FAITH OR BELIEF.

Common Sense Applied to Religion; Or, The Bible and the People by Catharine Esther Beecher, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book here. FAITH OR BELIEF.

CHAPTER XIX. FAITH OR BELIEF.

We have shown that a belief in the reality of the existence, both of mind and of matter, as causes, is one of the implanted principles of mind. Some philosophers have claimed that there is nothing in existence but mind, and that all that is called matter is simply ideas of things in the mind itself, for which there is no corresponding reality. Others have claimed just the opposite: that there is no such existence as an immaterial spirit, but that soul is the brain, or some other very fine organization of matter.

In both cases, the assumptions not only have no evidence to sustain them, but are contrary to the common sense or reason of all mankind, and never can be really believed.

When perceptions are called into existence by the agency of the senses, we can not help believing that things are as they appear to us, unless we have some evidence of deception either from disordered sensation or some other cause.

But in regard to our conceptions we have two classes. One class is attended with the belief that they correspond with realities, or the things they represent. The other class is not attended with this belief. For example, we can conceive of a house of a color, form, and details such as we never saw, and this conception is not attended with any belief of the reality of such an existence; but when we conceive of the home of our childhood, this conception is attended with a belief of the reality of the thing conceived.

This illustration furnishes the means of defining "truth" as "the reality of things." We conceive the truth when our conceptions represent correctly the reality of things, and we believe the truth when we feel this correspondence to exist. We believe falsehood when we have a conception attended by a feeling that it represents the reality of things when it does not.

All our comfort, success, and happiness depend upon believing the truth; for just so far as our belief or faith varies from the reality of things, we shall meet with mistakes, disappointment, and sorrow.

Our beneficent Creator has so formed our minds and our bodies that, in their natural, healthy state, our perceptions correspond with the reality of things uniformly, while, as before stated, our belief or faith also thus corresponds.

It is very rarely the case that disease or other causes prevent this uniform correct perception and belief in regard to all things that come within the reach of our own senses.

It is only in regard to that knowledge that we gain from the experience and testimony of others, or from the process of reasoning, that we become liable to a false belief.

Men often impart their conceptions of things to us, and we find that they do not correspond with realities.

We also, by a process of reasoning, often come to conceptions of things, and a belief in them, which we find to be false.

Evidence may be defined as all those causes which tend to produce correct ideas of truth or the reality of things.

Inasmuch as we find by experience that human testimony and the process of reasoning do not uniformly conduct us to right conceptions of realities, we find that there are different degrees of belief according to the nature of the evidence presented.

The highest kind of evidence is intuitive knowledge, which is a uniform result of the constitution of mind and its inevitable circumstances. This is called intuitive knowledge or intuitive belief.

All other evidence is gained by experience or by reasoning. The experience of other minds we gain by testimony. This is called the evidence of testimony.

Belief differs in degrees according to the nature and amount of evidence perceived. The highest kind of evidence produces what is called certainty. It is the kind which is felt in reference to the intuitive truths. There are all degrees of faith, from the highest certainty to entire incredulity or unbelief.

This fact lays the foundation for a distinction in practical matters which it is very important to recognize. It is often the case that there is an amount of evidence that produces a conviction which rests in the mind, but does not produce its appropriate practical result. For example, a man in feeble health has read enough on the subject to be convinced that a daily bath in cool water would tend to restore strength, and yet the belief does not secure the practice. But on a review of the books which produced the conviction, or on hearing some lecturer on health, the conviction becomes more powerful, and leads to a corresponding practice.

Now, in reference to the fact that there are multitudes of convictions which are inoperative, which, if vividly realized, would become principles of action, there is a distinction made, in common parlance, between a dead or ideal faith, and a living or practical faith. Still more is this distinction recognized in matters of religion, as will be hereafter shown.

The question whether faith or belief is under the control of the will, or whether it is necessary and inevitable, is one of very great importance both in regard to our happiness and our obligations.

If belief is not under the control of the will, it must be because either the mind has not the power of directing its attention to evidence, or because it is so made that, when it perceives the truth, it can not distinguish it from falsehood.

In regard to the first alternative, the control which the mind has over its own train of thought has been definitely pointed out and described in the articles on attention and on the will. It appears that the will is the regulating principle, which governs all mental operations by selecting the modes of happiness which the intellect shall be employed in securing. Whatever mode of present or of general happiness is selected, immediately all conceptions which the judgment discerns as having a fitness for accomplishing this object become vivid and distinct, and recall their associate conceptions. Thus it is the choice of any mode of enjoyment by the will which determines the train of thought.

When, therefore, any question is brought up which demands attention to evidence, if the mind has some desire to gratify, and the intellect discerns that the conviction of this truth will interfere with this chosen plan of happiness, the will refuses attention to what is not in consonance with the leading desire of the mind. Where conviction of any truth is foreseen to interfere with some plan of enjoyment already chosen, the only way by which attention can be secured is by exhibiting some evil that will follow inattention which will more than counterbalance the good to be gained. In this case, the mind may choose to attend, and run the hazard of losing the particular mode of enjoyment sought in order to avoid the threatened evil from inattention to evidence.

This is the method men pursue in all their intercourse with each other. They find that their fellow-men are unwilling to believe what is contrary to their own wishes and plans. But when they determine that belief shall be secured, they contrive various modes to make it appear either for their pleasure or their interest to attend to evidence, or else they exhibit some evil as the consequence of neglecting attention.

