Authors: (1) Daniele Capone, SecSI srl, Napoli, Italy (daniele.capone@secsi.io); (2) Francesco Caturano, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information, Technology University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (francesco.caturano@unina.i) (3) Angelo Delicato, SecSI srl, Napoli, Italy (angelo.delicato@secsi.io); (4) Gaetano Perrone, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (gaetano.perrone@unina.it) (5) Simon Pietro Romano, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (spromano@unina.it). Authors: Authors: (1) Daniele Capone, SecSI srl, Napoli, Italy (daniele.capone@secsi.io); SecSI srl (2) Francesco Caturano, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information, Technology University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (francesco.caturano@unina.i) Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information, Technology University of Napoli Federico II (3) Angelo Delicato, SecSI srl, Napoli, Italy (angelo.delicato@secsi.io); SecSI srl, (4) Gaetano Perrone, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (gaetano.perrone@unina.it) Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (5) Simon Pietro Romano, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy (spromano@unina.it). Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Napoli Federico II Table of Links Abstract and I. Introduction Abstract and I. Introduction II. Related Work II. Related Work III. Dockerized Android: Design III. Dockerized Android: Design IV. Dockerized Android Architecture IV. Dockerized Android Architecture V. Evaluation V. Evaluation VI. Conclusion and Future Developments, and References VI. Conclusion and Future Developments, and References VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS In this work, we have described Dockerized Android, a platform that supports cyber-range designers in realizing mobile virtual scenarios. The application is based on Docker, i.e., a container-based virtualization framework extensively adopted in the cyber-range field for several benefits already mentioned. We described the main components and showed how it is possible to realize a complex cyber kill-chain scenario that involves the utilization of Bluetooth components. The architecture has been conceived at the outset as an extensible one. Its feature set can be dynamically enabled or disabled through the docker-compose creator, and some fine-grained options can be configured to customize the scenarios. The strength of this system is its ability to quickly run a mobile component through Docker, with many interesting features out of the box. Furthermore, the centralization of several components increases the overall usability level. The cons are all related to compatibility issues with Windows and OS X when running the Core for Emulator. While the former will probably be solved with the next updates, the latter is not solvable without significant changes to the OS X implementation. Another limitation is the lack of support for emulating some hardware components, e.g., Bluetooth. For these reasons, the Linux environment as a host machine is strongly recommended. We will also assess the potential benefits of using Dockerized Android in cloud-based environments in future works. Other improvements include the full integration of security-based features in the Android Emulator. For example, the GPS location could be useful to simulate a realistic route traveled by a simulated user. In recent works, cyber ranges are configured by using the high-level SDL (Specification and Description Language) representation [8]. Integrating this language in Dockerized Android is relatively easy, as every feature is set through Docker environment variables. Additional efforts will be focused on improving automation features, such as the design of an event-based architecture to simulate complex sequential actions involving human interaction. REFERENCES [1] Jan Vykopal et al. “Lessons learned from complex hands-on defence exercises in a cyber range”. In: 2017 IEEE Frontiers in Education Conference (FIE). 2017, pp. 1–8. DOI: 10.1109/FIE.2017.8190713. [2] Adam McNeil and W. Stuart Jones. 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