This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license.
Authors:
(1) Kiriaki Frangias;
(2) Andrew Lin;
(3) Ellen Vitercik;
(4) Manolis Zampetakis.
Warm-up: Agents with known equal disutility
Agents with unknown disutilites
Conclusions and future directions, References
B Omitted proofs from Section 2
C Omitted proofs from Section 3
D Additional Information about Experiments
We similarly handle the second case, in which the agent does not exert effort, this time noting that the agent does not experience disutility:
For agent ai to be incentivized to exert effort, the payment needs to be such that:
Using E[|Ci|] < d and simplifying we get the lower bound:
To satisfy individual rationality, we require the following:
which holds if and only if:
which is always satisfied as long as constraint 12 is satisfied.
where the first inequality follows from above. Therefore the optimization problem for a suitable g∗ is the following:
such that:
This paper is available on Arxiv under CC 4.0 license.