The A B C of Relativity by Bertrand Russells, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book here . XII. CONVENTIONS AND NATURAL LAWS XII. CONVENTIONS AND NATURAL LAWS One of the most difficult matters in all controversy is to distinguish disputes about words from disputes about facts: it ought not to be difficult, but in practice it is. This is quite as true in physics as in other subjects. In the seventeenth century there was a terrific debate as to what “force” is; to us now, it was obviously a debate as to how the word “force” should be defined, but at the time it was thought to be much more. One of the purposes of the method of tensors, which is employed in the mathematics of relativity, is to eliminate what is purely verbal (in an extended sense) in physical laws. It is of course obvious that what depends on the choice of co-ordinates is “verbal” in the sense concerned. A man punting walks along the boat, but keeps a constant position with reference to the river bed so long as he does not pick up his pole. The Lilliputians might debate endlessly whether he is walking [Pg 178]or standing still: the debate would be as to words, not as to facts. If we choose co-ordinates fixed relatively to the boat, he is walking; if we choose co-ordinates fixed relatively to the river bed, he is standing still. We want to express physical laws in such a way that it shall be obvious when we are expressing the same law by reference to two different systems of co-ordinates, so that we shall not be misled into supposing we have different laws when we only have one law in different words. This is accomplished by the method of tensors. Some laws which seem plausible in one language cannot be translated into another; these are impossible as laws of nature. The laws that can be translated into any co-ordinate language have certain characteristics: this is a substantial help in looking for such laws of nature as the theory of relativity can admit to be possible. Combined with what we know of the actual motions of bodies, it enables us to decide what must be the correct expression of the law of gravitation: logic and experience combine in equal proportions in obtaining this expression. But the problem of arriving at genuine laws of nature is not to be solved by the method of tensors alone; a good, deal of careful thought [Pg 179]is wanted in addition. Some of this has been done, especially by Eddington; much remains to be done. To take a simple illustration: Suppose, as in the hypothesis of the Fitzgerald contraction, that lengths in one direction were shorter than in another. Let us assume that a foot rule pointing north is only half as long as the same foot rule pointing east, and that this is equally true of all other bodies. Does such an hypothesis have any meaning? If you have a fishing rod fifteen feet long when it is pointing west, and you then turn it to the north, it will still measure fifteen feet, because your foot rule will have shrunk too. It won’t “look” any shorter, because your eye will have been affected in the same way. If you are to find out the change, it cannot be by ordinary measurement; it must be by some such method as the Michelson-Morley experiment, in which the velocity of light is used to measure lengths. Then you still have to decide whether it is simpler to suppose a change of length or a change in the velocity of light. The experimental fact would be that light takes longer to traverse what your foot rule declares to [Pg 180]be a given distance in one direction than in another—or, as in the Michelson-Morley experiment, that it ought to take longer but doesn’t. You can adjust your measures to such a fact in various ways; in any way you choose to adopt, there will be an element of convention. This element of convention survives in the laws that you arrive at after you have made your decision as to measures, and often it takes subtle and elusive forms. To eliminate the element of convention is, in fact, extraordinarily difficult; the more the subject is studied, the greater the difficulty is seen to be. A more important example is the question of the size and shape of the electron. We find experimentally that all electrons are the same size, and that they are symmetrical in all directions. How far is this a genuine fact ascertained by experiment, and how far is it a result of our conventions of measurement? We have here a number of different comparisons to make: (1) between different directions in regard to one electron at one time; (2) in regard to one electron at different times; (3) in regard to two electrons at the same time. We can then arrive at the comparison of two electrons at different times, by combining [Pg 181](2) and (3). We may dismiss any hypothesis which would affect all electrons equally; for example, it would be useless to suppose that in one region of space-time they were all larger than in another. Such a change would affect our measuring appliances just as much as the things measured, and would therefore produce no discoverable phenomena. This is as much as to say that it would be no change at all. But the fact that two electrons have the same mass, for instance, cannot be regarded as purely conventional. Given sufficient minuteness and accuracy, we could compare the effects of two different electrons upon a third; if they were equal under like circumstances, we should be able to infer equality in a not purely conventional sense. The question of the symmetry of the forces exerted by an electron—i.e., that these forces depend only upon the distance from the electron, and not upon the direction—is more complicated. Eddington finally comes to the conclusion that this, too, is a matter of convention. The argument is difficult and I have not fully understood it; but I feel some hesitation in accepting it as valid. Eddington describes the process concerned in the more advanced portions of the theory of relativity as “world-building.” The structure to be [Pg 182]built is the physical world as we know it; the economical architect tries to