Author:
(1) David Staines.
4 Calvo Framework and 4.1 Household’s Problem
4.3 Household Equilibrium Conditions
4.5 Nominal Equilibrium Conditions
4.6 Real Equilibrium Conditions and 4.7 Shocks
5.2 Persistence and Policy Puzzles
6 Stochastic Equilibrium and 6.1 Ergodic Theory and Random Dynamical Systems
7 General Linearized Phillips Curve
8 Existence Results and 8.1 Main Results
9.2 Algebraic Aspects (I) Singularities and Covers
9.3 Algebraic Aspects (II) Homology
9.4 Algebraic Aspects (III) Schemes
9.5 Wider Economic Interpretations
10 Econometric and Theoretical Implications and 10.1 Identification and Trade-offs
10.4 Microeconomic Interpretation
Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 2 and A.1 Proof of Part (i)
B Proofs from Section 4 and B.1 Individual Product Demand (4.2)
B.2 Flexible Price Equilibrium and ZINSS (4.4)
B.4 Cost Minimization (4.6) and (10.4)
C Proofs from Section 5, and C.1 Puzzles, Policy and Persistence
D Stochastic Equilibrium and D.1 Non-Stochastic Equilibrium
D.2 Profits and Long-Run Growth
E Slopes and Eigenvalues and E.1 Slope Coefficients
E.4 Rouche’s Theorem Conditions
F Abstract Algebra and F.1 Homology Groups
F.4 Marginal Costs and Inflation
G Further Keynesian Models and G.1 Taylor Pricing
G.3 Unconventional Policy Settings
H Empirical Robustness and H.1 Parameter Selection
I Additional Evidence and I.1 Other Structural Parameters
I.3 Trend Inflation Volatility
For simplicity, there is only one factor of production: labor purchased on a competitive market. I will focus on the general case from (10.4) where labor is firm-specific.[107] The production function takes the form
where f must always be weakly concave (fll ≤ 0) to ensure standard first order conditions apply. The problem is as follows:
subject to the production constraint
The Lagrange multiplier gives the real marginal cost of production paid by the firm. Hence we can solve for real marginal cost
In the main analysis, I will work with a linear production technology with an economy-wide labor market. This ensures all firms will have the same marginal costs, simplifying analysis considerably
This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license.
[107] In this context it would be more natural to think of firms having monopsony power. Nevertheless, this causes no problem around ZINSS, where a constant mark-down would be isomorphic to an increase in θ, which would cancel from the first order dynamics. Nash [1950] supplies bargaining foundations.