The Sources and Authorities Uber Is Citing to Support Their Position

F.

Uber also cites a number of authorities, but none supports its position. In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFLCIO v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 993, 1005, we held that unions do not have standing under PAGA because they are “not employees” and therefore “cannot satisfy the express standing requirements of [PAGA].”

Our rejection of associational standing under PAGA has no bearing on the question here. In Robinson v. Southern Counties Oil Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 476, the court held that a plaintiff did not have standing when he brought a PAGA action “based on violations alleged to have occurred after . . . [he] was no longer employed by [the defendant].” (Id. at p. 484.)

There, the plaintiff “was not affected by any of the alleged violations” at issue in the case. (Ibid.) In this case, the operative complaint alleges that Adolph was employed by Uber and personally sustained one or more Labor Code violations committed by Uber during the time period applicable to his PAGA action.

Uber also relies on Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, where we said that “[f]or a lawsuit properly to be allowed to continue, standing must exist at all times until judgment is entered and not just on the date the complaint is filed.” (Id. at pp. 232–233.) Our holding today is consistent with Mervyn’s. As we explained in Kim, the question of standing is governed by the terms of PAGA.

Because a single action may still be maintained when issues comprising the action have been bifurcated into judicial and arbitral forums, the relevant statutory standing requirements are met “on the date the complaint is filed” and thereafter, regardless of whether an aggrieved employee’s individual claims have been sent to arbitration. (Mervyn’s, at p. 233.)