Authors:
(1) Diwen Xue, University of Michigan;
(2) Reethika Ramesh, University of Michigan;
(3) Arham Jain, University of Michigan;
(4) Arham Jain, Merit Network, Inc.;
(5) J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan;
(6) Jedidiah R. Crandall, Arizona State University/Breakpointing Bad;
(7) Roya Ensaf, University of Michigan. Table of Links Abstract and 1 Introduction 2 Background & Related Work 3 Challenges in Real-world VPN Detection 4 Adversary Model and Deployment 5 Ethics, Privacy, and Responsible Disclosure 6 Identifying Fingerprintable Features and 6.1 Opcode-based Fingerprinting 6.2 ACK-based Fingerprinting 6.3 Active Server Fingerprinting 6.4 Constructing Filters and Probers 7 Fine-tuning for Deployment and 7.1 ACK Fingerprint Thresholds 7.2 Choice of Observation Window N 7.3 Effects of Packet Loss 7.4 Server Churn for Asynchronous Probing 7.5 Probe UDP and Obfuscated OpenVPN Servers 8 Real-world Deployment Setup 9 Evaluation & Findings and 9.1 Results for control VPN flows 9.2 Results for all flows 10 Discussion and Mitigations 11 Conclusion 12 Acknowledgement and References Appendix 10 Discussion and Mitigations ISPs and government censors are motivated to detect OpenVPN flows in order to enforce traffic policies and information controls. We demonstrate that tracking and blocking the use of OpenVPN, even with most deployed obfuscation methods, is practical at scale and with minimal collateral damage. We note that many VPN providers’ claims that their obfuscated services are unobservable appear to be misleading and potentially dangerous, especially to users from countries where personal VPN usage is illegal. In light of our findings, users should not expect complete unobservability even when connected to “obfuscated” OpenVPN-based services. Putting the human danger aside, the ease of fingerprinting makes OpenVPN more susceptible to throttling or blocking from ISPs and governments. Previous research suggests that some censors already use two-stage pipelines, which are highly similar to our deployment, to detect other protocols such as Tor or Shadowsocks [1, 71]. These adversaries can quickly adapt such infrastructure to detect OpenVPN traffic by simply adding protocol-specific fingerprints and probes. Furthermore, while we focus on OpenVPN due to its overwhelming popularity among commercial VPNs, it is possible to extend our two-stage framework to other VPN protocols (e.g., WireGuard and StrongSwan) by analyzing their communication patterns and server behaviors. Governments can also quickly adopt these fingerprints to track and block VPN usage during sensitive times, like political upheavals, when VPN connections are most vital to the free flow of information. Short-Term Mitigation There are several defensive strategies to achieve near-term protection from the fingerprinting attack we describe. First, VPN providers offering both vanilla and obfuscated OpenVPN services should avoid colocating them. Ideally, obfuscation servers should be well separated from OpenVPN instances in the network address space and operate as “bridge servers” that forward client traffic to VPN servers elsewhere. For example, Mullvad VPN offers a Shadowsocks-based obfuscator service as a dedicated bridge, separating the VPN servers from the obfuscation [28]. Second, VPN providers should switch from static to random padding for their obfuscated services. As we have shown, for protocols with a stable and distinctive handshake phase, even the most basic threshold-based detector is able to fingerprint them by packet sizes. Ideally, the obfuscation layer should be able to send zero-length packets (packets whose payloads are all padding) to break the one-to-one correspondence between the unobfuscated and obfuscated packet streams [72]. Yet it is worth noting that previous work has shown that even fully randomized obfuscators (e.g., obfs4) can themselves be vulnerable to entropy-based fingerprinting attacks [67]. Third, we suggest that the OpenVPN developers follow recommendations from previous work with regard to how servers respond to failed handshake attempts. Servers closing failed connections immediately or in a predictable manner has enabled active probing attacks against a variety of other protocols [1, 13, 58]. In response, these protocols have implemented either unlimited timeouts (reading from the buffer indefinitely) or diversified close behaviors (in which each server instance closes failed connections in a different manner). Long-Term Defenses In the long term, we fear that the catand-mouse game between censors and circumvention tools, such as the Great Firewall and Tor, will occur in the VPN ecosystem as well, and developers and providers will have to adapt their obfuscation strategies to the evolving adversaries. We urge commercial VPN providers to adopt more standardized obfuscation solutions, such as Pluggable Transports [39], and to be more transparent about the techniques used by their obfuscated services. This transparency will help foster development of stronger obfuscation methods and encourage developers to design better techniques to overcome the progress of information control technologies. Additional future work is needed to characterize the performance costs of different approaches to VPN obfuscation and to help users with varying threat models make appropriate trade-offs between performance and resilient unobservability. