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Algorithmic Contract Design for Crowdsourced Ranking: What Was Left Out of Section 3by@browserology
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Algorithmic Contract Design for Crowdsourced Ranking: What Was Left Out of Section 3

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Too Long; Didn't Read

Find out what was taken out of Section 3 of our Algorithmic Contract Design.
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This paper is available on arxiv under CC 4.0 license.

Authors:

(1) Kiriaki Frangias;

(2) Andrew Lin;

(3) Ellen Vitercik;

(4) Manolis Zampetakis.

Abstract and Introduction

Warm-up: Agents with known equal disutility

Agents with unknown disutilites

Experiments

Conclusions and future directions, References

A Summary of notation

B Omitted proofs from Section 2

C Omitted proofs from Section 3

D Additional Information about Experiments

C Omitted proofs from Section 3


We similarly handle the second case, in which the agent does not exert effort, this time noting that the agent does not experience disutility:



For agent ai to be incentivized to exert effort, the payment needs to be such that:



Using E[|Ci|] < d and simplifying we get the lower bound:



To satisfy individual rationality, we require the following:



which holds if and only if:



which is always satisfied as long as constraint 12 is satisfied.




where the first inequality follows from above. Therefore the optimization problem for a suitable g∗ is the following:


such that:



This paper is available on Arxiv under CC 4.0 license.