Security Analysis

Table of Links

Abstract and 1. Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 Motivation

1.3 Our Work and Contributions and 1.4 Organization

2. Related Work

   2.1 Mobile AIGC and Its QoE Modeling

   2.2 Blockchain for Mobile Networks

3. Preliminaries

4. Prosecutor Design

   4.1 Architecture Overview

   4.2 Reputation Roll-up

   4.3 Duplex Transfer Channel

5. OS2a: Objective Service Assessment for Mobile AIGC

   5.1 Inspiration from DCM

   5.2 Objective Quality of the Service Process

   5.3 Subjective Experience of AIGC Outputs

6. OS2A on Prosecutor: Two-Phase Interaction for Mobile AIGC

   6.1 MASP Selection by Reputation

   6.2 Contract Theoretic Payment Scheme

7. Implementation and Evaluation

   7.1 Implementation and Experimental Setup

   7.2 Prosecutor Performance Evaluation

   7.3 Investigation of Functional Goals

   7.4 Security Analysis

8. Conclusion and References

7.4 Security Analysis

TABLE 2 summarizes the defenses of ProSecutor against potential security issues. Firstly, the attacks aiming to destroy ProSecutor in terms of the consistency, identity, and liveness [39] can be effectively defended by DPoS, SHA256- based cryptography scheme, and transaction fee scheme, respectively. Since these defenses are theoretically proven [32], [33], we omit the detailed explanations. Secondly, during the opinion collection and reputation calculation, the attackers can adopt diverse ways to tamper with the values. Leveraging MWSL [16], we calibrate the reputation by Familiarity, Freshness, and Market worth factors, which are proven to defend flooding, long-range, and dusting attacks effectively. Furthermore, the contract theoretic payment scheme and duplex transfer channels are proven to defend the moral hazard and repudiation, respectively.