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. Authors: (1) Diwen Xue, University of Michigan; (2) Reethika Ramesh, University of Michigan; (3) Arham Jain, University of Michigan; (4) Arham Jain, Merit Network, Inc.; (5) J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan; (6) Jedidiah R. Crandall, Arizona State University/Breakpointing Bad; (7) Roya Ensaf, University of Michigan. Authors: Authors: (1) Diwen Xue, University of Michigan; (2) Reethika Ramesh, University of Michigan; (3) Arham Jain, University of Michigan; (4) Arham Jain, Merit Network, Inc.; (5) J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan; (6) Jedidiah R. Crandall, Arizona State University/Breakpointing Bad; (7) Roya Ensaf, University of Michigan. Table of Links Abstract and 1 Introduction Abstract and 1 Introduction 2 Background & Related Work 2 Background & Related Work 3 Challenges in Real-world VPN Detection 3 Challenges in Real-world VPN Detection 4 Adversary Model and Deployment 4 Adversary Model and Deployment 5 Ethics, Privacy, and Responsible Disclosure 5 Ethics, Privacy, and Responsible Disclosure 6 Identifying Fingerprintable Features and 6.1 Opcode-based Fingerprinting 6 Identifying Fingerprintable Features and 6.1 Opcode-based Fingerprinting 6.2 ACK-based Fingerprinting 6.2 ACK-based Fingerprinting 6.3 Active Server Fingerprinting 6.3 Active Server Fingerprinting 6.4 Constructing Filters and Probers 6.4 Constructing Filters and Probers 7 Fine-tuning for Deployment and 7.1 ACK Fingerprint Thresholds 7 Fine-tuning for Deployment and 7.1 ACK Fingerprint Thresholds 7.2 Choice of Observation Window N 7.2 Choice of Observation Window N 7.3 Effects of Packet Loss 7.3 Effects of Packet Loss 7.4 Server Churn for Asynchronous Probing 7.4 Server Churn for Asynchronous Probing 7.5 Probe UDP and Obfuscated OpenVPN Servers 7.5 Probe UDP and Obfuscated OpenVPN Servers 8 Real-world Deployment Setup 8 Real-world Deployment Setup 9 Evaluation & Findings and 9.1 Results for control VPN flows 9 Evaluation & Findings and 9.1 Results for control VPN flows 9.2 Results for all flows 9.2 Results for all flows 10 Discussion and Mitigations 10 Discussion and Mitigations 11 Conclusion 11 Conclusion 12 Acknowledgement and References 12 Acknowledgement and References Appendix Appendix 10 Discussion and Mitigations ISPs and government censors are motivated to detect OpenVPN flows in order to enforce traffic policies and information controls. We demonstrate that tracking and blocking the use of OpenVPN, even with most deployed obfuscation methods, is practical at scale and with minimal collateral damage. We note that many VPN providers’ claims that their obfuscated services are unobservable appear to be misleading and potentially dangerous, especially to users from countries where personal VPN usage is illegal. In light of our findings, users should not expect complete unobservability even when connected to “obfuscated” OpenVPN-based services. Putting the human danger aside, the ease of fingerprinting makes OpenVPN more susceptible to throttling or blocking from ISPs and governments. Previous research suggests that some censors already use two-stage pipelines, which are highly similar to our deployment, to detect other protocols such as Tor or Shadowsocks [1, 71]. These adversaries can quickly adapt such infrastructure to detect OpenVPN traffic by simply adding protocol-specific fingerprints and probes. Furthermore, while we focus on OpenVPN due to its overwhelming popularity among commercial VPNs, it is possible to extend our two-stage framework to other VPN protocols (e.g., WireGuard and StrongSwan) by analyzing their communication patterns and server behaviors. Governments can also quickly adopt these fingerprints to track and block VPN usage during sensitive times, like political upheavals, when VPN connections are most vital to the free flow of information. Short-Term Mitigation There are several defensive strategies to achieve near-term protection from the fingerprinting attack we describe. First, VPN providers offering both vanilla and obfuscated OpenVPN services should avoid colocating them. Ideally, obfuscation servers should be well separated from OpenVPN instances in the network address space and operate as “bridge servers” that forward client traffic to VPN servers elsewhere. For example, Mullvad VPN offers a Shadowsocks-based obfuscator service as a dedicated bridge, separating the VPN servers from the obfuscation [28]. Short-Term Mitigation Second, VPN providers should switch from static to random padding for their obfuscated services. As we have shown, for protocols with a stable and distinctive handshake phase, even the most basic threshold-based detector is able to fingerprint them by packet sizes. Ideally, the obfuscation layer should be able to send zero-length packets (packets whose payloads are all padding) to break the one-to-one correspondence between the unobfuscated and obfuscated packet streams [72]. Yet it is worth noting that previous work has shown that even fully randomized obfuscators (e.g., obfs4) can themselves be vulnerable to entropy-based fingerprinting attacks [67]. Third, we suggest that the OpenVPN developers follow recommendations from previous work with regard to how servers respond to failed handshake attempts. Servers closing failed connections immediately or in a predictable manner has enabled active probing attacks against a variety of other protocols [1, 13, 58]. In response, these protocols have implemented either unlimited timeouts (reading from the buffer indefinitely) or diversified close behaviors (in which each server instance closes failed connections in a different manner). Long-Term Defenses In the long term, we fear that the catand-mouse game between censors and circumvention tools, such as the Great Firewall and Tor, will occur in the VPN ecosystem as well, and developers and providers will have to adapt their obfuscation strategies to the evolving adversaries. We urge commercial VPN providers to adopt more standardized obfuscation solutions, such as Pluggable Transports [39], and to be more transparent about the techniques used by their obfuscated services. This transparency will help foster development of stronger obfuscation methods and encourage developers to design better techniques to overcome the progress of information control technologies. Additional future work is needed to characterize the performance costs of different approaches to VPN obfuscation and to help users with varying threat models make appropriate trade-offs between performance and resilient unobservability. Long-Term Defenses This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license. available on arxiv

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Mitigating OpenVPN Fingerprinting: Risks and Defensive Strategies

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