Somos una HR Tech líder en soluciones tecnológicas para el mercado laboral. Contamos con tres unidades de negocios: los portales de clasificados, el software de reclutamiento y gestión de búsquedas Hiring Room y la plataforma tecnológica aplicada a la selección de talento Selecta y Staffing.

Jobint

Everyone seems ecstatic about Bitcoin right now, and for a while I’ve been interested in writing about — the cool frontend tool for building analytical applications. The reason I like Dash is it allows me to remain in my comfort zone: Python. And it boasts of being lightweight, easily customizable, you know, all those good things. Dash by plotly are a pretty useful indicator in stock trading. It’s still a as to whether Bitcoin is like a stock. As such, I’m using the term loosely here. help identify trends, provide trade signals, and smooth out price action by filtering out the “noise” from random price fluctuations. There are various variants of, and ways to calculate moving averages. Simple Moving Average is simply the average of the last values with being the period to average over. Weighted Moving Average and Exponential Moving Average are less simple in that they introduce weights and also take into consideration the fact that more recent values may provide a better indication of the trend and thus apply some form of decay to the weights. Moving averages (MAs) grey area MAs (SMA) N N (WMA) (EMA) Here, I’ll give a brief tutorial on how to visualize Bitcoin prices, the and the using Dash. SMA EMA Our first challenge is getting real-time Bitcoin prices. Thankfully, provides an that does just that. Coindesk API $ curl https://api.coindesk.com/v1/bpi/currentprice/USD.json {"time":{"updated":"Dec 31, 2017 19:26:00 UTC","updatedISO":"2017-12-31T19:26:00+00:00","updateduk":"Dec 31, 2017 at 19:26 GMT"},"disclaimer":"This data was produced from the CoinDesk Bitcoin Price Index (USD). Non-USD currency data converted using hourly conversion rate from openexchangerates.org","bpi":{"USD":{"code":"USD","rate":"13,935.3500","description":"United States Dollar","rate_float":13935.35}}} Nice. The prices are updated every minute so we need a service that calls this minute by minute. What we would like is a process that schedules the call every minute which is then executed in the background. API REST According to Heroku: Scheduling a job and executing a job are two related but independent tasks. Separating a job’s execution from its scheduling ensures the responsibilities of each component are clearly defined and results in a more structured and manageable system. As you would expect, Python is up to the task. The Advanced Python Scheduler (APScheduler) is a Python library that lets you schedule your Python code to be executed later, either just once or periodically. We also need a queuing system. We’ll use simply because it makes it easy to add background tasks to Python code on Heroku — my favorite . RQ (Redis Queue) PAAS $ pip install apscheduler rq redis We also need to install . There is a comprehensive guide . All I had to do from my Mac was and from my Ubuntu Redis here brew install redis sudo apt install redis-server We can then go on to create a process that listens to, and processes queued jobs. import osimport redisfrom rq import Worker, Queue, Connection listen = ['high', 'default', 'low']redis_url = os.getenv('REDISTOGO_URL', 'redis://localhost:6379') conn = redis.from_url(redis_url) if __name__ == '__main__':with Connection(conn):worker = Worker(map(Queue, listen))worker.work() This is simply a worker process that reads jobs from the given queues in an endless loop, waiting for new work to arrive when all jobs are done. Name the file worker.py Now we can go ahead to author a file named that would serve as our scheduler. We’ll use the class which is quite simple, and obtain a connection to our queue. scheduler.py BlockingScheduler from apscheduler.schedulers.blocking import BlockingSchedulerfrom rq import Queue scheduler = BlockingScheduler() from worker import connq = Queue(connection=conn) Having created and obtained a connection to the queue in our worker process, we can now schedule our job i.e making a REST call to Coindesk’s API. We’ll go ahead to author a file named You may want to install the following packages first utils.py $ pip install iso8601 requests And then import requests, calendar, timefrom iso8601 import parse_date def retrieve_current_price(endpoint): response = requests.get(url=endpoint)  
data = response.json()

updatedTime = data\['time'\]\['updatedISO'\]  
currentPrice = data\['bpi'\]\["USD"\]\['rate\_float'\]  
  
parsed = parse\_date(updatedTime)  
timetuple = parsed.timetuple()  
parsedTime = calendar.timegm(timetuple)

return Nothing groundbreaking here. We are simply making an request to the endpoint and extracting the needed information from the JSON response formatted as shown earlier. What we would like to do next is save these values to a datastore. We’ll use — a straightforward document oriented DB. http GET TinyDB $ pip install tinydb We’ll then go on to add the following snippets of code into Notice that the prices are stored in a file named utils.py bpi.db from tinydb import TinyDB, Query db = TinyDB('bpi.db')BPI = Query() db.insert({'updatedTime': int(parsedTime), 'QueryTime': int(time.time()), 'currentPrice': currentPrice}) So that looks like this utils.py import requests, calendar, timefrom iso8601 import parse_datefrom tinydb import TinyDB, Query def retrieve_current_price(endpoint): response = requests.get(url=endpoint)  
data = response.json()

updatedTime = data\['time'\]\['updatedISO'\]  
currentPrice = data\['bpi'\]\["USD"\]\['rate\_float'\]  
  
parsed = parse\_date(updatedTime)  
timetuple = parsed.timetuple()  
parsedTime = calendar.timegm(timetuple)

db = TinyDB('bpi.db')  
BPI = Query()  
db.insert({'updatedTime': int(parsedTime), 'QueryTime': int(time.time()), 'currentPrice': currentPrice})

