USA v. Samuel Bankman-Fried Court Filing, retrieved on March 15, 2024 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 8 of 34. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here IV. The Defendant’s Banking Misconduct The evidence at trial, as well as other evidence summarized in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), also establish that the defendant operated an unlicensed money transmitting business and lied to Silvergate Bank in order to open an account that he used as part of that transmission business. While unlicensed money transmission and bank fraud were charges severed from the trial, the proof underlying those charges was established by a preponderance of the evidence. This conduct, therefore, may be considered at sentencing. It is unlawful to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business in the United States. Exchanges that allow customers to exchange fiat for cryptocurrency are required under federal law to register with the Department of Treasury as money services businesses, and file suspicious activity reports when appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 705-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), conviction aff’d, 32 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 2019). As a result, before opening accounts for cryptocurrency exchanges, U.S. banks usually require evidence of the appropriate licensure. (PSR ¶ 44). When Bankman-Fried first founded FTX, access to the U.S. banking system was necessary for the company’s growth. Without bank accounts, FTX was unable to do fiat-to-cryptocurrency conversions, which were both a source of business income and a prerequisite for many cryptocurrency traders who wanted to fund their FTX accounts. (Tr. 654). But U.S. financial institutions were reluctant to open accounts for cryptocurrency businesses, and in many instances refused altogether. (GX-917; Tr. 313). When banks did open accounts, they typically conducted an enhanced due diligence process, including requesting evidence that the entity had the appropriate registrations with the Department of Treasury. (PSR ¶ 46). Rather than following the rules, and in order to circumvent U.S. money transmission laws and banks’ unwillingness to do business with cryptocurrency exchanges, Bankman-Fried and others used existing Alameda bank accounts to process customer deposits and withdrawals. (Tr. 654). Alameda never told Silvergate Bank that it was using its accounts to process FTX customer deposits and withdrawals. Besides the accounts at Silvergate, FTX also used a bank account at Signature Bank to transmit money for customers without an appropriate license. Bankman-Fried and others affirmatively lied to Signature Bank to convince the bank to continue to process FTX customer fiat deposits and withdrawals. For example, on May 14, 2020, an employee at Signature emailed FTX.com and Alameda personnel asking about a transfer which was received by a bank account held in the name of Alameda but which said it was related to FTX. Instead of telling the truth, at Bankman-Fried’s direction and with his knowledge, an Alameda employee falsely responded that the transfer was actually related to Alameda. (PSR ¶ 47). There came a time when certain of Alameda’s wire transfers were being rejected, so Bankman-Fried and others acting at his direction explored opening new bank accounts, including at Silvergate Bank where Alameda already had accounts. Silvergate Bank made clear, however, that it would not open an account for customer deposits and withdrawals absent evidence that FTX was licensed and registered, including registered federally as a money services business, and that, in any event, Silvergate Bank would need to conduct an enhanced due diligence process before opening any account used to process customer deposits and withdrawals. Bankman-Fried learned from Silvergate that Bankman-Fried should not attempt to open an account for FTX, and that if he wished to open an account to process customer deposits and withdrawals for FTX US, FTX’s business in the United States, FTX US would need to register with the Department of Treasury. (PSR ¶ 46). Notwithstanding those warnings from Silvergate Bank, in August 2020, to further obscure the relationship between FTX and Alameda, Bankman-Fried directed the incorporation of a new U.S.-based entity, North Dimension. Bankman-Fried was listed as sole owner, CEO, and president of North Dimension, which had no employees or business operations outside of its bank account. Bankman-Fried and others chose the name “North Dimension” in part to conceal that there was a relationship between North Dimension, on the one hand, and FTX or Alameda, on the other, from banks approving transactions with the North Dimension bank account. Once North Dimension was created, under Bankman-Fried’s supervision, employees of Alameda completed an account application with Silvergate Bank that falsely stated that the purpose of the North Dimension bank account was “trading” and “market making.” (PSR ¶ 48). Silvergate Bank was also given a completed North Dimension due diligence questionnaire—which Bankman-Fried signed—that falsely stated that North Dimension “trades on multiple cryptocurrency exchanges worldwide for its own account” and that North Dimension “also participates in direct peer-to-peer, OTC purchases and sales with certain third parties for its own account.” (GX-267). Furthermore, despite the fact that North Dimension was created for the purpose of transmitting customer deposits on and off the FTX exchange, the due diligence questionnaire falsely claimed that North Dimension was not a money services business. In April 2021, Silvergate approved the opening of the North Dimension account, based on those misrepresentations, without enhanced due diligence or review by Silvergate Bank’s executive committee, as would have been required had the true purposes of North Dimension’s account been disclosed to Silvergate Bank. Once the North Dimension bank account was opened, FTX directed customer dollar deposits to the North Dimension account. In the period from when the North Dimension account was opened until it ceased being the primary means for unlicensed money transmission in about January 2022, customers transmitted billions of dollars through the account. (PSR ¶ 49). At no point did FTX.com ever obtain the appropriate license. Continue Reading . Here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case retrieved on March 15, 2024, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. storage.courtlistener

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