also increase wealth. You undoubtedly will increase the riches of this individual, but inasmuch as the farmer must sell a part of his corn, the shoemaker a part of his shoes, and all men give up a portion of their possessions for the sole purpose of supplying themselves with water, which they before had for nothing, they are poorer by the whole quantity of commodities which they are obliged to devote to this purpose, and the proprietor of water is benefited precisely by the amount of their loss. The same quantity of water, and the same quantity of commodities, are enjoyed by the whole society, but they are differently distributed. This is however supposing rather a monopoly of water than a scarcity of it. If it should be scarce, then the riches of the country and of individuals would be actually diminished, inasmuch as it would be deprived of a portion of one of its enjoyments. The farmer would not only have less corn to exchange for the other commodities which might be necessary or desirable to him, but he and every other individual would be abridged in the enjoyment of one of the most essential of their comforts. Not only would there be a different distribution of riches, but an actual loss of wealth. It may be said then of two countries possessing precisely the same quantity of all the necessaries and comforts of life, that they are equally rich, but the value of their respective riches would depend on the comparative facility or difficulty with which they were produced. For if an improved piece of machinery should enable us to make two pair of stockings, instead of one, without additional labour, double the quantity would be given in exchange for a yard of cloth. If a similar improvement be made in the manufacture of cloth, stockings and cloth will exchange in the same proportions as before, but they will both have fallen in value; for in exchanging them for hats, for gold, or other commodities in general, twice the former quantity must be given. Extend the improvement to the production of gold, and every other commodity; and they will all regain their former proportions. There will be double the quantity of commodities annually produced in the coun try, and therefore the wealth of the country will be doubled, but this wealth will not have increased in value. Although Adam Smith has given the correct description of riches, which I have more than once noticed, he afterwards explains them differently, and says, "that a man must be rich or poor according to the quantity of labour which he can afford to purchase." Now this description differs essentially from the other, and is certainly incorrect; for suppose the mines were to become more productive, so that gold and silver fell in value, from the greater facility of their production; or that velvets were to be manufactured with so much less labour than before, that they fell to half their former value; the riches of all those who purchased those commodities would be increased: one man might increase the quantity of his plate, another might buy double the quantity of velvet; but with the possession of this additional plate, and velvet, they could employ no more labour than before; because as the exchangeable value of velvet and of plate would be lowered, they must part with proportionally more of these species of riches to purchase a day's labour. Riches then cannot be estimated by the quantity of labour which they can purchase. From what has been said, it will be seen that the wealth of a country may be increased in two ways: it may be increased by employing a greater portion of revenue in the maintenance of productive labour,—which will not only add to the quantity, but to the value of the mass of commodities; or it may be increased, without employing any additional quantity of labour, by making the same quantity more productive,—which will add to the abundance, but not to the value of commodities. In the first case, a country would not only become rich, but the value of its riches would increase. It would become rich by parsimony; by diminishing its expenditure on objects of luxury and enjoyment; and employing those savings in reproduction. In the second case, there will not neces sarily be either any diminished expenditure on luxuries and enjoyments, or any increased quantity of productive labour employed, but with the same labour more would be produced; wealth would increase, but not value. Of these two modes of increasing wealth, the last must be preferred, since it produces the same effect without the privation and diminution of enjoyments, which can never fail to accompany the first mode. Capital is that part of the wealth of a country which is employed with a view to future production, and may be increased in the same manner as wealth. An additional capital will be equally efficacious in the production of future wealth, whether it be obtained from improvements in skill and machinery, or from using more revenue reproductively; for wealth always depends on the quantity of commodities produced, without any regard to the facility with which the instruments employed in production may have been procured. A certain quantity of clothes and provisions will maintain and employ the same number of men, and will therefore procure the same quantity of work to be done, whether they be produced by the labour of 100 or of 200 men; but they will be of twice the value if 200 have been employed on their production. M. Say appears to me to have been singularly unfortunate in his definition of riches and value in the first chapter of his excellent work: the following is the substance of his reasoning: riches, he observes, consist only of things which have a value in themselves: riches are great, when the sum of the values of which they are composed is great. They are small when the sum of their values is small. Two things having an equal value, are riches of equal amount. They are of equal value, when by general consent they are freely exchanged for each other. Now, if mankind attach value to a thing, it is on account of the uses to which it is applicable. This faculty, which certain things have, of satisfying the various wants of mankind, I call utility. To create objects that have a value of any kind is to create riches, since the utility of things is the first foundation of their value, and it is the value of things which constitutes riches. But we do not create objects: all we can do is to reproduce matter under another form—we can give it utility. Production then is a creation, not of matter but of utility, and it is measured by the value arising from the utility of the object produced. The utility of any object, according to general estimation, is pointed out by the quantity of other commodities for which it will exchange. This valuation, arising from the general estimate formed by society, constitutes what Adam Smith calls value in exchange; what Turgot calls appreciable value; and what we may more briefly designate by the term value. Thus far M. Say, but in his account of value and riches he has confounded two things which ought always to be kept separate, and which are called by Adam Smith, value in use and value in exchange. If by an improved machine I can, with the same quantity of labour, make two pair of stockings instead of one, I in no way impair the utility of one pair of stockings, though I diminish their value. If then I had precisely the same quantity of coats, shoes, stockings, and all other things, as before, I should have precisely the same quantity of useful objects, and should