return Now that we’ve defined our job, we can go ahead to schedule it in our file. Let’s dig up the file again and add the following snippet of code just underneath everything else in the file. scheduler.py from utils import retrieve_current_price endpoint = "https://api.coindesk.com/v1/bpi/currentprice/USD.json" #To attach the needed metadata we use a decorator#Coinbase publishes prices every minute (60 seconds) @scheduler.scheduled_job('interval', minutes=1)def retrieve_current_price_job(): q.enqueue(retrieve_current_price, endpoint) scheduler.start() Sweet. Notice that we first import the method that executes our REST call. This method is then added to the redis queue with and another such job is added every minute. q.enqueue(retrieve_current_price, endpoint) Running and should begin to populate the file every minute with the Bitcoin price indexes. scheduler.py worker.py bpi.db We now need to move over to visualizations using Dash. As a teaser, here is a look at the expected final output from this tutorial. Its dynamic, so this just gives a peek. Dash is written on top of , , and . Flask Plotly.js React.js Snip of the Dash app As you can see, it does use a bit of styling here and there and most of the styling code is borrowed from . That said, we won’t go over the styling. Go ahead and download the stylesheet. https://github.com/plotly/dash-wind-streaming Stylesheet for the Dash app A bit annoying to install but we also need to download the file that contains packages for the application . You can install them using requirements.txt here $ pip install -r requirements.txt Once that is done, we can go ahead to author a file named that would contain the code for our Dash application. app.py As usual, import a few modules. We’ll describe the functionality of some later on. import osimport datetime as dtimport time import dashimport dash_core_components as dccimport dash_html_components as htmlfrom dash.dependencies import Input, Output, State, Event import plotly.plotly as pyfrom plotly.graph_objs import * import numpy as npfrom scipy.stats import rayleigh from tinydb import TinyDB, Query from flask import Flask, send_from_directory We’ll go ahead and create our object which takes a instance as an argument. Dash Flask server = Flask('BitcoinMAvgs') app = dash.Dash('BitcoinMAvgs-App', server=server, url_base_pathname='/dash/', csrf_protect=False) Voila! we have a Dash application. Pretty useless I know but all we need to do now is define our and . To get a comprehensive dive into Dash head . layouts callbacks here The Dash describes what your app would look like and is composed of a set of declarative Dash components. On the other hand, make Dash apps interactive using Python functions that are automatically called whenever an input component’s property changes. There are components and components. layout callbacks core html we’ll go ahead to start defining our layout. First we define the root div app.layout = html.Div([...], className='main-div') We can then add sub-components to this div If you look at the final layout you’ll notice the banner. We’ll go ahead to add that. Replace the ellipsis in the snippet above with the code below html.Div([html.H2("Bitcoin prices with moving averages")], className='banner'), This basically creates a , sets the reference to its styling and adds a text. div header The next thing we need to do is create the container for our graph, its title, and the corresponding components. Go ahead and add the snippet beneath the banner component. html.Div([ html.Div([html.H3("Price(USD) " + str(dt.datetime.now().date()))], className='Title'), html.Div([dcc.Graph(id='bpi'),],className='twelve columns bpi'), dcc.Interval(id='bpi-update', interval=12000) ],className='row bpi-row'), A few explanations. As we’ve seen already the and are simply components as we know them. But now we have 2 core components. and . The component shares the same syntax as written in the open-source library. The element allows you to update components on a predefined interval. In our case, every or . Also note that these components have IDs. We’ll use these IDs when writing our callbacks. divs header html dcc.Graph dcc.Interval Graph plotly.py Interval 2 minutes 12000 milliseconds Beneath the that contains our , we’ll add 3 more components —all wrapped in their own each having a corresponding label. div graph Dropdowns divs html.Div([ html.P("Period"), dcc.Dropdown(id='period',options= [{'label': i, 'value': i}for i in ['5', '10', '15']], value='10')] style={'width': '31%', 'display': 'inline-block'}), html.Div([ html.P("Box plot Period"), dcc.Dropdown(id='box_plot_period',options=[{'label': i, 'value': i}for i in ['5', '10', '15']], value='10')], style={'width': '31%', 'margin-left': '3%', 'display': 'inline-block'}), html.Div([ html.P("Time frame"), dcc.Dropdown(id='timeframe',options=[{'label': i, 'value': i}for i in ['1', '2', '3', '4']], value='2')], style={'width': '31%', 'float': 'right', 'display': 'inline-block'}) These will dynamically control the for our averages, the grouping for our and the timeframe in hours for which to show the averages respectively. dropdowns period box-plots Having defined our layouts, we can then go ahead to write what happens when we interact with the layouts — callbacks @app.callback( Output(component_id='bpi', component_property='figure'),[ Input(component_id='period', component_property='value'),Input(component_id='box_plot_period', component_property='value'),Input(component_id='timeframe', component_property='value')], [], [Event('bpi-update', 'interval')]) What we have here is simply the for our interface which we will define shortly that describes declaratively its and . The are the properties of a particular component. Here, our inputs are the properties of the components that have the IDs , , and i.e our and our output is the property of the component with the ID which is our . decorator input output inputs value period box_plot_period timeframe dropdowns figure bpi graph Now, we can code up the method to load the data from our datastore and return the figure based on our arguments. Beneath our , we’ll add the code below graph decorator def get_bpi(N, bN, T):T = int(T)curr_time = time.time()begin_time = curr_time - T * 60 * 60 db = TinyDB('bpi.db')  
BPI = Query()  
data = db.search(BPI.updatedTime > begin\_time) First we need to determine what slice of the data to process. And this is controlled by the argument; . We simply query the datastore for the last hours of data. Now that we have the raw data, we want to extract the prices and also build a friendly format of the — we’ll show the and for each data point in our graph. timeframe T T timestamp hour minute for bpi in data: prices.append(bpi\["currentPrice"\])  
a = dt.datetime.fromtimestamp(int(bpi\["updatedTime"\]))

dtime.append(str(a.hour) + ":" + str(a.minute)) plen = len(prices) So we would like to build for our prices but remember that we have parameterized the grouping of these so that we can group our prices into various chunks — , or as you wish. box-plots box-plots 10 minute 15 minute boxtraces = []names = [] for i in xrange(0, plen, bN): y = prices\[i:i + bN\]  
ind = i + bN - 1

