Table of Links Abstract and 1. Introduction Abstract and 1. Introduction A free and fair economy: definition, existence and uniqueness 2.1 A free economy 2.2 A free and fair economy Equilibrium existence in a free and fair economy 3.1 A free and fair economy as a strategic form game 3.2 Existence of an equilibrium Equilibrium efficiency in a free and fair economy A free economy with social justice and inclusion 5.1 Equilibrium existence and efficiency in a free economy with social justice 5.2 Choosing a reference point to achieve equilibrium efficiency Some applications 6.1 Teamwork: surplus distribution in a firm 6.2 Contagion and self-enforcing lockdown in a networked economy 6.3 Bias in academic publishing 6.4 Exchange economies Contributions to the closely related literature Conclusion and References A free and fair economy: definition, existence and uniqueness 2.1 A free economy 2.2 A free and fair economy A free and fair economy: definition, existence and uniqueness 2.1 A free economy 2.1 A free economy 2.2 A free and fair economy 2.2 A free and fair economy Equilibrium existence in a free and fair economy 3.1 A free and fair economy as a strategic form game 3.2 Existence of an equilibrium Equilibrium existence in a free and fair economy 3.1 A free and fair economy as a strategic form game 3.1 A free and fair economy as a strategic form game 3.2 Existence of an equilibrium 3.2 Existence of an equilibrium Equilibrium efficiency in a free and fair economy Equilibrium efficiency in a free and fair economy Equilibrium efficiency in a free and fair economy A free economy with social justice and inclusion 5.1 Equilibrium existence and efficiency in a free economy with social justice 5.2 Choosing a reference point to achieve equilibrium efficiency A free economy with social justice and inclusion A free economy with social justice and inclusion 5.1 Equilibrium existence and efficiency in a free economy with social justice 5.1 Equilibrium existence and efficiency in a free economy with social justice 5.2 Choosing a reference point to achieve equilibrium efficiency 5.2 Choosing a reference point to achieve equilibrium efficiency Some applications 6.1 Teamwork: surplus distribution in a firm 6.2 Contagion and self-enforcing lockdown in a networked economy 6.3 Bias in academic publishing 6.4 Exchange economies Some applications 6.1 Teamwork: surplus distribution in a firm 6.1 Teamwork: surplus distribution in a firm 6.2 Contagion and self-enforcing lockdown in a networked economy 6.2 Contagion and self-enforcing lockdown in a networked economy 6.3 Bias in academic publishing 6.3 Bias in academic publishing 6.4 Exchange economies 6.4 Exchange economies Contributions to the closely related literature Contributions to the closely related literature Contributions to the closely related literature Conclusion and References Conclusion and References Conclusion and References Appendix Appendix 3.2 Existence of an equilibrium In this section, we state and prove our main result. In the strategic form game in Table 4, the sum of excess payoffs in any cycle of outcomes equals 0. Therefore, the game does not admit a cycle of deviations. The profile x ∗ = (a2, b3) is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Note that the game in Table 4 is generated from a free and fair economy. From Definition 7, a sufficient condition for a finite strategic form game to admit a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the absence of a cycle of deviations. The sum of excess payoffs in any cycle of deviations has to be strictly positive, as illustrated in Table 3 in Example 2. Such an example of a cycle of deviations can not be constructed in a strategic form game generated from a free and fair economy (see Table 4 in Example 2). We prove that in a strategic form game generated by a free and fair economy, the sum of excess payoffs in any cycle of deviations equals 0. The principles of market justice that define a free and fair economy are only sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However, an economy that violates the fair principles may not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Authors: (1) Ghislain H. Demeze-Jouatsa, Center for Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld (demeze jouatsa@uni-bielefeld.de); (2) Roland Pongou, Department of Economics, University of Ottawa (rpongou@uottawa.ca); (3) Jean-Baptiste Tondji, Department of Economics and Finance, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (jeanbaptiste.tondji@utrgv.edu). Authors: Authors (1) Ghislain H. Demeze-Jouatsa, Center for Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld (demeze jouatsa@uni-bielefeld.de); (2) Roland Pongou, Department of Economics, University of Ottawa (rpongou@uottawa.ca); (3) Jean-Baptiste Tondji, Department of Economics and Finance, The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (jeanbaptiste.tondji@utrgv.edu). 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