construct it with the smallest possible amount of material. This is a question for logic and mathematics. The greater our technical skill in these two subjects, the more real building we shall do, and the less we shall be content with mere heaps of stones. But before we can use in our building the stones that nature provides, we have to hew them into the right shapes: this is all part of the process of budding. In order that this may be possible, the raw material must have some structure (which we may conceive as analogous to the grain in timber), but almost any structure will do. By successive mathematical refinements, we whittle away our initial requirements until they amount to very little. Given this necessary minimum of structure in the raw material, we find that we can construct from it a mathematical expression which will have the properties that are needed for describing the world we perceive—in particular, the properties of conservation which are characteristic of momentum and energy (or mass). Our raw material consisted merely of events; but when we find [Pg 183]that we can build out of it something which, as measured, will seem to be never created or destroyed, it seems not surprising that we should come to believe in “bodies.” These are really mere mathematical constructions out of events, but owing to their permanence they are practically important, and our senses (which were presumably developed by biological needs) are adapted for noticing them, rather than the crude continuum of events which is theoretically more fundamental. From this point of view, it is astonishing how little of the real world is revealed by physical science: our knowledge is limited, not only by the conventional element, but also by the selectiveness of our perceptual apparatus. We assume that there is an “interval” between two events, in the sense explained in , but we no longer assume that we can unambiguously compare the length of an interval in one region with the length of an interval in another. It is assumed by Weyl, who introduced this limitation, that we can compare a number of small intervals which all start from the same point; also that, in a very small journey, our measuring rod will not alter its length much, so that there will [Pg 184]only be a small error if we compare lengths in neighboring places by the usual methods. Weyl found that, by diminishing our assumptions as to interval in this way, it was possible to bring electromagnetism and gravitation into one system. The mathematics of Weyl’s theory is complicated, and I shall not attempt to explain it. For the present, I am concerned with a different consequence of his theory. If lengths in different regions cannot be compared directly, there is an element of convention in the indirect comparisons which we actually make. This element will be at first unrecognized, but will be such as to simplify to the utmost the expression of the laws of nature. In particular, conditions of symmetry may be entirely created by conventions as to measurement, and there is no reason to suppose that they represent any property of the real world. The law of gravitation itself, according to Eddington, may be regarded as expressing conventions of measurement. “The conventions of measurement,” he says, “introduce an isotropy and homogeneity into measured space which need not originally have any counterpart in the relation-structure which is being surveyed. This isotropy and homogeneity is exactly expressed by Einstein’s law of gravitation.” Chapter VII [13] [14] [Pg 185]The limitations of knowledge introduced by the selectiveness of our perceptual apparatus may be illustrated by the indestructibility of matter. This has been gradually discovered by experiment, and seemed a well-founded empirical law of nature. Now it turns out that, from our original space-time continuum, we can construct a mathematical expression which will have properties causing it to appear indestructible. The statement that matter is indestructible then ceases to be a proposition of physics, and becomes instead a proposition of linguistics and psychology. As a proposition of linguistics: “Matter” is the name of the mathematical expression in question. As a proposition of psychology: Our senses are such that we notice what is roughly the mathematical expression in question, and we are led nearer and nearer to it as we refine upon our crude perceptions by scientific observation. This is much less than physicists used to think they knew about matter. The reader may say: What then is left of physics? What do we really [Pg 186]know about the world of matter? Here we may distinguish three departments of physics. There is first what is included within the theory of relativity, generalized as widely as possible. Next, there are laws which cannot be brought within the scope of relativity. Thirdly, there is what may be called geography. Let us consider each of these in turn. The theory of relativity, apart from convention, tells us that the events in the universe have a four-dimensional order, and that, between any two events which are near together in this order, there is a relation called “interval,” which is capable of being measured if suitable precautions are taken. We make also an assumption as to what happens when a little measuring rod is carried round a closed circuit in a certain manner; the consequences of this assumption are such as to make it highly probable that it is true. Beyond this, there is little in the theory of relativity that can be regarded as physical laws. There is a great deal of mathematics, showing that certain mathematically-constructed quantities must behave like the things we perceive; and there is a suggestion of a bridge between psychology and [Pg 187]physics in the theory that these mathematically-constructed quantities are what our senses are adapted for perceiving. But neither of these things is physics in the strict sense. The part of physics which cannot, at present, be brought within the scope of relativity is large and important. There is