if (i + bN) > len(dtime):  
       
     ind = len(dtime) - 1

name = dtime\[ind\]  
names.append(name)

trace = Box(y=y, name=name, showlegend=False,  
x=\[i for j in range(len(y))\])

boxtraces.append(trace) Some explanations here. We loop through our list skipping over in steps — the parameter and for each of these data slices, we associate a label — which is the of the last datapoint in that slice. We then build a graph object using for each slice and append all those objects to a list. prices bN boxplot period timestamp Boxplot trace = Box(…) Now, we can calculate and plot our first moving average. The . The is just as its called — simple. We take an over the prices as we move across the data in chunks — which is our parameter. SMA SMA average N period SMA = []if plen > N: SMA = \[None for i in range(N - 1)\]  
  
for i in xrange(0, plen - N - 1, 1):

    y = prices\[i: i + N\]  
    sma = reduce(lambda x, y\_\_: x + y\_\_, y) / len(y)  
      
    SMA.append(sma) The Exponetial moving average — is slightly different and has the following formular EMA new EMA = [Closing price - previous EMA] x (2 / N+1) + previous EMA where N = period With that, we can go ahead and code up its implementation EMA = []if plen > N: EMA = \[None for i in range(N - 1)\]  
y = prices\[0: i + N\]  
  
avg = reduce(lambda x, y\_: x + y\_, y) / len(y)  
EMA.append(avg)

for i in xrange(N, plen, 1):  
       
    new\_ema = ((prices\[i\] - EMA\[-1\]) \* 2.0 / 11.0) + EMA\[-1\]

 EMA.append(new\_ema) Now to some things. plotly Just as we did for our traces, we also create a using the our and data. box-plot line-plot SMA EMA trace = Scatter( y=SMA, x=[i for i in xrange(0, plen, 1)],line=Line(color='#42C4F7'), mode='lines', name='SMA' ) trace2 = Scatter( y=EMA, x=[i for i in xrange(0, plen, 1)],line=Line(color='#32DD32'), mode='lines',name=str(N) + '-period-EMA' ) Nothing spectacular here, we’re simply creating a object and passing and properties. Scatter data styling With that done, we can create our plotly layout layout = Layout( xaxis=dict(tickmode="array",ticktext=names,tickvals=[i for i in xrange(0, plen, bN)],showticklabels=True), height=450,margin=Margin(t=45,l=50,r=50) ) traces = []traces.append(trace)traces.append(trace2) boxtraces.extend(traces) return Figure(data=boxtraces, layout=layout) The here is simply the list of our human friendly and our boxplots are grouped by so we want to use that too to set our . After which we can create a object instantiated with the and the . names variable timestamps bN tickvals Figure traces layout And that’s it! What’s left is to reference our the way. Just go ahead and copy the code below, and place it beneath all the code in stylesheet Flask app.py external_css = ["https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/skeleton/2.0.4/skeleton.min.css","https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Raleway:400,400i,700,700i","https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Product+Sans:400,400i,700,700i"] for css in external_css: app.css.append\_css({"external\_url": css}) css_directory = os.getcwd()stylesheets = ['BitcoinMAvgs.css'] static_css_route = '/static/' @app.server.route('{}<stylesheet>'.format(static_css_route)) def serve_stylesheet(stylesheet): if stylesheet not in stylesheets:

    raise Exception('"{}" is excluded from the allowed static files'.format(stylesheet))

return send\_from\_directory(css\_directory, stylesheet) for stylesheet in stylesheets:app.css.append_css({"external_url":"/static/{}".format(stylesheet)}) This snippet of code assumes the local is located in the same directory as stylesheet BitcoinMAvgs.css app.py Finally! we can run our application. if __name__ == '__main__':app.run_server() Start your server if its not already running Redis $ redis-server and execute these in separate shells $ python worker.py $ python scheduler.py $ python app.py Your application should be accessible via [http://localhost:8050/dash/](http://localhost:8050/dash/) There we have it. Dynamic moving averages of prices without writing a single line of . The complete code can be found on Bitcoin Javascript GitHub https://github.com/Viktour19/BitcoinMAvgs Drop a comment if there are any thoughts on how to make this better. Cheers!

