SEC v. Ripple Court Filing, retrieved on July 13, 2023 is part of . You can jump to any part in this filing . This part is 13 of 18. HackerNoon’s Legal PDF Series here DISCUSSION II. Analysis B. Defendants’ Offers and Sales of XRP 2. Programmatic Sales The Court next addresses Ripple’s Programmatic Sales, which occurred under different circumstances from the Institutional Sales. See SEC Mem. at 28; Defs. Mem. at 10–11. The SEC alleges that in the Programmatic Sales to public buyers (“Programmatic Buyers”) on digital asset exchanges, “Ripple understood that people were speculating on XRP as an investment,” “explicitly targeted speculators[,] and made increased speculative volume a ‘target goal.’” SEC Mem. at 28. Having considered the economic reality of the Programmatic Sales, the Court concludes that the undisputed record does not establish the third Howey prong. Whereas the Institutional Buyers reasonably expected that Ripple would use the capital it received from its sales to improve the XRP ecosystem and thereby increase the price of XRP, see Kik, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 180; cf. supra § II.B.1, Programmatic Buyers could not reasonably expect the same. Indeed, Ripple’s Programmatic Sales were blind bid/ask transactions, and Programmatic Buyers could not have known if their payments of money went to Ripple, or any other seller of XRP. SEC 56.1 Resp. ¶ 96; Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 652–54. Since 2017, Ripple’s Programmatic Sales represented less than 1% of the global XRP trading volume. SEC 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 77, 82. Therefore, the vast majority of individuals who purchased XRP from digital asset exchanges did not invest their money in Ripple at all. An Institutional Buyer knowingly purchased XRP directly from Ripple pursuant to a contract, but the economic reality is that a Programmatic Buyer stood in the same shoes as a secondary market purchaser who did not know to whom or what it was paying its money. [16] Further, it is not enough for the SEC to argue that Ripple “explicitly targeted speculators” or that “Ripple understood that people were speculating on XRP as an investment,” SEC Mem. at 28, because a speculative motive “on the part of the purchaser or seller does not evidence the existence of an ‘investment contract’ within the meaning of the [Securities Act],” Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). “[A]nyone who buys or sells[, for example,] a horse or an automobile hopes to realize a profitable ‘investment.’ But the expected return is not contingent upon the continuing efforts of another.” Id. (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943)). The relevant inquiry is whether this speculative motive “derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. It may certainly be the case that many Programmatic Buyers purchased XRP with an expectation of profit, but they did not derive that expectation from Ripple’s efforts (as opposed to other factors, such as general cryptocurrency market trends)—particularly because none of the Programmatic Buyers were aware that they were buying XRP from Ripple. Of course, some Programmatic Buyers may have purchased XRP with the expectation of profits to be derived from Ripple’s efforts. However, “[t]he inquiry is an objective one focusing on the promises and offers made to investors; it is not a search for the precise motivation of each individual participant.” Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (citation omitted). Here, the record establishes that with respect to Programmatic Sales, Ripple did not make any promises or offers because Ripple did not know who was buying the XRP, and the purchasers did not know who was selling it. SEC 56.1 Resp. ¶ 96; Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 652–54. In fact, many Programmatic Buyers were entirely unaware of Ripple’s existence. SEC Add. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 1606, ECF No. 844; ECF Nos. 831-1–831-26. The Programmatic Sales also lacked other factors present in the economic reality of the Institutional Sales which cut in favor of finding “a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” Forman, 421 U.S. at 852; cf. supra § II.B.1. For instance, the Programmatic Sales were not made pursuant to contracts that contained lockup provisions, resale restrictions, indemnification clauses, or statements of purpose. Cf. Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 373. Similarly, Ripple’s promotional materials, such as the “Ripple Primer” and the “Gateways” brochure, were widely circulated amongst potential investors like the Institutional Buyers. But, there is no evidence that these documents were distributed more broadly to the general public, such as XRP purchasers on digital asset exchanges. Nor is there evidence that Programmatic Buyers understood that statements made by Larsen, Schwartz, Garlinghouse, and others were representations of Ripple and its efforts. Lastly, the Institutional Buyers were sophisticated entities, including institutional investors and hedge funds. SEC 56.1 Resp. ¶ 105. An “examination of the entirety of the parties’ understandings and expectations,” including the “full set of contracts, expectations, and understandings centered on the sales and distribution of” XRP supports the conclusion that a reasonable investor, situated in the position of the Institutional Buyers, would have been aware of Ripple’s marketing campaign and public statements connecting XRP’s price to its own efforts. Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 379. There is no evidence that a reasonable Programmatic Buyer, who was generally less sophisticated as an investor, shared similar “understandings and expectations” and could parse through the multiple documents and statements that the SEC highlights, which include statements (sometimes inconsistent) across many social media platforms and news sites from a variety of Ripple speakers (with different levels of authority) over an extended eight-year period. Therefore, having considered the economic reality and totality of circumstances, the Court concludes that Ripple’s Programmatic Sales of XRP did not constitute the offer and sale of investment contracts.[17] [16] The Court does not address whether secondary market sales of XRP constitute offers and sales of investment contracts because that question is not properly before the Court. Whether a secondary market sale constitutes an offer or sale of an investment contract would depend on the totality of circumstances and the economic reality of that specific contract, transaction, or scheme. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11; Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 379; see also ECF No. 105 at 34:14-16, LBRY, No. 21 Civ. 260 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 2023) (declining to extend holding to include secondary sales). [17] Because the Court finds that the record does not establish the third Howey prong as to the Programmatic Sales, the Court does not reach whether the first or second Howey prongs have been satisfied. Continue Reading . here About HackerNoon Legal PDF Series: We bring you the most important technical and insightful public domain court case filings. This court case 1:20-cv-10832-AT-SN retrieved on September 7, 2023, from is part of the public domain. The court-created documents are works of the federal government, and under copyright law, are automatically placed in the public domain and may be shared without legal restriction. dropbox

SEC v. Ripple: Some XRP Buyers Did Not Know to Who or What They Were Paying Their Money

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