The only mode by which mankind are induced to give their thoughts to the concerns of an invisible world is by awakening their hopes of future good to be secured, or by stimulating their fears of future evils. It thus appears, from the laws and operations of the mind of which every person is conscious, and also from the conduct and recorded experience of mankind, that the mind has the power of directing its attention to evidence.

The other alternative which would establish the principle that belief is not under the control of the will is, that truth, when seen by the mind, can not be distinguished from falsehood. But this, it can be seen, involves a denial of the principles of reason and common sense. It is saying that the mind may have the evidence of the senses, memory, and all the other principles included in the laws of reason, and yet not believe it; for every process of reasoning is, in fact, exhibiting evidence either of the senses, memory, or experience, that a certain truth is included under a primary truth.

The only position which can be assumed without denying the principles of reason and common sense is, that belief, according to the laws of mind, is exactly according to the amount of evidence to which the mind gives its attention.

In order to belief, then, two things are necessary, viz., evidence, and the choice of the mind to attend to this evidence. When both of these are attained, the belief of truth and the rejection of falsehood are inevitable.

The influence which the will and desires have upon our belief accounts for the great variety of opinions among mankind on almost every subject of duty and of happiness.

There are two ways in which the desires and wishes regulate belief. In the first place, by preventing attention to the subject which would lead to the belief of truths that are inconsistent with the leading desires of the mind. This, in a great measure, will account for the great variety of religious belief. Religion is a subject which is felt to be inconsistent with the leading desires of most persons who are interested in the pursuit of other enjoyments than those resulting from obedience to God in the discharge of the duties of benevolence and piety. It is a subject, therefore, which receives so little examination that opinions in regard to it are adopted with trifling attention.

The second cause of variety of belief is the effect which desire has in making vivid those conceptions which most agree with the leading purpose of the mind. When the mind decides to examine the evidence on any subject, if the decision involves questions which have a bearing on some favorite purpose, all those arguments which are most consonant with the desires appear vivid and clear, and those which are contrary to the wishes are fainter and less regarded. This is a fact which universal experience demonstrates. Men always fasten on evidence which favors their own wishes, and but faintly conceive the evidence which is opposed. This is a cause which operates most powerfully in regard to religious truths whenever they interfere with the leading desires.

This view of the subject exhibits the importance of having the mind directed to proper objects; for if the mind is earnestly engaged in the pursuit of duty, it will be pleased with every development of truth, for truth and duty are never found to interfere. Truth is another name for "things as they are," and it is always the duty and happiness of man to regulate his conduct by seeing things as they are, rather than by seeing them in false relations. That man is best prepared to discover truth who is most sincerely desirous to obtain it, and to regulate his feelings, words, and conduct by its dictates.

There is nothing more obvious, from experience and observation, than that men feel their ability to control their belief, and realize both their own obligations and those of their fellow-men on this subject. They know that every man must act according to his belief of right and wrong, and thus that the fulfillment of every duty depends upon the nature of our belief. And the more important are the interests involved in any question, the more men perceive their obligations to seek for evidence, and obtain the knowledge necessary to enable them to judge correctly.

The estimation of guilt among mankind, in reference to wrong belief, is always proportioned to the interests involved and the opportunities for obtaining knowledge. In the minute affairs of life, where but little evil is done from false judgments, but little blame is attached to a man for believing wrong. Neither is a man severely judged if the necessary knowledge was inaccessible or very difficult to be obtained.

But where a man has great interests committed to his keeping, and has sufficient opportunity for obtaining evidence of truth, the severest condemnation awaits him who, through inattention or prejudice, hazards vast interests by an incorrect belief. If an agent has the charge of great investments, and through negligence, or indolence, or prejudice ruins his employer, his sincere belief is no protection from severe condemnation. If the physician has the health and life of a valued member of the community and the object of many affections intrusted to his skill, and from negligence and inattention destroys the life he was appointed to save, his sincere belief is but a small palliation of his guilt. If a judge has the fortune and life of his fellow-citizens intrusted to his judicial knowledge and integrity, and, through want of care and attention, is guilty of flagrant injustice and evil, the plea of wrong belief will not protect him from the impeachment and just indignation which await such delinquencies.

There is no point where men are more tenacious of the obligations of their fellow-creatures than on the subject of belief. If they find themselves calumniated, unjustly dealt with, and treated with contempt and scorn from prejudice or want of attention, the reality of belief is little palliation of the guilt of those who thus render them injustice. They feel the obligations of their fellow-men to know the truth in all that relates to their interests, honor, and good name; and often there is scarcely any thing which it is so difficult to forgive as the simple crime of wrong belief.

The only modes by which men attempt to justify themselves for guilt of this nature are to show either that the matter was of small consequence, or that the means of learning its importance and of obtaining the other necessary information was not within reach.

It may be laid down, then, as a long-established axiom in regard to this subject, that men estimate the guilt of wrong belief in all matters relating to the welfare of mankind in exact proportion to the value of the interests involved, and to the opportunities enjoyed for obtaining information.

Inasmuch as all our success and happiness depends upon our belief of the truth, we have two of the principles of reason and common sense to guide us. The first is, that we are to consider that to be right which has the balance of evidence in its favor; and the second is, that nothing is to be assumed as true unless there is some evidence that it is so.

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