Visualizing Bitcoin prices moving averages using Dash

Christian Science by Mark Twain, is part of the HackerNoon Books Series. You can jump to any chapter in this book . CHAPTER XV here CHAPTER XV We may take that up now.
It is not a single if, but a several-jointed one; not an oyster, but a vertebrate. Did Mrs. Eddy borrow from Quimby the Great Idea, or only the little one, the old-timer, the ordinary mental-healing-healing by “mortal” mind? If she borrowed the Great Idea, did she carry it away in her head, or in manuscript? Did she hit upon the Great Idea herself? By the Great Idea I mean, of course, the conviction that the Force involved was still existent, and could be applied now just as it was applied by Christ's Disciples and their converts, and as successfully. Did she philosophize it, systematize it, and write it down in a book? Was it she, and not another, that built a new Religion upon the book and organized it? I think No. 5 can be answered with a Yes, and dismissed from the controversy. And I think that the Great Idea, great as it was, would have enjoyed but a brief activity, and would then have gone to sleep again for some more centuries, but for the perpetuating impulse it got from that organized and tremendous force. As for Nos. 1, 2, and 4, the hostiles contend that Mrs. Eddy got the Great Idea from Quimby and carried it off in manuscript. But their testimony, while of consequence, lacks the most important detail; so far as my information goes, the Quimby manuscript has not been produced. I think we cannot discuss No. 1 and No. 2 profitably. Let them go. For me, No. 3 has a mild interest, and No. 4 a violent one. As regards No. 3, Mrs. Eddy was brought up, from the cradle, an old-time, boiler-iron, Westminster-Catechism Christian, and knew her Bible as well as Captain Kydd knew his, “when he sailed, when he sailed,” and perhaps as sympathetically. The Great Idea had struck a million Bible-readers before her as being possible of resurrection and application—it must have struck as many as that, and been cogitated, indolently, doubtingly, then dropped and forgotten—and it could have struck her, in due course. But how it could interest her, how it could appeal to her—with her make this a thing that is difficult to understand. For the thing back of it is wholly gracious and beautiful: the power, through loving mercifulness and compassion, to heal fleshly ills and pains and grief—all—with a word, with a touch of the hand! This power was given by the Saviour to the Disciples, and to all the converted. All—every one. It was exercised for generations afterwards. Any Christian who was in earnest and not a make-believe, not a policy—Christian, not a Christian for revenue only, had that healing power, and could cure with it any disease or any hurt or damage possible to human flesh and bone. These things are true, or they are not. If they were true seventeen and eighteen and nineteen centuries ago it would be difficult to satisfactorily explain why or how or by what argument that power should be nonexistent in Christians now. To wish to exercise it could occur to Mrs. Eddy—but would it? Grasping, sordid, penurious, famishing for everything she sees—money, power, glory—vain, untruthful, jealous, despotic, arrogant, insolent, pitiless where thinkers and hypnotists are concerned, illiterate, shallow, incapable of reasoning outside of commercial lines, immeasurably selfish— Of course the Great Idea could strike her, we have to grant that, but why it should interest her is a question which can easily overstrain the imagination and bring on nervous prostration, or something like that, and is better left alone by the judicious, it seems to me— Unless we call to our help the alleged other side of Mrs. Eddy's make and character the side which her multitude of followers see, and sincerely believe in. Fairness requires that their view be stated here. It is the opposite of the one which I have drawn from Mrs. Eddy's history and from her By-laws. To her followers she is this: Patient, gentle, loving, compassionate, noble hearted, unselfish, sinless, widely cultured, splendidly equipped mentally, a profound thinker, an able writer, a divine personage, an inspired messenger whose acts are dictated from the Throne, and whose every utterance is the Voice of God. She has delivered to them a religion which has revolutionized their lives, banished the glooms that shadowed them, and filled them and flooded them with sunshine and gladness and peace; a religion which has no hell; a religion whose heaven is not put off to another time, with a break and a gulf between, but begins here and now, and melts into eternity as fancies of the waking day melt into the dreams of sleep. They believe it is a Christianity that is in the New Testament; that it has always been there, that in the drift of ages it was lost through disuse and neglect, and that this benefactor has found it and given it back to men, turning the night of life into day, its terrors into myths, its lamentations into songs of emancipation and rejoicing. There we have Mrs. Eddy as her followers see her. She has lifted them out of grief and care and doubt and fear, and made their lives beautiful; she found them wandering forlorn in a wintry wilderness, and has led them to a tropic paradise like that of which the poet sings: “O, islands there are on the face of the deep
 Where the leaves never fade and the skies never weep.” To ask them to examine with a microscope the character of such a benefactor; to ask them to examine it at all; to ask them to look at a blemish which another person believes he has found in it—well, in their place could you do it? Would you do it? Wouldn't you be ashamed to do it? If a tramp had rescued your child from fire and death, and saved its mother's heart from breaking, could you see his rags? Could you smell his breath? Mrs. Eddy has done more than that for these people. They are prejudiced witnesses. To the credit of human nature it is not possible that they should be otherwise. They sincerely believe that Mrs. Eddy's character is pure and perfect and beautiful, and her history without stain or blot or blemish. But that does not settle it. They sincerely believe she did not borrow the Great Idea from Quimby, but hit upon it herself. It may be so, and it could be so. Let it go—there is no way to settle it. They believe she carried away no Quimby manuscripts. Let that go, too—there is no way to settle it. They believe that she, and not another, built the Religion upon the book, and organized it. I believe it, too. Finally, they believe that she philosophized Christian Science, explained it, systematized it, and wrote it all out with her own hand in the book Science and Health. I am not able to believe that. Let us draw the line there. The known and undisputed products of her pen are a formidable witness against her. They do seem to me to prove, quite clearly and conclusively, that writing, upon even simple subjects, is a difficult labor for her: that she has never been able to write anything above third-rate English; that she is weak in the matter of grammar; that she has but a rude and dull sense of the values of words; that she so lacks in the matter of literary precision that she can seldom put a thought into words that express it lucidly to the reader and leave no doubts in his mind as to whether he has rightly understood or not; that she cannot even draught a Preface that a person can fully comprehend, nor one which can by any art be translated into a fully understandable form; that she can seldom inject into a Preface even single sentences whose meaning is uncompromisingly clear—yet Prefaces are her specialty, if she has one. Mrs. Eddy's known and undisputed writings are very limited in bulk; they exhibit no depth, no analytical quality, no thought above school composition size, and but juvenile ability in handling thoughts of even that modest magnitude. She has a fine commercial ability, and could govern a vast railway system in great style; she could draught a set of rules that Satan himself would say could not be improved on—for devilish effectiveness—by his staff; but we know, by our excursions among the Mother-Church's By-laws, that their English would discredit the deputy baggage-smasher. I am quite sure that Mrs. Eddy cannot write well upon any subject, even a commercial one. In the very first revision of Science and Health (1883), Mrs. Eddy wrote a Preface which is an unimpeachable witness that the rest of the book was written by somebody else. I have put it in the Appendix along with a page or two taken from the body of the book, and will ask the reader to compare the labored and lumbering and confused gropings of this Preface with the easy and flowing and direct English of the other exhibit, and see if he can believe that the one hand and brain produced both. And let him take the Preface apart, sentence by sentence, and searchingly examine each sentence word by word, and see if he can find half a dozen sentences whose meanings he is so sure of that he can rephrase them—in words of his own—and reproduce what he takes to be those meanings. Money can be lost on this game. I know, for I am the one that lost it. Now let the reader turn to the excerpt which I have made from the chapter on “Prayer” (last year's edition of Science and Health), and compare that wise and sane and elevated and lucid and compact piece of work with the aforesaid Preface, and with Mrs. Eddy's poetry concerning the gymnastic trees, and Minerva's not yet effete sandals, and the wreaths imported from Erudition's bower for the decoration of Plymouth Rock, and the Plague-spot and Bacilli, and my other exhibits (turn back to my Chapters I. and II.) from the Autobiography, and finally with the late Communication concerning me, and see if he thinks anybody's affirmation, or anybody's sworn testimony, or any other testimony of any imaginable kind would ever be likely to convince him that Mrs. Eddy wrote that chapter on Prayer. I do not wish to impose my opinion on any one who will not permit it, but such as it is I offer it here for what it is worth. I cannot believe, and I do not believe, that Mrs. Eddy originated any of the thoughts and reasonings out of which the book Science and Health is constructed; and I cannot believe, and do not believe that she ever wrote any part of that book. I think that if anything in the world stands proven, and well and solidly proven, by unimpeachable testimony—the treacherous testimony of her own pen in her known and undisputed literary productions—it is that Mrs. Eddy is not capable of thinking upon high planes, nor of reasoning clearly nor writing intelligently upon low ones. Inasmuch as—in my belief—the very first editions of the book Science and Health were far above the reach of Mrs. Eddy's mental and literary abilities, I think she has from the very beginning been claiming as her own another person's book, and wearing as her own property laurels rightfully belonging to that person—the real author of Science and Health. And I think the reason—and the only reason—that he has not protested is because his work was not exposed to print until after he was safely dead. That with an eye to business, and by grace of her business talent, she has restored to the world neglected and abandoned features of the Christian religion which her thousands of followers find gracious and blessed and contenting, I recognize and confess; but I am convinced that every single detail of the work except just that one—the delivery of the Product to the world—was conceived and performed by another. About HackerNoon Book Series: We bring you the most important technical, scientific, and insightful public domain books. This book is part of the public domain. Mark Twain (2004). Christian Science. Urbana, Illinois: Project Gutenberg. Retrieved October 2022 https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/3187/pg3187-images.html This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at , located at . www.gutenberg.org https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html

