USA v. Samuel Bankman-Fried - Part 23: A sentence of 40 to 50 years' imprisonment is necessary

A SENTENCE OF 40 TO 50 YEARS’ IMPRISONMENT IS NECESSARY

A criminal sentence must be crafted, among other things, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, and deter future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The “starting point” in making any sentencing determination, however, remains the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). In this case, the breadth and depth of the defendant’s misconduct is reflected in an offense level beyond the highest level for which the Guidelines provide an advisory range, resulting in an advisory Guidelines sentence equal to the combined statutory maximum sentences for the defendant’s crimes of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d).

Applying the Guidelines and taking into account all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as fully set forth below, a sentence of 40 to 50 years’ imprisonment—though one that will permit the defendant to return to liberty after society can be assured that he will not have the opportunity to turn back to fraud and deceit—is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s crimes, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment for the defendant’s grievous criminal conduct, to adequately deter criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.

Bankman-Fried’s crimes were serious and long-running, causing billions of dollars in losses and significant harm to tens of thousands of victims financially and emotionally. The sheer enormity of the loss in this case, and the fact that the loss came in the form of stealing of victims’ money, puts Bankman-Fried in a category of defendants where sentences of forty years or more is appropriate. In some cases, like those of Bernard Madoff and Allen Stanford, a defendant’s theft of billions of dollars has necessitated a sentence of 100 years or more. And in some respects, such a sentence here would serve the interests of justice and deterrence because of the extraordinary nature of the defendant’s criminal conduct. But at the same time, given the defendant’s age relative to other defendants who have committed enormous frauds, a life sentence (or a sentence that is effectively a life sentence) is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of Section 3553(a). The Government is not asking the Court to impose a life sentence.

The aims of sentencing would not be served, however, by the defendant’s proposed sentence. The facts and circumstances of this case do not bear any material resemblance to those of the Michael Milken prosecution. A sentence of 6 years, as the defendant proposes, would be woefully inadequate to satisfy the purposes of sentencing, and would send the wrong message to the defendant, to others considering committing fraud, to victims, and to society at large.