therefore be equally rich, if utility were the measure of riches; but I should have a less amount of value, for my stockings would be of only half their former value. Utility then is not the measure of exchangeable value. If we ask M. Say in what riches consist, he tells us in the possession of objects having value. If we then ask him what he means by value, he tells us that things are valuable in proportion as they possess utility. If again we ask him to explain to us by what means we are to judge of the utility of objects, he answers, by their value. Thus then the measure of value is utility, and the measure of utility is value. M. Say, in speaking of the excellences and imperfections of the great work of Adam Smith, imputes to him, as an error, that "he attributes to the labour of man alone the power of producing value. A more correct analysis shews us that value is owing to the action of labour, or rather the industry of man, combined with the action of those agents which nature supplies, and with that of capi tal. His ignorance of this principle prevented him from establishing the true theory of the influence of machinery in the production of riches." In contradiction to the opinion of Adam Smith, M. Say, in the fourth chapter, speaks of the value which is given to commodities by natural agents, such as the sun, the air, the pressure of the atmosphere &c., which are sometimes substituted for the labour of man, and sometimes concur with him in producing. But these natural agents, though they add greatly to value in use, never add exchangeable value, of which M. Say is speaking, to a commodity: as soon as by the aid of machinery, or by the knowledge of natural philosophy, you oblige natural agents to do the work which was before done by man, the exchangeable value of such work falls accordingly. If ten men turned a corn mill, and it be discovered that by the assistance of wind, or of water, the labour of these ten men may be spared, the flour, which is the produce of the work performed by the mill, would immediately fall in value, in proportion to the quantity of labour saved; and the society would be richer by the commodities which the labour of the ten men could produce, the funds destined for their maintenance being in no degree impaired. M. Say accuses Dr. Smith of having overlooked the value which is given to commodities by natural agents, and by machinery, be cause he considered that the value of all things was derived from the labour of man; but it does not appear to me, that this charge is made out; for Adam Smith no where undervalues the services which these natural agents and machinery perform for us, but he very justly distinguishes the nature of the value which they add to commodities—they are serviceable to us, by increasing the abundance of productions, by making men richer, by adding to value in use; but as they perform their work gratuitously, as nothing is paid for the use of air, of heat, and of water, the assistance which they afford us, adds nothing to value in exchange. In the first chapter of the second book, M. Say himself gives a similar statement of value, for he says that "utility is the foundation of value, that commodities are only desirable, because they are in some way useful, but that their value depends not on their utility, not on the degree in which they are desired, but on the quantity of labour necessary to procure them." "The utility of a commodity thus understood, makes it an object of man's desire, makes him wish for it, and establishes a demand for it. When to obtain a thing, it is sufficient to desire it, it may be considered as an article of natural wealth, given to man in an unlimited quantity, and which he enjoys, without purchasing it by any sacrifice; such are the air, water, the light of the sun. If he obtained in this manner all the objects of his wants and desires, he would be infinitely rich: he would be in want of nothing. But unfortunately this is not the case; the greater part of the things which are convenient and agreeable to him, as well as those which are indispensably necessary in the social state, for which man seems to be specifically formed, are not given to him gratuitously; they could only exist by the exertion of certain labour, the employment of a certain capital, and, in many cases, by the use of land. These are obstacles in the way of gratuitous enjoyment; obstacles from which result a real expense of production; because we are obliged to pay for the assistance of these agents of production." "It is only when this utility has thus been communicated to a thing (viz. by industry, capital, and land,) that it is a production, and that it has a value. It is its utility which is the foundation of the demand for it, but the sacrifices, and the charges necessary to obtain it, or in other words, its price, limits the extent of this demand." The confusion which arises from confounding the terms "value" and "riches" will best be seen in the following passages. His pupil observes: "You have said, besides, that the riches of a society were composed of the sum total of the values which it possessed; it appears to me to follow, that the fall of one production, of stockings for example, by diminishing the sum total of the value belonging to the society, diminishes the mass of its riches;" to which the following answer is given: "the sum of the society's riches will not fall on that account. Two pair of stockings are produced instead of one; and two pair at three francs, are equally valuable with one pair at six francs. The income of the society remains the same, because the manufacturer has gained as much on two pair at three francs, as he gained on one pair at six francs." Thus far M. Say, though incorrect, is at least consistent. If value be the measure of riches, the society is equally rich, because the value of all its commodities is the same as before. But now for his inference. "But when the income remains the same, and productions fall in price, the society is really enriched. If the same fall took place in all commodities at the same time, which is not absolutely impossible, the society by procuring at half their former price, all the objects of its consumption, without having lost any portion of its income, would really be twice as rich as before, and could purchase twice the quantity of goods." In the first passage we are told, that if every thing fell to half its value, from abundance, the society would be equally rich, because there would be double the quantity of commodities at half their former value, or in other words, there would be the same value. But in the last passage we are informed, that by doubling the quantity of commodities, although the value of each commodity should be diminished one half, and therefore the value of all the commodities together be precisely the same as before, yet the society would be twice as rich as before. In the first case riches are estimated by the amount of value: in the second, they are estimated by the abundance of commodities contributing to human enjoyments. M. Say further says, "that a man is infinitely rich without valuables, if he can for nothing obtain all the objects he desires; yet in another place we are told, "that riches consist, not in the product itself, for it is not riches if it have not value, but in its value." Vol. ii. p. 2. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Ricardo, David. 2010. On The Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation. 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