IT IS NOT A SINGLE IF, BUT A SEVERAL-JOINTED ONE

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 33 of 38. Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware The proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware poses a significant threat to both U.S. national security—including counterintelligence interests—and to democratic values and human rights around the globe by enabling the surveillance, repression, and targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and other civil society members. In March 2023, President Biden signed an executive order limiting U.S. government operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States, or significant risks of improper use, including committing human rights abuses, by a foreign government or foreign person. At the same time, the Department of State launched a Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware with 10 other countries committed to undertaking concrete efforts to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, which an additional 6 countries joined in March 2024. Moving forward, the U.S. government will continue to work to disincentivize misuse and positively reshape the commercial spyware market by driving out or encouraging reform by businesses associated with the misuse of these tools. The Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to urge the countries that have already joined the Joint Statement to take concrete steps to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, induce additional countries to join, and persuade countries that misuse or enable the misuse of spyware to implement safeguards to deviate less from U.S. policy. The Department of State will continue to partner with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to promote accountability for those who misuse—or enable or benefit from the misuse—of commercial spyware through tools like sanctions, visa restrictions, and export controls. In addition, the Department of State will continue to elevate this issue in multilateral and public forums as well as engage closely with civil society, journalists, tech platforms, and the investment community. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 33 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 33 of 38. here here Line of Effort 8: Combat the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware The proliferation and misuse of commercial spyware poses a significant threat to both U.S. national security—including counterintelligence interests—and to democratic values and human rights around the globe by enabling the surveillance, repression, and targeting of journalists, human rights defenders, anti-corruption activists, and other civil society members. In March 2023, President Biden signed an executive order limiting U.S. government operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States, or significant risks of improper use, including committing human rights abuses, by a foreign government or foreign person. At the same time, the Department of State launched a Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware with 10 other countries committed to undertaking concrete efforts to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, which an additional 6 countries joined in March 2024. Moving forward, the U.S. government will continue to work to disincentivize misuse and positively reshape the commercial spyware market by driving out or encouraging reform by businesses associated with the misuse of these tools. The Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to urge the countries that have already joined the Joint Statement to take concrete steps to counter the misuse and proliferation of commercial spyware, induce additional countries to join, and persuade countries that misuse or enable the misuse of spyware to implement safeguards to deviate less from U.S. policy. The Department of State will continue to partner with the Departments of Commerce and Treasury to promote accountability for those who misuse—or enable or benefit from the misuse—of commercial spyware through tools like sanctions, visa restrictions, and export controls. In addition, the Department of State will continue to elevate this issue in multilateral and public forums as well as engage closely with civil society, journalists, tech platforms, and the investment community. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Tackling Spyware Misuse: United States' Efforts to Counter Commercial Spyware Proliferation