nothing in relativity to show why there should be electrons and protons; relativity cannot give any reason why matter should exist in little lumps. With this goes the whole theory of the structure of the atom. The theory of quanta also is quite outside the scope of relativity. Relativity is, in a sense, the most extreme application of what may be called next-to-next methods. Gravitation is no longer regarded as due to the effect of the sun upon a planet, but as expressing characteristics of the region in which the planet happens to be. Distance, which used to be thought to have a definite meaning however far apart two points might be, is now only definite for neighboring points. The distance between widely separated places depends upon the route chosen. We may, it is true, define the distance as the geodesic distance, but that can only be estimated by adding up little [Pg 188]bits, that is to say, by the method we use in estimating the length of a curve. What applies to distance applies equally to the straight line. There is nothing in the actual world having exactly the properties that straight lines were supposed to have; the nearest approach is the track of a light ray. Straight lines have to be replaced by geodesics, which are defined by what they do at each point, not all at once, like Euclidean straight lines. Measurement, in Weyl’s theory, suffers the same fate. We can only use a measuring rod to give lengths in one place: when we move it to another region, there is no knowing how it will alter. We do assume, however, that, if it alters, it alters bit by bit, gradually, continuously, and not by sudden jumps. Perhaps this assumption is unjustified. It belongs to the general outlook of relativity, which is that of continuity. No doubt it is owing to this outlook that relativity is unable to account for the discontinuities in physics, such as quanta, electrons and protons. Perhaps relativity will conquer these domains when it learns to dispense with the assumption of continuity. Finally we come to geography, in which I include history. The separation of history from geography rests upon the separation of time [Pg 189]from space; when we amalgamate the two in space-time, we need one word to describe the combination of geography and history. For the sake of simplicity, I shall use the one word geography in this extended sense. Geography, in this sense, includes everything that, as a matter of crude fact, distinguishes one part of space-time from another. One part is occupied by the sun, one by the earth; the intermediate regions contain light waves, but no matter (apart from a very little here and there). There is a certain degree of theoretical connection between different geographical facts; to establish this is the purpose of physical laws. It is thought that a sufficient knowledge of the geographical facts of the solar system throughout any finite time, however short, would enable an ideally competent physicist to predict the future of the solar system so long as it remained remote from other stars. We are already in a position to calculate the large facts about the solar system backwards and forwards for vast periods of time. But in all such calculations we need a basis of crude fact. The facts are interconnected, but facts can only be inferred from other facts, not [Pg 190]from general laws alone. Thus the facts of geography have a certain independent status in physics. No amount of physical laws will enable us to infer a physical fact unless we know other facts as data for our inference. And here when I speak of “facts” I am thinking of particular facts of geography, in the extended sense in which I am using the term. In the theory of relativity, we are concerned with structure, not with the material of which the structure is composed. In geography, on the other hand, the material is relevant. If there is to be any difference between one place and another, there must either be differences between the material in one place and that in another, or places where there is material and places where there is none. The former of these alternatives seems the more satisfactory. We might try to say: There are electrons and protons, and the rest is empty. But in the “empty” regions there are light waves, so that we cannot say nothing happens in them. Some people maintain that the light waves take place in the ether, others are content to say simply that they take place; but in any case events are occurring where there are light waves. That is all that we can really say for the places where [Pg 191]there is matter, since matter has turned out to be a mathematical construction built out of events. We may say, therefore, that there are events everywhere in space-time, but they must be of a somewhat different kind according as we are dealing with a region where there is an electron or proton or with the sort of region we should ordinarily call empty. But as to the intrinsic nature of these events we can know nothing, except when they happen to be events in our own lives. Our own perceptions and feelings must be part of the crude material of events which physics arranges into a pattern—or rather, which physics finds to be arranged in a pattern. As regards events which do not form part of our own lives, physics tells us the pattern of them, but is quite unable to tell us what they are like in themselves. Nor does it seem possible that this should be discovered by any other method. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Bertrand Williams (2004). THE A B C OF RELATIVITY. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved October 2022, from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/67104/67104-h/67104-h.htm This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org , located at https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html .

The Abolition of "Force"

Is the Universe Finite? 

LoC No. 05019207; Release Date: May 17, 2016; Public domain in the USA.

Of Conventions and Natural Laws

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