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 31 of 38. Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors For many countries, the greatest risk to their digital security and economies is online scams, criminal hacking, and other financial crimes. Ransomware in particular has emerged in recent years as a clear threat to national security, public safety, and economic prosperity. Operating from safe havens like the PRC, DPRK, Iran, Russia, and certain other countries, ransomware operators have disrupted government services, hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, and civil society entities. With some states using ransomware actors as proxies or turning a blind eye to their activities and the significant impact of their cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, it is increasingly clear that ransomware activity can threaten international peace and security. Digital solidarity is clearly expressed through the Department of State’s efforts to leverage its diplomatic capabilities to support the whole-of-government fight against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, including by building partner capacity; developing coalitions to prevent, disrupt, and punish criminal behavior; and fostering cooperation with the private sector. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice will continue to participate in the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force and to partner with private industry and international allies to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and resources, take down botnets, and seize cryptocurrency garnered from ransomware campaigns. For example, the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law Enforcement Network (GLEN) program—a long-standing partnership between the Departments of State and Justice—is a global law enforcement capacity-building network of DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) regional advisors, computer forensic analysts, and federal law enforcement agents. Twelve ICHIP attorney advisors are located around the world. The ICHIP advisor based in The Hague facilitated cooperation among the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Latvia in the largest ever takedown of the botnet and malware known as Qakbot in August 2023. The network also delivers training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners, prosecutors, and judicial authorities to combat intellectual property theft and cybercrime activity, as well as to assist in the collection and use of electronic evidence to combat all types of crime. The program improves U.S. security by reducing the use of foreign computing infrastructure for malicious activities targeting U.S. networks and by showing that no malicious actor can evade the rule of law. The GLEN has stood up five regional cryptocurrency working groups around the globe, which are dedicated to information sharing and capacity building to address criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, including in ransomware. Additional priorities for capacity building include Internet fraud and combating the growing scourge of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Department of State will continue to use its diplomatic engagements and capacity building to broaden and strengthen participation in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The CRI is a unique and geographically diverse coalition of nearly 60 countries, plus multilateral institutions such as the European Union, Interpol, and Organization of American States, committed to building collective resilience to ransomware, cooperating to disrupt ransomware and pursue the actors responsible, countering the illicit finance that underpins the ransomware ecosystem, and working with the private sector to defend against ransomware attacks. As a complement to the CRI, the Department of State, in coordination with the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force, will continue to develop bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to discourage states from sponsoring ransomware or permitting their territories to be used as safe havens by cyber criminals. The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including the voluntary norm that “states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructures are subject to malicious ICT acts,” in addition to “appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.” [5] Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 31 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 31 of 38. here here Line of Effort 6: Counter Criminal and Ransomware Actors For many countries, the greatest risk to their digital security and economies is online scams, criminal hacking, and other financial crimes. Ransomware in particular has emerged in recent years as a clear threat to national security, public safety, and economic prosperity. Operating from safe havens like the PRC, DPRK, Iran, Russia, and certain other countries, ransomware operators have disrupted government services, hospitals, schools, pipeline operations, and civil society entities. With some states using ransomware actors as proxies or turning a blind eye to their activities and the significant impact of their cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, it is increasingly clear that ransomware activity can threaten international peace and security. Digital solidarity is clearly expressed through the Department of State’s efforts to leverage its diplomatic capabilities to support the whole-of-government fight against ransomware and other forms of cybercrime, including by building partner capacity; developing coalitions to prevent, disrupt, and punish criminal behavior; and fostering cooperation with the private sector. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice will continue to participate in the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force and to partner with private industry and international allies to disrupt online criminal infrastructure and resources, take down botnets, and seize cryptocurrency garnered from ransomware campaigns. For example, the U.S. Transnational and High-Tech Crime Global Law Enforcement Network (GLEN) program—a long-standing partnership between the Departments of State and Justice—is a global law enforcement capacity-building network of DOJ International Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (ICHIP) regional advisors, computer forensic analysts, and federal law enforcement agents. Twelve ICHIP attorney advisors are located around the world. The ICHIP advisor based in The Hague facilitated cooperation among the United States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Romania, and Latvia in the largest ever takedown of the botnet and malware known as Qakbot in August 2023. The network also delivers training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement partners, prosecutors, and judicial authorities to combat intellectual property theft and cybercrime activity, as well as to assist in the collection and use of electronic evidence to combat all types of crime. The program improves U.S. security by reducing the use of foreign computing infrastructure for malicious activities targeting U.S. networks and by showing that no malicious actor can evade the rule of law. The GLEN has stood up five regional cryptocurrency working groups around the globe, which are dedicated to information sharing and capacity building to address criminal misuse of cryptocurrency, including in ransomware. Additional priorities for capacity building include Internet fraud and combating the growing scourge of online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The Department of State will continue to use its diplomatic engagements and capacity building to broaden and strengthen participation in the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI). The CRI is a unique and geographically diverse coalition of nearly 60 countries, plus multilateral institutions such as the European Union, Interpol, and Organization of American States, committed to building collective resilience to ransomware, cooperating to disrupt ransomware and pursue the actors responsible, countering the illicit finance that underpins the ransomware ecosystem, and working with the private sector to defend against ransomware attacks. As a complement to the CRI, the Department of State, in coordination with the U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force, will continue to develop bilateral and multilateral efforts designed to discourage states from sponsoring ransomware or permitting their territories to be used as safe havens by cyber criminals. The work of the CRI supports the implementation of the framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, including the voluntary norm that “states should respond to appropriate requests for assistance by another state whose critical infrastructures are subject to malicious ICT acts,” in addition to “appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity aimed at the critical infrastructure of another State emanating from their territory, taking into account due regard for sovereignty.” [5] [5] [5] Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Global Alliance Against Ransomware: United States and Allies' Strategies to Counter Criminal Actors

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 29 of 38. Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable To constrain our adversaries effectively and counter malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict, we will continue to work with our allies and partners to condemn this activity and impose meaningful consequences. These efforts use all the tools of statecraft, including diplomatic isolation, law enforcement, counter-cyber operations, and economic sanctions. In September 2019, 27 countries publicly pledged in a U.S.-led Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace to collaborate voluntarily to hold states accountable when they act contrary to the framework. The number of states willing to publicly hold states accountable reached 39 in July 2021 when NATO, the EU, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Japan all publicly condemned the PRC’s involvement in the Microsoft Exchange server data breach incident and other malicious cyber activities. More recently, likeminded coalitions attributed Russia’s cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite communications network on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine and stood in solidarity with Albania in the wake of Iran’s disruptive cyber operations. The United States will continue to work to expand the coalition of those willing to hold states accountable for disruptive and destabilizing cyber activity and to utilize appropriate multilateral groupings to support each other and to assist the victims of such behavior. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 29 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 29 of 38. here here Line of Effort 4: Hold Irresponsible States Accountable To constrain our adversaries effectively and counter malicious activities below the threshold of armed conflict, we will continue to work with our allies and partners to condemn this activity and impose meaningful consequences. These efforts use all the tools of statecraft, including diplomatic isolation, law enforcement, counter-cyber operations, and economic sanctions. In September 2019, 27 countries publicly pledged in a U.S.-led Joint Statement on Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace to collaborate voluntarily to hold states accountable when they act contrary to the framework. The number of states willing to publicly hold states accountable reached 39 in July 2021 when NATO, the EU, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Japan all publicly condemned the PRC’s involvement in the Microsoft Exchange server data breach incident and other malicious cyber activities. More recently, likeminded coalitions attributed Russia’s cyberattack on Viasat’s KA-SAT satellite communications network on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine and stood in solidarity with Albania in the wake of Iran’s disruptive cyber operations. The United States will continue to work to expand the coalition of those willing to hold states accountable for disruptive and destabilizing cyber activity and to utilize appropriate multilateral groupings to support each other and to assist the victims of such behavior. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Global Accountability in Cyberspace: International Efforts to Hold Irresponsible States to Account

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 27 of 38. Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Given the interconnected nature of cyberspace, international cooperation is crucial to deny, disrupt, and counter adversary activities in and through cyberspace. The Department of State leads efforts, including facilitating international outreach, to address the rising threat of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks on the critical infrastructure of the United States and its allies and partners. This includes sharing through diplomatic channels joint cybersecurity advisories with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA), and allies and partners on threats; capacity building and information sharing with new and existing partners to mitigate cyber threats and ensure the resilience of their critical infrastructure; and using bilateral, multilateral, and other fora to clarify and communicate expectations about adherence to international law and the framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace. In addition, members of the Quad have developed joint principles for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and NATO members have committed to ensuring the resilience of critical infrastructure, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure through training and exercises, and shared intelligence on threats. As part of its counter adversary cyber activity, the Department of State provides foreign policy guidance and uses diplomatic engagements to support the Department of Defense (DoD)’s efforts to campaign in and through cyberspace below the level of armed conflict to reinforce deterrence and frustrate adversaries. As laid out in the 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy, U.S. Cyber Command continues to defend forward to discover, expose, and protect against the sources of malicious cyber activities and to reinforce responsible state behavior by encouraging adherence to international law and internationally recognized cyberspace norms. The DoD Cyber Strategy also notes that cyber operations are most effective when used in concert with other instruments of national power, including diplomatic engagement and cyber capacity building. The Department of State, in close coordination with interagency and international partners, will continue to organize and execute sustained diplomatic pressure campaigns to raise international and public awareness of significant cyber threats and to increase the costs and risks to malicious cyber actors. For example, the United States has worked with allies, partners, and the private sector to disrupt DPRK revenue-generation efforts through cybercrime, crypto theft, and IT workers. U.S. Cyber Command, NSA, DHS, DOJ, and the FBI have exposed North Korean malware, seized malicious cyber infrastructure, seized cryptocurrency and fiat currency, and shared actionable threat intelligence with the private sector. The Department of State coordinates action with the Republic of Korea through a bilateral DPRK Cyber Working Group, including information sharing and policy coordination. Also, the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea coordinate efforts to counter DPRK cyber threats through a trilateral working group announced during the Camp David Summit in August 2023. The Department of State has also briefed officials around the world on threats posed by DPRK IT workers and cyber actors and deployed foreign assistance funds to build capacity to detect and defend against DPRK cyber and crypto threats. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 27 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 27 of 38. here here Line of Effort 2: Disrupt and Build Resilience to Malicious State Activity Given the interconnected nature of cyberspace, international cooperation is crucial to deny, disrupt, and counter adversary activities in and through cyberspace. The Department of State leads efforts, including facilitating international outreach, to address the rising threat of disruptive or destructive cyberattacks on the critical infrastructure of the United States and its allies and partners. This includes sharing through diplomatic channels joint cybersecurity advisories with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA), and allies and partners on threats; capacity building and information sharing with new and existing partners to mitigate cyber threats and ensure the resilience of their critical infrastructure; and using bilateral, multilateral, and other fora to clarify and communicate expectations about adherence to international law and the framework for responsible behavior in cyberspace. In addition, members of the Quad have developed joint principles for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and NATO members have committed to ensuring the resilience of critical infrastructure, enhanced protection of critical infrastructure through training and exercises, and shared intelligence on threats. As part of its counter adversary cyber activity, the Department of State provides foreign policy guidance and uses diplomatic engagements to support the Department of Defense (DoD)’s efforts to campaign in and through cyberspace below the level of armed conflict to reinforce deterrence and frustrate adversaries. As laid out in the 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy, U.S. Cyber Command continues to defend forward to discover, expose, and protect against the sources of malicious cyber activities and to reinforce responsible state behavior by encouraging adherence to international law and internationally recognized cyberspace norms. The DoD Cyber Strategy also notes that cyber operations are most effective when used in concert with other instruments of national power, including diplomatic engagement and cyber capacity building. The Department of State, in close coordination with interagency and international partners, will continue to organize and execute sustained diplomatic pressure campaigns to raise international and public awareness of significant cyber threats and to increase the costs and risks to malicious cyber actors. For example, the United States has worked with allies, partners, and the private sector to disrupt DPRK revenue-generation efforts through cybercrime, crypto theft, and IT workers. U.S. Cyber Command, NSA, DHS, DOJ, and the FBI have exposed North Korean malware, seized malicious cyber infrastructure, seized cryptocurrency and fiat currency, and shared actionable threat intelligence with the private sector. The Department of State coordinates action with the Republic of Korea through a bilateral DPRK Cyber Working Group, including information sharing and policy coordination. Also, the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea coordinate efforts to counter DPRK cyber threats through a trilateral working group announced during the Camp David Summit in August 2023. The Department of State has also briefed officials around the world on threats posed by DPRK IT workers and cyber actors and deployed foreign assistance funds to build capacity to detect and defend against DPRK cyber and crypto threats. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

Diplomatic Efforts to Combat Cyber Threats and Maintain International Cyber Resilience 

Enhancing Product Development Through Customer Success Feedback

You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 18 of 38. Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Digital solidarity is further built and reinforced through the joint development, harmonization, and mutual recognition of rights-respecting approaches to data governance and digital trade. This work is currently ongoing through mechanisms such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the G7, OECD, TTC, and the Quad. The United States supports the trusted free flow of data and an open Internet with strong and effective protections for individuals’ human rights and privacy and measures to preserve governments’ abilities to enforce laws and advance policies in the public interest. Legitimate concerns about data privacy can be addressed through protective mechanisms that follow the data while at the same time facilitate cross-border data flows and strengthen global cooperation among enforcement authorities. The United States will continue championing trusted cross-border data flows by promoting data transfer mechanisms that improve interoperability between different data privacy regimes. Working alongside our interagency partners, the Department of State supported the negotiation and implementation of the EU- U.S. Data Privacy Framework; the development of the OECD Declaration on Trusted Government Access to Data Held by the Private Sector, which identifies commonalities in the privacy safeguards democratic governments follow when accessing data for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes; as well as initiatives on Data Free Flow with Trust at both the G7 and the OECD. The Department of State works with the Department of Justice to clarify application of the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act and to negotiate bilateral agreements under the act. Along with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the United States launched the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum in April 2022, building on the previously established Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CBPR system. The CBPR provides a data privacy certification backed by relevant authorities that facilitates data flows by promoting interoperable, enforceable data protection standards. Officials from the Departments of State and Commerce will continue efforts to bring new countries into the agreement, building on efforts such as workshops held in Kenya, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, UK, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Colombia, Fiji, and Barbados as well as ASEAN countries. While the United States and its likeminded trade partners share many of the same values, we often have differing approaches to how to regulate the digital economy. The U.S. government advocates for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches that target the challenges we face while providing the flexibility to realize the benefits of new and emerging technologies. Unilateral approaches in digital taxation and the imposition of network usage fees often do not address the core issues of accessibility and fairness expressed by their proponents. Additionally, the rise of a growing digital sovereignty narrative that has been embraced by some of our close partners and allies has the potential to undermine key digital economy and cybersecurity objectives. The Department of State, working with other agencies, will continue to argue against data localization, network usage fees, digital services taxes as well as other market access barriers that contribute to the perception of increased control, but in reality often can undermine growth and security objectives. Continue Reading Here. This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here. This part is 18 of 38. You can jump to any part of the United States International Cyberspace & Digital Policy Strategy here . This part is 18 of 38. here Line of Effort 1: Support the Trusted Flow of Data and Advocate for Multistakeholder, Risk-Based Approaches to Digital and Data Governance Digital solidarity is further built and reinforced through the joint development, harmonization, and mutual recognition of rights-respecting approaches to data governance and digital trade. This work is currently ongoing through mechanisms such as Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), Digital Transformation with Africa initiative (DTA), the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP), the G7, OECD, TTC, and the Quad. The United States supports the trusted free flow of data and an open Internet with strong and effective protections for individuals’ human rights and privacy and measures to preserve governments’ abilities to enforce laws and advance policies in the public interest. Legitimate concerns about data privacy can be addressed through protective mechanisms that follow the data while at the same time facilitate cross-border data flows and strengthen global cooperation among enforcement authorities. The United States will continue championing trusted cross-border data flows by promoting data transfer mechanisms that improve interoperability between different data privacy regimes. Working alongside our interagency partners, the Department of State supported the negotiation and implementation of the EU- U.S. Data Privacy Framework; the development of the OECD Declaration on Trusted Government Access to Data Held by the Private Sector, which identifies commonalities in the privacy safeguards democratic governments follow when accessing data for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes; as well as initiatives on Data Free Flow with Trust at both the G7 and the OECD. The Department of State works with the Department of Justice to clarify application of the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act and to negotiate bilateral agreements under the act. Along with Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, the United States launched the Global Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) Forum in April 2022, building on the previously established Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CBPR system. The CBPR provides a data privacy certification backed by relevant authorities that facilitates data flows by promoting interoperable, enforceable data protection standards. Officials from the Departments of State and Commerce will continue efforts to bring new countries into the agreement, building on efforts such as workshops held in Kenya, Mexico, Chile, Brazil, UK, Israel, Jordan, Panama, Colombia, Fiji, and Barbados as well as ASEAN countries. While the United States and its likeminded trade partners share many of the same values, we often have differing approaches to how to regulate the digital economy. The U.S. government advocates for multistakeholder, risk-based approaches that target the challenges we face while providing the flexibility to realize the benefits of new and emerging technologies. Unilateral approaches in digital taxation and the imposition of network usage fees often do not address the core issues of accessibility and fairness expressed by their proponents. Additionally, the rise of a growing digital sovereignty narrative that has been embraced by some of our close partners and allies has the potential to undermine key digital economy and cybersecurity objectives. The Department of State, working with other agencies, will continue to argue against data localization, network usage fees, digital services taxes as well as other market access barriers that contribute to the perception of increased control, but in reality often can undermine growth and security objectives. Continue Reading Here. Continue Reading Here . Here This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State This post was originally published on May 6, 2024, by the U.S Department of State by the U.S Department of State

JOBINT

jobint.com

201-500 employees

Since 2022

COMPANY RANKING

JOBINT

EVERGREEN INDEX #6156

Representing this company? Click here to claim and customize this page!

Jobint WIKI

Apply to get your Tech Company News Page live on HackerNoon.com today!

JOBINT

jobint.com

201-500 employees

Since 2022

COMPANY RANKING

JOBINT

EVERGREEN INDEX #6156

RELATED COMPANIESRANK

STORIES ABOUT JOBINT

Representing this company? Click here to claim and customize this page!

Jobint WIKI

Apply to get your Tech Company News Page live on HackerNoon.com today!